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In the 1960s, Seyyed Hossein Nasr was the first to articulate in contemporary language the 
vision of an Islamic environmentalism. Ever since, in a number of articles and interviews 
Nasr has elaborated his vision further. As the ultimate solution to the environmental crisis, 
he has persistently argued the need to substitute the prevalent scientific worldview with a 
religious worldview. However, there has not been any systematic and comprehensive 
presentation of Nasr’s approach that discusses his ideas in the context of the intellectual 
currents which have shaped his thought.  
  
This thesis attempts to address the gaps in the presentation of Nasr’s religious perspectives 
on environmentalism.  The research has been guided by two questions: 1) what do we 
need to know to best appreciate Nasr’s vision? And 2) how does Nasr’s vision adhere to 
traditional Islamic thought?  The thesis has demonstrated that Nasr’s arguments are rooted 
in metaphysical principles of reality, found in the perennial philosophy as well as in 
traditional Islamic metaphysics, Sufism, philosophy and sciences, as represented by the 
key authorities of those areas. The thesis hopefully contributes to scholarship in an 
important dimension of Islamic environmentalism and on the environmental aspects of the 
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For a humanity turned towards outwardness by the very process of modernization, it is not easy to see that the 
blight wrought upon the environment is in reality an externalization of the destitution of the inner state of the 
soul of that humanity whose actions are responsible for the ecological crisis.1   Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
 
0.1 The Environmental Crisis is caused by the Modern Industries 
In the Gulf of Mexico at 9:49 PM on the 20th of April in 2010, a Deepwater Horizon 
drilling rig, one of the most technologically advanced specimens of deep-sea petroleum 
technology, blew out.  Leaking at the rate of nearly 3 million gallons of crude oil a day, the total 
spill quickly far exceeded the last biggest oil spill in American history by the supertanker Exxon 
Valdez totalling 11 million gallons off the coast of Alaska in 1989.2  The Valdez spill devastated 
the ecology of a whole coastal region that is still paying a heavy price twenty years later.3 After 86 
days of continuous oil leak from the blow out of the Deepwater Horizon rig, the environmental 
damage to the marine ecosystem and the nearby coastal regions is expected to be more severe than 
that caused by the Valdez spill.4 The blame for this disaster has mainly been pinned on the lack of 
sufficient precaution on the part of the British Petroleum (BP) who had hired Deepwater Horizon 
for the operation. Notwithstanding BP’s negligence, such criticisms miss the underlying problem of 
the science and technology-based modern lifestyle which relies on advanced technology to 
                                                 
1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (Chicago: ABC International 
Group, 1997), 3. 
2 “Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill(2010): Overview,” New York Times, 6 August 2010; available from  
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/o/oil_spills/gulf_of_mexico_2010/index.html?scp=1-
spot&sq=bp%20oil%20spill&st=cse Internet; accessed 6 August 2010. 
3 See William Yardley, “Recovery Still Incomplete After Valdez Spill,” New York Times, 5 May 2010; 
available from http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/06/us/06alaska.html?ref=exxon_valdez_oil_spill_1989  Internet; 
accessed 23 August 2010. 
4 See Justin Gillis and Leslie Kaufman, “After Oil Spills Hidden Damage Can Last for Years,” New York 
Times, 17 July 2010; available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/science/earth/18enviro.html  Internet; accessed 23 August 2010. 
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relentlessly exploit the earth’s resources in ways that it cannot always control.5 Moreover, as we 
will see next, the environmental/ecological6 damage by this explosion pales in comparison to the 
cumulative effect on nature of our outwardly peaceful industrialized lifestyle worldwide year after 
year, as claimed by most scientific investigations.  
 
There appears to be a near total consensus among climate scientists that the current 
environmental/ecological crisis – pollution of the air by emissions from the burning of fossil fuels 
(coal, oil and gas), of the land and water by industrial chemical waste, and the consequent climate 
change, ocean acidification, deforestations, desertifications, and threat to the survival of numerous 
species – is caused by modern science and technology-based modern economies and lifestyles.7 In 
other words, the environmental crisis refers to the growing disequilibrium of conditions in the 
biosphere resulting mostly, according to the vast majority of climate scientists, from modern 
technology-based human activities.  
 
                                                 
5 Increasing inability to control our ever more complicated technology was made even more 
evident with the meltdown of nuclear plants in Japan only a few months after the drilling rig 
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico. 
6 Throughout this thesis we will make no distinction between the environmental and ecological damage 
because they are inseparable in our context. 
7 According to a recent survey conducted by the University of Illinois (USA) from 3146 participating earth 
scientists 82% believed that the climate is changing because of human activities. Among the climate scientists alone 
that figure rose to 97.4%.  See Peter Doran and Maggie Kendall Zimmerman, “Examining the Scientific Concensus on 
Climate Change,” EOS publication of American Geophysical Union, Vol. 90 No.3 20 January 2009, p.22. Also, see 
Naomi Oreskes, “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change: How Do We Know We’re Not Wrong?” in Climate 
Change: What it Means for Us, Our Children, and Our Grandchildren, eds. Joseph Dimento and Pamela Doughman 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2007), 65-99. Oreskes states that only a handful of scientists many of whom are not 
even climate scientists, reject the opinion among vast majority of  scientists that the environmental crisis is not only 
real, but also, that it has been caused by the technology dependent modern lifestyle.  Oreskes claims that  the 
conclusions of these contrarians have been so flawed scientifically that they have not been able to publish their findings 
in peer-reviewed journals but only in “books and pamphlets issued by politically motivated think-tanks.” See, Oreskes, 
“Scientific Consensus on Climate Change”, 75.  For a more recent and detailed study of the same phenomenon, see 
Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues 
from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming (London: Bloomsbury Press, 2010). 
 3
Recent scepticism about one aspect of the environmental crisis, namely global warming, is 
based on the discovery of erroneous reporting about the rate of melting of the Himalayan glaciers 
by scientists associated with Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).8 However, most 
climate scientists insist that this should not be taken as evidence that the crisis is not real or is not 
due to human activities. They argue, “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
other scientific assessments of climate change, which involve thousands of scientists producing 
massive and comprehensive reports, have, quite expectedly and normally, made some mistakes. 
When errors are pointed out, they are corrected. But there is nothing remotely identified in the 
recent events that changes the fundamental conclusions about climate change.”9  
 
In 2007 essay, Will Stephen and colleagues including the Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen 
cogently argued that relentless industrialization has brought about the current state of the 
environmental crisis.10 They argue that pre-industrial societies had minimal impact on the 
environment,11 and that modern economy and lifestyle driven by modern science and technology is 
responsible for the environmental crisis. Stephen et al demonstrate that it was only after the onset 
of the industrial revolution that the atmospheric CO2 concentration increased steadily to the extent 
                                                 
8 See Elizabeth Rosenthal, “U.N. Panel’s Glacier Warning is Criticized As Exagerrated”  New York Times, 18 
January, 2010; available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/19/science/earth/19climate.html  Internet; accessed 18 August 2010. 
9 See Peter Gleick et al.,“Climate Change and the Integrity of Science,” Science, 7 May 2010, vol. 328. 
No. 5979, pp. 689-690.  It is an open letter from about 250 scientists belonging to US National Academy of Sciences 
which reaffirms the claim of the vast majority of climate scientists that indeed human activities are driving the current 
environmental crisis. Available from http://www.sciencemag.org/content/328/5979/689.full; Internet; accessed 2 
September 2010. 
10 See Will Stephen, Paul J. Crutzen and John R. McNeill, “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now 
Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature,” Ambio Vol. 36, No.8, December 2007, pp. 614-621.  
In the same vein, The Earth Charter states, “The dominant patterns of production and consumption are causing 
environmental devastation, the depletion of resources, and a massive extinction of species.” The Earth Charter, p. 1. 
The Earth Charter, created by the independent Earth Charter Commission, was produced following the Earth Summit 
of 1992.  Since then it has been endorsed by UNESCO, World Conservation Union (IUCN) and thousands of 
organizations world wide. Available from:  www.EarthCharter.org Internet; accessed 10 June 2010. 
11 Stephen et al, “The Anthropocene,”  615.   
 4
that by 1900, it exceeded the upper limit reached of the previous 250 thousand years.12  
Furthermore, they found that as the rate of technological and economic growth accelerated so did 
the concentration of atmospheric CO2 which is now about 33% higher than the pre-industrial 
level.13  The six-fold increase in the world’s population since the Industrial Revolution, so often 
blamed for the environmental crisis, was itself a direct result of harnessing the power of fossil 
fuels, to make synthetic fertilizers containing reactive nitrogen compounds from atmospheric 
nitrogen to boost food production, and to develop other services which made the modern 
population boom possible. 14   
 
The urgency for a veritable solution to the crisis can be argued based on numerous recent 
claims by scientific investigations. Johann Rockstrom, the director of the Stockholm Resilience 
Centre, and twenty six other eminent scientists have, for the first time, provided an estimate of the 
boundaries within which human civilization is viable.15 They have identified nine critical planetary 
systems whose conditions they claim are precariously worsening due to impact of modern 
lifestyles, namely atmospheric CO2 concentration, ocean acidification, stratospheric ozone 
depletion, nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, global freshwater use, change in land use, biodiversity 
loss, atmospheric aerosol loading, and other chemical pollution.  Among these, CO2 concentration, 
balance of nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss, have already far exceeded the safe boundaries. 
One of the major conclusions of the scientific investigations is as follows: “We do not have the 
luxury of concentrating our efforts on any one of [the planetary systems] in isolation from others. If 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 617. 
13 Ibid., 618. 
14 Ibid., 616. 
15 See Johan Rockstrom et al, “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity,” Nature, Vol 461 24 September 2009, 
pp. 472-475.  
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one boundary is transgressed, then other boundaries are also under serious risk.”16  
 
According to the latest findings of the IPCC, by the end of this century the global 
temperature may rise by 5.2 centigrade’s instead of the previous estimate of 2.4 centigrade.17 By 
2050, the ocean acidification resulting from absorption of CO2 by ocean water “may render most 
regions chemically inhospitable to coral reefs” the habitats of large segments of the marine 
population.18 The quantity of nitrogen compounds introduced to the ecosystem through the use of 
synthetic fertilizers is already greater than that by all the natural processes combined, and is now a 
major source of greenhouse gases and pollution of water systems.19 Pollution affects human and 
other lives in ways that are often not obvious to us. Biodiversity loss per year is estimated to be at 
least one hundred times higher than the pre-industrial level which in itself is bound to have a 
devastating effect on the ecology in the coming decades.20  As for humans, according to recent 
research conducted by David Pimentel, a renowned Cornell University chemist, already each year 
forty percent of all deaths worldwide are caused by water, air and soil pollution.21 However, these 
findings about the environment apparently related to the modern economic system, has been 
largely ignored by many distinguished economists.  As one of them has asserted recently, “In fifty 
years, if things go as they have since 1800…The environment will be improving.”22 Such 
assertions make greater discussion of the issue all the more necessary. However, our thesis sides 
                                                 
16 Rockstrom et al, “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity”,  474. 
17 See the The Key Scientific Developments Since The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report of June 2009 prepared 
by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in Science Brief 2, June 2009, p. 5; available from 
www.pewclimate.org; Internet; accessed 10 June 2010. 
18 Ibid., 1. 
19 Rockstrom et al, “A Safe Operating Space,” 474. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Andrea Thompson, “Pollution May Cause 40 Percent of Global Deaths,” LiveScience, 10 September 2007; 
Available from: http://www.livescience.com/environment/070910_pollution_deaths.html Internet; accessed 9 
December 2010. 
22 Deirdre N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), 12. 
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with the conclusions of the vast majority of climate scientists that the environmental crisis is 
caused by human activities enabled by modern science and technology. 
 
In the last few decades, especially since the early 1970s, numerous environmental 
movements as well as economic policies at both national and international levels have tried to 
address this growing crisis. In order to understand Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s particular religious and 
metaphysical approach to the crisis, at the outset we ought to consider his background and his 
immense scholarly output as well as his historic role in environmentalism of the West and of the 
Islamic world.  
0.2 Introduction to Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr was born in Tehran in a family of well-known scholars in 1933. His 
father Seyyed Valīullāh Khan Nasr was an eminent philosopher of ethics with a mastery of Arabic 
and Persian languages.  In 1950, Nasr began his undergraduate studies in physics at MIT because 
he was interested “in the nature of physical reality.”23 At the end of  his first year of study he 
participated in a group discussion with the famous philosopher Bertrand Russell who, when asked 
to remark on the nature of physics, answered, in Nasr’s words, that “physics did not concern itself 
with the nature of physical reality per se but with mathematical structures related to pointer 
readings.”24  Russell’s answer along with his own growing unease with “the implicit positivism of 
the atmosphere”25 at MIT caused Nasr to seriously reconsider his chosen field of study, and hence 
began seeking a discipline that could better fulfil his initial quest. Having graduated from MIT with 
honours in 1954, he went on to earn his PhD from Harvard University in a more philosophically 
                                                 
23 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. 




oriented discipline, the history of science. Over the last fifty years, Nasr has had a remarkably 
productive career as an academic and as an administrator in Iran, Lebanon and in the United States.  
Since 1984, he has been a University Professor in the Department of Religion at the George 
Washington University in Washington D.C 
 
Recognized as one of the most important Islamic intellectuals of our time, Nasr is the 
author of nearly fifty books and hundreds of articles on Islamic philosophy, Sufism, Islamic 
science, Islamic art, the environmental crisis, and the school of perennial philosophy expounded by 
René Guénon (1886-1951) and Frithjof Schuon (1907-98). Among the numerous accolades he has 
received throughout his long career, perhaps the most notable are the honours of being chosen as 
the prestigious Gifford Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh in 1981 and of being included in 
the Library of Living Philosophers in 2001.26 Huston Smith, the eminent scholar of world religions, 
has called him “one of the major intellects of our day.”27 While Keith Critchlow, the foremost 
scholar of sacred art and architecture in the world, has dubbed him “the most important living 
philosopher on the planet today.”28   
 
                                                 
26 Every couple of years since 1939, one living philosopher has been chosen for this library by a distinguished 
board of contemporary philosophers. The philosophers chosen include such prominent philosophers of the 20th century 
as John Dewey, Alfred North Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Karl Popper, Martin Buber, A.J. Ayer and Hans-Geroge 
Gadamar. Nasr is one of  only two non-European philosophers who are part of the list, the other being the Indian 
philosopher Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. See the introductory pages of The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. 
(Chicago and La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 2001). 
27 Huston Smith quoted on the dust jacket of  Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).  
28 Keith Critchlow, “Keyonte Speech” in The Beacon of Knowledge: Essays in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
ed. Mohammad H. Faghfoory (Louisville, Kentucky: Fons Vitae, 2003), xlvii. 
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In addition to being the first Muslim and Islamic intellectual to address the environmental 
crisis,29 Nasr is also the first person ever to write extensively about the philosophical and religious 
dimension of the crisis.30 By the same token, he was also the first person to lay out a 
comprehensive, far-reaching religious response that goes beyond proposing ethical measures. Also, 
as the foremost living representative of the perennial school of philosophy, Nasr has given the most 
extensive and detailed response to the environmental crisis out of all other Perennialists as yet.31 
Embedded in his environmentalism is a call for the revival of religiously purposeful lifestyles 
across the world as alternatives to the technology and economic-interest-driven modern lifestyles, 
which, he believes, is behind the ecological/environmental crisis.32 This ecumenical aspect of 
Nasr’s vision is a reflection, as we will see, of both the school of perennial philosophy and of the 
inner dimension of Islam.  
 
Three key terms crucial for understanding Nasr’s approach to the environmental crisis, are 
as follows: 1) Religious worldview, 2) Scientific worldview, and 3) Scientism. In the most basic 
sense, these terms can be defined as follows: 1) Religious worldview refers to the nature of reality 
                                                 
29 See Richard Foltz, Introduction to  Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick 
M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 2003), xxxviii. 
30 This assessment is based on our inability to find any comparable scholarly work prior to Nasr’s The 
Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968) dealing 
with the religious and philosophical roots of the contemporary environmental crisis at length. (Subsequent editions of 
the same book have left out the words ‘the encounter’ from the title). In this connection, also see Giovanni Monastra, 
“Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Religion, Nature, and Science,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Library of 
Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. (Chicago and 
La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 2001), 496-7. 
31 Lord Northbourne (1896-1982), another prominent Perennialist, wrote eloquently about the land, organic 
farming and spirituality. However, his writings were relatively limited on the impact of scientific worldview and did 
not deal with traditional metaphysics of nature nearly as extensively as Nasr has done.  See Of the Land and the Spirit: 
The Essential Lord Northbourne on Ecology, eds. Christopher James, the 5th Lord Northbourne and Joseph Fitzgerald 
(Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2008).  
32 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 
Chapter 6: 71-94. Also,  see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Ecological Problem in the Light of Sufism: The Conquest of 
Nature and the Teachings of Eastern Science,” in Sufi Essays, 3rd edition (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1999), 
152-63. 
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of the universe as envisioned by a religion, i.e. the universe consists of signs of God.33 2)  The 
scientific worldview refers to the nature of reality of the universe as seen by modern science, i.e. 
the universe consists of ontologically unrelated material entities with no reference to any supra-
natural source of their existence.34 3) Scientism is the ideology that modern science is, if not the 
only, the most reliable means to true knowledge.35 According to Nasr, since the Scientific 
Revolution of the 17th century, the scientific worldview gradually started replacing the religious 
worldview, and scientism came to be the prevalent underlying ideology in the West and 
Westernized parts of the world.36 This situation, according to Nasr, is the underlying cause of the 
environmental crisis and must be reversed. If there is to be a long term solution to the 
environmental crisis, the religious worldview must be re-established.  
 
If our reliance on scientific investigations in section 0.1 seems at odds with holding modern 
science responsible for the environmental crisis, it is because Nasr’s perspective does not deny 
modern science’s ability to know much about the material dimension.37 For him, the problem with 
                                                 
33 For further elaboration of religious worldview see pp. 44- 45 and see Chapters 1-3 for the meaning in the 
Christian and the Islamic context. Speaking of pre-modern human beings at large, Mircea Eliade observed, “For 
religious man, nature is never only ‘natural’; it is always fraught with a religious value. This is easy to understand, for 
the Cosmos is a divine creation…the world is impregnated with sacredness.” Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the 
Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Willard Trask (New York: Hartcourt, 1987), 116.   
34 For an overview of the scientific worldview, see John J. Carvalho IV, “Overview of the Structure of a 
Scientific Worldview,” Zygon, vol. 41, no. 1 (March 2006), pp. 113-124. 
35 We have paraphrased Huston Smith’s definition of ‘scientism’. See Huston Smith, “Scientism: The Bedrock 
of the Modern Worldview,” in Science and the Myth of Progress, ed. Mehrdad M. Zarandi (Bloomington, IN: World 
Wisdom, 2003), 233. For a brief discussion of the nature and consequences of the modern scientific worldview and 
scientism, see Chapter 1.4-1.5. For an extended discussion, especially from the Islamic metaphysical perspective, see 
Chapter 6.  
36 As Huston Smith has asserted, “Until the rise of modern science, all the peoples of the 
world believed not only in this world, but also in another world, which although invisible, is more 
real and more important than this one – the world presented in Plato’s allegory of the cave, which 
depicts this world as only the shadows cast by a transcendent world.” Huston Smith, Beyond the 
Postmodern Mind : The Place of Meaning in a Global Civilization (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical 
Publishing House, 2003), 244. 
37 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,” in An Early Crescent: The Future 
Knowledge and Environment in Islam, ed. Ziauddin Sardar (London: Mansell, 1998), 133. 
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modern science is that it ignores or denies the existence of any reality other than that of the 
material aspect of nature.38  
0.3 Objective: 
In spite of Nasr’s historic role, the depth of his message, and its great relevance today, there 
is no single work that presents his approach to the environmental crisis in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner. His major works on the subject The Encounter of Man and Nature and 
Religion and the Order of Nature trace the philosophical roots of this crisis to rationalism and 
modern science. In response, Nasr's books recommend spiritual renewal that would revive a 
religious worldview and encourage the eventual replacement of modern science with a sacred 
science that would uphold the metaphysical principles inherent in all religious traditions.  
 
An adequate response in any civilization, he argues, would require the help of that 
civilization’s traditional intellectual resources. However, Nasr's above-mentioned books do not 
provide any extensive and specific strategy for the response that he envisions for any civilization. 
That strategy can be found in his several articles and interviews dealing with  the way the Muslim 
world should respond to the environmental crisis in the context of the prevalent intellectual climate 
in that world today. The full appreciation of his strategy in the Islamic world also requires an 
appreciation of the different aspects of Islamic intellectual tradition that he refers to. The situation 
calls for a single volume that gives due attention to each aspect of Nasr’s vision on the 
environmental crisis. 
 
                                                 
38 Nasr does not criticize modern science “if it is kept within the boundaries defined by the limitations of its own 
philosophical premises concerning the nature of physical reality as well as its epistemologies and methodologies.” 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 4.  Also, see 
our Chapter 6. 
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A systematic and comprehensive treatment of Nasr’s environmentalism would require 1) A 
discussion of Nasr’s thesis on the root of the environmental crisis and the essential response 
necessary for all religious traditions, 2) An examination of the traditional Islamic worldview and 
the impact of modern science has had on Muslim thought since the 19th century, which Nasr 
addresses when he discusses his Islamic response, 3) An analysis of Nasr’s strategy for the Islamic 
world in light of the Islamic intellectual tradition which most reflects his arguments and thereby 
demonstrate the traditional Islamic character of his response, 4) A brief discussion of other 
comparable visions in the Islamic world and in the West as well as a response to direct or indirect 
criticisms of Nasr’s approach, situating him in the context of other major environmentalist visions 
today. The purpose of this thesis is to fulfil these objectives without presuming to be exhaustive.  
 
Throughout the thesis, we will emphasize that Nasr argues his case on the basis of the 
knowledge of the spiritual reality of nature and its relevance to human purpose as defined by 
religion, and not merely on the basis of consideration for physical survival as is the case of 
mainstream environmentalism, or merely on the basis of ethical teachings which religiously 
oriented environmentalism generally emphasizes. The foundation in knowledge is important for 
Nasr, because modern science, which he holds primarily responsible for the crisis, challenges 
religions with the knowledge that it professes.   
 
In bringing together the arguments that are relevant to the current intellectual climate we 
hope to facilitate greater understanding of this eminent thinker who, since the 1960s, has been 
advocating spiritual renewal as the most effective means for facing the environmental crisis in the 




The theoretical foundation of Nasr’s response is rooted in the perennial philosophy and 
Islamic revelation, metaphysics and philosophy. Here in the Introduction, we have identified the 
three fundamental principles of the perennial philosophy for reality as such: the unity of reality, the 
hierarchy of reality, and the ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the universe.39 These 
perennial principles, which are identical to Islamic metaphysical principles of the nature of reality 
as we shall see, remain for Nasr the standards of truth in his analysis of the environmental crisis 
and in his recommended solutions. In Nasr’s view, the certitude of these  principles lies in direct 
knowledge accessible by the Intellect or a pure heart, or faith in the principles of reality in the 
revelations or the corresponding metaphysics, and not by mere ordinary reason.40   
 
Before embarking upon a systematic presentation of Nasr’s strategy to confront the 
environmental crisis, it is useful to outline, in the Introduction, the following objectives, as they 
lay the groundwork for the rest of the thesis: 
1) To give a rationale for considering Nasr’s traditional religious response by highlighting 
how mainstream environmentalism has been failing for want of religious/spiritual values. 
2) To outline Nasr’s defence of Christianity against those who hold it responsible for the 
environmental crisis. 
3) To outline Nasr’s stance regarding modern technological solutions for the crisis. 
4) To outline three fundamental principles of the perennial philosophy for reality as such and 
their significance to traditional Islam and Nasr’s approach. 
                                                 
39 For a brief discussion of the principles of the perennial philosophy for reality as such, see section 0.9. 
40 For a discussion on the distinction between ordinary reason and the Intellect or the pure heart, See section 
0.9.1 and Chapter 3.4 and 3.4.1.  For a brief discussion on traditional  metaphysics, see 0.9.2. 
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5) To distinguish between reason and Intellect in the traditional sense and how that determines 
Nasr’s epistemology. 
6) To distinguish between traditional metaphysics and cosmology or worldview from their 
modern meanings. 
7) To outline Nasr’s vision of traditional Islam. 
8) To outline the status of environmentalism in the Muslim world. 
9) To discuss what distinguishes Nasr from other Islamic environmentalists. 
10) To refute criticisms against the possibility of Islamic environmentalism per se based on 
Islamic traditional views such as that of Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240). 
 
The remaining chapters after the Introduction are grouped into four parts. Throughout the 
thesis our main objective is not to defend Nasr’s views, but to analyse them. Throughout the thesis 
we attempt to respond to two questions: 1) what do we need to know to best appreciate Nasr’s 
approach to the environmental crisis? And 2) how does Nasr’s vision adhere to traditional Islamic 
thought?  
 
Part I of the thesis consists of Chapter1, which presents Nasr’s thesis on the philosophical 
causes of the crisis, namely rationalism and modern scientific worldview which reject the perennial 
principles. At the end of Chapter 1 are the general recommendations to remedy the situation across 
all religious traditions.  
In the rest of the thesis we discuss Nasr’s approach as summarized in the following 
passage: 
 
The Islamic world must carry out two extensive programs despite all the obstacles placed 
before it by external factors. The first concerns formulating and making clearly known in a 
contemporary language the perennial wisdom of Islam concerning the natural order, its 
 14
religious significance and intimate relation to every phase of man’s life in this world. This 
program must of necessity include a critical appraisal of both modern science and scientism 
as well as the significance of traditional Islamic science…The second program is to expand 
the awareness of the Sharī‘ite teachings concerning the ethical treatment of the natural 
environment and extend their field of application whenever necessary according to the 
principles of the Sharī‘ā itself.41 
 
Part II consists of Chapters 2-4. It lays out the three metaphysical principles of the 
traditional Islamic view of reality as such – which essentially correspond to the three perennial 
principles – and their relevance to Islamic ethics including the Sharī‘ā. Sufism and metaphysics are 
portrayed as integral means of preserving the validity and popularity of those principles and of 
Islamic ethics.  Finally, we see how the encounter with modern science since the 19th century has 
resulted in an intellectual climate in the Muslim world in which the traditional Islamic outlook on 
nature is ignored.  Nasr’s strategy aims, in part, to refute the assumptions of this prevalent 
intellectual climate regarding modern science and technology. 
 
Part III consists of Chapters 5-8. This is the main component of Nasr’s approach. First, we 
demonstrate how traditional Islamic sciences integrated three fundamental principles of Islam for 
reality and thus differed fundamentally from modern science. Second, we provide Nasr’s critique 
of modern science and technology with the aim of showing how they undermine the three 
principles from the Islamic metaphysical standpoint, and produce a fragmented and materialistic 
outlook conducive to the exploitation of nature. Finally, we discuss Nasr’s vision of an Islamic 
science that would not have the negative consequences of modern science, and the educational 
reforms necessary for that long term strategy to succeed. Part III also includes Nasr’s suggestions 
                                                 
41 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science,143. Nasr does not discuss the “second programme” in any depth but 
concentrates on the first programme.  Accordingly, we focus on his first programme  as well. His position on the 
“second programme”  is discussed in Chapter 3.1.  Chapter 3.2-3.5 explains why the first programme  is critical for the 
continued relevance of Islamic ethics. 
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of practical steps, including greater usage of traditional tools, reviving traditional modes of 
production, reviving traditional sciences of agriculture, medicine, etc., and educational reforms, 
that should be taken before the envisioned Islamic science can materialize. 
 
Part IV consists of the final Chapter. We end the thesis with a recapitulation of Nasr’s 
entire strategy and our own final reflections. 
 
0.4.1 Sources 
  The research is primarily based on Nasr’s books and articles in English, the language of all 
his major works, numerous speeches, available tapes of his lectures, and on our own class notes.42 
In order to properly understand Nasr’s intellectual background we studied translations of relevant 
original works of some of the luminaries of Islamic intellectual tradition to whom Nasr refers, 
namely Abū ‘Alī al-Hussain Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), Muḥyī al-Dīn 
Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240), and Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī or Mullā Ṣadrā(1571-1640), Mawlānā Jālāl al-Dīn 
Rūmī (1207-73) as well as the works of some of the most prominent traditionalist thinkers of the 
20th century who, according to Nasr, articulated the essence of traditional thought in contemporary 
language most eloquently, namely René Guénon (1886-1951), Frithjof Schuon (1907-98), Titus 
Burckhardt (1908-84) and Martin Lings (1909-05), as well as the available writings of  Shaykh 
Aḥmad al-‘Alawī (1869-1934), the famous Algerian shaykh of the Shadhili Sufi order, in whose 
spiritual lineage Nasr belongs. These readings have been mainly supplemented by some of the 
contemporary scholars who more or less agree with Nasr’s views, notably, Huston Smith, William 
                                                 
42 We have had the opportunity to take the course titled Man and Nature, a graduate level course offered by 
Nasr  in the Spring of 2004 at the George Washington University, Washington DC.  In addition, we have had access to 
recordings of many of his lectures given at various venues which are available at his office at the George Washington 
University, USA. 
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Chittick, the foremost authority on Ibn ‘Arabī and one of the leading scholars of the Islamic 
intellectual tradition at large, Osman Bakar, a leading authority on Islamic science and philosophy, 
and Ibrahim Kalin, one of the leading scholars on the philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā.  Furthermore, we 
studied the works of various scholars whose insights and research have helped us understand many 
of Nasr’s views as in the case of Islamic environmentalism, traditional sciences, modern science 
and technology, and those that provide the history, content, and analysis of Muslim reformist and 
fundamentalist thought.   
 
In order to understand the significance of Nasr’s vision for today, it is necessary to see how 
mainstream environmentalism has failed in ways that only a religious/metaphysical approach can 
fulfil.  Towards that end, we will consider the merits and drawbacks of mainstream 
environmentalism over the last forty years through the eyes of a few of the most influential 
scholars and activists who have been involved with environmentalism for most of this period, 
namely Donella Meadows et al, Wolfgang Sachs, and James Gustave Speth. Their most noted 
works over the last decade will be discussed extensively because of their well-documented 
arguments and because each work in its own way reveals the need of a spiritual revival in order to 
escape from the current impasse in the struggle against the crisis.  
 
0.5 Failures of Mainstream Environmentalism Today 
The awareness of environmental crisis, at least at the local level, began in earnest in the 
early 1960s in America, the country that was most industrialized and therefore most likely to notice 
the pollution resulting from it.  By the early 1970s, especially after Club of Rome’s Limits to 
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Growth
43 was published in 1972, it was widely accepted that the modern industrial culture was the 
primary cause of environmental degradation that had to be taken care of. By 1976 a series of 
legislations were passed to help to protect the environment in America. Ironically, the positive 
effects from these legislations had a negative effect on the environmental movements themselves: 
“people forgot that the conditions they enjoined were the result of earlier gains won by the 
environmental movement.”44 This created the opportunity for a confluence of business interests, as 
well as political and social movements to paint the environmentalists as alarmists. Through out the 
1980s and 1990s, the proponents of economic progress formulated new policies for subsuming 
environmentalist concerns as the global nature of the crisis became more evident.  
 
One of the most revealing analyses of these policies designed to tackle the environmental 
crisis and of their effects has been carried out by Wolfgang Sachs in his widely acclaimed book 
Planet Dialectics.45 Sachs is the former chairman of the Greenpeace movement in Germany and 
currently a senior research fellow of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate in Berlin as well as a lead 
author in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Sachs has shown how these policies 
have focused on pursuing greater efficiency in the management of the world’s remaining natural 
resources without questioning the fundamental modern economic goal of continuous growth.  
 
According to Sachs, there have been two major components of these policies. First, the idea 
that the ever more efficient technology would optimize the amount of resource input necessary for 
                                                 
43 See Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to 
Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972). This book had a seminal effect on arousing awareness of a crisis with the 
environmental condition. For the same reason it provoked many criticisms especially by economic growth advocates 
who did not, like Herman Kahn, want to believe that technology or resources could have limits. See Elodie Vielle 
Blanchard, “Modelling the Future: An Overview of the ‘Limits to Growth’ Debate,” Centaurus 2010: 52: pp.91-116. 
44 Frederick Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 11.  
45 See Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development (Halifax, Nova 
Scotia: Fernwood Publishing, 2001).  
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a given output of performance such that increased efficiency would offset negative effects of 
economic growth.46  Second, the idea that the poverty of the poor in mostly Third World countries 
cause them to exploit the already dwindling natural resources, has lead policy makers to argue for 
further economic growth to lift the poor out of poverty.47  
 
In the name of saving the environment from the poor, the economic policy makers have 
expanded developmental activities with the stated goal of eliminating their poverty while ignoring 
that such activities themselves are often the cause of scarcity of nature and that those who have 
always depended on nature “have no choice other than to pursue the last remaining fragments of its 
bounty.”48  Thus, “development has come to be seen as the therapy for the injuries caused by 
development.”49 In fact, as Andrea Cornwall has observed, the word ‘development’ and the phrase 
‘poverty reduction’ have been hallowed in the economic jargon to make their meanings “beyond 
reproach.”50  Project proposals needing funding are often sprinkled with such words and 
expressions to make them attractive leaving out serious questioning of “what is actually done.”51 
 
With regards to technological efficiency as a means for lessening the damage to the 
environment, Sachs argues that while pursuing this path has some positive impact, it has number of 
drawbacks in the long run that help to perpetuate the economic goal of continuous growth of 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 47-48, 59. 
47 Ibid., 60. Also, see Lloyd Timberlake, “The Emergence of the Environmental Awareness in the West,” in 
The Touch of Midas, ed. Z. Sardar (Manchester Univ. Press, 1984), 127. 
48 Sachs, Planet Dialectics, 35.  
49 Ibid., 34. See for instance the predicament of the people who live near Kerinci Sebalat National Park in 
Western Sumatra. Fazlun Khalid, “Applying Islamic Environmental Ethics,” in Environmentalism in the Muslim 
World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 108-09. Also see Vandana Shiva, “Soil not 
Oil” Alternatives Journal, 35:3, 2009, pp. 19-23.  
50 Andrea Cornwall, “Buzzwords and fuzzwords:  deconstructing development discourse,” Development in 
Practice, Volume 17, Numbers 4-5, August 2007, p. 472. 
51 Ibid., 471. 
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production and consumption in a finite world. Ironically, the saving effects of greater efficiency are 
negated by the faster growth in demand created by an expanded economy.52 Indeed, many studies 
over the last decade have concluded that the increased efficiency in technology has generally not 
resulted in decreased resource use or pollution.53 Increased efficiency has generally resulted in 
further growth in output and industrial waste. Thus, the pursuit of efficiency cannot be effective in 
lessening the consumption of resources so long as economic growth continues.  Sachs points out 
that pursuing efficiency can work best only in places that have already achieved a certain degree of 
industrialization.54 Otherwise, increased efficiency can only be an argument for the introduction of 
modern technologies. On the other hand, the focus on efficiency in just material production 
disregards non-material goals and values associated with the ‘less efficient’ traditional means of 
production.55  
 
The authors of the immensely influential 1972 classic Limits to Growth have observed in 
their 30-year update56 that in the real world, “technologies we see are highly specific to particular 
problems; they cost money and take a long time to develop. Once they are proven in the lab there 
are further delays to develop the capital, labour, sales and service staff, marketing and finance 
                                                 
52 Sachs, Planet Dialectics, 41-42. 
53 James Gustave Speth, The Bridge at the Edge of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 56-
57. 
54 Sachs, Planet Dialectics, 41. 
55 Ibid., 51, 53-54.  Ali Ahmad notes that “under-development or the simplicity of agrarian lifestyle” was not 
the only reason for a harmonious relationship humans and nature in pre-modern Northern Nigeria, “there were clear 
manifestation of an Islamic pedigree” for this harmony: “Although a sizeable number of the people were nomadic 
pastoralists, they seldom encroached upon designated harīms and himās.” See Ali Ahmad, “Nigeria,” in 
Environmentalism in the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 76-77.  A 
harīm in Islamic law is a public space prohibited from dirtying or loitering, and a himā is a designated as an area where 
any harm to nature is strictly prohibited. 
56 Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis Meadows, Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (White 
River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green, 2004). This is a second update of their seminal work by the same title thirty 
years earlier and has received wide acclaim by environmentalists. This book based its projections on much more 
optimistic assumptions about technological efficiency and resource availability than it was done previously. However, 
the outcome did not change significantly.   
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mechanisms necessary to bring them into widespread use.”57 However, when we are racing against 
time, as it is the case with the environmental crisis, the usual many years of delay in the 
implementation of more efficient technologies can seriously diminish the effectiveness of such 
technological solutions, even with favourable market forces, and political and social will.   
 
Using their World3.3 computer simulation programme and 2002 as the base year, Meadows 
et al show that if the world continues to carry on with its usual economic activities without taking 
any major step to reduce its ecological footprint, industrial production, food available per person, 
life expectancy and human welfare, all may continue to rise until about 2025 before beginning a 
sharp decline across all measures due to “increasingly inaccessible non-renewable resources.”58 
More importantly, in contrast to the efficiency argument, the simulation programme has shown that 
even with the very optimistic assumptions that availability of non-renewable resources would 
increase by 100 percent and technologies to reduce pollution would improve in efficiency by an 
annual rate of 4 percent – between 1970 and 2000 the rate of growth in efficiency was 2 percent59–
the decline in the indexes are delayed by only about 50 years more.60 Their most significant finding 
that leaves no choice but to seek ways and means to limit economic growth is as follows: “the more 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 212. 
58 Meadows et al, Ibid., 168-169. In response to critics who have pointed out that predictions of economic 
collapse made by the first edition of Limits to Growth have not quite materialized in the same way yet, Jun Abraham of 
Johns Hopkins University has remarked that “modelling sheds light on making an informed decision among possible 
scenarios”  and not to make exact predictions which would be impossible anyway. See Jun Abraham,  rev. of Limits to 
Growth: 30-Year Update, by Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis Meadows, Natural Resources Forum 
29(2005), 180. 
59 Speth, Bridge at the Edge, 114. 
60 Meadows et al, Limits to Growth: 30-Year Update, 210-11.  As the authors of another notable recent study 
have concluded, “It is wishful thinking to believe that technology – whether in the form of renewable and nuclear 
energy sources or improved fuel efficiency – will deliver more than a fraction of the reductions needed.”   See Mayer 
Hillman with Tina Fawcett and Sudhir Chella Rajan, How Can We Save the Planet (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
2008),  239. 
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successfully society puts off its limits through economic and technical adaptations, the more likely 
it is to run into several [limits] at the same time.”61 
 
Sachs argues that this predilection for technical solutions to the environmental crisis is 
partly due to a mechanical view of ecology.  He points out that early in the 20th century, the term 
ecology was redefined under the scientific empiricist influence, as a self-regulating ecosystem.  The 
sense of wholeness once associated with the interrelatedness of all elements of nature has been 
reduced to the technical term of ‘homoeostasis’62 maintained “in the tradition of mechanical 
engineering, as ‘self-regulatory feedback mechanism’.”63Ever since, it has been difficult for 
mainstream environmentalists to think of ecology outside the mechanical scientific paradigm.64 As 
long as the ecology is seen as a mechanical system, it can be conceived as something that can be 
managed scientifically; and like a machine, it is something that performs functions but has no 
ultimate purpose. As the distinguished political theorist Jane Bennett has noted, today’s 
mainstream environmentalist “deploys techniques to rationalize nature and to render it predictable, 
to replace its self-sustaining, “wild” state with well-managed industrial, commercial, residential, 
and recreational sites.”65 According to Sachs, the task for the modern ecologists or the 
environmentalists has been to scientifically determine how much damage an ecosystem could take 
before collapse, and how to maintain that balance at “the edge of abyss”66 by technological 
manipulations without challenging developmental aspirations that cause the damage in the first 
place. As Bennett observes, generally today’s environmental management is about “how much of 
                                                 
61 Meadows et al, Limits to Growth, 223. 
62 Sachs, Planet Dialectics, 62-63. 
63 Ibid., 63. 
64 Ibid., 62. 
65 Jane Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and the State in a Post-Hegelian Era (New 
York: New York University Press, 1987), 47. 
66  Sachs, Planet Dialectics, 36. 
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each pollutant could be safely discharged into the environment and to ensure that these ‘threshold 
values’ were not exceeded.”67 But, as we will see next, for the environmentalists, the predilection 
for technological solutions is partly motivated by opposition they face from industries and 
corporations against pursuing broader or more fundamental environmental agendas. 
  
James Gustave Speth who was the principal environmental adviser to President Carter and 
thereafter founded the World Resources Institute, headed the United Nations Development 
Program(UNDP) in the 1990s and served as the dean of the Yale school of Forestry and 
Environmental Studies, has also concluded that mainstream environmentalism has failed “in far too 
many ways” to protect the planet.68 As James Halteman has put it, given his reputation as a “highly 
seasoned leader of environmental reform in both the academic and policy arenas” Speth’s book The 
Bridge at the Edge of the World is a “confession.”69 Speth argues that “the methods and styles of 
today’s environmentalism are not wrongheaded, just far too restricted”70 because the mainstream 
environmentalists try to work from within the system to salvage what they can. 
 
Speth has identified several major limitations for environmentalists working within the 
system: first and foremost, the very nature of the modern economic culture driven by modern 
science and technology: “Today’s capitalist culture serves up an ever increasing volume of 
environmentalist insults. That is its nature, born of powerful technology in the hands of powerful 
corporations with little transparency, weak oversight, and overriding commitments to profits and 
                                                 
67 Bennett,Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment, 47. 
68 Speth, Bridge at the Edge,78. 
69 James Halteman, “A Sustainable world,” Christian Century, December 16, 2008, p. 38. 
70 Speth, Bridge at the Edge,81. 
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growth.”71 Other major limitations clearly follow from this principle obstacle. On the one hand, 
environmentalism faces very powerful opposition from businesses and industries as it runs against 
their economic interests. On the other hand, the science involved in either identifying an ongoing 
pollution process or that of restoring an already polluted environment is quite complex. Thus, in 
the face of the opposition of the business and industry forces and the daunting complexity of the 
science involved, “a huge and impenetrable regulatory and management apparatus”72 has come into 
being that is difficult to comprehend not only for the public, but also for the experts.73 The same 
opposition also generally forces environmentalists to try to eliminate the most obvious of 
symptoms by pursuing greater technological efficiency rather than trying to address the underlying 
causes of environmental degradation.74  
 
0.6 The Call for Spiritual Values  
The environmentalists we discussed above, and many more, see the revival of what we 
might call spiritual values as a necessary foundation for any potential strategy that may enable 
humanity to retreat from the progressively worsening condition of the environmental crisis.  
 
While Speth cites technological advancement as one of the major tools necessary to face the 
crisis,75 he acknowledges that choosing the modern technological fixes to meet our material needs 
brought us to the environmental predicament we face today: “we created a powerful technology 
and forged an organization of economy and society to deploy that technology extensively, rapidly, 
and, if need be, ruthlessly. And we succeeded in subduing nature and creating wealth far beyond 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 82. 
72 Ibid., 83. 
73 Ibid., 84. 
74 Ibid., 85. 
75 Ibid., 113 
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our ancestors’ imaginings. So successful were these systems and accomplishments that we were 
swept up in them, mesmerized by them, captivated, even addicted. There were warning signs along 
the way...: being, not having; giving, not getting; needs, not wants; better, not richer...”76 Given 
that all religions have consistently emphasized being, giving, and simplicity in living, not 
surprisingly, Speth admits that to bring about the necessary change of consciousness “the potential 
of faith communities is enormous.” For him, the need of our time is to follow in the footsteps of 
someone like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the Christian preacher whose courage to seek change in 
the racial status quo was grounded in faith in the Christian promise of God’s justice.77 
 
With more than three decades of experience in seeking solutions to the crisis, the authors of 
Limits to Growth have come to very similar conclusions. Like Speth, they also believe in the 
necessity of advanced technology along with great transformation of consciousness that can 
redirect resources to produce such technologies: “Impressive – and even sufficient – technological 
advance is conceivable, but only as a consequence of determined societal decisions and willingness 
to follow up such decisions with action and money.”78 For them, such decisions and willingness are 
only possible through a “structural change” of the dominant consciousness of today that consists of 
“deeply held beliefs and practices... that make people see themselves primarily as consumers and 
producers, that associate social status with material or financial accumulation, and that define goals 
in terms of getting more rather than giving more or having enough.”79 Without that necessary 
change of consciousness “society will develop technologies and markets that destroy the 
                                                 
76 Ibid., 236.  
77 Ibid., 232. 
78 Meadows et al, Limits to Growth, 204 
79 Ibid., 238. 
 25
environment.”80 That necessary change, as they point out, “is a change advocated in nearly every 
religious text, a change not in the physical or political world, but in people’s heads and hearts –in 
their goals, in their understanding of their purpose in life.”81  
 
Sachs faults contemporary environmentalism for treating the crisis “as a technical problem 
what in fact amounts to no less than a civilizational impasse – namely, that the level of productive 
performance already achieved turns out to be not viable in the North, let alone for rest of the 
globe.”82  He repeatedly calls for the need for “enlightened restraint”83 or “intelligent self-
limitation”84 of production and consumption as the crucial missing element in all the strategies to 
contain the environmental crisis. He recommends listening to the “Teachers of wisdom in the East 
and the West .... [who] almost unanimously recommended adherence to the principle of simplicity 
in the conduct of life... [which] demands a limited but skilful use of material objects.”85  Again, the 
truth is that teachers of wisdom who have recommended simplicity for the most part have been 
devoted followers of one religion or the other. In our time, we can cite examples of Mahatma 
Gandhi (1869-1948), Mother Teresa (1910-97), the Dalai Lama (b. 1935) and Sufi Masters such as 
Shaykh Aḥmad al-‘Alawī (1869-1934) or Shaykh Muḥammad Rahim Bawa Muhaiyaddeen 
(d.1986) who have done the same. 
 
 0.7 The Role for Religions and the Significance of Nasr 
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85 Ibid., 212. 
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In stressing the role of religion in our approach to the environmental crisis, Max 
Oelschlaeger, an authority on religion and ecology, has observed that “certain social preferences – 
for example, sustainability, for preservation of endangered species and wild places –are incapable 
in principle of being realized through the market.”86 They can be realized only through religion 
which is “the primary form of cultural conversation outside the modern story of economic growth 
and technological fixes.”87 In the same vein, Mary Evelyn Tucker, a leading authority on religion 
and ecology has observed “no other group of institutions can wield the particular moral authority of 
the religions.”88  
 
There is a perception that mainstream environmentalism lacks a certain persuasive power 
because of its strictly secular nature. According to Bryan Appleyard, one of the most penetrating 
critics of modern science and its applications in recent decades, mainstream environmentalism at 
the end offers no more than a mechanical vision of the universe and by the same token offers “no 
transcendent rationale” for the transformation of the soul our veteran environmentalists believe is 
necessary for decisive change in human behaviour to avoid the continued worsening of the 
environmental crisis: 
The environmentalist may enthuse about peace of mind he may attain through correctly 
green behaviour. But, at base, his reasons for that behaviour is purely practical. There is no 
transcendental rationale. It is a religion of catastrophe. We can only undo the harm we 
have done; we can aspire to nothing higher. All that we have achieved is as nothing before 
the mute, alien landscape of nature. And that remains, as in the bleak vision of mechanical 
determinism, all that we can ever have, even in the Green paradise.89  
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Today, it is in the context of the sense of the lack of a more persuasive rationale in the 
mainstream environmentalism or a search for a way to revive spiritual or religious values that the 
significance of Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s approach to environmentalism becomes apparent. With 
regards to the environmental crisis, Nasr observes, “We all know ...that outwardly (I do not say 
inwardly) this crisis is driven by the modern economic system appealing to human passions, 
especially the passion of greed intensified by the creation of false needs, which are not really needs 
but wants.”90 He asks, “How are we going to stop people from wanting more and more if not 
through the power of the Spirit accessible through religion?...No force in the world today, except 
religion, has the power to do that unless it be by sheer force.”91 Most importantly, for Nasr, religion 
should not be seen just as a source of ethics but also knowledge: “Every religion provides ... not 
only principles for ethical action, but also knowledge, knowledge in the deepest sense of the term, 
of God, of the human state, and also of nature.”92 
 
Nasr’s environmentalism can be traced to an intense love for virgin nature that he felt as a 
child at the foothills of Mt. Damavand in Iran: “It was at the foothills of this peak … that I first 
encountered virgin nature in her awesome majesty and developed an intense love for her which has 
accompanied me throughout my life.”93 This love for nature accompanied him in the Boston area 
where he lived while studying at M.I.T. and Harvard.  By the mid-1950’s, the cost to the local 
nature as a result of technological and economic progress in the area brought home to him “the 
imminence of the environmental crisis.”94  
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His direct involvement with environmentalism began in May 1966 with his Rockefeller 
Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago. These lectures, first published in 1968 as the 
book The Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis of Modern Man,95 argue that “the 
ecological crisis is only an externalization of an inner malaise and cannot be solved without 
spiritual rebirth of Western man.”96 According to Nasr, the “inner malaise” is caused to a large 
extent by the “various applications of modern science.”97  In his Rockefeller Lectures, Nasr traced 
the intellectual and historical roots of the crisis to renaissance humanism and its fruit modern 
science, which eventually replaced the medieval Christian worldview with modern scientific 
worldview. In summarizing Nasr’s thesis in Chapter 1, we discuss two terms in particular which 
are crucial for understanding Nasr’s approach to the crisis, namely ‘scientism’ and ‘scientific 
progressivism’. As discussed in Chapter 1, scientism is the conviction that modern science 
provides if not the only, at least the most reliable means to true knowledge.98 For Nasr, scientism 
led to the widespread acceptance of the ideology that modern science and scientific rationality 
constitute the most reliable means of human progress. In Chapter 1, we have termed this ideology 
of human progress through the pursuit of modern science and scientific rationality, ‘scientific 
progressivism’.99 In addition, Chapter 1 adds recent research by economic historians that confirms 
the critical importance of modern scientific worldview, and not just the presence of energy 
resources like coal and the Protestant work ethics, in ushering in the Industrial Revolution and the 
accompanying economic system that envisions continuous economic. 
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96 Nasr, Man and Nature, 9. 
97 Ibid., 13. 
98 See p. 86.  




0.7.1 Nasr Rejects Lynn White, Jr.’s Thesis Against Christianity 
It is important to outline the difference between the position of Nasr and that of historian 
Lynn White, Jr. with regards to the environmental crisis because White’s seminal article “The 
Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis”100 and Christian refutation of White’s position has come 
to shape, to a large extent, the discourse on the role that religions can play in human response to the 
environmental crisis.101  
 
  Published ten months after Nasr’s Rockefeller Lectures in May 1966, White’s thesis was 
that the root of the environmental crisis lay in the Biblical axiom that humans “have dominion” 
over the earth.102 On the other hand, White reiterated a number of themes of Nasr’s Rockefeller 
Lectures although without as much philosophical justification as Nasr had done. Most importantly, 
White concurred with Nasr’s view that our outlook on nature determines how we interact with it 
and that there could be no technological solution to the environmental crisis.103 For Nasr, 
glorification of human reason during the Renaissance followed by the Scientific Revolution and 
modern scientific worldview, and not Biblical teachings, were at the root of the idea of domination 
in the modern sense.  After all, the environmental crisis did not begin prior to the Industrial 
Revolution which can hardly be imagined without the Scientific Revolution.104 Rejecting White’s 
hypothesis against Christian theology, Nasr has observed that “neither Christian Armenia nor 
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Ethiopia nor even Christian Eastern Europe gave rise to the science and technology which in the 
hands of secular man has led to the devastation of the globe, and that therefore other factors must 
have been involved.”105 He reminds his audience that “Only rarely has any voice been raised to 
show that the current belief in the domination of nature is the usurpation, from the religious point 
of view, of man’s role as the custodian and guardian of nature.”106 Indeed, Peter Harrison has 
demonstrated that in the Genesis the Hebrew term rada which has been translated as “have 
dominion”107 did not convey this meaning but “the ideal of just and peaceful governance.”108 In 
addition, White had ignored that human dominion over nature could not have implied exploitation 
of nature, for as Genesis 2:15 states: “God took the human person and put him in the garden to 
cultivate and care for (Hebrew: shamar) it.”109  In the same vein, Nasr and other Islamic 
environmentalists have argued against those Muslims today who seek to justify exploitation of 
nature on the basis of Qur’ānic verses that declare that God has made the natural world subject to 
human beings.110 He argues that such an interpretation only applies to those “who remains God’s 
‘abd (servant) and not the man who declares his independence of God’s Will. That is why in 
another verse referring to animals the Qur’ān says, ‘Thus have We made them subject unto you 
that ye may magnify Allah’ (22:37).”111 
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Even though White’s thesis against the Christian conception of human dominion over 
nature has been characterized by many as simplistic, it’s incrimination of the Christian scripture for 
the environmental crisis provoked a series of refutations from many Christian intellectuals.112 
Compared to the attention generated by White’s article, Nasr’s The Encounter of Man and Nature 
went relatively unnoticed, except in few works that followed in its wake such as Theodore 
Roszak’s Where the Wasteland Ends113 first published in 1972, followed by Phillip Sherrard’s The 
Rape of Man and Nature
114 both of which argue in essence that the environmental crisis is an outer 
reflection of modern human’s spiritual crisis, or alternatively, as Nasr put it, “He who is at peace 
with God is also at peace with His creation, both with nature and with man.”115 
 
But, as we have seen, more than forty years after Nasr’s Rockefeller Lectures leading 
environmentalists are finally pointing at the need for a spiritual renewal to be the essential 
foundation for any truly effective answer to the environmental crisis. In the mean time, Nasr has 
elaborated his thesis extensively in his Religion and the Order of Nature. Moreover, in many 
articles, speeches, and especially in a series of interviews published over the last decade, he has 
provided an outline of a specifically Islamic response to the crisis in the context of current 
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intellectual challenges and in light of not only Islamic ethics but also of Islamic philosophical, 
metaphysical and scientific traditions of which he is one of the greatest living authorities. One 
might say that Nasr’s elaborations of traditional Islamic philosophy, metaphysics and scientific 
tradition alone can enable one to fully appreciate his response to the environmental crisis.  
 
However, it is important to note that Nasr, like the veteran Western environmentalists we 
have discussed, does not discount mainstream technological solutions to the environmental crisis. 
As such, it is important to spell out Nasr’s position in this regard at the outset to dispel any notion 
that he does not acknowledge modern technology’s ability to alleviate the crisis. 
 
0.8 Nasr on Technological Solutions 
Nasr rejects the possibility of any long-term technological solution for a number of reasons. 
First, as in the case of developmental activities, it is the application of modern science and 
technology which has led to the crisis to begin with. Reliance on technological solutions can only 
perpetuate the mentality responsible for the current state of things.116 For Nasr, most importantly, 
this mentality relates to the way reliance on modern technology undermines the vision of unity of 
reality.117 
Second, Nasr argues that it is not possible for modern science to know how the innumerable 
elements in a real ecology interact with each other even at the material level. For instance, Nasr 
points out  that while we can calculate the force of gravitation between two objects in hypothetical 
isolation easily, to do so in the presence of a third object is immensely complicated, and to do so in 
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the presence of the fourth is nearly impossible.118 Likewise, Max Oelschlaeger notes that “Chaos 
theory, among other scientific developments, offers a new language through which nature is 
viewed as a dynamic system so complex as to defy definitive scientific description and theoretical 
elucidation.”119 If modern science cannot identify the actual interrelationships among the 
innumerable variables in nature, we have no reason to believe that there could be a technological 
solution even in the remote future.  Yet, given the critical state of the environmental crisis, Nasr is 
not against technological or economic fixes if they will slow the pace of destruction:  
It is true that we have to take some immediate practical measures such as having more 
public transportation, using natural gas rather than petroleum, and so forth...Such actions 
are all well and fine, and one should do what one can along these lines...Such actions are 
going to give us more time in which to really solve the problem. So I am in favour of all 
immediate solutions on a technological or economic level...less polluting technologies will 
help...What people like Al Gore and others are saying is correct to a large extent...but I do 
not believe those technologies alone will save us from the crisis. We have to have an inner 
transformation. We have to have another way of looking at ourselves, at the purpose of 
human life, what makes us happy, and not turn over to consumption as the only way to be 
happy... 120   
 
Thus, Nasr’s overall objective is not fundamentally different from what Meadows et al., 
Sachs and Speth are advocating. However, as we will see, his approach goes much deeper than 
theirs in questioning, in light of Islamic metaphysics, philosophy, and theology, the merits of 
modern science and technology, the worldview associated with it, and especially, in arguing for an 
alternative science altogether.121  But to make sense of how his arguments from Islamic intellectual 
perspective relate to the environmental crisis for people of different faiths worldwide, we need an 
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overview of the other major intellectual influence on Nasr, namely the perennial philosophy and its 
perspective on traditional epistemology, metaphysics and cosmology in diverse religious traditions.  
 
 
0.9 Nasr and the Perennial Philosophy 
Nasr has been deeply influenced by the school of perennial philosophy that arose in the 
1920s with René Guénon (1886-1951) and whose foremost expositor in the 20th century came to be 
Frithjof Schuon (1907-98).  What has distinguished this school of perennial philosophy from any 
other school bearing the same name in the past has been its emphasis on following one or other 
religious tradition in its totality.122 Hence, followers of the school of perennial philosophy 
beginning with Guénon generally refer to themselves as Traditionalists,123 the term we will use 
henceforth to refer to them. Nasr’s thoughts resonate with those who have been deeply influenced 
by Guénon and Schuon such as Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877-1947), Titus Burckhardt(1908-84), 
Lord Northbourne (1896-1982), Martin Lings(1909-2005), Hasan Gai Eaton(1921-2010), Marco 
Pallis (1895-1989), William Stoddart (b. 1925) and Huston Smith (b. 1919). Nasr’s role as both an 
Islamic philosopher and a Traditionalist becomes understandable seeing what the fundamental 
principles of the perennial philosophy are.  
 
Nasr’s views on the perennial philosophy are almost identical to those of Frithjof 
Schuon.124 According to this philosophy, there are certain metaphysical principles in each religion 
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which are universal in their essential reality.  The most important and foundational of these 
principles of reality is described as the Supreme Reality, which is Absolute, and Infinite in the 
sense of containing all possibilities such that any existence outside It is incomprehensible.125 
Second, the existence of a multiplicity of entities within this infinite Single reality necessarily 
implies a hierarchic structure of being and consciousness issued from this same Supreme 
Reality.126 These two principles exist in some form or another in all authentic religious traditions, 
even in their outward dimension.127 Only in the inner dimension of the religion, however, are the 
full implications of these principles discussed.128 
 
According to the perennial philosophy, a religion is authentic as long as it is based on a 
revelation from the Supreme Reality; in other words, an authentic religion cannot be founded by 
purely human efforts.129 Having been based on guidance from the Supreme Reality, only an 
authentic religion can guide human beings in “understanding the universe”130 and traversing the 
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various levels of being and awareness to reach back to that Source.131 As such, the perennial 
philosophy considers Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and any other tradition 
that agrees with the three fundamental principles mentioned above as authentic religious 
traditions.132  
 
Clearly, the existence of any religion implies that the human being has a purpose. Since his 
purpose necessitates “understanding the universe” or making sense of what he encounters beside 
himself, everything in the cosmos must have a meaning and therefore a purpose. Thus, for reality 
as such, and not just with regards to human beings alone, the perennial philosophy believes in the 
presence of at least three principles at the foundation of each authentic religion: 1)Unity of  the 
Supreme Principle; 2) Hierarchic structure of Reality; 3) Ultimate meaningfulness or 
purposefulness of all things in the universe (i.e. there is a meaning for each entity beyond its 
utilitarian value to the human being). Not surprisingly, these principles are reflected in Islam’s 
outer dimension and in their fullest elaboration in its inner dimension or metaphysics as we will see 
in Chapter 2. This essential identity between the principles of Islamic metaphysics and those of the 
perennial philosophy, with regards to the principles of reality as such, is what supports Nasr’s 
stance as a Traditionalist as well as a traditional Islamic philosopher.133 For Nasr, as we will see, 
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these three perennial principles and their implications form the basis of his entire analysis of the 
root of the environmental crisis and its solution.  
 
As to the question of why we should believe in the truth of these principles, Nasr and other 
Traditionalists point to their inclusion of revelation and of knowledge accessed by a faculty of 
perception more penetrating than reason. This brings us to the heart of Nasr’s epistemology, which 
includes this other faculty of perception present within human beings.  
 
0.9.1 Reason, Intellect and Revelation 
Nasr claims that nowadays the words ‘intellect’ and ‘intellectual’ have come to mean 
“analytical function of the mind” and “hardly bear any relation to the contemplative”134 and have 
thus deviated from their traditional sense. Along with other traditionalists, Nasr insists on the 
existence of a human faculty of perception that is more penetrating and inclusive than the faculty of 
reason. Traditionalists refer to this faculty of perception as the Intellect,135 and the act of perception 
through this faculty as ‘Intellection’. 
 
The existence of the means and levels of perception beyond that of ordinary level are 
affirmed by both the eastern and western religious traditions.136Traditional philosophies from both 
the East and West make a clear distinction between reason and Intellect. Plato, for example, 
highlights how the eternal unchanging Truth is apprehensible by an intelligence beyond the faculty 
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of reason.137 Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī (d.1111), the celebrated Islamic theologian, asserted that there 
is “a light that appears in the heart” through which the vision “that all proceeds from one source 
and that there is no more than one Agent” – a verification (taḥqīq) of the tawḥīd (Unity of God) – 
is obtained.138  Al-Ghazzālī refers to the power of perception of that light as the “prophetic power” 
beyond the reach of ordinary reason.139 
 
Nasr contends that the Arabic term al-‘aql is used in the Qur’ān to denote both reason and 
Intellect. If that can be misleading, in Islamic philosophy and Sufism, “the distinction between the 
two as well as their interrelation and the dependence of reason upon the Intellect is always kept in 
mind.”140  Indeed, in the Islamic peripatetic philosophy of al-Fārābī (870-950) and Ibn Sīnā (980-
1037) there is a clear distinction between ordinary rationality and a rational power in the human 
actualized by an intelligence beyond the human level.141 The Illuminationist philosophers 
following Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (1155-1191) and those connected with the school of Ibn 
‘Arabī, including Mullā Ṣadrā, also make a clear distinction between ordinary rationality and a 
faculty of perception that can perceive spiritual realities.142 Additionally, as we will see in Chapter 
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is “the Light of the heavens and the earth” and Who “guides to His Light whom He wills.” See 
Qur’ān 24:35. 
140 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of 
Prophecy (Albany: State Univesity of New York, 2006), 94. 
141 For a summary of al-Farabi’s view on the hierarchy of faculties of perception, see Osman Bakar, 
Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in Islamic Philosophies of Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts 
Society, 1998), 62. For a similar view of Ibn Sīnā, see Chapter 5.    
142 Regarding the Illuminationists see Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, 99.  For an 
account of Mullā Ṣadrā’s views on the hierarchy of the faculties of perception, see Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, The Wisdom of 
the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, trans. James Morris (Princeton:Princeton University 
Press, 1981),132; Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mullā Ṣadrā on Existence, Intellect, and 
Intuition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 139. 
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3, in Sufism, the Intellect is referred to as the pure heart or the ‘eye of the heart’, a faculty of 
perception beyond ordinary rationality which “witnesses” spiritual verities. 
 
Likewise, for Schuon, the Intellect is that light of God within the human being which the 
famous Christian gnostic Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) described as “something in the soul that is 
uncreated and uncreatable.”143 As such, it is through this divine spark within us, and not by any 
power that is purely human, that we can know God. In the same vein, the Intellect is like the inner 
revelation of the Qur’ān which is also a direct guidance from God. 144 
 
Being an integral element of the human condition, the Intellect is never totally inoperative 
in any human being. The Intellect, when “subject to the contingencies”145 of individual 
consciousness,146 works like reason, whose function is “division and analysis” that can provide 
“peripheral knowledge” alone.147 Thus, carrying out the “analytical function of the mind”148, the 
faculty of reason is like a reflection of the Intellect on the ordinary human plane.149  But, how can 
the Intellect function free of the contingencies of the human condition? 
 
                                                 
143  Frithjof Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, 2nd Quest edition (Wheaton, IL: Quest Books, 
2005), xxix. 
144 “Revelation is none other than the objective and symbolic manifestation of the Light which man carries in 
himself, in the depths of his being.” See Schuon, Survey of Metaphysics and Esotericism,81-82. Also, see Nasr, Need 
for a Sacred Science, 10. 
145 “The Intellect is infallible in itself, but this does not prevent the human receptacle from being subject to 
contingencies which, though they cannot modify the intrinsic nature of intelligence, can nonetheless be opposed to its 
full actualization and to the purity of its radiance.” See Frithjof Schuon, “In the Wake of the Fall,” in Science and the 
Myth of Progress, ed. Mehrdad M. Zarandi (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 24. 
146 “Intelligence is either individual or universal; it is either reason or Intellect; if it is individual, it must find 
its inspiration in its universal root to the extent that it seeks to go beyond the domain of material facts.” Schuon, The 
Transcendent Unity of Religions, 152.  
147 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Contemporary Man between the Rim and the Axis,” in Science and the Myth of 
Progress, ed. Mehrdad M. Zandi (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 103. 
148 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 65n3. 
149 At times, we will refer to the faculty of reason as ‘ordinary reason’ to emphasize its distinction from the 
Intellect. 
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  As we shall see in Chapter 3, the goal of the seekers of God on the Sufi path is to purify the 
heart in order to attain the ‘eye of the heart,’ or the Intellect.  As Schuon asserts, the Intellect can 
manifest only in proportion to the cultivation of virtue which “is conscious and permanent striving 
after perfection” implying “self-effacement, generosity and love of truth.”150 Nasr concurs with 
Schuon’s assessment and relates it to Qur’ānic suggestion that “human reason...when healthy and 
balanced leads naturally to [the realization of] tawḥīd rather than to the denial of the Divine and 
can be misled only when the passions destroy its balance and obscure its vision.”151 With the 
cultivation of virtues152 according to the religious tradition that any particular Revelation has given 
rise to,153 the contingencies of individual consciousness can be gradually overcome to render the 
Intellect increasingly more free to perceive without constraints.  In other words, for the 
Traditionalists, knowledge by the Intellect is much more “concrete” than what is accessible by 
reason which being discursive by nature, is “abstract” in the sense that it is not knowledge realized 
at depth of one’s heart, at the depth of one’s being. 154 The stages of attainment of virtues or of self-
purification also suggest a hierarchy in the functioning of the Intellect, sometimes referred to as the 
hierarchy of Intellects.155  
 
Nasr and other Traditionalists base their certitude of the perennial principles and their 
implications on the Revelations, as well as on their sapiential interpretations (which is necessarily 
                                                 
150 Schuon, “In the Wake of the Fall,” 23-24. 
151 Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 7.  For Qur’ānic verses, see Chapter 3.4-3.4.1. 
“Soundness of intellect and the vision of divine signs [are] a means to ma‘rifah (experiential knowledge of God or the 
Supreme Reality)…” ‘Alī ibn ‘Uthmān Hujwīrī (990-1077), “The Revelation of Realities Veiled,” quoted in 
Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism, trans. John Renard (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 275.  
152 Schuon, The Transcendent Unity of Religions, 151. 
153 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 54. 
154 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 24   
155 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Reply to Huston Smith,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Library of 
Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. (Chicago and 
La Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 2001), 160.  
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achieved through the use of the Intellect), and finally on their own Intellection. As for those who 
doubt the truth of Intellection, “the only possible reply is that such proof is given by the 
expressions of Intellection themselves; just as it is impossible to prove the validity of a given 
religion to every soul...so also is it impossible to prove the reality of the Intellect to every 
understanding...”156 Schuon argues that “in every manifestation of liberating truth there is 
something self-evident, to which we may or may not be sensitive but which we grasp to the extent 
that our mind recognizes in this manifestation some latent content of its own substance.”157 And 
this is what “compels faith.”158  Thus, the main criterion of the perennial principles is the direct 
perception by the Intellect, and not the mere intellectual discovery of an essential identity of 
metaphysical principles across diverse religious traditions. However, as Nasr points out, the 
ubiquity of the principles simply confirms the Intellect’s universal function.159 
0.9.2 Metaphysics, Cosmology and Religious Worldview 
The Traditionalist understanding of such terms as metaphysics and cosmology are keys to 
grasping Nasr’s thought, and therefore, in order to avoid confusion, it is important to note the 
distinction between the Traditionalist and modern philosophical or scientific understanding of these 
same terms. According to Nasr and other Traditionalists, metaphysics is the science of the Real, 
“the primary and fundamental science or wisdom which comes before and contains the principles 
of all other sciences.”160 In this sense, Nasr notes that the Traditionalist understanding of 
metaphysics is the same as what has been understood by m‘arifah, jñāna and other such terms 
                                                 
156 Frithjof Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, trans.  Mark Perry, Jean-Pierre Lafouge, and James Cutsinger, 
ed. James Cutsinger (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2009), 27. 
157 Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, 27. 
158 Ibid. 
159 See Nasr, “Reply to Huston Smith,” 159. 
               160 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 132. 
Also, see René Guénon, “Oriental Metaphysics,” in The Underlying Religion: An Introduction to the Perennial 
Philosophy, eds. Martin Lings and Clinton Minnaar (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007), 95-109 and Frithjof 
Schuon, “Understanding and Believing,” in The Underlying Religion: An Introduction to the Perennial Philosophy, 
eds. Martin Lings and Clinton Minnaar (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007), 141-150. 
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pertaining to various religious traditions.161 As understood by these traditional terms, metaphysics 
is concerned with the knowledge of God in the ultimate sense and it is thereby at the heart of every 
religion. Thus, in the traditional sense Shankara (788-821), Ibn Arabī (1165-1240) and Meister 
Eckhart (1260-1327) were the most eminent metaphysicians of Hindu, Islamic and Christian 
traditions respectively.  
 
In light of the discussion above, the perennial philosophy is an exposition of any traditional 
metaphysics in the most universal terms. According to Nasr, there is no distinction between the 
perennial philosophy and Islamic metaphysics in its essence.162 A Traditionalist adheres to the 
traditional metaphysics of the religious tradition he follows and makes sense of the diversity of 
religions by the perennial philosophy. Since the metaphysics in every religion is concerned with  
the knowledge of God or the ultimate reality,  the Intellect as the faculty of perception that ‘sees’ 
the true nature of things beyond appearances is the essential means of metaphysical knowledge or 
certitude.163 
 
The Traditionalist definition of metaphysics stands in sharp contrast to the modern 
philosophical understanding of the term. The contemporary philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith of 
Harvard University describes metaphysics as “a subfield of philosophy.”164 As for what 
                                                 
161 Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 132. The terms m‘arifa in Arabic and jñāna in Sanskrit, connote the term 
gnosis. In Islam, the term m‘arifah refers to the experiential knowledge of God.  See John Renard, introduction to 
Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 2004),11-
63.  It is important to note that both the terms m‘arifah in Islam and jñāna in Hinduism mean “knowledge” in the 
highest sense beyond appearances. 
162 We will explore this point further in Chapter 2. 
163 As Nasr asserts, “Metaphysics [in the traditional sense] is a veritable “divine science” and not a purely 
mental construct which would change with every alteration in the cultural fashion of the day or with new discoveries of 
the science of the material world.” Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 54. 
164 Peter Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago, 2003), 237. 
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metaphysics deals with, Godfrey-Smith states that “Standard questions here include the nature of 
causation, the reality of the ‘external world’.... The term is sometimes seen as referring to an 
investigation that goes beyond what can be addressed using science. Constructed that way, 
metaphysics is regarded by many as a mistaken enterprise.”165 Metaphysics in this modern sense 
does not look beyond the material or sensible universe.166  
 
Likewise, there is a sharp distinction between traditional understanding of cosmology and 
modern scientific understanding of the term. As with metaphysics, the Traditionalist understanding 
of cosmology coincides with the way cosmology has been understood in various religious 
traditions which seek to describe the cosmos in its totality, including material and non-material 
realities including God or the Highest Reality.167 They depict a hierarchic structure of being, 
authority and reality wherein all material and nonmaterial beings and entities originate from and 
depend on God at various levels of the cosmos. Traditionally, metaphysics is the science of the 
Real or the science of the way everything in the cosmos is related to what is ultimately Real, that 
is, God.168 Hence, traditional cosmology is a picture of the cosmos viewed through the 
                                                 
165Ibid., 237-38.  
166 It is in this modern sense that the distinguished philosopher Alex Rosenberg speaks of the mechanical 
worldview espoused by Newtonian mechanics as “a metaphysical theory, according to which the physical universe is 
just a “clockwork” mechanism...” Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd edition 
(New York: Routledge, 2005), 81. (accent ours) 
167 See, for instance, the all-inclusive nature of Christian and Islamic cosmologies in E. Edson and E. Savage-
Smith, Medieval Views of the Cosmos: Picturing the Universe in the Christian and Islamic Middle Ages (Oxford:  
University of Oxford, 2004)  
168 For instance, Shyakh Ibn ‘Atā’illāh al-Iskandarī (d. 1309), one of the masters of metaphysics in Islam, 
states, “The Cosmos is all darkness. It is illumined only by the manifestation of God in it. Whoever sees the Cosmos 
and does not contemplate Him, in it or by it or before it or after it, is in need of light and is veiled from the sun of 
gnosis by the clouds of created things.” Ibn ‘Atā’illāh al-Iskandarī , The Book of Wisdom, chapter 1, verse 14, trans. 
Victor Danner (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 49. 
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metaphysical principles.169 As Titus Burckhardt notes, traditional cosmology is “the science of the 
world inasmuch as this reflects its unique cause, Being.”170  
A traditional Christian or Islamic cosmology can be depicted as levels of heavens and 
angelic beings, with the earth being at the lowest plane, and God being beyond the furthest 
heavenly plane. Interpreted symbolically, however, the various elements of any cosmology depict a 
relationship between God and universe which reflects the principles of unity and hierarchy of 
reality such that the cosmos is an ordered whole reflecting God’s power, glory, will and wisdom 
from ‘above’ at all levels, including the earth. And as such, everything in worldly plane has a 
meaning and therefore a purpose. Modern cosmologies, on the other hand, are really 
cosmographies that depict only the material aspect of the cosmos according to modern scientific 
findings and speculations.171 As such, for Nasr, from the traditional perspective there is no such 
thing as a modern scientific cosmology, no matter how much we know of the material dimension 
of the cosmos.172 
 
Traditional cosmology, therefore, is evidently a religious cosmology and the term religious 
worldview is synonymous with traditional cosmology. Since the same metaphysical relationship 
between God and the creation can be depicted through a variety of symbols, outwardly even within 
the same religious community there can exist different cosmologies.  Likewise, in different 
religious traditions, different symbols and terms have been used outwardly to depict their 
                                                 
169 “All traditional cosmology is in fact the fruit of applications of the metaphysical principles to different 
domains of cosmic reality.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Cosmos as Theophany,”   in The Essential Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr, ed. William C. Chittick (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007), 189.   
170 Titus Burckhardt, “Traditional Cosmology and Modern Science,” in Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on 
Traditional Science and Sacred Art, trans. and ed. William Stoddart (Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia, 1987), 17. 
171 Purely material conception of cosmology by modern science is evident in modern studies of cosmologies. 
See Steven Weinberg, Cosmology (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), v-vi. 
172 “A cosmology which is based solely on the material and corporeal level of existence, however far it may 
extend into the galaxies…is not real cosmology. It is a generalized view of a terrestrial physics and chemistry.”  Nasr, 
Man and Nature, 22-23. 
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cosmologies.173 Hence, in speaking of a religious worldview, Traditionalists underline the 
overarching metaphysical principles. In that sense, a religious worldview is an articulation of 
reality as such, because in every religion God is ultimately synonymous with what is most Real.  
Thus, for a Traditionalist, any religious worldview fundamentally refers to the view that the totality 
of reality is characterized by unity of reality, hierarchy of reality and meaningfulness or 
purposefulness of the cosmos.  
 
The significance of cosmology or worldview in Nasr’s approach to the environmental crisis 
lies in the fact that no conscious human decision or action takes place in a metaphysical vacuum, 
that is to say, without a sense of what is real within and without him.174 Gestalt psychologists have 
also concluded that one’s worldview determines one’s perception.175 For instance, we don’t jump 
from the top of a mountain because we know that the nature of reality is such that we will hurt 
ourselves badly if we do so. When someone prays, he does so because for that person the nature of 
reality is such that there is a God in the universe who listens and responds, so on and so forth. 
Accordingly, Nasr contends that the human activities that has led to the environmental crisis was 
caused by a shift from the religious worldview prevalent before the Scientific Revolution to one 
determined by modern science after the Revolution.  
 
0.10 Nasr and Traditional Islam 
                                                 
173 See Martin Lings, “The Past in the Light of the Present,” in The Underlying Religion: An Introduction to 
the Perennial Philosophy, eds. Martin Lings and Clinton Minnaar (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007), 35-54. 
174 Based on class notes for the course titled Man and Nature, a graduate level course taught by Nasr in the 
Spring of 2004 at the George Washington University (USA), 27 January 2004.  Nasr emphasizes this point in almost 
all his public lectures on the environmental crisis. For instance, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Reading the Cosmic 
Qur’ān,” lecture delivered to the Muslim Students’ Association (MSA) at the George Mason University (USA), 27 
March 2008.  Also, see Nasr, “Islam and the Environment,” Lecture delivered at the Georgetown University School of 
Foreign Service, Qatar,  26 January 2009. Tapes  are available at  Nasr’s office at the George Washington University, 
USA. 
175 See Huston Smith, “Nasr’s Defense of the Perennial Philosophy,” 151. 
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According to Nasr, if one looked at the Islamic world two hundred years ago, “all that he 
could have observed, from the esoteric utterances of a Sufi saint to the juridical injunctions of 
an‘ālīm, from the strict theological views of a Hanbalite doctor from Damascus to the unbalanced 
assertions of some extreme form of Shi’ism, would have belonged in one degree or another to the 
Islamic tradition; that is to the single tree of Divine Origin whose roots are the Qur’ān and the 
Ḥadīth, and whose trunk and branches constitute that body of tradition that has grown from those 
roots over some fourteen centuries in nearly every inhabited quarter of the globe.”176  In other 
words, all these divergent claims were fundamentally determined by the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth, at 
least with regard to the fundamental principles including tawḥīd (unity of God), hierarchy of 
reality, and of the origin and end of the universe in God.  Indeed, for Nasr, “tradition” is primarily 
its principles:  
By “tradition” we do not mean habit or custom or the automatic transmission of ideas and 
motifs from one generation to another, but rather a set of principles which have descended 
from Heaven and which are identified at their origin with a particular manifestation of the 
Divine, along with the application and deployment of these principles at different moments 
of time and in different conditions of a particular humanity.177 
 
If the various groups differed from each other, they were not only in agreement on the 
fundamental principles but also practiced many of the same customs of the Prophet Muḥammad. 
Nasr contrasts this situation with the modern one in which many Muslims’ worldviews are 
significantly shaped by what is ‘modern’ which for him “means that which is cut off from the 
Transcendent, from the immutable principles which in reality govern all things and which are made 
known to man through revelation…”178 As the social critic Gerard Kelly has observed, “Central to 
                                                 
176 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 
1994), 11.  Ḥadīth refers to the sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad. 
177 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 2nd edition (Chicago: ABC International, 
2001), 73. 
178 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 98. (accent ours) 
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th[e] ideas [of modernism] is the supremacy of reason, expressed in scientific enquiry and giving 
birth to technological progress.”179 Indeed, for Nasr, the ‘modern’ had its beginning in the 
rationalistic tendencies of “the European Renaissance”180 and culminated with modern science 
which in turn led to the Enlightenment, scientism, and Industrial Revolution.181 Hence, we may say 
that for Nasr, modernism today consists of ideas which are based, directly or indirectly, on the 
transcendent-denying worldview of modern science and the associated rationalism.182  
 
For Nasr, the very presence of modernism, along with numerous current ‘fundamentalist’ 
movements which share many counter-traditional ideas with roots in modernism,183 has 
necessitated the need to distinguish tradition from the effects of modernism in the society.184 Thus, 
for Nasr, ‘traditional’ Islam is not a new category of Islam; rather, it is the understanding of Islam 
unaffected by modern scientific worldview, directly or indirectly, through various modern 
ideologies rooted in that worldview. Traditional Islam, as defined by Nasr, differs from other 
contemporary forms of Islam mainly in the latter’s rejection of the inner dimension of Islam, 
namely Sufism, though it is “not a teaching meant to be followed by all members of the 
                                                 
179 Gerard Kelly, Get a Grip on the Future without Losing Your Hold on the Past (London: Monarch Books, 
1999), 133 quoted in Haifaa Jawad, “Seyyed Hossein Nasr and The Study of Religion in Contemporary Society” The 
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 22:2, 2005,  p. 66  n18. 
180 Nasr, Traditional Islam in The Modern World, 12. Also, see Chapter 1.2-1.3. 
181 See Chapter 1.5. As the eminent political theorist Jane Bennett has observed that “Today, to call something 
‘modern’ is to frequently invoke its Enlightenmemnt characteristics.” See Bennett, Unthinking  Faith and 
Enlightenment, 7. 
182 See Chapter 1.4-1.4.1. 
183 “Most of the current ‘fundamentalist’ movements while denouncing modernism, accept some of the most 
basic aspects of modernism. This is clearly seen in their complete and open-armed acceptance of modern science and 
technology.” Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 19. According to Nasr, unlike many ‘fundamentalist’ 
movements, traditional Islam is opposed to any form of dictatorship. He believes that “such dictatorships are usually 
outwardly based on the external forms of political institutions derived from French Revolution and other upheavals of 
European history, even though they are presented as the authentic Islamic form of government. Ibid., 17 and 20-21. 
 
184 “What is directly opposed to tradition is counter-tradition,...and of course modernism, without whose 
existence there would be no need for the usage of such a term as ‘tradition’.” Ibid.,14.  Nasr excludes the original form 
of Wahhabism from the counter-traditional category which while opposed to the inner dimension of Islam, still 
remained bound to the Islamic worldview though in a very exoteric fashion. Ibid.,12. 
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community.”185 Thus, Nasr’s understanding of traditional Islam, as that which embraces both the 
outer and the inner dimension of Islam, is in accord with the opinions of grand authorities namely 
“al-Ghazzālī (d.1111) in the Sunni world, and Shaykh Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Amilī (1546-1621), in the 
Shi‘ite world.”186   
According to Nasr, the fundamental difference alluded to above between the traditional 
perspective and those of other current movements also manifests from the former’s acceptance of 
the sapiential commentaries of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth,187 espousal of Islamic art,188 emphasis on 
religious ethics in economics,189 insistence on non-coercive political administration,190 and 
opposition to scientific worldview in support of the religious/metaphysical view of nature.191 The 
last point, that is, the role of Sufism and the associated metaphysical knowledge in traditional Islam 
in upholding a religious/metaphysical view of nature and in providing a foundation for Islamic 
ethics, in the face of challenges by modern scientific views on nature, is the main subject of our 
discussion in Chapter 3.192  
Nasr points out the traditional nature of his own early upbringing in Iran: 
The greatest care was taken in my education in a home in which there was constant 
talk of cultural and religious matters and where [Sufi] poetry flowed freely like the morning 
breeze.  I was tutored from the earliest age by both parents who spent many hours a week 
teaching me verses of the Qur’ān, Persian poetry and even history, especially sacred history 
even when I was at the pre-schooling stage.”193 He continues, “Although Tehran was 
becoming gradually modernized, we still lived in a more or less ‘medieval’ Islamic town.  
                                                 
185 Ibid., 15. 
186 Ibid., 15-16. Also, see Joseph Lumbard, “The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology in the 
Modern Islamic World”, in Islam, Fundamentalism and Betrayal of Tradition, ed. Joseph E.B. Lumbard (Bloomington, 
IN: World Wisdon, 2004), 39-77. 
187 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 14-15 and 18. 
188 Ibid., 16. 
189 Ibid., 17. 
190 Ibid., 20-22. 
191 Ibid., 19. 
192 A remarkable early manifestation of traditional Islamic response to the scientific worldview was that of the 
theologian, Sufi and philosopher Maulanā Ashraf ‘Alī Thanvī (1863 – 1943).  See Fuad S. Naeem, “ A Traditional 
Islamic Response to the Rise of Modernism,” in Islam, Fundamentalism and Betrayal of Tradition, ed. Joseph E.B. 
Lumbard (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdon, 2004), 79-116. 
193 Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,”  6. 
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The early experience of our house, the narrow streets leading to it, the small mosque, the 
religiously decorated water fountain (saqā-khānah) nearby, the kind and pious neighbors, 
the sounds of the Qur’ān and the chants of vendors passing by are all indelibly marked in 
my memory and represent in a concrete manner the experience of the pre-modern world 
which I was to rediscover later intellectually.194  
 
This earlier traditional Islamic upbringing was complemented in two principle ways since 
his mid-twenties. From twenty four years of age he joined the ‘Alawī branch of the Shadhili Sufi 
order.195 In addition, for two decades thereafter he studied with the most renowned traditional 
teachers in Iran, namely Sayyid Muḥammad Kāzim 'Aṣṣār, 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad 
Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1892-1981) who wrote the most voluminous commentary of the Qur’ān in the 20th 
century, Tafsīr al-mīzān ("The Commentary of the Balance"), Sayyid Abu'l-Ḥasan Qazwīnī, and 
Hādī Ha'irī, a great authority on Rūmī and Sufism who was “like a second father”196 to Nasr. With 
the first three teachers, he studied traditional philosophy and metaphysics, especially Ibn ‘Arabī, 
Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā, and with Hadi Ha’iri he studied Sufi literature.197 Commenting on his 
immersion into Sufism and the study of Islamic philosophers after a long study of Western thought, 
Nasr’s speaks with wonder at the depth of Islamic wisdom and his abiding commitment to it ever 
since: “The writings of Sufi masters and Islamic philosophers began to regain the profoundest 
meaning for me after this long journey through various schools of Western philosophy and 
science…It was based upon personal rediscovery after  a long search and one might add suffering, 
Islamic wisdom became a most intense living reality…because I had been guided by the grace of 
Heaven to the eternal Sophia of which Islamic wisdom is one of the most universal and vital 
                                                 
194 Ibid., 7. 
195 Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 27. 
196 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 41. 
197 In assessing Nasr’s traditional Islamic education,  Patrick Laude has observed, “He is by no means a 
simply a Muslim born expert on Islam, he is the spiritual and intellectual offspring of a lineage of remarkable men 
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embodiments. Henceforth, I was set upon the intellectual path I have followed ever since… ”198 
His turn to Islam was not just confined to academic interest. As Dr. Mohammad Faghfoory recalls 
his student days at the University of Tehran when Nasr was a member of the faculty in the 
university, “It was hard for many students at the University of Tehran in the 1960s to comprehend 
that a young Harvard-educated professor prays five times a day and fasts regularly during Ramadan 
and almost every Thursday.”199  
 
A word must be said about Nasr’s views on the Sunni/Shi‘ite division within the Muslim 
world because some scholars have portrayed him as one having a Shite intellectual perspective.200 
First, while his traditional teachers in Iran were all Shi‘ite, he has been part of a Sunni Sufi order 
for most of his life. Second, the intellectual issue which concerns his view on nature, namely, the 
nature of reality as such, is the same both in the Sunni and the Shi‘ite worlds in their inner 
dimensions. As Nasr has observed, Sunnism and Shi‘ism have some differences only “on the 
formal and legal level” and Sufism transcends these outer differences without rejecting them.201  
Nasr points out that the first eight of the Shi‘ite Imams also “appear in the initiatic chain of nearly 
every Sufi order.”202 Also, Ibn ‘Arabī has been as influential in the Shi‘ite as in the Sunni world.  
The distinguished Iraqi Sunni Islamic scholar Haifaa Jawad dismisses any criticism of Nasr’s pro-
Shi‘ite bias to be without any foundation.203 It is not surprising that in addition to his native Iran, 
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his writings have been influential in the mostly Sunni countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan 
and Turkey.204 
 
Nasr’s articulation of traditional Islam has found support among some of the foremost 
Islamic scholars today. According to John Voll, a leading contemporary historian of the Muslim 
world, from early in his career Nasr has articulated an “Islamic perspective that reflected the main 
lines of the majority consensus within the framework of the historic traditions of Islam”205 and 
from the 1970s onward became the most visible spokesperson of the Muslim intelligentsia who 
were traditional and yet fully cognizant of the modern world.206 William Chittick, one of the 
foremost scholar of Islamic intellectual tradition today, has stated categorically that Nasr’s 
“interpretation of the contemporary implications of Islamic thought are firmly grounded in the 
tradition, much more so than many of his critics would like to acknowledge.”207  Chittick argues 
that if Nasr quotes Schuon and other Traditionalist authors frequently that “cannot be taken as 
evidence that his views do not have the Islamic support that he claims. He is not speaking as a 
preacher interested in bolstering his arguments by quoting the revered names, but rather as a 
philosopher who has found some of the clearest expositions of his intellectual vision in 
contemporary authors.” 208 However, in addition to the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, Nasr quotes Ibn Sīnā, 
al-Ghazzālī, Ibn ‘Arabī, Mullā Ṣadrā, Rūmī and many other great authorities of Islamic tradition 
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frequently.  Indeed, Jawad has stated categorically that “Seyyed Hossein Nasr is one of the main 
proponents of…the traditional Islamic point of view.”209 Jane Smith, another distinguished Islamic 
scholar, adds that “Nasr persuasively makes the case for the absolute necessity of reappropriating 
the traditional Islamic perspective.”210 
 
0.11  Environmentalism in the Muslim World and Nasr 
            Based on the several country reports in Environmentalism in the Muslim World,211 the most 
comprehensive study done yet of Muslim environmentalism across the world, one can draw a few 
conclusions about environmentalism in the Muslim world today.  As in the West, developmental 
activities in Muslim countries have been the primary cause of environmental degradation. The 
limitations of conventional Western environmentalism we discussed earlier are confirmed by 
studies on many major Muslim countries where environmental movements, more often than not, 
are modelled after their secular counterparts in the West and try to follow similar methods in 
raising environmental awareness and in “managing” the natural “resources” through secular or 
scientific means. Ali Ahmad, a Nigerian Islamic legal expert, laments about  methods used by most 
Muslim environmentalists in Nigeria, “their strategies and plans of action completely adopt the 
Western framework, with little consideration for an Islamic input that will readily address local 
sensibilities.”212Even Saudi Arabia, the country which is home to the birth-place of Islam, has a 
National Commission for Wildlife Conservation and Development (NCWCD) that is run as a 
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secular institution. Not surprisingly, “There has been a steady decline of himā213 system in Saudi 
Arabia over a number of years, much of it giving way to unsuitable economic development 
projects.”214 
 
As in the West, business and industrial sectors have been most resistant to 
environmentalism and governments themselves have been, except in the case of Iran215 and 
possibly Malaysia,216 often at odds with agendas of environmental movements. The whole agenda 
of ‘sustainable development’ – the development that does not endanger future availability of the 
resource –pushed for and often partially funded by Western nations, UNDP and international 
environmental organizations, generally is not accompanied by any serious effort on the ground to 
ensure sustainability of the environment.217 Most often, development activities are carried out with 
hardly any concern for their impact on the environment. Existing government regulations are weak 
and are rarely enforced. The lack of greater active interest can be attributed to a variety of factors.  
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Often, among the general population, there is little awareness that the environmental crisis is not 
simply about garbage piling up in their neighbourhoods or confined to some Western countries, but 
threatens the environment/ecology of the whole planet in a way that will make human life on earth 
progressively more difficult in the years and decades ahead. But, the most important factor behind 
the environmental degradation, as we saw earlier, is developmental activities fuelled by the ideal of 
material progress related to scientific progressivism. 
 
As an intellectual, Nasr sees his function to be one to affect change directly at the level of 
ideas not at the level of actions.218 Hence, the intellectual support of Muslim modernists and many 
‘fundamentalists’ that legitimizes and encourages scientific progressivism is the subject of our 
discussion in Chapter 4. As we will see, Muslim modernist reformists beginning with Jamāl al-Dīn 
al-Afghānī (1838-1897), later followed by many ‘fundamentalists’, saw no fundamental difference 
between Islamic science of the middle ages and modern science. Accordingly, the reformists saw 
modern science and technology as value-neutral and the central means of progress of human 
society. Nasr points out that this lack of distinction between traditional and modern science, 
blindness to the secular cultural baggage that comes with it, and the scientific progressivism, stand 
in the way of a spiritual view of nature essential to bring back the attitude of respect and care for 
nature. 
 
In Chapters 5-7, we see how Nasr’s arguments based on Islamic metaphysical principles 
delegitimize the arguments of the proponents of scientific progressivism. First, Chapter 5 implicitly 
rejects the claim that modern science is simply an advanced version of traditional science.  Nasr 
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demonstrates that Islamic traditional sciences had developed in harmony with the fundamental 
metaphysical principles which were later to be ignored completely in modern science. Second, 
Nasr rejects the view that either modern science or modern technology is value-neutral. We present 
Nasr’s arguments to that effect in Chapters 6 and 7.  In Chapter 6, we discuss how modern 
scientific knowledge creates a worldview wherein God is irrelevant. Instead of helping to realize 
tawḥīd, modern scientific knowledge portrays the cosmos consisting of distinct ontologically 
unrelated material entities. Here we include Nasr’s critique of modern science whose immediate 
significance becomes clear in light of the strong opposition to his kind of environmentalism voiced 
by Western secular environmentalists who are inspired by the theory of evolution. Chapter 7 
discusses how modern technology-based lifestyle forces one to think quantitatively and ultimately 
has the same effect on human thought as scientific knowledge does – it takes one’s consciousness 
away from the realities of unity and hierarchy of reality as well as from any sense of an ultimate 
purpose beyond the material domain. In summary, Chapters 6 and 7 warn of continuous 
undermining of Islamic values in the milieu of modern science and technology. 
 
The discussions in Chapters 6 and 7 also underline the importance of the discussion in 
Chapter 3 about metaphysical knowledge as the foundation of ethics and of Sufism as the means of 
realizing it. It is the basis of Nasr’s argument that merely an ethical approach to the environmental 
crisis, while helpful, cannot succeed in the long run if modern science is allowed a free play. 
Though an ethical approach can be effective, especially in projects which are relatively isolated 
from larger economic activities such as the Misali Ethics Project in Zanzibar led by Fazlun 
Khalid,219 Othman Llewellyn’s Jabal Aja’ project in Saudi Arabia,220 tree-planting campaigns in 
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Northern Nigeria221 and Ayman Awhal’s efforts to save forests in Malaysia and Indonesia.222  But 
the worsening environmental situation in Iran illustrates that for a nation at large unless collective 
ambition of continuous technological and economic growth is not sacrificed,223 preaching on 
environmental ethics of Islam which Iranian government has done well,224 while helpful, cannot 
effectively contain or reverse the environmental degradation.  
 
Nasr is much in agreement with most other prominent Muslim environmentalists with 
regards to the need to revive existing Islamic ethics regarding the environment as well as to expand 
their scope to face the challenge of today’s environmental degradation.225 We have in mind most 
prominent Islamic environmentalists like Mawil Izzi Dien, Fazlun Khaled, S. Nomanul Haq, 
Othman Abd-ar Rahman Llewellyn, Ibrahim Ozdemir and several others whose views can be easily 
traced to the Qur’ān or the Ḥadīth, and by the same token are traditional by nature.226 Almost all of 
them have been, in one degree or another, influenced by Nasr’s exposition of the relationship 
between God, the human being and the natural world since the publication in the early 1960s of his 
Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines. Where they differ from Nasr is in their attitude, in 
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varying degrees, towards modern science and the role that Islam’s inner dimension can play in 
addressing the environmental crisis.  For instance, Fazlun Khalid, who is perhaps the most active 
Islamic environmentalist on the ground, relies mainly on appealing to Islamic ethics.227 Yet, he 
owes his gratitude to Nasr’s vision on environmentalism and still consults him.228 Nasr attempts to 
bring together both the outer dimension of Islam in the form of Islamic ethics which includes the 
Sharī‘ā, and the inner dimension of Islam – Sufism, traditional sciences and later Islamic 
philosophy which have integrated Sufi metaphysics, all of which uphold the metaphysical 
principles of Islam– to address the crisis. For this reason, we think Nasr’s approach to the 
environmental crisis is more fully traditional Islamic than those of other Islamic environmentalists. 
 
Many of the aforementioned Islamic environmentalists also recognize the folly of the 
modern scientific worldview as that which stands in the way of a viable solution to the 
environmental crisis.229 But unlike Nasr, they have neither criticized modern science, scientism or 
scientific progressivism extensively, nor suggested comprehensive alternatives, however 
improbable in the short term, to enable Muslims to deal with the problem of scientism and 
scientific progressivism in the Muslim world in the long run. At the same time, the scientific 
progressivist attitude of modernist reformists can be found among some of the Islamic 
environmentalists such as Mawil Izzi Dien, who believes that “[Western] civilisation ... utilizes 
empirical methodology and organisation to harness natural phenomena in the service of human 
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needs. By combining this instrumental civilisation with the Islamic notion of value, significant 
advances may be made in the Muslim world in particular, and possibly extended to the wider 
world.”230 This statement is particularly surprising in light of his awareness of the horrendous 
social disruption and ecological disaster that has been caused by the rapid industrialization of the 
Middle East in the last few decades.231  
 
0.11.1 Criticisms of the Idea of Islamic Environmentalism 
Nasr and other Islamic environmentalists have also faced criticisms for their insistence that 
Islam itself is highly eco-friendly and Muslims need only to become aware of this aspect of their 
religion. Foremost among these critics of Nasr and other Islamic environmentalists are Richard 
Foltz and Kaveh Afrasiabi.232 While Afrasiabi’s critique of the Islamic attitude towards the 
environment runs along the same line as Foltz’s, his is particularly polemical in tone. Hence, my 
rebuttal of the more nuanced critique by Foltz should serve for both.   
 
Given the limited scope, I will point out only a few of many unconvincing arguments Foltz 
makes to suggest that Islam is not originally as eco-freindly as Islamic environmentalists, including 
Nasr, insist. In interpreting the Qur’ānic verse “In Whose Hand is the dominion (malakūt) of all 
things” (23:88)  Nasr states, in reference to the natural order, “This verse not only implies the 
                                                 
230 Izzi Dien, Environmental Dimension of Islam, 81. 
231 Mawil Izzi Dien, “Islam and the Environment: Theory and Practice,” in Islam and Ecology: A Bestowed 
Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University 
Press, 2003), 110-114.  For a look at the environmental crisis in the Gulf area of the Middle East today, see Liz 
Alderman,“Dubai Struggles with Environmental Problems after Years of Growth,” New York Times, 28 October, 2010; 
available from  http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/business/energy-environment/28dubai.html?hpw ; Internet; 
accessed 18 November 2010. 
232 See Richard C. Foltz, “Islamic Environmentalism: A Matter of Interpretation,” in Islam and Ecology: A 
Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 249-79 and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, “Toward an Islamic Ecotheology,” in Islam and Ecology: A 
Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 281-296. 
 59
governance of all things by God but also the existence of metaphysical root of all things in God’s 
‘Hand’.”233  For Foltz, Nasr’s interpretation of the term ‘nature’ contrasts with the way the term has 
been used by Ibn Sīnā or Ikhwān al- Ṣafā, and this difference serves as an evidence of self-styled 
interpretations of Islamic environmentalists.234 On the other hand, Nasr’s comment clearly relates 
to the doctrine of immutable archetypes (al-a‘yān al-thābita) attributed to Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
interpretation of certain Qur’ānic verses and the principle of hierarchy of reality.235  
 
Foltz dismisses, without evidence, the way Islamic environmentalists understand the 
Qur’ānic doctrine of  the human being as the khalīfah (vicegerent) of God to mean, among other 
things, that humans bear the responsibility to care for nature according to God’s will, that is, as 
stewards following God’s will on earth.236 On the other hand, we find classical exegetes of the 
Qur’ān such as Abū Ja‘far al-Tabarī (d. 923) and Abū ‘Abdallah al-Qurtubī (d. 1273) interpreting 
the term khalīfah as one who follows the will of God.237 In the same vein, from an inner 
perspective, we find Sufis like Ibn ‘Arabī and Nizām al-Dīn Nishaburi (d. 1327) see khalīfah as the 
human being who can judge God’s creation with the qualities of God Himself.238  
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Foltz’s dismissal of the interpretation of Islamic sacred texts by contemporary Muslim 
environmentalists, early commentators of the Qur’ān, or by mystics like Ibn ‘Arabī, as 
unauthentically Islamic no matter how enormously influential, belies his own argument that only 
one interpretation of the sacred texts should not be seen as true in exclusion of the rest, while 
insisting that only “non-hierarchical” interpretation of the sacred texts are needed today.239 Foltz’s 
stance is particularly puzzling with regards to the interpretation of the term khalīfah when there 
appears to be a consensus among Islamic environmentalists in understanding the term in the sense 
mentioned earlier. According to Foltz, the term khalīfah suggests a hierarchical relationship 
between the human being and rest of creation which, for him, is problematic for the 
environment.240 Such an interpretation is, in fact, more in line with those of Muslim reformists and 
many fundamentalists who wrote, according to Othman Llewellyn, “under the influence of 
European Humanism, and in response to allegations that Islam gives too little value to the human 
being.”241 Furthermore, in light of our earlier discussion, only in the state of surrender to God’s 
will does one have any right over the created order.242 Exploitation of nature has no place in this 
relationship between the human being and nature. 
 
Foltz’s dismissal of the environmentalists’ understanding of the term khalīfah goes along 
with his contention that Islam is anthropocentric “like Christianity and Judaism.” Foltz explains, 
“Islam...emphasizes the relationship between humans and God above all else and has, by 
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comparison, little to say about the importance of our myriad fellow creatures.”243  In other words, 
for Foltz, the focus on the “relationship between humans and God” proves Islam’s 
anthropocentrism. What Foltz misses, sadly, is that in Islam, much like in the other two Abrahamic 
faiths, cultivating the virtues of justice, compassion, contentment, simplicity, etc., which strengthen 
the relationship between God and humanity, can also guarantee protection of the natural world 
from human exploitation, as noted by the veteran environmentalists Sachs, Speth and Meadows et 
al.244 Moreover, the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth have much to say about the value of the natural world 
and the need to treat every entity with compassion.245 Beyond that, in the absence of the 
industrialization, the traditional world had no need for a more extensive theology with regards to 
the environment. As Ali Ahmad has observed, in the Northern Nigeria “It is widely accepted that 
Islam played a significant role in engendering consciousness about natural elements, their beauty, 
their precise and delicate order, and how everything is interrelated and connected.”246  If the 
Islamic faith intrinsically has been less caring about the natural world than the Hindu or the 
Buddhist world, as Foltz has implied,247 there would be evidence that these other civilizations had 
preserved their natural world better in the pre-modern age. Moreover,  there is no evidence now 
that Hindu India or Buddhist Sri Lanka are any less active in polluting their contemporary 
environment than their geographical and cultural neighbours Muslim Bangladesh and Pakistan.248  
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Foltz asserts, without evidence, that the Qur’ānic doctrine of tawḥīd has not been 
understood historically “as meaning ‘all-inclusive’”249 contrary to assertions of contemporary 
Islamic environmentalists, such as Nasr. Indeed, the understanding of tawḥīd as the all-inclusive 
unity of reality, is crucial to Nasr’s thesis against modern science’s fragmented view of reality.250 
Hence the flaws of Foltz’s assertion deserve clarification.  
 
Foltz believes that the doctrine of the unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd), attributed to the 
teachings of Ibn ‘Arabī, is the only basis of understanding tawḥīd as an all-inclusive reality. He 
believes that waḥdat al-wujūd is based solely on one Qur’ānic verse “Wherever you turn, there is 
God’s countenance,”251 although there are other verses pointing to that meaning and numerous 
Sufis have spoken of very similar experiences of their own long before Ibn ‘Arabī.252 In addition, 
waḥdat al-wujūd is intertwined with the doctrine of immutable archetype (al-a‘yān al-thābita) 
which refutes Foltz’s suggestion that Ibn ‘Arabī was a monist.253 Moreover, there is precedence of 
very similar views held by the great theologian and Sufi, al-Ghazzālī who Foltz quotes elsewhere 
to bolster his own argument for Islamic support of birth control.254 Al-Ghazzālī states categorically, 
“The gnostics, after having ascended to the heaven of reality, agree that they see nothing in 
existence save the One, the Real. Some of them possess this state as a cognitive gnosis. Others, 
however, attain this through a state of tasting. Plurality is totally banished from them, and they 
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become immersed in sheer singularity...Nothing is with them but God.”255 This assertion by al-
Ghazzālī certainly vindicates Ibn ‘Arabī’s exposition of tawḥīd to be in line with that of his 
uncontroversial great predecessor. 
 
Foltz acknowledges Ibn ‘Arabī’s enormous influence on Sufism but tries to dismiss his 
metaphysics as unorthodox 256 and “highly controversial”257 seemingly unaware of the fact that 
until the middle of the 19th century Sufism could hardly be distinguished from orthodox Islam for 
most of the Muslim world.258 William Chittick, the foremost expositor of Ibn ‘Arabī’s thought in 
the West, explains how Ibn ‘Arabī has been the most influential Islamic intellectual since al-
Ghazzālī259and why his influence has been in sharp decline since the second half of the 19th 
century: 
After his death in 1240, Ibn ‘Arabī’s teachings quickly spread throughout the Islamic 
world...The reason for this spread was certainly not that the masters of various forms of 
rational discourse that shaped the Muslim elite were overawed by his mystical credentials. 
Quite the contrary, they were convinced by the soundness of his arguments and the breadth 
of his learning. They paid attention to him because he offered powerful proofs, drawn from 
the whole repertoire of Islamic knowledge, to demonstrate the correctness of his views. 
Many of these scholars adopted his basic perspectives and a good deal of his terminology, 
and many also criticized his teachings or made sweeping condemnations. But no reputable 
scholar could simply ignore him. Ibn ‘Arabī’s doctrines and perspectives did not have the 
limited, elite audience that one might expect. They also seeped down into nooks and 
crannies of Islamic culture...Ibn ‘Arabī’s popularity among Sufis should not be understood 
to mean that he was widely read by them...however, those with an intellectual calling, who 
often ended up as guides and teachers, spoke a language that was largely fashioned by him 
and his immediate followers...Partly because of his pervasive influence and widespread 
                                                 
255 Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī , The Niche of Lights, trans. David Buchman (Provo, Utah: Brigham 
Young University Press, 1998), 17.  In another occasion    relates this the to formal declaration of tawḥīd(unity of 
God): “ ‘There is no god but God’ is the declaration of God’s unity  of the common people, while ‘There is no he but 
He’ is the declaration of God’s unity of the elect...”  
See al-Ghazzālī, The Niche of Lights, 20. 
256 See Foltz, “Islamic Environmentalism: A Matter of Interpretation,” 250-251. 
257 Foltz, “Islamic Environmentalism: A Matter of Interpretation,” 253. 
258 See Chapter 4.1.1. 
259 William C. Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabī: Heir to the Prophets (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 1. 
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recognition, Ibn ‘Arabī came to be targeted by reformers and modernists from the second 
half of the 19th century.260 
 
Hence, James Morris, one of the leading scholars of Ibn ‘Arabī and Islamic intellectual tradition, 
suggests, “Paraphrasing Whitehead’s famous remark about Plato ... one could say that the history 
of Islamic thought subsequent to Ibn ‘Arabī (at least down to the 18th century and the radically new 
encounter with the modern West) might largely be construed as a series of footnotes to his 
work.”261 Likewise, what has often been ignored since the 19th century is that Ibn ‘Arabī has 
provided some of the most cogent arguments to emphasize that the observance of the Sharī‘ā was 
an essential means of spiritual perfection for Muslims.262 In the same vein, Nasr argues that Ibn 
‘Arabī has been a great force for the preservation of the Islamic tradition by providing superior 
reasoning: “Through Ibn ‘Arabī, Islamic esotericism provided the doctrines which alone could 
guarantee the preservation of the Tradition among men who were always in the danger of being led 
astray by incorrect reasoning and in most of whom the power of intellectual intuition was not 
strong enough to reign supreme over other human tendencies and to prevent the mind from falling 
into error.”263  
 
0.12 The Need for a Sacred Science  
Nasr is not content with drawing attention to modern science’s effects on the human mind 
and consequently upon nature as elaborated in chapters 6 and 7. His traditional response aspires to 
transform modern science itself traditional by reinterpreting its observational data through the lens 
of traditional metaphysical principles. For Nasr, this does not necessarily mean reverting back to 
                                                 
260  Chittick, Heir to the Prophets, 2-3. 
261 James Morris, “Ibn Arabi and his Interpreters,” Part II-A, Journal of the American Oriental Society, 106 
(1986), 733. 
262 See Chapter 3.3. 
263 Nasr, Three Muslim Sages (New York: Caravan Books, 1964), 91. 
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the traditional Islamic sciences of the middle ages discussed in Chapter 5, but to take them as 
inspiring models and adopt the natural philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā which provides the most 
systematic treatments in Islam of the parameters of natural sciences as yet, namely cause, effect, 
space, time, matter, growth and change and how they relate to the being or the self while upholding 
the principles of unity and hierarchy of reality as well as of the purposefulness of all entities. 
Chapter 8 summarizes Ṣadrā’s view of the aforementioned parameters of science and how that 
leads to profound answers to questions relevant today. In addition, Chapter 8 provides a summary 
of the educational reforms Nasr has in mind to enable Muslims to establish the Islamic sacred 
science he envisions for the future.  
 
0.13 Introduction Summary 
The environmental crisis has been the result of modern science and technology-based 
lifestyles and economies. Mainstream environmentalism is in an impasse because it works from 
within the paradigm of the technology-driven modern economic system without being able to alter 
that very system which causes the environmental degradation. As voiced by several leading 
environmentalists and argued for by others including Nasr, there is an urgent need for a religious 
approach to the environmental crisis. 
 
With the summaries we have provided for each of the chapters, we have outlined Nasr’s 
strategy as follows. The foundation of Islamic environmentalism must be based on the religious 
view of nature, that is, on knowledge of nature as given in Islamic sacred texts, their sapiential 
commentaries and the Intellection of Islamic sages. This approach cannot be successful without 
undoing the hold of the scientific worldview on people’s consciousness. The undoing would 
 66
involve a re-appreciation of Islamic metaphysics, Sufism and philosophy, and a critique of modern 
science and technology from the Islamic philosophical or metaphysical perspective. Eventually, 
this strategy involves replacing modern science with an Islamic science founded on its own 
metaphysical principles. However, since the environmental crisis confronts the whole of humanity 
and not just the Muslims, Nasr often speaks in the universal terms of the perennial philosophy so as 
to relate the environmental challenges facing the whole humanity and to point at long term 
solutions. 
 
Thus, in order to prepare ourselves to understand Nasr’s vision for the Islamic world we 
have provided a brief summary of the perennial philosophy and its relationship to any traditional 
metaphysics and cosmology or worldview whose Islamic counterparts are of central importance in 
his strategy for an Islamic response that includes the establishment of an Islamic science. 
Furthermore, we have presented the traditional Islamic character of Nasr’s upbringing, education 
and thought, outlined the environmental challenges faced by Muslim countries, and defended the 
notion of an Islamic environmentalism against critics. 
 
In order to focus on the main objective of our thesis, which is to present Nasr’s vision and 
strategy systematically and comprehensively in rest of the thesis, this Introducion has also 
attempted to highlight the similarities and differences between him and other prominent Islamic 
environmentalists. After a systematic presentation of Nasr’s whole strategy over the next eight 




However, for a comprehensive understanding of Nasr’s Islamic approach to the 
environmental crisis, our journey must begin by first identifying what Nasr considers to be the root 
causes of the current environmental crisis in the intellectual history of Western Europe where 
Renaissance humanism, followed by the Scientific Revolution, the Enlightenment and the 




            We have followed the Chicago style for referencing with occasional slight modifications.  
We have followed the convention laid out in the Encyclopaedia of the Qur’ān 264 for transliteration 
of common Arabic words.  To convey the plural of any Arabic noun, we have added a ‘s’ at the end 
of the Arabic word, e.g., ḥadīths (sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad). Unless mentioned otherwise 
or included in a quote, the Qur’ānic verses are from The Meaning of the Holy Qur’ān.265 Likewise, 
the ḥadīths are accessed from The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari.266  
 
We have used the pronoun ‘he’ to refer to any unnamed human being without meaning only 
the ‘male’ gender. All dates are given according to the Common Era. Finally, every section in 
every chapter has been numbered in order to make reference to the discussion in that section easy. 
Section numbers begin with the number of the chapter it belongs to. Thus, Chapter 4.6 refers to 
section 4.6 in Chapter 4.  
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A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS 
 
A young Muslim will never be able to understand the modern world without understanding the role of religion 
and also its eclipse in the West during the incubation, birth, growth and spread of the modern world[view] in 
Europe and America and its later spread to other lands.1 
               S. H. Nasr 
 
The solution of the environmental crisis cannot come but from the cure of the spiritual malaise of modern man 
and the rediscovery of the world of the Spirit...2  
S. H. Nasr 
 
Nasr holds that the environmental crisis today is driven by the prevalent modern scientific 
worldview which since the Scientific Revolution gradually replaced religious worldviews that 
prevailed before the advent of modern science.3 Nasr’s thesis is based on the premise – which is 
supported by the conclusions of the vast majority of the climate scientists4 – that human activities 
based on modern science and technology since the Industrial Revolution are the main cause behind 
the environmental crisis. Nasr’s solution to the crisis lies in part in our ability to understand what is 
destructive about modern science and technology and to find appropriate remedies accordingly.  
The solution, Nasr asserts, requires in part understanding “the philosophical and theological 
significance” of assumptions inherent in modern science that concerns both the human self-
perception and his perception of the nature that surrounds him.5 Our purpose in this chapter is to 
highlight Nasr’s main conclusions in this regard and present historical evidence to explain them 
wherever possible. We will do this in three phases.  
 
                                                 
1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1994), 
136. 
2 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 
145. 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (Chicago: ABC International Group, 
1997), 21-22. 
4 Introduction 0.1.  
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First, in section 1.1, we will briefly present Christian religious and philosophical 
worldviews before the advent of modern science. Second, from section 1.2 to 1.4.1, we will outline 
how, for Nasr, the birth of modern science was the final triumph of a rationalistic trend in Western 
thought that eventually replaced Christian worldviews with the modern scientific worldview. 
Third, in sections 1.5 and 1.5.1 we will discuss how the modern scientific worldview gave birth to 
the modern human being inclined to exploit nature to meet the needs of his increasingly 
materialistic goals and activities. This will include a brief presentation of recent research by 
eminent economic historians that, in effect, vindicates Nasr’s philosophical conclusion that modern 
scientific worldview played a crucial role in bringing about the Industrial Revolution and the 
environmental crisis that eventually followed. We will end the chapter with a summary of Nasr’s 
general recommendations for all civilizations for a lasting solution to the environmental crisis. 
 
1.1 Nature in the Pre-Modern Christian Europe 
Since modern science was born in the Christian West, we must begin with a look at the 
view of nature in Christianity, a view that was later to be eclipsed by that of modern science. Many 
eminent contemporary Christian thinkers have portrayed the Christian view of nature, with 
emphasis on the view of God’s presence in nature, as it was prevalent before the advent of modern 
science. 6 This attests to the radical transformation of the Western worldview after the birth of 
modern science. Nasr points out, directly or indirectly, of the presence of the perennial 
                                                                                                                                                                 
5 Nasr, Man and Nature, 20-21. 
6 Philip Sherrard, The Rape of Man and Nature (Ipswich, UK: Golgonooza Press, 1987), 64.  As Peter 
Harrison has observed, in the Middle Ages, the knowledge of all things meant primarily the knowledge of their 
spiritual meanings and purposes. See Harrison, “Subduing the Earth: Genesis 1, Early Modern Science, and the 
Exploration of Nature,” The Journal of Religion, 1999, pp.91-92. For a summary of the Christian view of God’s unity 
and omnipresence and of nature as a sign of God, see Wolfgang Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence: Breaking Through 
the Barrier of Scientistic Belief (Illinois: Sherwood Sugden & Company, 1984), 45-60. Wendel Berry, “Christianity 
and the Survival of Creation”, in Seeing God Everywhere: Essays on Nature and the Sacred, ed. Barry McDonald 
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metaphysical principles – unity of reality, hierarchy of reality, and the purposefulness of the 
cosmos – in traditional Christian sources.  
 
First, we have the Biblical view of the unity and omnipresence of the Spirit of God, the 
view that is also championed by the likes of Francis of Assisi (1182-1226), Hildegard of Bingen 
(1098-1179) and Meister Eckhart (1260-1327).7 This also relates to the idea of vestigia dei, the 
“signs of God” in all things of nature.8  Indeed, Saint Paul states this in unequivocal terms: “the 
invisible things of Him from the creation of the world have been clearly seen, being understood by 
the things that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead.” (Romans 1:20)  
 
Second, the early Greek Church Fathers like St. Maximus (580-662) envisioned the logos 
doctrine according to which principles of all entities were contained in Christ, the Logos or the 
Word of God through whom the cosmos was created by God.9 Likewise, the doctrine of the 
existence of archetypes or principles in the Divine plane for of all corporeal entities are to be found 
in other Christian Platonic and Neoplatonic sages.10   
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 53-70. For a summary of St. Maximus’s views, see Vincent Rossi, “Sacred 
Cosmology in the Christian Tradition,” The Ecologist Vol. 30; Issue 1, January 2000. 
7 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 56-59.    
8 Ibid., 136. The term vestigial dei to mean signs or traces of God in creation was first coined by Saint 
Augustine (354-430) and ever since remained integral to the Christian view of nature as reflected in the thoughts of 
numerous medieval saints and scholars. See Marie-Dominique Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1997), 115-117. Especially significant in this regard is Saint 
Bonaventure’s (1221-1274) metaphysical exposition of St. Francis’s experiences of the divine in the midst of nature. 
See P. Rout, Francis and  Bonaventure (Glasgow,UK: Fount Paperbacks, 1996). 
9 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 58-59.  The logoi of things is the “fundamental meaning” in 
accordance with which the thing is created by God. See Andrew Louth, Maximus the Confessor (New York: 
Routledge, 1996), 65. 
10 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 57 and 97-98. 
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Third, we have the synthesis of Aristotelian cosmology with the Christian worldview of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-74) that has been the centrepiece of scholasticism since the 13th century 
and has been splendidly conveyed by Dante’s Divine Comedy. It is the vision of a geocentric and 
finite universe with a hierarchic structure that also represents the levels of reality the human soul 
has to traverse, from the lowest or the earthly level, to reach the highest reality of God.11  
 
1.2 The Root is in Rationalism 
While Nasr acknowledges a number of interrelated causes that laid the ground for the 
emergence of modern science, for him, the increasing dominance of rationalism in Western thought 
from the 12th century onward was the fundamental philosophical cause.  In light of our earlier 
discussion of the distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘Intellect,’12 “Rationalism does not mean simply 
the use of reason, but the exclusive use of reason independent of both intellection and revelation 
and the consideration of reason as the highest and exclusive authority for the attainment of truth.”13  
To be sure, rationalism as such pitted itself against the tradition of St. Augustine (354-430), St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-74), Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) and their followers.14 By the same token, 
rationalism obscured the sacred or sapiental view of nature which can only be appreciated by the 
Intellect. As Nasr put it, “The reduction of the Intellect to reason …not only caused sacred 
knowledge to become inaccessible and to some even meaningless but it also destroyed that natural 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 99-100. 
12 See Introduction 0.9.1. 
13 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 170.  
14 Erigena clearly makes a distinction between reason and the intellect, which shares in the divine nature. See 
W. Norman Pittenger, “The Christian Philosophy of John Scotus Erigena,” The Journal of Religion, vol. 24, No. 4 
(Oct., 1944), 250.  For Aquinas, the act of intellectus was more perfect than that of ratio. See Andrew Tallon, Head 
and Heart: Affection, Cognition, Volition as Triune Consciousness (Fordham University Press, 1997), 275. Saint 
Augustine also held that human reason, once illuminated by God, can know much more. See Brian Harding, 
“Scepticism, Illumination and Christianity: In Augustine’s Contra Academicos,” Augustinian Studies 34:2 (2003), 12. 
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theology which in the Christian context represented at least a reflection of knowledge of a sacred 
order, of the wisdom or sapientia.”15  
 
According to Nasr, by the end of the 17th century, the growing rationalism among 
intellectual circles in the Christian West fundamentally transformed not just the human view of the 
cosmos but also of his own self, “What happened in the post-medieval period in the West was that 
higher levels of reality became eliminated in both the subjective and the objective domains: There 
was nothing higher in man than his reason and nothing higher in the objective world than what that 
reason could comprehend with the help of the normal human senses.”16 It becomes evident from 
Nasr’s analysis that this transformation happened in three progressive major phases. The first 
phase, which began after the fall of the Moorish city of Toledo in 1085, consisted of the impact on 
Christian thought of the Islamic Aristotelian philosophy and the associated sciences from the 
Islamic world.17 The second phase was driven by the intellectual movement known as Renaissance 
Humanism. Nasr contends that the transformations of our understanding of the human self and 
nature during the first two phases effectively divorced philosophy from metaphysics and 
revelation, laying the foundations for the birth of modern science in the 17th century.18  The third 
phase is the Scientific Revolution during the 17th century, which led to the separation of science 
                                                 
15 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 4. As 
Mircea Eliade suggests, “...we might say that for the nonreligious men of the modern age, the cosmos has become 
opaque, inert, and mute; it transmits no message, it holds no cipher. The feeling of sanctity survives today in Europe 
chiefly among rural populations, for it is among them that a Christianity lived as a cosmic liturgy still exists.” See 
Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. Williard R. Trask (New York and London: 
Hartcourt, 1987), 178. 
16 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1994), 100-101. 
17 Nasr, Man and Nature, 60-61; Also see David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The 
European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450, 2nd 
edition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 225-246. 
18 Nasr, Religion and Order of Nature, 177. Also, see Charles G. Nauret, Humanism and the Culture of 
Renaissance Europe, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 204   
73 
 
from metaphysics and revelation19 and, by the same token, led to a complete denial of the perennial 
principles of the unity and hierarchy of reality and the of ultimate meaningfulness or 
purposefulness of the cosmos.   
 
Given the limited scope of our discussion and our concern with the philosophical 
foundations of modern science and their implications, we will first highlight some of the most 
important factors that led to the third phase, the Scientific Revolution, which saw a complete 
triumph of rationalism and empiricism. This will be followed by a discussion of the basic 
philosophical assumptions of modern science and how the scientific worldview amounted to a 
denial of the traditional Christian worldviews fundamentally. We will begin with a brief summary 
of Nasr’s view of the role of Renaissance Humanism in Scientific Revolution and highlight the 
immense significance of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in whom, according to Nasr, “can be found 
that aspect of modern science which is concerned not so much with understanding the order of 
nature as with dominating over it.”20 
 
1.3 The Renaissance Humanism and the emergence of the Promethean Man 
The Humanist movement of the Renaissance was multi-faceted and often contradictory.21  
Increasing rationalist thought was undoubtedly one of the most important trends.22  First, 
Aristotelian thought continued to be taught in universities, and increasingly outside the Christian 
context, until well into the 17th century.23  Second, as Nasr suggests, many of the most influential 
                                                 
19 Nasr, Man and Nature, 70. 
20 Nasr, Religion and Order of Nature, 135. 
21 Lauro Martines, “The Protean Face of Renaissance Humanism,” Modern Language Quarterly, 1990; 51: 
105 -121. 
22 Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence, 44 and 47. 
23 Lindberg, Beginnings of Western Science, 228-49. 
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thinkers such as Lorenzo Valla (1406-57), Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), Giovani Pico (1463-94), and 
Charles de Bouvelles (1475-1566) glorified the human being for his possession of reason and 
freedom with which he could know and experience things, including God, without any help from 
heaven.24 In fact, Bouvelles identified the wise man with the image of Prometheus who symbolized 
the audacious human who stole the power of the gods.25 To this list should be added Giordano 
Bruno (1548-1600), one of most influential thinkers of the late Renaissance for whom, “The ideal 
of humanity includes the ideal of autonomy; but as the ideal of autonomy becomes stronger, it 
dissociates itself more and more from the realm of religion.”26 
 
Another intellectual trend that was manifest along with growing rationalism, especially in 
the 16th century, was scepticism, not only of metaphysical realities, but of the very possibility to 
know the truth as well. In the early 16th century, interest in scepticism of Sextus Empiricus (d. 3rd 
century) which held “that there is not sufficient and adequate evidence to decide whether 
knowledge is possible or not,”27 was revived by the humanist movement. After Nicolaus 
Copernicus (1473-1543) presented the mathematical justifications for his heliocentric model of the 
universe in 1543, revolutionizing the European conception of cosmology,28 the scepticism of 
                                                 
24 Nasr, Religion and Order of Nature, 173-75.  Nasr recognizes that the Renaissance Humanist movement 
was in part an educational programme for the study of grammar, rhetoric, poetry, etc., but he emphasizes the aspect 
that glorifies the power of human reason over everything else. Ibid., 164-65. For Ficinio and Pico’s view of human 
nature, see Nauert, Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe,73, 76.  The rationalist trend should be viewed 
also as an increasing focus on the mundane in the context of the nominalist denial led by William of Ockham (1285-
47) of any human ability to know metaphysical truths on the one hand, and on the other, the Protestant movement 
which turned away from the scholastic philosophy with its metaphysical contents. See Lindberg, Beginnings of 
Western Science, 251; Lawrence Schmidt and Scott Marratto, The End of Ethics in a Technological Society (Montreal 
& Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 13.  
25 Nasr, Religion and Order of Nature, 175-76; Ernest Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in 
Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963), 96. 
26 Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, 98. 
27 Nasr, Religion and Order of Nature, 171. 
28 Copernicus’s proposition with its mathematical arguments for a heliocentric model of the universe, in 
rejection of the hitherto universally accepted and Church-backed geocentric model, was the first biggest event against 
traditional Christian cosmology. In Europe, for many of the intellectual elite who gradually became aware of 
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Sextus Empiricus was more widely studied and had considerable influence on Montaigne (1533-
92), one of the leading voices of late Renaissance. 29 However, the rationalistic trend had to be 
strong considering that it is the rationalistic Promethean image of the human being which emerged 
out of the Renaissance and completely eclipsed all other trends during the Scientific Revolution 
and the Enlightenment which followed. Indeed, the most influential voice that offered a way out of 
the scepticism of the late Renaissance was that of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), a product of late 
Renaissance thought who had a decidedly rationalist mindset in understanding the non-human 
world, despite being religious in an outward sense.  
 
1.3.1 Baconian Progressivism and the Divorce of Philosophy from Metaphysics 
Bacon was instrumental in popularizing the ideology that the knowledge about the material 
aspect of nature and the development of mechanical arts with the aim to control and harness its 
power was a certain means of human progress.  This ideology of human progress came to its full 
fruition only after the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century.  In the first decade of the 17th 
century, the epistemology proposed by Bacon to develop such useful arts promised to reverse the 
still prevalent traditional way of studying the particulars of the phenomenal world by looking 
through the metaphysical principles: 
 
There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The [first] one 
flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, 
the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to the 
discovery of middle axioms. And this is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Copernicus’s arguments for the rejection of the geocentric model, it was the first major phenomenon to shake the 
foundations of their conviction in the traditional worldview. Furthermore, it threw into doubt the view of the cosmos as 
an ordered whole and God’s special concern for the earth and its inhabitants placed at the centre of His universe.  
29 “Sextus Empiricus was not a major thinker, but his summary of the most radical form of philosophy, 
Pyrrhonism, helped to shape the expression of all the accumulated doubts of late Renaissance thinkers.” Nauret, 
Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance, 218. 
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senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most 
general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried.30 
 
To resolve nature into abstractions is less to our purpose than to dissect her into 
parts;…Matter, rather than forms should be the object of our attention, its configurations 
and changes of configuration, and simple action, and law of action or motion; for forms are 
figments of the human mind, unless you will call those laws of action forms.31 
 
Bacon is referring to the still prevalent Aristotelian doctrine of  hylomorphism, which 
stipulates that every corporeal entity is a combination of a ‘form’ and a ‘matter’ where ‘form’ 
represents the essence of the entity and therefore the actual object of knowledge whereas ‘matter’ 
is the unknowable pure potentiality.32 In his rejection of Aristotelian forms and reliance on 
empirical knowledge alone, Bacon was following in the footsteps of the influential late 
Renaissance nature philosophers33 even though he wanted to make natural philosophy more 
materialistic than they had proposed. Thus, Bacon clearly represents Nasr’s contention that 
Renaissance Humanism divorced philosophy from metaphysics and revelation.34 
 
The most crucial aspect of Bacon’s proposed methodology was that if only accidents, 
instead of the universal principles or the intangible Aristotelian forms of things, could be the focus 
of study, then knowledge of nature could also be cumulative. Theodore Roszak illustrates the 
difference between knowledge reached by the Baconian method and that reached by traditional 
                                                 
30 Francis Bacon, “The New Organon,” Book One, Aphorism no. xix in The New Organon and Related 
Writings, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960),43.  
31 Ibid., Book One, Aphorism no. LI, p. 53.  
32 In his De Anima (On the Soul), Aristotle speaks of ‘form’ as the ‘actuality’ and ‘matter’ as the ‘potentiality’ 
which together constitute a corporeal body. De Anima, Part II, 1.  “Aristotelian physics aimed at understanding 
qualitative processes. Quantities were at best peripheral to it, because they failed to speak of the essence of things.” 
Peter Dear, Revolutionizing the Sciences: European Knowledge and Its Ambitions, 1500-1700, 2nd edition (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), 64. 
33 See Fulton H. Anderson, Editor’s Introduction to The New Organon and Related Writings, pp. xii-xiii. Also 
see Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, 145-46. 
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means.35 Roszak explains that no other types of knowledge such as philosophy, theology or 
literature could be cumulative in the same manner because in each of those areas the essentials are 
intangibles and grasping them would involve not just one’s reason, but feelings, intuitions, faith, 
and speculations as well. While it is possible to gain insights from another’s interpretation of 
Shakespeare, Plato or the New Testament, one cannot directly build on it; each must struggle to 
grasp the meanings in these with his own heart, for as Roszak holds, “The foundation of the 
[traditional] arts and of philosophy properly understood is the perennial wisdom.”36 In other words, 
what one says about Shakespeare’s Hamlet says as much about one’s own wisdom as about 
Shakespeare. However, the same cannot be said about one recording the changes in the accidents 
associated with natural entities; if accidents are the only things that count, as Bacon suggests, one’s 
unfinished work could be taken up by another.37 Such knowledge consisted of numerical 
measurements that required only a functioning ordinary rational faculty without needing any 
contemplation or intuition to grasp the meaning or form of things. 
 
Bacon believed that from the progressive accumulation of physical data on particulars, it is 
possible to deduce the general principles for the purely physical causes behind natural phenomena. 
Such knowledge would be the means to harness the power of nature which would benefit human 
society, and bring about progress.  As Bacon himself states, “For the end which this science of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
34 “The corruption of philosophy by ... an admixture of theology is ... widely spread, and does the greatest 
harm, whether to entire systems or to their parts.” Bacon, “The New Organon,” Book one Aphorism no. LXV, p. 62. 
35 Theodore Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends: Politics and Transcendence in Postindustrial Society 
(Berkeley, CA: Celestial Arts, 1989), 142-59. 
36 Ibid., 154. 
37 “...this Instauration of mine...is by no means forgetful of the conditions of mortality and humanity, for it 
does not suppose that the work can be completed within one generation but provides for its being taken up by another.” 
Bacon quoted in Roszak, Where the Wasteland Ends, 150. 
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mine proposes is the invention not of arguments but of arts...to command nature in action.”38 It is 
an ‘end’ which ignores intangible forms and substances of philosophers.39 
 
In the New Organon, Bacon envisions that his empirical cumulative method of advancing in 
knowledge was to apply “not only to natural sciences but to all sciences.”40 It is to “embrac[e] 
everything”41 except that which directly relates to faith in God. He hoped “that things human may 
not interfere with things divine... [And] give to faith that which is faith’s.”42 We term this ideology 
that human progress on earth is possible by basing all knowledge on empirical foundations without 
affecting the quality of one’s faith, ‘Baconian progressivism’.   
 
Nasr states that until the advent of modern times, the primary goal of Western Christian 
civilization, or any other civilization for that matter, was the perfection of moral virtue, not the 
“progress through material evolution”43 which Bacon called for.44  Over the course of the 
Renaissance, historian Torben Nielsen suggests, “Both ‘happiness’ and ‘moral virtue’, the supreme 
and absolute blessings for antiquity and middle ages, were reduced to incidentals in the process by 
which man became free.” 45 
   
                                                 
38 Francis Bacon, “The Great Instauration,” in The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. 
Anderson (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960), 19.  
39 “men have been kept back as by a kind of enchantment from progress in the sciences by reverence for 
antiquity, by authority of men accounted great in philosophy, and then by general consent.” Bacon, “The New 
Organon,” Book One, Aphorism no.LXXXIV, p.80. 
40 Bacon quoted by Sherrard, Rape of Man and Nature, 68. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Bacon, “Great Instauration,” 14-15. 
43 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 150-151. 
44 Ibid. “The modern world devotes to the treatment of sick bodies an incalculable store of energy which in the 
past was devoted to the treatment of sick souls. Men were brought up in the consciousness that all souls are sick, save 
only the rarest exceptions.” Martin Lings, Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions, 2nd edition (London: Unwin 
Paperbacks, 1980), 34. 
45 Torben Nielsen, “The State, the Market and the Individual,” Acta Sociologica, 1986 (29), 4:283-302), 284. 
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The coming of Baconian progressivism is understandable considering the context of his 
time.46 There was extreme poverty among the masses and the apparent utility of the developing 
mechanical arts in mining, metallurgy, architecture, mechanical clocks, etc., was envisioned as a 
means to help the masses out of their deplorable material conditions.47 Yet, as noble as his motives 
might have been, thinking himself as though on a divine mission48 to uplift humanity in the 
material sense, he had little concern for the welfare of the rest of nature.  In any case, Bacon was 
seeking to turn the thrust of human pursuit towards material progress through empirical certainties 
that deny all assertions in Christian tradition about the hierarchic structure of reality and the vision 
of nature consisting of the signs of God.  As the distinguished philosopher Charles Taylor puts it, 
the Baconian view abandoned “the attempt to read the cosmos as the locus of signs…in order to 
adopt the instrumental stance effectively.”49 As such, compared to the prevalent scholastic 
worldview of the day, things have no intrinsic purpose or final cause in Baconian epistemology.50  
In all, if Bacon thought his method would fulfil God’s purpose for humans, he limited that purpose 
to their material well being only. 51 
 
According to Nasr, the idea of material progress as the primary goal of life was propelled 
by two key factors: 1) The “Reduction of man to purely human”;52 2) utopianism in the material 
sense that is clearly discernible with Bacon.53 By the “reduction of man”, Nasr refers to man’s 
                                                 
46 Lauro Martines, “The Protean Face of Renaissance Humanism,”105-106. 
47 William R. Shea  “The Scientific Rev Really Occurred” European Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, (459-471), 2007, 
p. 463. 
48 Bacon, “Great Instauration,” 14. 
49 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 98. 
50 Ibid., 98. 
51 Ibid., 222. Bacon called Plato and Aristotle “pompous” and saw the Aristotelian ‘forms’, the ‘first cause’, 
and the ‘final cause’ as mere vanities. Bacon, “ The New Organon,” Book One, Aphorism nos. LXXI and LXV, pp.69, 
62. 
52 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 150. 
53 Ibid., 153.   
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turning away from his higher nature, the Intellect, and holistic or higher reality that he can perceive 
through it.54  Hence, to the extent that the Promethean man55 abandoned the worldview that is 
traditional which could be appreciated best by his Intellect, he also abandoned the goal of spiritual 
perfection for the goal of progress in material comfort.56  
 
The Promethean man’s worldly orientation and the ideology of Baconian progressivism 
would be given a firm rationalistic philosophical foundation and great prestige by the end of the 
Scientific Revolution of the 17th century. The cosmos had to be completely secularized by a new 
cosmology that denied the hierarchy of reality in order for the Baconian proposition to be widely 
accepted. This is precisely what appears to have happened in the course of the Scientific 
Revolution and thereafter during the Age of Enlightenment. 
 
1.4 Scienctific Revolution and the Divorce of Science from Metaphysics 
The Scientific Revolution, as Nasr and many other scholars argue, completely secularized 
nature. 57 In fact, the secularization process fulfilled many objectives of the Baconian vision by (1) 
redefining ‘matter’ from being a ‘pure unknowable potentiality’ to being just a quantity, (2) 
rejecting the forms or substances as proper subjects of inquiry, (3) introducing the philosophical 
basis (Descartes’ bifurcation of the human self and any object of knowledge) for conceiving the 
possibility of a pure objective knowledge independent of human qualities, and finally, (4) by 
setting forth mechanical laws and claiming them as the ultimate laws of nature. 
 
                                                 
54 See Introduction 0.9.1. 
55 See section 1.3. 
56 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 150-51. 
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Galileo (1564-1642) made a philosophical decision to regard the quantitative aspects of any 
object as its “primary qualities” and all else that could be said about the object as its “secondary 
qualities.”  As Nasr explains, this was the beginning of the change in the whole conception of 
‘matter’ from its traditional view as pure potentiality.58 It amounted to a rejection of the 
Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism that the Catholic Church had adopted and to giving Bacon’s 
rejection of substances and forms of objects a stamp of approval from the scientific community. 
 
René Descartes (1596-1650), for his part, was influenced by Bacon through his mentor, the 
puritan Dutch mechanical engineer Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637).59  In Descartes’ words, “the 
nature of body, taken generally, does not consist in the fact that it is hard, or heavy, or a coloured 
thing, or a thing that touches our senses in any other manner, but only in that it is a substance 
extended in length, breadth and depth,”60 that is, res extensa (extended thing). What were 
considered “secondary qualities” by Galileo were produced in the res cogitans (thinking thing) 
which he identified the human self with.  The res extensa and res cogitan faculties, it is important 
to add, are totally distinct.61  Moreover, within its “length, breadth and depth,” matter was no more 
than a conglomerate of particles and every phenomenon was no more than consequences of matter 
                                                                                                                                                                 
57 See for instance, Roszak, Wasteland, 172-74, 178-80; Sherrard, Rape of Man and Nature, 68-71; Smith, 
Cosmos and Transcendence, 13-30. 
58 Eventually, this would lead to conceptualizing objects in nature in purely quantitative terms and express it 
in a mathematical formula such as F= m*a, where ‘F’ is the force necessary to give an acceleration ‘a’ to an object ‘m’ 
that represents the quantification of the reality of ‘matter’ of that object. Based on notes from the course Man and 
Nature offered by Nasr at the George Washington University. 24 February 2004.  
59 Beeckman was one of the three most prominent students of Bacon in the continental Europe. See 
Philosophical Studies, C.1611-C.1619, Vol. 6, edited by Graham Rees and Lisa Jardine (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1996), p. lxxvii.  Beeckman also had a profound impact on Descartes’ science and thought. See Routledge 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy; available from http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DA026SECT1; 
Internet; accessed: 10 August 2010.  
60 Rene Descartes quoted in Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 139. 
61 Descartes could not explain how res cogitans could perceive res extensa, and failing thus, he assigned that 
role to God. See Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence, 29. 
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and motion. Motion was a result of collision or frictions with other “extensions” in an universe 
where, according to Descartes, even living bodies functioned in the same way as machines did. 
  
With the bifurcation of res cogitans and res extensa, Descartes went a step further than 
Galileo. His Discourse on Method (1637), coming only four years after the trial and condemnation 
of Galileo, helped create the first rationalistic school of philosophy. This school posited that the 
faculty of reason is independent of any higher principle and is the ultimate authority of human 
conclusions and perceptions. Hence, Nasr suggests that Descartes “made the thinking of the 
individual ego the centre of the reality and the criterion of all knowledge, turning philosophy into 
pure rationalism…The knowing subject was bound to the realm of reason and separated from both 
the Intellect and revelation, neither of which were henceforth considered as possible sources of 
knowledge of an objective order.”62  
  
Thus, in addition to reducing the cosmos to a material quantity as Galileo had done before 
him, Descartes also reduced the human self to that which possessed no faculty of knowledge higher 
than that of ordinary reason.63 Descartes ultimately gave philosophical legitimacy to the 
Promethean man’s rationalism and to the Baconian methodology for knowledge.  
 
Finally, as Nasr points out, the new science was radically altering the traditional 
understanding of the “order in nature” in all civilizations from one in which Divine Laws governed 
the whole universe, morally and otherwise, to just mechanical laws of the material dimension that 
                                                 
62 Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 41-42.   
63 Descartes’ was a clear case of the eclipse of the intellect by reason. The rationalistic bent of his mind was 
evident in his admitted inability to conceive “substantial forms and real qualities” in the bodies. Descartes quoted in 
Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence, 28. 
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could be determined by scientific experiments.64 As Lawrence Schmidt and Scott Marratto observe, 
“An examination of the material nature can reveal its laws to humans, but it cannot reveal the 
meaning and purpose of human freedom... [which] can be discovered by philosophical 
reflection.”65 Both in the “classical and Christian traditions”, ultimate natural order is the 
metaphysical reality that can be known and that “right action for human beings consists of attuning 
themselves to it.”66  Yet, in opposition to this traditional vision, Descartes’ Discourse of Method 
refers to the mechanical laws as the natural laws from God.67 Henceforth, the mathematically-
defined mechanical laws came to be seen as the laws of nature, ignoring the fact that mathematical 
laws can have no relevance to moral and other laws that govern the universe, unless defined 
symbolically.68  
 
The strictly rationalistic or mathematical character of the new science was such that, for 
decades, it was incomprehensible to the vast majority of people who still held the traditional view 
of the universe as it appeared to them, and which gave meaning to their lives.69 To be sure, as the 
eminent historian of science Sherwood Taylor put it, “before the separation of science [from 
religion] and the acceptance of it as the sole valid way of apprehending Nature, the vision of God 
in Nature seems to have been normal way of viewing the world, nor could it have been marked as 
                                                 
64 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 132-33.  Also, Ibid., 155, n15.  “All laws are reflections of the 
Divine Principle. God is the Law-Giver. He manifests his Will both in the Cosmos and in the human domain through 
laws.” See Osman Bakar, The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 
1999), 71. 
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Himself.” Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence, 54. 
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Beginnings of Western Science, 213. 
67 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 133. 
68 The medieval scholastic tradition was aware of the limitations of mathematics. See John L. Heilbron, 
“Coming to Terms with the Scientific Tradition,” European Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2007, p 478. 
69 Margaret Jacob, Scientific Culture and The Making of the Industrial West (New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 18-27. 
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an exceptional experience.”70 In fact, like Bacon, both Galileo and Descartes tried to popularize 
their science by stressing on its utility in a material, physical or commercial sense,71  not by 
appealing to people’s higher nature or, as Nasr would refer to it, their Intellect. 
 
In their quest for certitude in an age of scepticism, Galileo and, more systematically, 
Descartes, settled for mathematical proofs as certainties. Galileo and Descartes thus cleared the 
way for quantification and mathematicization of nature, thus separating science from metaphysics 
or religion with the intent to render it controllable. Exploitation of nature for the material welfare 
of human beings was now justified philosophically in an unprecedented manner.72   
 
1.4.1 Newtonian Science Retained the Cartesian Biases 
Nasr argues that the fundamental philosophical assumptions of the new science set forth by 
Galileo and Descartes was not altered in any significant way by the Newtonian science that 
followed.73 Indeed, Newton (1642-1727) did not question the principles of quantification or 
Cartesian bifurcation.  He accepted the idea of a mathematically definable universe and relied 
firmly on facts based on the empirical method. Although he attributed the cause of the laws of his 
physics to God, the spiritual content of Newtonian physics was confined to his own interpretation 
of them. His legacy was the mechanistic worldview defined by his mathematical formulations and 
                                                 
70 Sherwood Taylor, The Fourfold Vision (London, 1945), 91; quoted in Nasr, Man and Nature,41. 
71 Jacob, Scientific Culture, 18, 43. The contemporary historians of science James E. McClellan III and Harold 
Dorn note that in the 17th century the ideology of the social utility of the new science was “activist and contrasted with 
the Hellenic view of the practical irrelevance of natural philosophy and the medieval view of science as the subservient 
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edition (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 245. 
72 According to McClellan and Dorn, “Bacon and Descartes separately voiced the view that humans should be 
the master and possessor of nature, that nature and the worlds natural resources should be vigorously exploited...” 
Whatever idea of human dominion over nature Christians had inherited from their religion before the 17th century, it 
did not match “a distinctive imagery of the violent rape and torture of nature as an aspect of scientific practice came to 
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the Cartesian dualism inherent in them which enabled the imprinting of mathematical relations 
upon the cosmos. John Henry, the distinguished historian of science, sums it up conclusively: 
Newton “represented the triumphant synthesis” of Bacon’s experimentalism and Descartes’ 
rationalism.74 
 
Devoid of metaphysical principles, the legacy of the Scientific Revolution was a conception 
of reality that separated nature “from the intelligible world in the Platonic sense”75 as envisioned 
by St. Augustine, St. Maximus and Johannes Scotus Erigena (810-877),76 “from the moral 
principles dominating over human life,”77 as envisioned by St. Thomas,78 and “from any spiritual 
reality that human beings and nature could share,”79 as envisioned in the doctrines of the unity and 
omnipresence of the Spirit and of Christ as the Logos.80  In the same vein, Wolfgang Smith terms 
the entire modern scientific outlook “a wholesale apostasy from the Christian worldview.”81  Thus, 
the Scientific Revolution of the 17th century is called a revolution not for a sudden unprecedented 
flourishing of Renaissance science, but for the radical divorce of science from Christian 
metaphysics of nature. It replaced the Christian view of nature with a mechanical vision of nature 
that was detached from the soul and devoid of any suggestions of divine presence or consciousness.  
 
1.5 Scientism and Scientific Progressivism during the Enlightenment and Beyond 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the fore in the seventeenth-century. Bacon, for example, asserted bluntly that ‘Nature must be taken by the forelock.’”  
See, Science and Technology in World History, 245-46. 
73 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 140. 
74 John Henry, The Scientific Revolution and the Origins of Modern Science (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 
1997), 96.  
75 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 103.   
76 Ibid., 57-58 and 97-98. 
77 Ibid., 103 and 132-33. 
78 Ibid., 132. 
79  Ibid., 103. 
80 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 56, 59. 
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During the Enlightenment and the ensuing Industrial Revolution, Newtonian science and its 
worldview spread throughout the West, and thereafter, in the lands the West had colonized. 
Rationalistic and empiricist methodologies of modern science came to be applied to philosophy as 
evident especially in the thought of John Locke (1632-1704),82 and from the early 19th century, to 
the study of human society to make these disciplines as rationalized and “progressive” as modern 
science itself. 83 This phenomenon was the result of scientism, the idea that modern science or 
scientific rationality is, if not the only, at least the most reliable means to true knowledge.84 At first, 
and until the late 17th century, scientism was limited to a very small minority of intellectual elite, 
but later spread throughout Europe.85 Scientism implied that the modern scientific worldview was 
true. It made the Newtonian mechanical worldview the foundation of the Enlightenment.  
 
Scientism has two key effects: (1) it robs man’s view that nature has levels of reality 
beyond the tangible material aspects and (2) it secularizes human consciousness. Jane Bennett aptly 
summarizes the effects of this ideology on nature, evident especially since the Enlightenment: “the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment sought to demystify the world according to faith, where nature 
was God’s text, filled with divine signs, intrinsic meaning, and intelligible order. In the face of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
81 Smith, Cosmos and Transcendence, 47. 
82 For more, see Locke’s atomistic conception of ideas. John Locke, “Of Innate Notions,” in The Age of 
Enlightenment: The 18
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 Century Philosophers, ed. Sir Isaiah Berlin (New York and Toronto:  The New American 
Library, 1956), 36-45. 
83 For an in-depth study of the effect of the quantifying spirit of the Newtonian physics on other branches of 
natural science, see The Quantifying Spirit in the 18th Century, eds. Tore Frangsmyr, J.L. Heilborn, Robin E. Rider 
(Berkely: University of California, 1990). Also, see Richard Dewitt, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and 
Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 188-90.  
84 See Huston Smith, “Scientism: The Bedrock of the Modern Worldview,” in Science and the Myth of 
Progress, ed. Mehrdad M. Zarandi (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 233. 
85 For a thoughtful account of  the effects of scientism as they became manifest in the 19th century in the 
development of positivism of August Comte (1798-1857), materialism of Ludwig Feuerbach(1804-1872), Karl Marx 
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and Scientism in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Urbana: University of IL, 2008). 
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belief in an enchanted cosmos, the Enlightenment sought to push God to a more distant social 
location.”86  
 
Scientism was likewise a challenge for Christianity, especially from the time of the 
Enlightenment. As the eminent philosopher Louis Dupre states, “One may plausibly argue that the 
eighteenth century was the first non-Christian century. Most leading thinkers and artists, even if 
they were not opposed to Christianity, ceased to take their inspiration from it. For the first time, the 
secular became dominant.” 87  Dupre adds that the 19th century was even worse for religion, “It 
was an epoch marked by a virulent antitheistic campaign to clean the cultural slate of all Christian 
traces.”88 In the 19th century, scientism clearly rejected the traditional view of the hierarchy of 
reality as evidenced in Marxism’s claim of being scientifically true,89 in Darwin’s theory of 
evolution,90 and later, in Freud’s effort to establish a scientific psychology without considering any 
role for the Spirit.91 To this day many scholars assert the secularizing effect of modern science and 
technology without any qualms.92 
                                                 
86 Jane Bennett, Unthinking Faith and Enlightenment: Nature and the State in a Post-Hegelian Era (New 
York: New York University Press, 1987), 7. 
87 Louis Dupre, “Spiritual Life and the Survival of Christianity,” Cross Currents; Fall 1998, Vol. 48 issue 3, 
381. 
88 Ibid. 
89 “There is no doubt that Marxism was a scientistic movement. That is, it openly sought to extend methods 
derived from mathematics and the natural sciences to deal with social phenomena.” Olson, Science and Scientism in 
Nineteenth-Century, 163. 
90 See Chapter 6.6. 
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Beginning with the Enlightenment, the ideology of Baconian progressivism, which thrust 
the idea of “progress through material evolution”93 forcefully, was transformed into a 
progressivism based on scientism. Also, once nature could be seen through the eyes of modern 
science as mere quantity, progress in the material sense, was inevitable: “why have the 
experimental sciences received a development in modern civilization such as they never had in any 
other? The reason is that these sciences are those of the sensible world, those of matter, and also 
those lending themselves most directly to practical applications.”94 The logic of this progress 
enabled by a science that reduces reality to the material plane is no different from Bacon’s logic in 
the possibility of cumulative knowledge about nature if the existence of higher realities of entities 
would be rejected.95  
 
On the other hand, as we have noted above, the spread of scientism had the secularizing 
effect on human consciousness which, as Nasr puts it, encouraged “human beings to devote all 
their energies to worldly activities as the hereafter became more and more a distant concept.”96 The 
goal of moral perfection had further receded even from the days of Bacon. As the eminent historian 
Roy Porter noted, the age of Enlightenment that followed the Scientific Revolution, saw a shift in 
human interest from “being good” to “being happy” in the tangible material sense.97 The 
distinguished philosopher Jacob Needleman has described the same situation as an effect of 
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95 See section 1.3.1. 
96 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 151. 
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modern science having robbed the cosmos of divine consciousness such that it could no longer 
inspire in humans an expansion of consciousness necessary for the awareness of the good and holy: 
“Science, while beginning as a search for a new way to experience the meaning of the book [of 
nature], soon ended by counting commas. Gradually, but inexorably, the desire to manipulate 
nature took centre stage. Pragmatism was born, and the purpose of knowledge came to be the 
satisfaction of desire rather than growth of consciousness.”98  
 
Thus, scientism produces and maintains a secularized view of nature as well as a secular 
humanity. According to Nasr, this secular humanity, seeing no purpose or meaning of nature 
beyond its material reality, has been eager to conquer and consume more and more of it with the 
help of science and technology resulting in the ever increasing destruction of nature. 99  
  
In other words, in Nasr’s view, the more secularized both nature and human consciousness 
are, the more the human being resorts to the means to explore and satisfy his lust for life in the only 
real domain before him – the secularized natural world.  Thus, for a secularized world, modern 
science, along with its rationalism and technology which enable the effective exploring and 
exploiting of the secularized nature, is necessarily the most reliable means for human progress. We 
will refer to this ideology that modern science and associated scientific rationality is, if not the only 
then the most reliable means of human progress as ‘scientific progressivism’. In summary, for 
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Nasr, scientism leads to scientific progressivism which in turn leads to the exploitation of nature 
and the environmental crisis.  
 
The negative effects of scientism and the resulting scientific progressivism have been slow 
to manifest.  As Schmidt and Marratto note, the Enlightenment philosophy, with its outward 
oriented mechanical worldview devoid of spiritual meaning, sought to eliminate or reduce outer 
causes of human suffering – labour, scarcity, disease and war – and “understood ethics in terms of 
this project.”100 However, in the process, this project to lift the human lot in the Baconian sense has 
ignored the inner or spiritual need of the human being and the role of the spiritual view of nature in 
fulfilling that need. Additionally, in the 20th century, the two World Wars followed by the growing 
awareness of an environmental crisis since the 1960s have brought the urgent need to question 
scientism and scientific progressivism.  
 
Since 1905, although the theory of relativity, Quantum mechanics and several other 
developments that followed have challenged the Newtonian mechanical model, it is the mechanical 
model of the classical Newtonian science with its Cartesian philosophical basis that still influences 
most of the sciences and the general consciousness of modern humanity.101 As John Carvalho has 
observed, the scientific worldview today “takes into account belief in an actual reality outside of 
the human mind and the ability of the human mind and human sense to grasp that reality 
[completely].”102  Hence, referring to the scientific developments of the 20th century, Wolfgang 
Smith suggests that “this vast body of physical theory still rests upon the old Newtonian 
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foundations. In point of its essential function...it reduces, now as before, to the venerable Cartesian 
doctrine.”103 Scientific knowledge remains to this day ‘objective’ in the sense of being unrelated to 
God or to the soul. In Nasr’s words, “The Truth remains that no matter how much it changes, 
modern science cannot but deal with [outer] phenomena.”104 The traditional view of nature, on the 
other hand, involves ‘seeing’ its inner reality105 with faith in revelation and/or knowledge by 
Intellection.106 
 
Nasr’s suggestion that the environmental crisis was caused by a change from a religious or 
metaphysical view to a modern scientific view is corroborated by the likes of Theodore Roszak,107 
Philip Sherrard,108 Huston Smith,109 Wolfgang Smith,110 several Islamic environmentalists noted in 
the Introduction, and various other scholars of ecology and religion. For instance, Mary Evelyn 
Tucker and John Grim, two of the leading scholars of the field of ecology and religion, maintain 
that the environmental crisis was caused by the worldview that has “captured the imagination of 
contemporary industrialized societies.”111 Recently, even some of the most outstanding economic 
historians have begun to acknowledge the truth of the claim that the modern scientific worldview 
itself played a decisive role in creating today’s economic and technological society which is in 
constant search for growth.  
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1.5.1 Nasr’s Vindication by Economic Historians 
In the last two decades, researches by two eminent economic historians, namely Margaret 
Jacob of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) and Joel Mokyr of the Northwestern 
University, have provided historical analyses which, in effect, have vindicated Nasr’s conclusions 
by linking the change in the Western understanding of nature in the 17th century with the Industrial 
Revolution, and with the continued technological and economic growth beyond it. Hence, we will 
discuss the relevant works of these two scholars at length. 
 
Mokyr begins his recently published book The Enlightened Economy with the statement 
“Economic change in all periods depends, more than most economists think, on what people 
believe.”112 For Jacob and Mokyr, the Industrial revolution was not just the natural consequence of 
available resources and other economic factors that prompted people to invent adequate technology 
to make use of them in order to raise their standard of life in the material sense.  The driving force 
behind the rapid economic growth was the rate and breadth of technological innovations. As 
Mokyr suggests, “The Industrial Revolution, it was felt for many decades, should be explained by 
economic factors...Yet these approaches have all suffered from the “endogenous growth problem”:  
none of them carry the weight of the explanadum without relying on technological change.”113  
 
                                                 
112 Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened Economy: An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), 1. 
113 Joel Mokyr, “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth,” The Journal of Economic History,  
Vol. 65, Number 2, June 2005, pp. 287-88. 
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Scholars have generally maintained that 17th century science, except in a few cases, had no 
direct effect on the technological development over the 18th century.114 Yet, what brought about the 
numerous and sustained technological innovations throughout the 18th century and later? 
According to Mokyr, it was the emergence of a culture of progress and improvement during the 
Age of Enlightenment that drove the technological innovations. This culture, Mokyr adds, was 
characterized by what he calls, ‘Industrial Enlightenment’, meaning “a belief in the possibility and 
desirability of economic progress and growth through knowledge.”115 Mokyr traces this belief to 
the Baconian vision for social uplift where the term “knowledge” refers to the knowledge that is 
“useful” in harnessing the wealth and power of nature.   
 
What sustained Industrial Enlightenment was, according to Mokyr, the reduction of the cost 
to access the useful knowledge, that is, scientific and technological knowledge.116 Although Mokyr 
does not directly credit the modern scientific worldview for the Industrial revolution, it seems 
implicit in Mokyr’s discussion of the Baconian theory of useful knowledge. 
 
Mokyr argues that the rapid economic growth of the 18th century can only be explained by 
“developments in the intellectual realm concerning [what constitutes] useful knowledge.”117  This 
useful knowledge, he contends, consisted not only of the work of scientists, but also of “those who 
collected data and practices” about the material realm.118 Bacon envisioned a constant growth of 
useful knowledge that consists solely of empirical findings.  Philosophically, this meant a shift 
                                                 
114 See James E. MeClellan III and Harold Dorn, Science and Technology in World History (Baltimore:  The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 269. 
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116 Ibid., 297-322.  
117 Ibid., 287. 
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from a holistic to a fragmented view of reality; that is, from the traditional perspective in which the 
reality of the material world was inextricably related to higher realities and ultimately to God to 
one in which higher realities were abandoned and human efforts were devoted to acquiring 
knowledge of the multiplicities in the material domain alone. The “division of knowledge”119 
which Mokyr credits for the growth of useful knowledge through “specialization, 
professionalization and expertization”120 was part and parcel of Bacon’s fragmented view of 
reality.  Therefore, the intellectual development of useful knowledge that Mokyr deems necessary 
to explain its growth relates to Bacon’s reversal of traditional epistemology.121 After a century of 
intense scientific activity and research during the Scientific Revolution which established a science 
based only on the material domain, Baconian vision of progress in knowledge and prosperity, once 
novel, now seemed completely credible, justified, and desirable by the time of the Enlightenment.  
 
Jacob is more direct than Mokyr in suggesting that the modern scientific worldview itself 
determined “useful knowledge” in the 18th century and in turn served as an instrument for 
advancing more science and technology.  She argues that under the influence of Newton’s 
mechanical worldview, in the secular age of the 18th century, the religious dimension of Bacon’s 
inspiration to build a prosperous utopia for the poor masses was forgotten. The utopian vision 
simply became a justification for technological innovation.122 Jacob states categorically, “A new 
scientific understanding of nature preceded mechanized industry and most important, assisted in its 
development.”123 
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Jacob concurs with Mokyr in the ways Newton’s science was made easy to grasp and was 
disseminated widely so as to reduce the cost to access the new scientific knowledge. Yet, she notes 
that the Principia of Newton was not just about force and motion of the planetary realm, it also 
included parts about “mechanics of local motion” based on which “scientists created and merchants 
consumed curricula and books applicable to technological innovation.”124 Figures such as James 
Watt, the inventor of the first steam engine, came from the groups of mechanics and engineers who 
studied Newtonian science from such texts. In effect, there is no doubt that modern science “in the 
form of Newtonian mechanics directly fostered industrialization.”125  
 
According to Jacob, Newton’s mechanized worldview significantly altered people’s very 
interests and actions, as well. Through their study of Newtonian science both the engineers and the 
entrepreneurs who hired them to make technological innovations learned to “objectify the physical 
world, see its operations mechanically, and factor their common interests and values into their 
partnerships.”126 This is evidently a result of seeing the universe not as a marvel of God but as a 
harmonious mechanical order functioning according the physical laws Newton had unearthed.  If 
nature neither consists of the signs of God nor, as by Cartesian doctrine, have any relation to us 
humans ontologically, human attitude towards nature could only turn from one of wonder to one, 
owing to our reliance on it for material needs, more exploitative. As such, as Jacob asserts, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
123 Ibid.,1. (accent ours)    
124 Ibid., 107. 
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“Science made nature lawful.”127 In the same vein, Bennett concludes that “in the face of a view of 
knowledge as mysterious divine hints, [the Enlightenment] sought a transparent, certain science; in 
the face of a sacralised nature, [the Enlightenment] sought a fund of useful natural resources.”128 
 
Furthermore, the secularization of the vision of the universe simultaneously affected 
people’s faith in religion. If everything functioned according to the mechanical laws, all the 
teachings of the Christian tradition were inevitably going to be questioned as well because “as the 
definition of creation changed so too did the human conception of the Creator.”129 According to the 
mechanical view of nature, knowledge of science and mathematical laws alone could suffice for 
humans to benefit from nature. If there was a God, He could very well be either distant, or as 
physicist P.S. Laplace (1749-1837) put it, an unnecessary hypothesis.  
 
Not surprisingly, if we look at the values of the 18th century engineers, inventors and their 
entrepreneurial partners, we can see that the religiosity of the early industrialists had, declined 
markedly over time, if not completely disappeared.130  Importantly, their interest in “more and 
better science”131 continued unabated as their faith weakened.  For Jacob, this “turn towards the 
secular” is what the Enlightenment was about as it had played a decisive role in the aspirations to 
technology and the subsequent economic growth.132  
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The decline in religious faith along with growing interest in modern science could be 
attributed to various limitations of modern science.133 However, fundamentally this phenomenon 
had to do with how truth and falsehood became determined by an increasingly scientifically 
minded culture.  Beginning with the Age of Enlightenment, “the rules of the discourse and the 
criteria for ‘what was true’ or ‘what worked’ shifted toward a more empirical and verifiable 
direction.”134  In other words, the criteria for truth became increasingly rational and empirical. The 
validity of faith and intuition could not be demonstrated by graphs or models. In all, the widespread 
dissemination of scientific knowledge transformed the way people perceived the world around 
them and led them to make efforts to shape this world and their lives in accordance with what was 
deemed real and worthy in the newly acquired scientific worldview. For Jacob, the secular 
orientation of the Enlightenment inspired people to find success in the life of the world through 
science and technology and encouraged them to try to control and exploit the natural world.135 By 
the same token, we may conclude that scientific progressivism today is driven fundamentally from 
the hold that scientism or the scientific worldview has on any society. 
 
The conclusions of Jacob and Mokyr add further weight to Nasr’s arguments that substituting 
religious worldviews with the modern scientific worldview lead to human activities that are 
exploitative of nature. What then would Nasr have modern humanity do in order to find a lasting 
solution to the environmental crisis? This leads to Nasr’s recommendations for all civilizations. 
 
 
                                                 
133 See Chapter 6. 
134 Mokyr, “The Intellectual Origins,” 303. 
135 Our analysis of the perspective of Prof Margaret Jacob was confirmed by her in personal e-mail 
correspondence, 11-12 June 2010. 
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1.6 Nasr’s General Recommendations for all Civilizations 
Nasr holds that the ultimate solution to the environmental crisis lies in restoring the 
religious or sacred vision of nature. He recommends several interrelated steps in order to bring that 
about. He asserts that the sacred vision of nature cannot be revived until modern science and 
scientific worldview are universally criticized and their limitations are exposed.136 First of all, Nasr 
holds that the modern human being must accept the reality of God.  Then he must re-establish the 
sacred view of nature according to traditional sources.137 This would involve reinstating the belief 
that the human being possesses higher faculties of perception beyond reason.138 Only then the 
reality of revelations and their sapiential commentaries can be accepted and the religious view of 
nature as a sign or a symbol of God can be revived.139 
 
Nasr insists that the human being must understand that there are metaphysical principles – 
such as the perennial principles we have been referring to – which govern “human ethics as well as 
the cosmos to bring out the interconnectedness between man and nature in light of the Divine.”140 
Only then, the human being can believe at the deepest level the need for ethical treatment not only 
of human beings but also of the world of nature.141 Finally, in order to overcome the negative 
effects of modern science completely, sciences must be subordinated to the all-governing 
metaphysical principles.142 
 
1.7 Chapter Summary  
                                                 
136 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 152-53. 
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138 Ibid., 185, 223. 
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In effect, Nasr argues that the modern scientific worldview leads to scientism and scientific 
progressivism which in turn lead to goals and activities which cause exploitation of nature and 
contribute to the environmental crisis. In other words, scientism and scientific progressivism 
resulted from a radical shift in human orientation from a traditional outlook on nature filled with 
the signs of God to one strongly influenced by modern scientific outlook devoid of any suggestion 
of God’s role or reality.  The scientific outlook swept aside faith in the unity and hierarchy of 
reality and denied any purpose beyond the material plane. Nasr suggests that these are the roots of 
the current environmental crisis. A number of eminent scholars of religion, philosophy and ecology 
essentially agree with Nasr’s analysis. For the first time, even some economic historians have come 
to support, in effect, Nasr’s view that the modern scientific worldview played a critical role in 
bringing about the Industrial Revolution and the kind of growth oriented economy and 
technological innovations that was to be sustained afterwards. Nasr’s recommendations for all 
nations have the common objective of restoring the religious worldviews across all religious 
communities in order to achieve a lasting solution to the environmental crisis.  
 
In order to fully comprehend what Nasr implies by the aforementioned recommendations 
for all civilizations, it is necessary to analyse his extended discussions of the ways Muslims may 
restore the sacred vision of the cosmos or the natural world within the context of the Islamic 
metaphysical, scientific, and philosophical traditions of which he stands as one of the living 
authorities. We will begin this task in the next chapter by exploring the counterparts in Islam of the 
perennial principles we discussed earlier and how they define the sanctity of nature and its 



















































THE PERENNIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURE WITHIN ISLAM 
 
The fact that Cairo or Karachi suffer from the environmental decay does not negate the traditional Islamic 
doctrines concerning the love and appreciation of nature any more than does the pollution of Tokyo negate the 
spiritual significance of the Zen gardens of Kyoto.1   S. H. Nasr 
 
Because of the intimate connection between man and nature, the inner state of man is reflected in the external 
order.2    S. H.  Nasr 
 
In order to set the stage for Nasr’s traditional Islamic response to the environmental crisis, 
we will discuss the existence and the implications of the three principles of the perennial 
philosophy for reality as such – unity of reality, the hierarchy of reality, and the ultimate 
meaningfulness or purposefulness of the cosmos – in Islamic metaphysics (ma‘rifa).3 We will also 
demonstrate how these principles form the basis of the Islamic metaphysical view of nature as the 
Self-disclosure of God and, as such, our ontological bond with nature such that nature can be a 
means of knowing God and realizing His Unity.  Also, in demonstrating the existence of the 
perennial principles in Islamic metaphysics, we suggest implicitly that in Nasr’s analysis of the 
environmental crisis, the perspective of the perennial philosophy is essentially traditional Islamic 
outlook as well.  
      
2.1 The Perennial Principles and the Islamic Tradition 
Islam, in its outward or exoteric aspect, contains the principles of tawḥīd (Unity of God), 
the hierarchic structure of reality, and of the ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the 
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International Group, Inc., 1997), 96. 




cosmos, corresponding to the principles of the perennial philosophy for reality as such. After a 
brief summary of the principles in their outer or ordinary sense, we will discuss their exposition in 
Islamic metaphysics which reveals their identity with the perennial principles as well as helps to 
clarify certain questions that the outer dimension alone cannot resolve. 
 
Tawḥīd (Unity of God) 
The principle of tawḥīd is the basis and the central pole of Islam. It corresponds to the 
perennial principle of the unity of reality.  In the ordinary sense, tawḥīd implies the absoluteness 
and the Unity of God.  God is not only eternally One (Al-Aḥad), He is also the Sovereign (Al-
Mālik) over all things and “there is none like unto Him.”4 This transcendent aspect of God is 
however complemented by suggestions in the Qur’ān that He is Near (Al-Qarīb), Most Loving (Al-
Wadūd), that all natural phenomena are His signs and “Wherever you turn there is God’s 
countenance,”5 suggesting an ever present link between God and the cosmos.  In short, we can 
conclude that tawḥīd points to an inseparable ontological bond between God and the created order 
that cannot be explained by an understanding of God in His transcendent aspect alone. 
  
Hierarchy of Reality  
Though all things are created with Truth,6 in cosmic manifestation, this hierarchy is based 
on differences among the fundamental created elements used to create the different categories of 
entities. Thus, the Qur’ānic description of the created order includes among other beings, human 
beings, made of earth; jinns, made of fire; and angels, made of light, with the plane of angels being 
                                                 
4  Qur’ān 112:4. See The Holy Qur’ān, trans. Martin Lings (Cambridge: The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for 
Islamic Thought, 2007). 
5 Qur’ān 2:115. The Message of the Quran, trans. Muhammad Asad, Bilingual edition (Watsonville, CA: The 
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above that of men and jinns respectively.7 Even within the angelic order, divine authority descends 
through a hierarchy of angels, with those closer to divine reality entrusted with greater authority. 
Thus, the Qur’ān speaks of not only a hierarchy of reality but also of a largely concealed hierarchy 
in which the visible world is dependent on the invisible world.8  
 
 Corresponding to the hierarchy of existence, there is also a hierarchy of the capacity 
for knowledge.9 The Qur’ān alludes to varying capacities of perception of the signs of God 
according to people’s “understanding” or level of wisdom.10 But if the level of our perception can 
vary according to our level of “understanding” or wisdom, certainly what we perceive with our 
senses and ordinary reason is necessarily only a starting point for knowing its higher reality. 
 
Ultimate Meaningfulness or Purposefulness 
God does not create anything in vain.11 He has created each entity in a measure and 
proportion appropriate to its purpose as determined by Him.12 Also, every entity and every event is 
a sign reflecting the wisdom, beauty, generosity and majesty of its Creator.13 But how is the 
purpose of an entity related to its being a “sign” or to “God’s countenance” wherever we turn? The 
answer lies within the metaphysical exposition of the principles of tawḥīd and the hierarchic nature 
of reality.   
 
                                                 
7 Qur’ān 15:27; 32:7.  
8 Qur’ān 2:3; 3:44; 50:33. 
9 “Are they equal – those who know and those who do not?” (Qur’ān 39:9). 
10 “We detail our signs for people who have understanding.” (Qur’ān 6:98). 
 “In the creation of the heavens and the earth…are signs for people who are wise.”(Qur’ān 2:164).  
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12 “Verily, We have created all things in proportion and measure” (Qur’ān 54:49). 
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2.2 Metaphysical Exposition of Tawḥīd and Hierarchy of Reality  
The Qur’ān raises questions that require deeper reflection and an understanding of the 
immanent aspect of God in light of His transcendence. Indeed, in the Qur’ānic references to the 
principles of tawḥīd and hierarchy of reality, the absolute transcendence of God vis-à-vis His 
creation seems to be only one side of the story. One clue on the relationship between God and the 
universe that Nasr and other Islamic environmentalists never fail to point out is that both the 
entities in nature and the verses in the Quran are related by the same term āyā (sign or symbol) of 
God.14 This is a clear indication that just as the Quran is a means for knowledge of God, so is 
nature. We might say that Islamic metaphysics (ma‘rifah) is the full exploration of this realization 
that everything inside and outside of us, and not only the Qur’ān, is a means of knowledge of God. 
 
Indeed, the famous Sufi Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī (d. 994) cited Junayd al-Baghdādī (d. 910), 
one of the greatest authorities on Sufism, in asserting that metaphysics (ma‘rifah) is either direct 
Self-disclosure of God within His servants or the true knowledge God instructs of His signs (āyāt 
Allāh) “on the horizon and within themselves” (Qur’ān 41:53).15 ‘Abd Allāh Anṣārī (1006-88), 
another famous Sufi, reiterates this understanding in stating that metaphysics (ma‘rifah) is “the 
comprehension of the essence of a thing as it is.”16 In other words, from the metaphysical point of 
view, the knowledge of the “essence of a thing as it is” is equivalent to the knowledge of the “Self-
disclosure of God”. Thus, Islamic metaphysics is the means of unveiling the realities of the signs of 
God that constitute the universe. Hence, it is in metaphysics that we should look for understanding 
                                                 
14 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Reading the Cosmic Qur’ān,” lecture delivered to the Muslim Students’ Association 
(MSA) at the George Mason University (USA), 27 March 2008. 
15 Abū Bakr al-Kalābādhī, “The Exploration of Sufi Teachings (Kitāb at-ta‘arruf),” trans. John Renard in 
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the universe at all levels and, by the same token, for a comprehensive elucidation of the principles 
of unity and hierarchy of reality. The principle of purposefulness, as we will see, is inseparable 
from these other two principles. 
 
Though the Sufis had for long alluded to the deepest meanings of tawḥīd and the hierarchy 
of reality, the most comprehensive expositions of these two metaphysical principles in the Islamic 
tradition can be found in the doctrinal Sufism of  Muhyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240) and his 
school which includes Mullā Ṣadrā (1571-1640). Ibn ‘Arabī, according to Nasr, “expounded the 
most profound doctrine possible of Being and its manifestations,”17 which relates directly to tawḥīd 
and hierarchy of reality. Nasr’s own understanding of Sufism also rests largely on doctrines 
expounded by Ibn ‘Arabī, as is evident in his recently published work on Sufism The Garden of 
Truth.
18In reference to Ibn ‘Arabī’s significance in Islamic tradition, William Chittick, the foremost 
scholar of both Sufism and Ibn ‘Arabī in the West, states, “…practically every intellectual 
formulation of Sufism after him derives directly or indirectly from his own works or those of his 
followers.”19  
 
For our present discussion, most importantly, Nasr considers Ibn ‘Arabī to be one of the 
main proponents of the perennial philosophy.20 Hence, it is imperative to discuss the key doctrines 
of Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysics concerning the relationship of the human being to God and the 
                                                 
17 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of 
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cosmos, that is, the whole of reality, in order to see how the principles of the perennial philosophy 
not only have their counterparts in Islamic metaphysics, but also form the basis of Islamic 
metaphysics on nature.  
 
2.2.1 Ibn ‘Arabī’s Exposition of the Principle of Tawḥīd 
We will present Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysical exposition of tawḥīd  by  way of discussing the 
formulation of  three doctrines associated with his thought which have been permanent fixtures of 
Sufism ever since his time:  
 
1) The immutable archetype (al-a‘yān al-thābita) 
2)  Theophany/Self-disclosure of God (tajallī) 
3)  Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd ) 
 
2.2.1a The Immutable Archetype (al-a‘yān al-thābita) and Self-disclosure of God (tajallī) 
The doctrine of immutable archetype in Islamic metaphysics is derived from the Qur’ān’s 
affirmation that Allah knows the reality of things even before He brings them into existence: 
“Whenever We will anything to be, We but say unto it Our word "Be" - and it is.”21 The “thing” 
before God gives existence to “it”, is the “immutable archetype” of any existent entity.   
 
God’s purpose for creation is expressed in majestic simplicity in the hadīth qudsi,22 “I was a 
hidden treasure; so I loved to be known, hence I created creatures in order that I might be 
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known.”23  Ibn ‘Arabī interprets this divine utterance as evidence of God’s desire to be known 
through the things He creates:  “God says to a thing, ‘Be!’… it becomes a locus of manifestation 
for the Real. This is the meaning of His words, [‘Be!’] And it is.”24 In other words, the immutable 
archetype becomes the “locus of manifestation” for God when He desires to give it existence. 
 
As to what the existent things manifest in particular at the “locus of manifestation of the 
Real”, Ibn ‘Arabī directs our attention to the divine names revealed in the Qur’ān.  God in His 
Essence (dhat) is unknowable. He becomes known through His attributes corresponding to His 
names which are His first delimitations. Thus His names are His first Self-disclosures in His desire 
to be known.  For Ibn ‘Arabī, the Qur’ān is the Self-disclosure of God (tajallī) in a linguistic mode 
where God reveals His attributes most directly through His names.25 Though God in His Essence is 
unknowable, like light which is invisible but becomes known only as multiplicity of differentiated 
colours, God can be known by His attributes.  
 
The divine names function as universal archetypes of the created order. The Being of God 
is present in all entities, but either they do not all reveal the same attributes of God or the attributes 
do not shine with same brilliance in each entity.  Each immutable archetype permits the 
manifestation of a unique combination of divine names and determines the degree of their 
                                                 
23 This hadīth qudsi is quoted by Ibn ‘Arabī frequently. See William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-Arabi 
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‘wrote ”the Qur’ān upon the Tablet. Thus metaphysically, the Qur’ān contains the prototype of all creation.” Bakar, 





manifestations when the archetype is given existence. By existentiating each archetype, God 
reveals a unique combination of His attributes. Thus, all existent entities in Ibn ‘Arabī’s language 
are ‘Self-disclosures’ of God (tajallī) in accordance with their immutable archetypes in the 
knowledge of God.  
 
An immutable archetype can be said to be one of the infinite possibilities of God’s Being. 
In other words, an immutable archetype is His knowledge of a particular possibility of His Being. 
He may or may not existentiate this archetype, but as a possibility of His Being, it must remain 
fixed, and therefore immutable in His knowledge eternally.  Therefore, even when an entity on 
earth perishes, it does not bring an end to its immutable archetype.   
 
We never see the immutable archetypes of the existent entities because the archetypes in 
themselves are non-existent. What we perceive in the cosmos are actually the divine attributes 
themselves, inasmuch as they are manifest. As Ibn ‘Arabī writes:  
 
God says, “We created not the heavens and the earth, and what is between them, save 
through the Real” (Qur’ān 15:85), which is Pure Being. Hence, there came to be ascribed to 
It everything given by the realities of the entities…the effects belong to the divine names.26 
 
Consisting of Self-disclosures of God, the cosmos is a theophany; it is the Cosmic Qur’ān 
(al-Qur’ān al-takwīnī), the counterpart of the composed or oral Qur’ān.27  But this view of the 
cosmos as theophany must not be confused with the deification of the cosmos. Ibn ‘Arabī  explains 
that coming into existence with the Creative word “Be” does not mean that a thing itself gains 
‘being’ of its own or that God is no longer transcendent: “This does not mean that the thing 
‘acquires existence.’ It only acquires the property of being a locus of manifestation…He is He, and 
                                                 
26 Futūhāt II 216.7 in SPK, 95-96. Also, see Imaginal Worlds, 18. 




things are the things.”28 Each existent entity is like a mirror of nothingness reflecting some 
qualities of God.29 In other words, the ultimate meaning of an entity is the qualities of God 
revealed through it and its ultimate purpose is to make God known in that capacity. 
 
Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī (1207-73) summarized the relationship between the attributes of the 
Creator and the created in like manner in these lucid verses:   
Consider the creatures as pure and limpid  
water, within which shine the Attributes of the Almighty. 
Their knowledge, their justice, their kindness –  
All are stars of heaven reflected in flowing water.30 
 
2.2.1b Waḥdat al-wujūd (Unity of Being) 
Even though Ibn ‘Arabī himself did not use the expression waḥdat al-wujūd, his views on 
the cosmos and the Being of God point to what is meant by this expression.31 Waḥdat al-wujūd, or 
the Unity of Being, is derived from the doctrine that the cosmos is composed of non-existent 
immutable archetypes existentiated solely by the one God, thereby affirming tawḥīd.  Thus, the 
doctrine of waḥdat al-wujūd does not imply that multiplicity is false, but simply that Being is One 
while existents are many. For each existent, its being is neither separate nor independent of the 
Being of God. All entities have the presence of the Being of God in Its totality but can reveal only 
those divine qualities determined by their immutable archetypes. Since the immutable archetypes 
are in themselves non-existent, waḥdat al-wujūd posits the existence of the Being of God alone 
without negating the multiplicity of existents. As such, Nasr sometimes relates waḥdat al-wujūd as 
                                                 
28 Futūhāt, II 484.23 in Chittick,SPK, 90. 
29 Futūhāt III 46.27, 47.25 in Chittick, SPK, 205. 
30 Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī vol. VI 3172-73, translated and quoted in William Chittick, The Sufi Path of 
Love: The Spiritual Teachings of  Rūmī (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 43. 
31 The term waḥdat al-wujūd  was coined by Sa‘id al-Din Farghani (d. 1300), one of  Ibn ‘Arabī’s followers. 
Though according to William Chittick the term reflects Ibn ‘Arabī’s point of view well. See William C. Chittick, “ 
Rūmī and waḥdat al-wujūd,” in Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of  Rūmī, eds. A. Banani, R. 




‘transcendent unity of being’.32Many Sufi poets indicated the reality of waḥdat al-wujūd without 
providing an elaborate metaphysics of the divine names and qualities as Ibn ‘Arabī did. As  Rūmī 
(1207-1273) says in the Mathnawī, 
We and our existences are non-existent: Thou art the 
Absolute appearing in the guise of mortality.33 
 
Likewise, the most celebrated Arab Sufi poet Ibn al-Fārid (1181-1235) refers to the reality 
of the one God behind all acts and veils:  
All thou beholdest is the act of the One. 
In solitude, but closely veiled is He. 
Let him but lift the screen, no doubt remains: 
The forms are vanished, He alone is all.34 
 
Waḥdat al-wujūd is central to Nasr’s thought on the cosmos as theophany,35 and it clearly 
corresponds to the first principle of the perennial philosophy in that it asserts the existence of one 
Ultimate Principle or Reality36 from which rise the multiplicity of existents of the cosmos. 
  
2.2.1c  The Human Being as the Image of God and as the Microcosm 
With the understanding of the doctrines of the immutable archetypes (al-a‘yān al-thābita) 
and waḥdat al-wujūd (Unity of Being), we can explore Ibn ‘Arabī’s view of the human being, his 
relationship to the cosmos, and his ultimate purpose. 
 
                                                 
32 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), 283. 
33 Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī, quoted in Seyyed Hossein Nasr: Islamic Art and Spirituality (New York:  
State University of New York Press, 1987), 138.  
34Ibn al-Fārid, quoted in Seyyed  Hossein Nasr, Sufi Essays, 3rd edition (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1999), 78. 
35 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 189-214. 
Also, see Nasr’s book of verses, The Pilgrimage of Life and the Wisdom of  Rūmī, (Oakton, VA: The Foundation of 
Traditional Studies, 2007), 23.  




The immutable archetype for the human being is unlike that of any other being because as 
the famous hadīth of the Prophet confirms, “God created Adam (human being) in His image.” Not 
surprisingly, as Ibn ‘Arabī interprets a hadīth qudsi and verses of the Qur’ān, only the human being 
is the locus of manifestation for all the divine names: 
God says [in a hadīth qudsi], “My earth and My heaven embrace me not, but the heart of 
My believing servant does embrace Me.” …It is as if He is saying “All my names become 
manifest only within the human configuration.” He said, “He taught Adam the names, all of 
them” (Qur’ān 2:31), that is, [ultimately] divine names from which all things in engendered 
existence come into being.37 
 
Ibn ‘Arabī provided theoretical formulations for what was known intuitively or 
experientially by Sufis for centuries before him. Mansūr al-Hallāj (d. 922) proclaimed: 
 Anā man ahwā wa man ahwā anā 
I am He whom I love, and He whom I love is I38 
 
The great Sufi poet Farīd al-Dīn ‘Attār (d. 1220) narrates the whole mystic journey through 
the symbolism of the flight of a flock of birds in his Conference of the Birds. At the end of the 
journey, the thirty birds who succeed in the journey to the divine presence realize that they, the 
thirty birds (si murgh in Persian), ‘are’ the simurgh, the mythical bird which, for ‘Attār, symbolizes 
the divine. They then realize that they are mere reflections of the Being they sought and 
worshipped; otherness and duality have perished: 
To be consumed by the light of the presence of the Simurgh 
Is to realize that, 
I know not whether I am Thee or Thou are I; 
I have disappeared in Thee and duality hath perished.39 
 
 
                                                 
37 Futūhāt I 216.9 in  SPK, 276. 
38 Mansūr al-Hallāj quoted in Annemarie Schimmel, As Through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam (Oxford, 
UK: Oneworld, 2001), 32. 




If the human being is the locus of manifestation for all the divine names, he is also the 
microcosm of the cosmos by virtue of the fact that the cosmos is also a manifestation of God’s 
names.40 As Ibn ‘Arabī explains, the Qur’ān affirms the microcosm-macrocosm relationship 
between the human being and the cosmos in no uncertain terms: “God says, ‘We shall show them 
our signs upon the horizons and in themselves until it is clear to them that It is the Truth’ (41:53) so 
that they will know that the human being is a microcosm of the cosmos containing the signs that 
are within the cosmos.”41  
 
But the cosmos is incomplete without the human being.  In Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysics, in 
contrast to all the divine names manifesting together in the human entity, no non-human entity 
reflects the full range of God’s names. Thus, since the human being is the only entity in the cosmos 
that reflects all the attributes of God, only his presence within the cosmos makes it a total 
theophany. Hence, the human being, for Ibn ‘Arabī, is like the spirit of the cosmos: 
 
The whole cosmos is the differentiation of Adam, while Adam is the all-comprehensive 
book. In relation to the cosmos he is like the spirit in relation to the body…through bringing 
together all of this the cosmos is the “great human being,” so long as the human being is 
within it.42 
 
It follows that not only the human being and the cosmos reflect each other as ‘images’ of 
God, as body and spirit, the cosmos and the human being are integral to each other.  One cannot be 
known without reference to the other. In order to know himself, the human being must know God 
                                                 
40 Commenting on the hadīth “God created Adam  in His image”, al-Ghazzālī stated, “God showed 
beneficence to Adam. He gave him an abridged form that brings together every sort of thing found in the cosmos. It is 
as if Adam is everything in the cosmos, or an abridged transcription of the world.” Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, The Niche 
of Lights, trans. David Buchman (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1998), 31. 
 
41 Ibn ‘Arabī , Futūhāt vol. II 150.33 quoted in William Chittick in Self –Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn 
al-Arabi’s Cosmology (Albany: State University of New York, 1998), 9. (Henceforth referred to as SDG). Also, see 
Qur’ān 51: 20-1.  




whose attributes are reflected in the cosmos. The divine names provided by the revelation tell us 
exactly what the “signs” of God in the cosmos are.  But without reference to entities and 
phenomena of the cosmos, the human being could never know what the names meant. Thus, the 
quest for self-knowledge or the quest for knowledge of God requires that we see the cosmos 
consisting of not just material “facts” but “signs of God” (āyāt Allāh).  
 
God created the human being such that through him He may be known as God, and the 
cosmos plays an essential role in aiding human beings in fulfilling that purpose. And in knowing 
God in this manner “wherever one turns,” a Muslim can also fulfil his ultimate purpose of knowing 
God and His Unity (tawḥīd). 
 
2.2.2  Ibn ‘Arabī’s Exposition of the Principle of  Hierarchy of Reality 
Not all entities or signs of God reflect the attributes of God equally because the immutable 
archetypes allow manifestation of divine attributes in different combinations and degrees. From Ibn 
‘Arabī’s metaphysical perspective, the number and the intensity of manifestation of the divine 
attributes is at the root of the hierarchy of reality in the cosmos.43  
 
As we have seen, the human being reflects all the attributes of God. Therefore, there is a 
horizontal hierarchy of reality on the material plane with the human being at the top followed by 
the animal, plant and mineral kingdoms respectively in the descending order. However, according 
to the Qur’ān, between the invisible world of God and His angels and the visible material domain, 
there is a world of intermediate realities – referred to in the Qur’ān as the barzakh (55:19) – which 
                                                 




shares the attributes of both the spiritual world above and the corporeal world below.44 Traditional 
accounts regarding posthumous life of the soul until resurrection on the Day of Judgment, take 
place in this intermediate world.45  Entities in this world, such as the jinns, are immaterial but have 
forms and possess sensory qualities.  
 
Ibn ‘Arabī conveys the reality of this intermediate world by the term ‘imagination’.  
According to Chittick, the term ‘imagination’ is used by Ibn ‘Arabī in two closely related senses. It 
can be used either to mean the intermediate world we discussed above, or “In the narrowest 
sense…a specific faculty of the soul that brings together sensory things, which have shapes and 
forms, and  consciousness, which has no shape or form.”46 Contemporary scholars of the school of 
Ibn ‘Arabī usually use the term ‘imaginal’ to distinguish the intermediate reality or the faculty to 
perceive it as such, from the sense of unreality associated with the term ‘imagination’ in its current 
usage in English. 
 
Like all Islamic thinkers, Ibn ‘Arabī conceives of all things originating in God. Thus, 
creation begins from above with the immutable archetypes in God. In Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysics, the 
first step in comprehending the hierarchy of reality is to know that even though God is equally 
present in every existent entity, He is not equally perceptible at all levels of reality. For the school 
of Ibn ‘Arabī, for any given immutable archetype, the hierarchy of reality results from the divine 
names not being equally manifested at all levels of the cosmos. Ibn ‘Arabī speaks of decreasing 
levels of transparency of divine reality – from the realm of the Absolute Presence of God to the 
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corporeal plane.47  The various manifestations of Presence below the divine reality are also 
described in terms of decreasing levels of spiritual luminosity – luminosity being a measure of the 
intensity of the presence of the pure Spirit or Light (al-Nur) of God. 
 
The divine names and the immutable archetypes are closest to the Essence of God. When 
God chooses to give existence to an immutable archetype, it ‘descends,’ so to speak, from the 
spiritual world into the imaginal world where it first manifests in a ‘form’ corresponding to its 
immutable archetype in the spiritual plane above.48 When this imaginal form ‘descends’ to the 
material plane, it is wedded to matter – itself a pure potentiality –to give rise to the corporeal entity 
corresponding to the imaginal ‘form’ in the imaginal plane above.49 The imaginal form is nothing 
other than the aggregate of the divine qualities that constitute the corresponding immutable 
archetype though at a diminished intensity. Likewise, the visible form of a corporeal entity itself is 
nothing but the outermost manifestation of the qualities of the imaginal form when combined with 
matter below.50    
 
It follows that the immutable archetype of any given corporeal entity is the principle of its 
reality on the imaginal plane, and likewise, the imaginal form in the imaginal world is the principle 
of the corporeal entity on the corporeal plane. The human being cannot access purely spiritual 
realities except by the way of knowing imaginal realm separating the corporeal from the spiritual.51 
Corresponding to the hierarchy of reality there is a hierarchy of human faculties of perception. For 
                                                 
47 Chittick, SPK, 16. 
48 Futūhāt III 361.5 in Chittick,SPK,122. 
49 Futūhāt III 46.27 and  47.25 in Chittick, SPK., 204. 
50 As Mullā Ṣadrā explained, “material forms are nothing but icons and moulds of ... disembodied [i.e. 
intelligible] forms.” Ṣadrā quoted in Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford 
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Ibn ‘Arabī, only spiritual practice and Divine grace open up faculties of perception for levels of 
reality beyond the level perceived by ordinary rationality.52  
 
From the brief discussion above on Ibn ‘Arabī’s vision of the role of the divine names, we 
can conclude the following: first, that there is a hierarchy of reality on the material plane among 
entities based on both the number and degree of manifestation of divine attributes. Second, there is 
another hierarchy of reality corresponding to each corporeal entity, from its immutable archetype in 
the knowledge of God to its imaginal form below in the imaginal world, and finally to the wedding 
of the imaginal form with the matter below in the corporeal world. Moreover, for each entity, the 
hierarchy is the result of the decreasing intensity of manifestation of the divine names at each 
successive plane from above.  
 
There are several features of the hierarchic structure of reality that we must keep in mind. 
Any plane of reality has its principle in the plane above it. The human being cannot access the 
spiritual plane except through the intermediate plane of the imaginal reality. Most importantly, all 
planes of reality are ultimately contained within an indivisible and infinite Unity that God is and 
hence, God’s Unity is the basis of relationship between different planes of reality. As we will see in 
the next chapter, the metaphysics of the hierarchic structure of reality also provides the basis for 
understanding, among other things, the necessity of religion with all its rites and symbols. 
 
2.3 Chapter Summary 
The first principle of the perennial philosophy is almost identical to waḥdat al-wujūd. The 
second principle of the hierarchy of reality also clearly has a counterpart in Islam in terms of 
                                                 




spiritual, imaginal and corporeal planes of reality. As for the cosmos, the doctrine of the non-
existent immutable archetypes (al-a‘yān al-thābita) enables us to understand that the principle of 
tawḥīd (Unity of God) imply waḥdat al-wujūd (Unity of Being) and to see that the signs of God 
which fill the cosmos are the Self-disclosures of God. Thus, in the ultimate sense, the meaning of 
the cosmos consists of the attributes of God and the purpose of the cosmos is to make Him known. 
 
The doctrine of the imaginal world sheds more light on the relation between different 
planes of reality and the nature of the signs of God. Waḥdat al-wujūd is joined with the doctrine 
that the human being is made “in the image of God” to give us the vision of the microcosmic and 
macrocosmic relationship between the human being and the cosmos. From this perspective, the 
human being can know himself and the Unity of God by seeing Him everywhere. Most 
importantly, underlying the entire vision of the cosmos are the principles of tawḥīd and the 
hierarchy of reality which portray the cosmos as sacred and symbolic.  
 
We can conclude that Islamic intellectual tradition contains metaphysical doctrines which 
not only agree with the perennial principles, but also serve as the basis of Islam’s view of the 
cosmos as theophany and of the human being’s intimate relationship with it in fulfilling his 
purpose. Therefore, any system of thought, such as the modern scientific worldview and associated 
ideologies, which deny the perennial principles, also challenge the foundation of the Islamic view 
of nature and its role in fulfilling human purpose.  
 
Given the essential identity of the perennial principles with those of Islamic metaphysics, 




Traditionalist standpoint, as we see in his major works that relate to environmental crisis,53 he does 
so from an essentially Islamic perspective as well. However, our discussion here is only the 
foundational part of what we propose as Nasr’s traditional Islamic response to the environmental 
crisis. In subsequent chapters we will see that all of Nasr’s positions are directly or indirectly based 
on consideration of the Islamic metaphysical principles we discussed in this chapter.   
 
                                                 
53 See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (Chicago: ABC 
International Group, 1997) and Religion and the Order of Nature (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 




METAPHYSICS, SUFISM, AND ISLAMIC ETHICS 
What undergirds a house is its foundation, and what undergirds the religion is experiential knowledge of God, 
along with certitude and circumspect intelligence.1 
                                    Prophet Muḥammad 
 
Sufism possesses teachings concerning the nature of man and the world about him which contains keys to the 
solutions of the most acute problems of the modern world, such as the ecological crisis.2  
                  S. H. Nasr     
 
Like other Muslim environmentalists who have been advocating an Islamic response to the 
environmental crisis, Nasr strongly encourages the observance of Islamic environmental ethics 
which includes the Sharī‘ā concerning the natural world: “Islamic environmental ethics must be 
revived in the context of al-Sharī‘ā and the Islamic view of nature on the basis of the noble 
Qur’ān...”3 But he argues that the prevailing modern scientific worldview can only “corrode 
metaphysical and religious doctrines upon which ethics must of necessity rely.”4 How the 
fundamental religious and metaphysical doctrines discussed in Chapter 2 form the basis of Islamic 
ethics and by what means we may best preserve the relevance of those doctrines for Muslims will 
be the focus of our attention in this chapter.     
 
                                         
1 This ḥadīth is quoted by the renowned Sufi, Abū ‘l-Qasim al-Qushayrī (d. 1074)  in “The Treatise on Sufism 
( Ar-Risālat al-qushayrīya),” in Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, 
trans. John Renard, The Classics of Western Spirituality Series (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 287. The Prophet 
further goes on to explain that by ‘circumspect intelligence’ he means “being intent on obeying God.” Ibid. The chain 
of transmission includes the Prophet’s wife ‘A’isha (d. 678). Ibid., 399 n4. 
2 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 2nd edition (Chicago: ABC International, 2001), 
93. 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic worldview and Modern Science,” in Islamic Thought and Scientific 
Creativity, Vol. 7 (1), 1996, p. 21. For an excellent summary of Islamic ethics on the environment, see Othman Abd-
ar-Rahman Llewellyn, “The Basis for a Discipline of the Islamic Environmental Law,” in Islam and Ecology: A 
Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 185-247. 
4 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 86. 
We discuss how modern scientific worldview undermines faith in religion and metaphysical  doctrine  briefly in 
Chapter 1.4-1.5 and in greater detail, especially from the Islamic metaphysical  point of view, in Chapter 6. 
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In order to draw attention to Nasr’s emphasis on the revival and observance of Islamic 
ethics, we will give an outline of various strategies Nasr recommends for Islamic environmental 
ethics to play a significant role towards the protection of the environment. Next, we will briefly 
discuss how Islamic metaphysics or ma‘rifa (knowledge of God or of Supreme Reality) and 
religious doctrines are foundational to Islamic ethics. And finally, we will discuss the critical 
importance of Sufism in upholding and confirming the religious and metaphysical view of nature.  
 
3.1 Nasr’s Strategies for the Dissemination and Application of the knowledge of Islamic 
Environmental Ethics  
Nasr is aware that today most of the ‘ulamā’ (Islamic religious scholars) have little concern 
about the environmental crisis and are hardly aware of Islamic teachings about the natural world. 
He sees an urgent need for pious Muslims, especially the ‘ulamā,’ to wake up to the fact that Islam 
is not just about praying to God and moral behaviour towards other human beings, but also about 
taking care of  the world of nature.5  
 
Accordingly, Nasr recommends education on Islamic environmental ethics in the 
madrasahs as well as in the modern educational institutions of the Muslim world.6 Once the 
‘ulamā’ have educated themselves about Islamic teachings on the environment, Muslim 
governments would do well to work together with the ‘ulamā’  “who have the ear of the people” 
                                         
5 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On the Environmental Crisis,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, Science, 
Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam 
Publishing, 2007), 146-47.  
6 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” in Islam and 




and let them “spearhead efforts.”7 In addition, Nasr encourages contemporary scholars to use 
existing “concrete laws and principles of regulations”8 in Islamic jurisprudence “to extend” the 
field of application of existing environmental Sharī‘ā “whenever necessary”9 to respond to today’s 
environmental crisis.10  
 
Nasr argues that laws intended for the preservation of the environment which have sanction 
of the Sharī‘ā have a better chance of being observed than secular laws do, because Muslims 
“would see them as God’s Laws, rather than simply governmental regulations to be circumvented 
whenever possible.”11He supports efforts by civil laws or by modern NGOs to take measures with 
the aim of limiting pollution as long as those measures do not violate Islamic principles such as the 
legal maxims.12 Such approaches which protect the natural environment may qualify as ‘āda and 
‘urf,13 and receive approval by Islamic legal scholars. Finally, as means for funding the 
environmental projects, especially for the creation and administration of harīms and himās,14Nasr 
                                         
7 Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” 102. 
8 Ibid.,” 99. 
9 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 143. 
10 For the most extensive discussion of Islamic environmental ethics, see Mawil Izzi Dien, The Environmental 
Dimension of Islam (Cambridge, UK : The Lutterworth Press, 200). This work and the aforementioned essay by 
Othman Abd-ar-Rahman Llewellyn, contain a great variety of excellent suggestions about how the existing Sharī‘ā on 
the environment can be extended for modern circumstances. 
11 Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” 99. 
12 Ibid., 102; Also Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 143. For a summary of Islamic legal maxims as they 
apply particularly for the environment, see Izzi Dien, Environmental Dimension of Islam, 114-116. For a thorough 
study of Islamic legal principles, please see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence 
(Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2008). 
13 ‘āda and ‘urf are “customary practices and definitions” in a Muslim society “which may acquire legal force 
when they accord with the aims of the Sharī‘ā.” Othman Llewellyn, “The Basis for a Discipline of the Islamic 
Environmental Law,” 192. 
14 A harīm is an inviolate public space or water resource and a himā  is a protected area for the non-human 
species. They are among the most important environmental practices in the Sharī‘ā. For an excellent discussion of  
harīms, himās  and suggestions for their extension under modern circumstances, see Othman Llewellyn, “The Basis for 
a Discipline of the Islamic Environmental Law,”210-217. 
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recommends the revival of the traditional Islamic institution of waqf (religious endowments for 
public welfare) supported mainly by pious individuals.15  
 
In summary, we can envision a comprehensive Islamic ethics based programme which not 
only has a better chance of being practiced by Muslim nations where faith is still strong, but could 
also, by the same token, go farther than the reach of secular environmental protection laws 
especially in those circumstances that cannot be observed or regulated by authorities. However, 
according to Nasr, such ethically based efforts cannot ultimately succeed unless we can revive and 
maintain the religious or metaphysical view of nature which the scientific worldview denies.16 To 
understand this, we must first grasp how religious and metaphysical doctrines are at the foundation 
of Islamic ethics. 
 
3.2 Religious and Metaphysical doctrines at the Foundation of Islamic Ethics 
The fundamental Islamic religious doctrines that define the relationship between the human 
being and nature are the doctrines of amāna (bestowed trust)17 and khilāfa (vicegerency).18 Also, 
the Qur’ān suggests that servitude to God and obedience to His Prophet accordingly is the proper 
attitude necessary for human beings to achieve felicity.19 Indeed, servitude is the only means by 
                                         
15  Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,”103. The waqfs funded the 
building of mosques, schools, hospitals, wells, and other charitable projects for the public in the pre-modern Islamic 
world. Llewellyn, “The Basis for a Discipline of the Islamic Environmental Law,” 217-8. 
16 For our discussion of the ways modern scientific worldview denies Islamic metaphysical principles, see 
Chapter 6. 
17 See Qur’ān 33:72. 
18 See Qur’ān 2:30. 
19  Ingrid Mattson  points out  that in the verse “I have  only created jinn and humans to worship me” (Qur’ān : 
51:56), the word ‘ibada  translated here as “worship” literally means “servitude.” Ingrid Mattson, The Story of the 
Quran: Its History and Place in Muslim Life (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). The verses 3:132; 4:69 
asserts the need to obey God and His Prophet to achieve felicity. 
122 
 
which the human being can act as a khalīfah (vicegerent) and treat what God has given to him as 
amāna – his own body, senses, reason, heart, and the natural world about him.20   
 
Servitude to God requires that we know the will of God.  However, the will of God is 
known not only by the specific divine commands, which form the main components of the Sharī‘ā, 
but also indirectly and fundamentally by the intrinsic nature of everything created by God. Nasr 
makes this point by drawing attention to the fact that the Qur’ānic term ḥaqq not only refers to God 
who is al-Ḥaqq (The Truth) but “[it] at once means truth, reality, right, law, and due.”21  He 
observes that “according to Islam each being exists by virtue of the truth (ḥaqq) and is also owed 
its due (ḥaqq) according to its nature. The trees have their due as do animals or even rivers and 
mountains. In dealing with nature man must pay what is due to each creature and, each creature has 
its right accordingly…The rights of creatures were given by God and not by us, to be taken away 
when we decide to do so.”22   
 
Since the Qur’ān describes the fundamental nature of the reality of entities as signs of God 
(āyāt Allāh) (3:190), it is fundamentally by that criterion that God’s will regarding the human 
treatment of nature is determined. As Mawil Izzi Dien has observed, this point is emphasized by a 
                                         
20 See pp. 59-60. 
21 Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,”97. 
22 Ibid.  When one perceives the haqq of a thing, one “understands not only the thing itself, but also his own 
correct response to it.” William Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabī: Heir to the Prophets (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 88. In the same 
vein, James Morris, one of the leading Islamic scholars today, asserts “al-Ḥaqq, ‘the Real,’ is at once the ultimate 
Reality, Truth, Right, and the vast complex of human rights and responsibilities which are inseparable from our always 
partial recognition of the  Real.” James Morris, “Communications and Spiritual Pedagogy: Exploring the Methods of 
Investigation in Classical Islamic Thought,” unpublished manuscript, p. 2; available from 
http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlespdf/sp_communication.pdf ; Internet; accessed 10 September 2010. 
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verse on the she-camel – a metaphor for the natural world that the Qur’ān uses several times – 
which must not be harmed because of her essential value as a sign of God: 23 
…This she-camel of Allah 
Is a sign unto you: 
So leave her to graze 
In God’s earth, and let her 
Come to no harm, 
Or you shall be seized 
With a grievous punishment. (Qur’ān 7:73)24 
 
In fact, everything “in the creation of the heavens and the earth”25 are signs of God.  If we 
disregard God’s signs, we sin against Him and “corruption doth appear on the land and the sea.”26  
 
If the appropriate human attitude due to each entity in the natural world is determined 
fundamentally by it’s nature as a sign of God, then our appreciation of Islamic ethics depends 
ultimately upon true understanding of the signs which concerns metaphysics (ma‘rifa).27 Indeed, in 
light of the doctrines of immutable archetype (al-a‘yān al-thābita), Self-disclosure of God (tajallī) 
and the Unity of Being (wahdat al-wujūd), we might say that Islamic metaphysics (ma‘rifa) is an 
elaboration of the Qur’ān’s repeated assertions that all entities are signs of God.  However, these 
doctrines are only metaphysical expositions of the ordinary religious doctrines of tawḥīd and the 
hierarchy of reality.  
 
Indeed, the doctrines of amāna (bestowed trust) and khilāfa (vicegerency) are made 
comprehensible by the metaphysical doctrines of the immutable archetypes and of the human being 
                                         
23 Izzi Dien, The Environmental Dimension of Islam, 98. 
24Also, see Qur’ān 26:155-158; 17:59. 
25 Qur’ān 3:190; 2:164. 
26 Qur’ān 30:41. See The Holy Qur’ān, trans. Muhammad M. Pickthal (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’ān, 
2001). Also, see Qur’ān 26:155-158. 
27 See p. 103. 
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as the microcosm of the cosmos which reflects all the qualities of God who is One (Al-Aḥad).28 For 
Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), the amāna is the potential ability of the human being alone to 
know the realities of all things, that is, the archetypes, in his heart where God, the One, dwells.29 In 
the same vein, in his popular exegesis of the Quran, Nizām al-Dīn Nishaburi (d.1327) asserts, the 
human being becomes God’s khalīfah (vicegerent) when his heart’s vision is “illumined with the 
fire of the light of God,”30 the means by which, for al-Ghazzālī, the human knows how all things 
are rooted in God.31 Thus, the religious doctrines of amāna and khilāfa are rooted in the principles 
of tawhid, the hierarchy of reality and purposefulness of the cosmos.32 If the doctrines of amana 
and khilāfa determine Islamic ethics regarding the natural world, Islamic environmental ethics is 
rooted fundamentally in tawḥīd. Indeed, as Mohammad Hashim Kamali, one of the foremost 
scholars of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and Law (Sharī‘ā) today has observed, “Every discussion 
of law and morality in Islam must, of necessity, proceed from tawḥīd…God created the universe, 
and every part of it is synchronized with its other parts.”33  
 
Al-Ghazzālī spoke of four levels of knowledge of tawḥīd:  First level consists of the 
declaration by tongue without accepting it by the heart;34  second level is limited to imitation of 
                                         
28 See Chapter 2.2.1c. 
29 See Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, “The Elaboration of the Marvels of the Heart (Kitāb Sharḥ ‘ajā’ib al-qalb),”  
trans. John Renard in Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, The Classics 
of Western Spirituality Series (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 304. 
30 Nizām al-Dīn Nishaburi quoted in Mahmoud M. Ayoub, The Quran and Its Interpreters, Vol. I (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York, 1984), 78. 
31 See p. 38. 
32 Tawḥīd is known by knowing the rootedness of things in God, the One; the apparent distinction between a 
thing’s ordinary appearance and its root in God proves the hierarchy of reality; and the ultimate 
meaningfulness of the cosmos again lies in its rootedness in God who is the ultimate reality. 
33 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari‘ah Law: An Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2008), 17. 
34 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, On Trust and the Unity of God, trans. Mohammad Nur Abdus Salam(Chicago: 
Great Books of the Islamic World, 2002 ), 22. 
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others;35 third level consists of an intuitive knowing of how “all proceeds from one source” while 
still retaining a sense of mutiplicity;36 and finally, the fourth level is the state where “one sees 
nothing save One.”37 The first level of belief is termed as that of the hypocrite.  The second level is 
most common and is limited to faith in the knowledge or belief of others. With this ordinary level 
of belief in tawḥīd, the unitarian approach to life in Sharī‘ā38 can be explained mostly by the 
logical conclusion at the mental level that all facets of life must be somehow related because 
everything has been created or willed by one and the same God. However, al-Ghazzālī suggests 
that the third and fourth levels of knowledge of tawḥīd, which reveal the interconnections among 
everything unperceived by ordinary rationality, can also justify those ethical teachings or Sharī‘ā 
injunctions which may otherwise seem arbitrary. 
 
Al-Ghazzālī asserts that “God’s Unity is in the Religious Law, and the Religious Law is in 
God’s Unity.”39 He explains this by way of arguing that ultimately hell or heaven is not given to us 
“from some other place” but that our own deeds draw us to the hell or heaven existing within our 
own true reality.40 He explains that there is a level of realization of tawḥīd which allows us to 
experience “one animate being” within which everything in the universe, including heavens and 
                                         
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. The second, third and the fourth level of knowledge of tawḥīd also corresponds to the Lore of 
Certainty(‘ilm al-yaqīn), the Eye of Certainty(‘ayn al-yaqīn) and the Truth of Certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn) in Sufism. 
“The Lore is the certainty that comes from hearing the fire described, the Eye is the certainty that comes from seeing 
the flames; the Truth is the certainty which comes from being consumed in it. This last description is the extinction 
(fanā’) of all otherness which alone gives realisation of the Supreme Identity. The second degree is the Heart-
knowledge, for the Eye which sees is the Heart.” Martin Lings, What is Sufism?, (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1982), 
61-62. This is a further elaboration of  al-Ghazzālī’s discussion to the same effect. See al-Ghazzālī, “Elaboration of the 
Marvels of the Heart,” 306-307. 
38 Kamali, Shari‘ah Law, 18. 
39 Al-Ghazzālī, On Trust and the Unity of God, 28. 
40 Ibid., 30. 
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hells, are interconnected into an Unity.41 Al-Ghazzālī adds that this vision of Unity cannot be 
understood except by recognition of the truth of the hadīth “Verily, God created Adam in His 
image” suggesting how as His ‘image’, the human being contains within himself the universe, 
including the hells and the heavens, though that reality and all the interconnections among people, 
the non-human world, deeds and obligations remain hidden from our ordinary consciousness.42In 
this manner, Al-Ghazzālī demonstrates the significance of metaphysics in comprehending the 
Sharī‘ā, especially in cases where the rationale is not obvious. 
 
This brings us back to the metaphysical view of the human being who as God’s  ‘image’, 
shares, even if he is not aware of it, all His attributes,43 and has the potential to be His khalīfah 
(vicegerent), His perfect representative on earth. In this regard, Ibn ‘Arabī argues that the human 
being represents God most perfectly only when he can manifest the divine qualities of mercy and 
majesty44 within himself in perfect equilibrium as they are in God.45 Further, we will see next that 
Ibn ‘Arabī also provides the metaphysical rationale for observing the Sharī‘ā and explains how the 
Sharī‘ā serves to bring about the necessary equilibrium of divine qualities in the human being. 
 
3.3 The Metaphysics of the Hierarchy of Reality Provides the Rationale for Sharī‘ā 
                                         
41 “There is a station in gnosis (marifat) where, when a person reaches it, he really sees that all that exists is 
interconnectedness, one with another, and are all like one animate being. The relationship of the parts of the world such 
as the heavens, the earth, the stars to each other is like the relationship of the parts of one animate being to each other. ” 
Ibid., 25. 
42 Ibid. 25 and 33. 
43 See Chapter 2.2.1c 
44 The qualities of mercy refers to God’s qualities of beauty and generosity by which we can imagine His 
nearness or immanence.  In contrast, the qualities of majesty, often referred to as the qualities of wrath or severity, are 
those that emphasize His transcendence and power over creation. See William Chittick, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-Arabi 
and the Problem of Religious Diversity, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 56. 
45 Ibn al-Arabi, al-Futūhāt al-Makkiyya, II 615.22 in William Chittick, The Sufi path of knowledge: Ibn al-
Arabi’s metaphysics of imagination (New York:  State University of New York Press, 1989), 370.  Also, see William 
Chittick, The Sufi path of knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi’s metaphysics of imagination (New York:  State University of New 




In light of the metaphysics of the hierarchy of reality discussed in Chapter 2, the principles 
of the entities in a given plane of reality lie in the plane above it.  Hence, all entities or meanings 
on the earthly plane are mere symbols of their realities in the imaginal plane and beyond. Further, 
since we don’t have access to the knowledge of spiritual realities except through the imaginal 
realm, only those who have access to the higher planes of knowledge can convey messages 
received at those levels most appropriately. In turn, they alone can explain the symbolism or the 
higher realities of events and entities on the earthly plane. In order to understand how the Islamic 
religion with all its rites and symbols has a rationale beyond what could be fathomed by ordinary 
reason, we must first understand that in Islamic metaphysics the Qur’ān itself is an imaginal reality 
and that the Prophet Muḥammad is its most perfect interpreter.  
  
  Ibn ‘Arabī draws attention to the imaginal nature of the Qur’ān  by the way of describing its 
‘descent’ as an imaginal reality.  Originally, the Qur’ān is the pure meaning of guidance from God. 
But reportedly the revelation of the Qur’ān was always preceded by dream-visions.46  Thus, the 
Qur’ān received on the material plane is an imaginal form of the immutable archetype or the 
‘meaning’ of the Qur’ān, combined with the sensory quality of sound.47 Naturally, only those who 
have access to realities above the material plane would qualify to interpret the Qur’ān as it should 
be interpreted. So, how is the Prophet the most perfect interpreter of the Qur’ān? 
 
Differences between levels of reality are determined by different levels of manifestation of 
the qualities of God who is All-Knowing (al-‘Alīm) or All-Aware.48 According to Ibn ‘Arabī and 
other Sufis, the human being grows in knowledge, awareness and perfection with spiritual 
                                         
46 See Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 74. For our discussion on the imaginal realities, see Chapter 2.2.2. 
47  Futūhāt II 375.32  in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 75.  
48 Chapter 2.2.2. 
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practice.49 Accordingly, Ibn ‘Arabī asserts, “The perfect human being witnesses God in the 
manifest domain inasmuch as He is in the cosmos, and he witnesses Him in the nonmanifest 
domain inasmuch as He is concealed.”50 As the prototype of the perfect human being in Islam, the 
Prophet knew all levels of reality perfectly. Since the Qur’ān is an imaginal world itself, only the 
Prophet, having the perfect knowledge of the higher planes of reality, can interpret its guidance 
pefectly by giving directions and establishing the most appropriate rites and symbols.51 By this 
logic, the Sharī‘ā, essentially based on the Prophet’s interpretations of the Quran, is the most 
perfect general guidance from God.52 But how does observance of the Sharī‘ā help to bring about 
the equilibrium of divine qualities in the human being? We will outline Ibn ‘Arabī’s arguments 
below.  
 
Obedience to God entails observing His guidance given by the Sharī‘ā which includes 
commands and prohibitions, and whose main components – the remembrance of God’s unity, 
prayer, fasting,  alms-giving and pilgrimage – obviously have the goal of drawing human beings to 
God’s mercy or nearness. As Ibn ‘Arabī says, the prophets have designated for the people “acts that 
bring about nearness to God.”53 The prohibitions against lying, stealing, drinking, backbiting, and 
                                         
49 Futūhāt I 271.27 and I 319.27 in Chittick, Sufi path of knowledge, 168-69.  On the views of other Sufis, see 
Chapter 3.4 – 3.4.1. 
50 Futūhāt IV 246.12 in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 155.  Also, see Chittick, Sufi path of knowledge, 30.  
51 Futūhāt III 398.11 in  Imaginal Worlds, 154. 
Al-Ghazzālī makes a similar argument in his Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal. Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, Al-Ghazali’s Path to 
Sufism: his Deliverance from Error, trans. R.J. Mccarthy, S.J. (Luiseville,KY: Fons Vitae, 2000), 65-66. 
52 “God gives to His servants from Himself, and also through the hands of His messengers. As for what comes 
to you on the hand of the Messenger, take it without employing any scale. But as for what comes to you from the hand 
of God, take it with a scale. For God is identical to every giver, but He has forbidden you from taking every gift. Thus 
He says, ‘Whatever the messenger gives you, take; whatever he forbids you, forego.’ [59:7] Thus your taking from the 
messenger is more profitable for you and better able to actualize your felicity.”  See Futūhāt IV 186.22 in Chittick, 
Imaginal Worlds, 146. 
53 Futūhāt chapter 66 in Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 134. 
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so forth, ultimately have the same goal also. Thus, the main thrust of the Sharī‘ā is obviously to 
unveil qualities of mercy in the observant Muslim.  
 
Now, the attributes of mercy are higher in rank, nearer, or more fundamental to God 
because as the famous hadīth qudsi states, “My mercy precedes my wrath.” With the cultivation of 
the qualities of mercy given priority in the Sharī‘ā, its observance serves to unite, harmonize, and 
balance the diverse divine attributes in the human being.54 Thus, the observance of the Sharī‘ā 
unveils the qualities of mercy and severity in the faithful Muslim in proper balance, a feat that 
human calculations alone would be unable to determine.  
 
Thus, according to Ibn ‘Arabī, for Muslims to fully actualize their human potential, there is 
no recourse other than to follow the Prophet Muḥammad. He concludes, “The road to felicity is 
that set down by revealed religion, nothing else.”55 Conversely, the rationale for religion is 
weakened if the perennial principles and the associated metaphysics are neglected or denied. By 
extension, the same logic applies to the rites and symbols established by revelations and prophets 
corresponding to other religions.56 The Qur’ān itself acknowledges the reality of the diversity of 
religious paths ordained by God.57 As such, the Islamic tradition is quite in harmony with the 
Traditionalist insistence on observing rites and symbols of each religion by its adherents.58 
 
 
                                         
54 Chittick, Imaginal Worlds, 3, 148-49. 
55 Futūhāt, II 148.12, in Chittick, Imaginal Worl ds, 146. 
56 Ibn ‘Arabī recognized not only the validity but also the necessity of diverse religions. See Futūhāt  Chapter 
48 in Imaginal Worlds, 157-160. 
57 See the Qur’ān 5:48; 22:67; 5:68.  
58 See p. 34. For an excellent study of  traditional Islamic concepts and attitudes towards other religions, 
please see Reza Shah-Kazemi, The Other in the Light of the One: The Universality of the Qur’ān and Interfaith 
Dialogue (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts Society, 2006). 
130 
 
3.4 Sufism and the Supremacy of Knowledge by the Heart 
Metaphysics or ma‘rifa (knowledge of God or Supreme Reality) is the central objective and 
perspective of Sufism. For one on the Sufi way, it is the perspective, the road-map or discursive 
knowledge of God, and as the objective, it is the experiential knowledge of God.59 In other words, 
metaphysical doctrines are theoretical articulation of realized knowledge of those who already 
reached the ‘end’ of the Sufi path; the doctrines define the nature of reality as such for all entities 
and thereby serve as road maps to God who is the Supreme Reality (al-Ḥaqq).60  
 
Martin Lings, one of the leading Islamic scholars of the twentieth century in the West, 
pointed out that Sufism’s “aspirations, its practice, and in a sense even its doctrine” is summed up 
by the following much quoted hadīth qudsi: 
 
Nothing is more pleasing to Me, as a means for My slave to draw near unto Me, than 
worship which I have made binding upon him; and My slave ceaseth not to draw near unto 
Me with added devotions of his free will until I love him; and when I love him I am the 
Hearing wherewith he heareth and the Sight wherewith he seeth and the Hand whereby he 
graspeth and the Foot whereon he walketh.61 
 
Thus, in addition to observing the obligatory duties of Islam crystallized in the Sharī‘ā,62  Sufism 
consists of the numerous ways of drawing near to God. Non-obligatory forms of worship include 
additional prayers, recitation of the Qur’ān, dhikr(remembrance or invocation of God by His 
names), spiritual retreat (khalwa), and charity beyond the minimal established by the obligatory 
                                         
59 See ‘Alī ibn ‘Uthmān Hujwīrī (990-1077), “The Revelation of Realities Veiled (Kashf al-maḥ jūb),” trans. 
John Renard in Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, The Classics of 
Western Spirituality Series (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 273-274. 
60 “The theoretical gnosis (known also as doctrinal Sufism) does not mark progress over earlier Sufism … 
Earlier Sufis had spoken more or less through allusions to the reality of the Garden of Truth while Ibn ‘Arabī and his 
followers provided a full map of the nature of the Garden along with the means of reaching it.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam’s Mystical Tradition (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2007), 210-11. 
61 Sahih Bukhari, Riqaq, 37, quoted in Lings, What is Sufism?, 74. 
62 There have always been Sufis who have been neglectful of Sharī‘ā obligations. But such Sufis are the 
exceptions that prove the rule. 
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duty of alms-giving (zakāh). In all this, the Prophet Muḥammad serves as the preeminent example 
for imitation.63 The objective of drawing near God also coincides with the need to see Him 
everywhere one looks because the noblest way of worshiping Him is to do so as though one sees 
Him.64  
 
Since the Sufi way has sought to contemplate the presence of God in all actions and 
phenomena, more than in any other aspect of Islam, it is in Sufism that the inner or higher reality of 
the world of nature also holds a special interest.65 Accordingly, we find al-Ghazzālī state that one 
gains “knowledge of God Most High through the knowledge of His handiwork, and this is the 
totality of the universe.”66  
 
However, this contemplation can only bear fruit to the degree that the heart is made pure 
because the Intellect or the “light that appears in the heart”67 and enables us to witness beyond 
what ordinary rationality can offer, that is, a vision of God’s omnipresence, is able to function 
without obstructions only when the heart is pure. Indeed, purity of the heart is the goal of Sufism.  
                                         
63 “All of the early handbooks of Sufism, beginning with Sarrāj(d. 988) and Qushaayrī (d. 1074), emphasize 
the role of the Prophet as the model and exemplar of the mystic in all the ordinary details of life and daily ritual as well 
as in internal experience.” Carl Ernst, The Shambala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambala Publications, Inc., 1997),49. 
64 This refers to the famous hadīth of Archangel Gabriel in which the Prophet was asked by the angel to tell 
him about “doing what is beautiful”. The Prophet replied “Doing what is beautiful means that you should worship God 
as if you see Him, for even if you do not see Him, He sees you.” See Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, The 
Vision of Islam (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1994), xxv. 
65 In fact, Sufi interest in the inner reality of the natural world was inspired by the Qur’ān itself.  According to 
the Qur’ān, every creation symbolizes metaphysical, moral, and ethical truths by their very nature, as we see for 
instance in the specific cases of raven (5:31), dog (7:176), good and bad tree (14:24-6), spider (29:41), ass (62:5) and 
the hidden pearls (56:23) as well as in various natural phenomena. These examples employ a symbolic, rather than 
rationalistic understanding of nature, and further, they stand as evidence that moral and metaphysical principles are not 
arbitrary; rather these principles govern the cosmos.  
66 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, On Knowing Yourself and God, trans. Mohammad Nur Abdus Salam (Chicago: 
Great Books of the Islamic World, 2002 ), 12. 
67 Al-Ghazzālī quoted on p. 38.  In another instance, in seeking to give this vision the Quranic legitimacy, al-
Ghazzālī quotes the Qur’ānic verse “Does not a person, the centre of whose being God has expanded, have the light of 
his Lord.”(39:22). See al-Ghazzālī, “Elaboration of the Marvels of the Heart,” 305.  
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As al-Ghazzālī observed, the object of Sufism “is to lop off the obstacles present in the soul and to 
rid oneself of its reprehensible habits and vicious qualities in order to attain thereby a heart empty 
of all save God and adorned with constant remembrance of God.”68  
 
The Sufi understanding of the perceptual role of the heart can be traced to the numerous 
mentions in the Qur’ān and the Hadīth of the necessity of a having a heart able to grasp the 
spiritual realities in the natural world as well as in ourselves. The Qur’ān warns that the signs of 
God cannot be deciphered except by those who have understanding.69 It points at the heart not only 
as a physical organ but also as the means of understanding of a higher order of reality beyond what 
is accessible by the senses and ordinary reason. It is not enough to have physical organs and senses; 
evil doers may have hearts but they “understand not” with them: 
 
They have hearts wherewith they understand not; eyes wherewith they see not, and ears 
wherewith they hear not. They are like cattle, nay, more misguided, for they are 
heedless.(Qur’ān 7:179)70 
 
The Qur’ān suggests that the physical heart can be transformed into an instrument for 
grasping deeper or higher realities if there is faith in God and the heart is cleansed of worldly 
attachment, doubts about God, and of evil, accordingly.71 The benefit of such a pure heart is the 
certitude in knowledge.  Commenting on the Qur’ānic verse “The heart did not lie as to what it 
saw” (53:11) the renowned Sufi Abū Tālib al-Makkī (d. 996) indicates Quranic legitimacy to the 
experience of certitude by the heart: “[God] thus establishes that the heart has eyes; so the vision of 
                                         
68 Al-Ghazzālī, Al-Ghazali’s Path to Sufism,51. 
69 Qur’ān 2:269; 3:7; 3:190; 6:98; 7:32. 
70 Also see Qur’ān 22:46. 
71 Qur’ān 9:108; 26:89; 29:49; 7:33; 3:14; 6:32; 64:11. 
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the heart is certitude, and one who possess the heart is endowed with certitude.”72 Thus, in Sufi 
terminology, that which we have referred to as the Intellect is also known as the ‘eye of the heart’ 
(‘ayan al-qalb). 
 
Sufis over the ages have asserted the supremacy of knowledge by the pure heart.  Like 
Rūmī,73 al-Ghazzālī, Ibn ‘Arabī, and numerous other Sufis before him, the famous Sufi poet 
Mahmūd Shabistarī (d. 1321) contends that mere reasoning is incapable of revealing the reality of 
things.  Shabistarī summarizes ratiocination as the process that first starts with concepts in the 
mind, second, the mind judges and categorizes different concepts, and third, the mind applies 
Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning among concepts that are ‘known,’ to infer from there, a new 
‘known’. Thus, knowledge through ratiocination is not an absolute knowledge but contingent upon 
other ‘knowns’ and hence only an ‘imitation’ and not an experiential knowledge.74 Instead, we find 
Shabistarī speaking of the “work of the Heart” that alone can reach beyond ordinary reason:  
  
The physical actions of one’s water and clay 
Don’t lead to the Knowledge which is the work of the Heart.75 
 
And many Sufis have used the term ‘eye of the heart’ to relate to the faculty of the heart that can 
perceive all levels of reality: 
 
                                         
72 Abū Tālib al-Makkī, “The Sustenance of Hearts (Qūt al-qulūb),” trans. John Renard in Knowledge of God 
in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, The Classics of Western Spirituality Series (New 
York: Paulist Press, 2004), 198. 
73 “The saints have polished their breasts until cleansed of greed, cupidity, avarice, and hatred. Without doubt 
the pure mirror is the heart acting as a receptacle for infinite pictures....Here reason must remain silent, or else lead 
astray.” Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī  vol. I,  3484-88, trans. William Chittick,  in Chittick, Sufi Path of Love: The 
Spiritual Teachings of  Rūmī (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 38. 
74 Sa’d ud- Dīn Mahmūd Shabistarī, The Garden of Mystery (Gulshan-i rāz),  Trans. Robert Darr. (California: 
Real Impressions, 1998). Verses 73-79. 
75 Shabistarī, Garden of Mystery, verses 428-429. 
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I saw my Lord with the eye of the heart 
And said: “Who are you?” He answered: “You!”76 
 
Or, 
The eye of the heart knows 
What it has seen through His collyrium: 
Light and mercy, all the way to the seventh heaven.77 
 
Or, 
Open the ‘eye of the heart’ so that thou canst see the spirit, 
And gain vision of that which visible is not.78 
 
Nasr has warned that in modern thought, not only that the Intellect has been reduced to 
reason, but the heart is also associated with only emotions and sentiments and not with the deepest 
knowledge as implied by the Sufis.79  However, as the ‘eye of the heart’, the Intellect is not like the 
dry ordinary reason; the Intellect knows with certitude and loves at the same time. Indeed, the 
famous Sufi Shaykh Aḥmad al-‘Alawī (1869-1934) spoke of the Intellect in him as the “bond 
which bindeth”80 one’s soul to God with knowledge that is at once truth and love because the 
Intellect sees nothing but God, the Loving (Al-Wadūd), in all It sees:  
Our intelligences are made drunk with the wine of love, 
As though we were mad, yet mad we are not. 
Thou seest us amongst men, but we are not as thou seest, 
For our Spirits shine clear above the highest heights. 
Our is an intelligence, a flawless jewel, 
Exquisite in beauty; it perceiveth naught but God. 
This is the bond which bindeth, be it but a glimmering.81  
                                         
76 Mansūr al-Hallāj (d. 922) quoted in Annemarie Schimmel, As Through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam 
(Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2001), 32. 
77 Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī , Dīwān-i Shams-i Tabrīzī 21214, in Chittick, Sufi Path of Love, 75. 
78 Hātif Ishfahāni (d. 1784) quoted in Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present: 
Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy (Albany: State Univesity of New York, 2006), 102. 
79 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, 102. 
80 As Martin Lings pointed out, Shayk Alawi used derivative words from the root of the word ‘aql  (reason or 
Intellect in Arabic) which means ‘to bind’ to suggest the role of Intellect as that which binds. Martin Lings, A Sufi 
Saint of the Twentieth Century: His Spiritual Heritage and Legacy, 3rd edition (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Text Society, 
1993), 214 n3. Nasr has made the same suggestions only to be criticized for stretching the meanings of Arabic words. 
See Leif Stenberg, The Islamization of Science: Four Muslim Positions Developing an Islamic Modernity, Lund 
Studies in History of Religions, Vol. 6 (New York: Coronet Books, 1996), 121. 




3.4.1 Dhikr as the Sustenance for Metaphysical Knowledge 
What is the most efficacious way to cleanse the heart to enable the ‘eye of the heart’ to 
open? While obligatory acts of worship are of primary importance, altogether they can occupy only 
about an hour each day. Hence, for the Sufi who wants to watch over his heart for the remaining 
hours of the day as well, the supererogatory acts gain special importance.82 Of the supererogatory 
acts we mentioned earlier, the practice of dhikr (invocation of God by His many revealed names) is 
the most universal among Sufis.83 Numerous Qur’ānic verses and prophetic traditions attach 
tremendous significance to dhikr.84 The dhikr is used  to purify the heart of evil qualities such as 
greed, envy, jealousy and hatred by imbuing it with virtues which are “human reflection of the 
divine aspect symbolized by the sacred Names”85 of God.  Indeed, numerous Sufis have referred to 
cultivating virtues through remembrance of God as “assuming the traits of the divine names” (al-
takhalluq bi’l-asma’ al-ilahiyya).86 As Rūmī observed, “When I mention His Name, good fortunes 
arrives; then the Name becomes the Named…”87   
 
                                         
82 Lings, What is Sufism?, 78. 
83 See Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1975), 167-178. For an excellent exposition of the meaning and practice of dhikr, see Ibn ‘Atā’illāh al-Iskandarī, 
The Key to Salvation – A Sufi Manual of Invocation, trans. Mary A.K. Danner (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 
1996). 
84 “You have a good example in God’s Messenger, for whosoever hopes for God and the Last Day and 
remembers God frequently” (Qur’ān 33:21).  “Remember Me and I will remember you” (Qur’ān 2:152).“Call upon Me 
and I will answer you” (Qur’ān 40:60).  “And remember the name of your Lord, and devote yourself to Him.” (Qur’ān 
73:8). “Verily, in the remembrance of God hearts find their rest.” (Qur’ān 13:28). The Prophet Muḥammad said “There 
is a polish for everything that takes away rust; and the polish of the heart is dhikr, the invocation of God.” See  
Essential Sufism, eds. James Fadiman and Robert Frager (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), 102.  
85 Titus Burckhardt,  An Introduction to Sufi Doctrine, Trans. D.M. Matheson,  (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad 
Ashraf  Publishers, 1996), 115-16. 
86 William Chittick, Sufism: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001), 57. 
87 Jālāl al-Dīn Rūmī, (Diwan-i Shams-i Tabrizi, verse 30701, trans. William C. Chittick,  in Chittick, The Sufi 
Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of Rūmī (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 159.   
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We might say that sincere dhikr is a way of overcoming the contingencies of individual 
consciousness which hide the Intellect88 by substituting them with selfless and merciful qualities of 
God such as truthfulness, patience, contentment, generosity, kindness and love such that the 
Intellect, or as al-Ghazzālī said, “the light that appears in the heart,” can shine and provide 
knowledge of spiritual realities, including that of nature.89 Indeed, the famous Sufi Ḥakīm at-
Tirmidhī (d. 908) saw dhikr as the “sustenance” for ma‘rifa.90 Only with such certitude, as we saw 
in section 3.2, can ethical teachings of religion have the firmest foundation and the virtues can 
flourish most easily. Indeed, the famous Sufi Abū Nasr as-Sarrāj (d. 988) argued that the Revealed 
Law “encompasses the two concepts of transmission (riwāya) and comprehension (dirāyā).”91 He 
suggests that the inner qualities nurtured in the Sufi way are essential for an enlightened 
comprehension of the Law. In short for Sarrāj, “The outward can not get by independent of the 
inward.”92 Likewise, Nasr has related Sufi vision as the wisdom that has issued from the same 
source as the Law has, such that the loss of the former “cannot but affect the understanding and 
mode of attachment of men” to the Law.93 
   
                                         
88 See p. 39. 
89 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, The Niche of Lights, trans. David Buchman (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young 
University, 1998), 26-27.  
90 See John Renard, Introduction to Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical 
Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 25. 
91 Abū Nasr as-Sarrāj, “The Book of Flashes (Kitāb al-luma‘ ),” trans. John Renard in Knowledge of God in 
Classical Sufism: Foundations of Islamic Mystical Theology, The Classics of Western Spirituality Series (New York: 
Paulist Press, 2004), 82. 
92 Ibid., 83. 
93 “It must be always remembered that the greatest obligation of the Muslim is towards the Truth (al-Ḥaqq), 
which is another name of Allāh. From this Truth, or al-Ḥaqīqah, has issued not only a Sacred Law which guarantees 
human felicity on the plane of action, but also a wisdom which alone is the guarantee of correct knowledge. The loss of 
this wisdom cannot but affect the understanding and mode of attachment of men to the Sacred Law.”  Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 224. 
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Al-Ghazzālī draws attention to the way the Prophet Abraham also was given the vision of 
spiritual realities to help him gain certainty.94 He concludes that much of prophecy “can be 
perceived only by fruitional experience as a result of following the way of Sufism.”95 Naturally, 
Sufism would ensure a greater observance of Islamic ethics in every affair. Indeed, as the 
anonymous author of the famous tenth-century text The Manners of Kings asserts concerning Sufis, 
“I have seen no people more firmly connected to the prophetic example, both externally and 
internally, both secretly and openly, in terms of law, intention, and practice, than the society known 
by the name Sufism.”96  
 
In this manner, Sufism, with its metaphysics and the way of verification (taḥqīq) of the 
professed truths, provides a counterpoint to the modern scientific worldview that also seeks to 
describe the nature of reality of the whole cosmos.97 Hence, Sufism is the most convincing means 
for Muslims to challenge the scientific worldview which Nasr holds ultimately responsible for the 
environmental crisis. Nasr has this in mind when he says, “religious ethics, although necessary, is 
not sufficient. What is needed in addition is the reassertion of the religious understanding of the 
order of nature, which involves knowledge and not only ethics.”98  
 
                                         
94 Al-Ghazzālī, On Knowing Yourself a nd God, 23. “Thus did we show Abraham the kingdom of the heavens 
and the earth so that he migh be one of those possessing certainty.” (Qur’ān:6:75) 
95 Al-Ghazzālī, Al-Ghazali’s Path to Sufism, 62.  
96 Abd al-muluk fi bayan haqa’iq al-tasawwuf  (The Manners of Kings: Explaining the Realities of Sufism), 
eds. Bernd Ratke, Beiruter Texte und Studien, 37 (Beirut/Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991), pp. 5-6, quoted in Carl 
Ernst, The Shambala Guide to Sufism, 25.  It is important to note that the eminent historian Marshall Hodgson 
speculated that the widespread practice of the Sharī‘ā  in the traditional Islamic world was sustained by the influence 
of Sufism: “It is probable that without the subtle leaven of the Sufi orders, giving to Islam an inward personal thrust 
and to the Muslim community a sense of participation in a common spiritual venture quite apart from anyone’s 
outward power, the mechanical arrangements of the Sharī‘ā would not have maintained the loyalty essential to their 
effectiveness.” Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. 2 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 125. 
97 See Chapter 6. 




As the heart is purified by Sufi practices, and thereby ennobled by the virtues that originate 
in God, the human being becomes a channel of divine grace for all of nature.99 Seeing through the 
‘eye of the heart’ the purified heart sees nature not only as the conveyer of God’s beauty, charity, 
love and wisdom, but also as that which is ontologically related to the human soul and reflects its 
inner realities.100 Such a human being cannot but live in harmony with nature. In contrast, as the 
Prophet revealed, the world of nature is relieved when a wicked person passes away.101 
 
3.5 Sufi  Popularization of Nature’s Wonder 
One of the major ways that Sufis have propagated their messages and at once gained 
popularity has been the profusion of heartfelt poetic expressions in praise of God’s omnipresence, 
beauty, love and wisdom as they found evident in nature. Such poetic expressions constituted until 
recently the most popular and influential form of literature in the Islamic world. Hence, Nasr 
argues that the popularity of Sufi poetry can again be a powerful means for the revival of Islamic 
view of nature as sacred presence.102 
 
In Sufi poetry ‘forms’ or visible aspects of nature, do not exist in opposition to their ‘meanings’ but 
serve as aids which leads to these ‘meanings’. The apparent form-meaning dichotomy also 
corresponds to parallel dichotomies of outer and inner, evident and hidden, seen and unseen, shell 
                                         
99 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Contemplation and Nature in the Perspective of Sufism,” in Islamic Life and 
Thought ( Chicago: ABC International Group, Inc., 2001),  203. 
100 See Chapter 2. 3.1c. “There exists a spiritual connection extending from the human being to everything in 
the cosmos...So there is nothing in the universe that does not have an influence on the human being, and on which the 
human being does not also have an influence.” Ibn ‘Arabī quoted in Morris, James Winston. The Reflective Heart, 
(Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2005), 286-287.  
101 A funeral procession passed by the Prophet Muḥammad who asked, "Relieved or relieving?" The people 
asked, "O Allāh's Apostle! What is relieved and relieving?" He said, "A believer is relieved (by death) from the 
troubles and hardships of the world and leaves for the Mercy of Allāh, while (the death of) a wicked person relieves the 
people, the land, the trees, (and) the animals from him."  see The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari,  Vol 
8, Book 76, Number 519, trans. Muhammad M Khan (Riyadh: Dar-us-Salaam Publications, 1997), 342. 
102 Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” 95, 100. 
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and kernel, and so forth, observed frequently in Sufi poetry. Thus, in contemplating the meaning of 
forms, Rūmī keeps the Prophet’s directive in mind: “The Prophet said, ‘Behold the form of the 
heavens and the earth, and through this form draw benefit from that Universal Meaning.’”103 
Hence, the underlying theme of everything in the natural world is its function as a means to 
knowledge of God’s qualities, and ultimately, of His unity. As Shaykh Muḥammad ibn al-Habīb 
(1876-1972) wrote: 
Reflect upon the beauty of the way in which both the land and sea are made, 
And contemplate the beauty of Allah outwardly and secretly. 
The greatest evidence to the limitless perfection of Allah can be found 
Both deep within the self and the distant horizon.104 
If you were to reflect on the physical bodies and their marvellous forms  
And how they are arranged with great precision, like a string of pearls; 
And if you were to reflect on the earth and the diversity of its plants 
And the great variety of rugged land in it; 
And if you were to reflect on all the secrets of the heavens – 
The Throne and the Foot-stool and the spirit sent by the command – 
Then you would accept the reality of tawḥīd with all your being, 
And you would turn from illusions, uncertainty and otherness.105 
 
And Rūmī sang: 
 The unique God has manifested His signs in the 
 six directions to those with illuminated eyes. 
 Whatever animal or plant they behold, they 
 contemplate the gardens of divine Beauty. 
That is why he said to them, 
Wheresoever you turn, there is His Face (Q 2:115).106 
 
In the same vein, there is nothing in the phenomenal world that does not bear God’s 
fragrance: 
 
 I am joyous in the world of nature for the world of nature is joyous through Him 
I am in love with the whole universe because it comes from Him. 107 
                                         
103 Rūmī, Fīhi ma fīhi, 39/40, in Chittick, Sufi Path of Love,  20. 
104 See Qur’ān 41:53. 
105 Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn al-Habīb, The Diwan of Shaykh Muḥammad Ibn al-Habīb (Cape Town: Madinah 
Press, 2001), 69, in Fazlun Khalid, “Applying Islamic Environmental Ethics,” in Environmentalism in the Muslim 
World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 90. Khalid points out that Ibn al-Habīb was 
not only a Sufi Master of the Darqawi-Qadiri Sufi Order in Morocco, but also a distinguished scholar of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Ibid., 91. 




Anne-Marie Schimmel, one of the greatest authorities of Sufi poetry in the 20th century, 
observed that in Sufi poetry every creature in the animal and plant kingdoms is a reminder of 
God’s glory: 
Since the Qur’ān states that everything was created in order to worship God, early Sufis 
listened to the trees and flowers, the birds and fishes, each of them speaking in lisan ul-hal, 
the “tongue of its whole being.” Sanā’ī (d.1131) created the lovely “Littany of the Birds,” in 
which every bird addresses God in his own language: the stork speaks with a constant lak 
lak, attesting al-mulk lak, al-‘izz lak, “Thine is the kingdom, Thine is the glory,” while the 
dove is always calling ku ku, “where? Where?108  
 
In the same vein, Schimmel also describes how, in Sufi poetry, each flower, bird, animal, 
the sun, moon, mountain, sea, and precious stone has special meaning by the way it adores God or 
by the message it carries from God.109  
 
As a Sufi and also as one deeply influenced by Sufi poetry, Nasr articulates his vision of the 
sacred presence in nature through moving verses of his own and proves the enduring influence of 
Sufi vision of nature to those who would turn to it: 
Thy Beauty is in all creatures reflected here below. 
In the face of a fair maiden and the flight of a flock of birds, 
In the azure sky and the roaring sea, 
In the mane of the mighty lion and the hues of the lovely sea urchin. 
I hear the Beauty of Thy Voice in the siren song of the whale, 
As well in the chant of the nightingale in the garden, 
Hymning Thy Praise in her morning concert. 
Above all I behold Thy Beauty in the sanctified soul of Thy true lovers, 
Beholden to Thy Love, basking in Thy Radiance.110 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
107 The Sufi poet Sa‘dī (d.1292)  quoted in Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the 
Environmental Crisis,” 95, 
108 Annemarie Schimmel, As Through a Veil: Mystical Poetry in Islam (Oxford, UK: Oneworld, 2001), 75.  
109 Ibid., 76-78. Also, see Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam, 306-309. 
110 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Pilgrimage of Life and the Wisdom of Rūmī (Oakton, VA: The Foundation of 
Tradional Studies, 2007), 23. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
Nasr strongly supports the observance of Islamic ethics concerning the natural world. 
However, he argues that the rationale for Islamic ethics can be grasped the best theoretically by 
means of religious and metaphysical doctrines and experientially by verification of the same 
obtained through the path of Sufism. Al-Ghazzālī, Ibn ‘Arabī and the most influential Sufis before 
them essentially take the same stance. In the traditional Islamic world, Sufism, with its focus on 
cleansing the heart, its love and contemplation of nature, widely popular poetry, and most 
importantly, in providing a way of verification (taḥqīq) of religious and metaphysical doctrines, 
contributed immensely to preserving an awareness of the divine presence in nature for the ordinary 
believer. But, as we will see in the next chapter, increasing scientific progressivism in the Muslim 
world since the second half of the 19th century has been spreading the scientific worldview, and, by 
the same token, marginalizing Sufism and the associated metaphysical knowledge. It is a situation 
that makes it less and less likely for Islamic environmental ethics to retain its credibility and be 
observed sufficiently across the various Muslim societies to have any significant effect on the 




THE ADVENT OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESSIVISM1 AND 
THE MARGINALIZATION OF SUFISM 
 
If you look at the present Muslim World, whether the governments are pro-Western or monarchies or 
republics, whether the governments are the products of Islamic revolutions or are secular, they are all unified 
in their glorious hymning of the praises of modern science and technology. It is that attitude which has to 
change.2   
S. H. Nasr  
 
Since the 13th/19th century onward two forces in the Islamic world began to oppose Sufism and its vast 
influence upon all aspects of human society from economic guilds to music. These two forces were 
modernism and that puritanical rationalism identified mostly with Wahabi/Salafi movement. …Sufi 
metaphysics, cosmology, psychology and spiritual methods as well as art, especially in the form of poetry and 
music, constitute the intellectual and spiritual heart of Islam.3  
              S. H. Nasr 
  
One of the effects of modernism upon Islam has been to reduce Islam in the minds of many to only one of its 
dimensions, namely the Sharī‘ā, and to divest it of those intellectual weapons which alone can ward off the 
assaults of modern thought upon its citadel…the intellectual challenges posed by modernism in the form of 
evolutionism, rationalism, existentialism, agnosticism and the like can only be answered intellectually and not 
juridically. 
 S. H. Nasr 
 
While the previous chapter explores how the tradition of Sufism and the associated 
metaphysics play a crucial role in Muslims’ faith and attachment to Islamic ethics, this chapter 
explores how those traditions have been steadily marginalized since the advent of scientific 
progressivism in the Muslim world since the middle of the 19th century. First, we discuss Nasr’s 
assessment of the general current attitude of Muslims regarding modern science and technology, 
the attitude which he wishes to change. This is followed by a brief discussion on the integral role of 
Sufism in pre-modern view of Islam which for Nasr represents traditional Islam.4 The rest of the 
chapter explores how this integral role of Sufism in pre-modern Islam has been steadily discredited 
                                                 
1 We have defined ‘scientific progressivism’ as the ideology that modern science and associated scientific rationality is, 
if not the only, then the most reliable means of human progress. See p. 89. 
2 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, Science, Muslims, and 
Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam Publishing, 2007), 
58-59. 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 2nd edition (Chicago: ABC International, 2001), 253. 
4 See pp. 47-48. 
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and expunged both in the name of “progress” and in the name of Islam itself, by an intellectual 
climate shaped by scientific progressivism.  
 
4.1 Nasr on the Contemporary Muslim Attitude towards Modern Science and Technology 
Nasr laments the fact that today, in imitation of the West, the Muslim world at large has 
been pursuing modern science and technology as fast as it can afford without considering its 
negative consequences either for the world of nature or for Islamic values. Nasr attributes this 
situation to three inter-related reasons: 1) Today, since economic, political and military power is 
driven by technology and dominated by the technologically superior West, 5 Muslim governments 
want “to become masters of modern technology as fast as possible” 6 to gain power in these sectors. 
If technological developments and applications can bring short-term gain in these sectors at the 
cost of environmental degradation, “even to talk about environmental crisis becomes threatening to 
governments;”7 2) At the ordinary level, people love technology for the conveniences and many 
lifesaving benefits;8  3) Muslim modernists9 and many ‘fundamentalists’10—the two groups Nasr 
has called the “most vociferous” 11 in the Muslim world—provide the ideological support for 
greater penetration of modern science and technology in Islamic society.  Nasr has observed that in 
spite of the many differences between the modernists and the fundamentalists, they are one “in 
their complete and open-armed acceptance of modern technology.”12   
                                                 
5 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 140. 
6 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On the Environmental Crisis,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, Science, Muslims, and 
Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam Publishing, 2007), 
134. 
7 Ibid., 137. 
8 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, Islam & Science, 
Vol. 3 (Winter 2005) No.2, 110,117.  
9 For Nasr, a modernist Muslim is the person whose outlook is shaped significantly by what is ‘modern’. See pp. 46-7. 
10 Following Nasr, we have referred to Salafi conservatives, revivalists, Wahhābī s, or other groups inspired by them as 
“fundamentalists.”  See Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 12-22 and 75-95. 
11 Nasr, Need for Sacred Science, 138. 
12 Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), 19. 
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Indeed, scientific progressivism is clearly evident when we look at diverse Muslim 
countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabi, Jordan or Egypt, each espousing a different 
interpretation of Islam.13 This is not to say that Muslims have been more enthusiastic about modern 
science and technology than those from other religious traditions. Indeed, on average Muslim 
governments spend much smaller fraction of their GNP on research and development (R&D) in 
science than those of other developing or developed countries do.14 There are signs that the 
financial support for R&D may be sharply increasing.15 In any case, the lesser investment on R&D 
should not mislead us into thinking that the Muslim world does not desire modern technology.16 
We may conclude that no matter how far behind Muslim states might be in the advancement of 
scientific learning, there stands a prevalent conviction among Muslims that not only is modern 
science “in harmony”17 with Islam, but that it is also an essential means of  progress for human 
societies.  
 
                                                 
13 On the moderate and modernist Muslims’ enthusiasm for modern science and technology, see Herwig Schopper, 
“Where are the New Patrons of Science,” Nature Vol. 444, 2 Nov 2006, pp. 35-36. 
On the fundamentalist Muslims’ enthusiasm for modern science and technology, see Ehsan Masood, “An Islamist 
Revolution,” in Nature Vol. 444, 2 Nov 2006, pp. 22-25. 
14 Pervez A. Hoodbhoy, “Science and the Islamic World – The Quest for Rapprochement,”  Physics Today, August 7, 
2007, p. 52. 
15 Ibid., 53. See Toni Feder, “International Research University Open in Saudi Arabia,” Physics Today, November 
2009. Likewise, Jordan is building a huge research facility known as SESAME modelled after the internationally 
acclaimed research facility in Europe known as CERN. See Schopper, “Where are the New Patrons of Science,” 36. 
16 On the craze for modern technology among educated Muslims in Pakistan, see S. Nomanul Haq. “Science, 
Scientism, and the Liberal Arts,” Islam and Science, Vol. 1(December, 2003) No. 2, pp.  267-271. To the best of our 
knowledge, the situation is quite the same in Bangladesh and other similar developing Muslim nations.  The craze for 
modern technology is most blatantly evident in the oil rich Muslim states. As Herwig Schopper has observed, 
“Believing that oil money can simply buy Western technology, wealthy Arab states do little beyond consuming science 
and technology products.”16 Schopper, “Where are the New Patrons of Science,” 35. 
17 According his survey, Ehsan Masood has found that most Muslims see “science and Islam as being in harmony.” 
Masood, “An Islamist Revolution,” 23. 
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As an intellectual, Nasr views his main task not to be about “action by Muslim governments 
and companies in relation to technology.” 18 Rather, he seeks to create “an awareness of what is 
really involved for [all] Muslims when it comes to the adoption of modern technology.”19 A 
significant part of his task amounts to providing intellectual refutations of the modernist and 
fundamentalist positions on modern science and technology. 
 
According to Nasr, the root cause of the acceptance with open arms of modern science and 
technology by modernists and fundamentalists goes back to the views of modernist reformist 
thinkers in the late nineteenth century who were convinced that modern science and technology 
were essential for the ‘progress’ of Muslim societies. The reformist thinkers that Nasr has in mind 
here are figures such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad ‘Abduh, and other Muslim thinkers 
who followed in their footsteps. These reformists saw science and technology as “the secret of 
West’s power” and stressed that modern science “could do no wrong.”20 Their views have been 
promoted by “teachers in classrooms and preachers from the pulpits in mosques…extolling 
Western science and technology and considering its mastery as practically a religious duty.”21  
 
Nasr carries out his intellectual task of refuting the modernist and fundamentalist positions 
on modern science and technology  in three ways which we will discuss in chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
respectively: 1) By underlining the compatibility of the fundamental principles of traditional 
sciences and those of Islam; 2) By underlining the incompatibility of  the philosophical 
assumptions of modern science and the metaphysical principles of Islam and the consequences of 
                                                 
18 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,”110.  
19 Ibid. However, in this connection, we should note that it was by Nasr’s initiative in the 1960s and 70s that the now 
famous national parks were established in Iran.  Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and Ecology, Speech given at Yale 
University, USA, 9 April 2011. 
20 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 139 
21 Ibid., 139. 
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this incompatibility on the human soul and the environment; 3) By underlining the negative 
consequences of modern technology on the human soul and the environment.   
 
Nasr’s above-mentioned concerns with fundamental Islamic principles, the human soul, and 
the environment, clearly indicate the relevance of his responses to Sufism and the associated 
metaphysics we discussed in chapters 2 and 3.  Hence, in order to fully appreciate Nasr’s response 
it is vital to take a look at the way the scientific progressivism took root in the Muslim world both 
in the modernist and the fundamentalist camps and marginalized Sufism. 
 
4.1.1 Sufism in the Pre-Modern Islamic World 
In the traditional Islamic world the observance of the Sharī‘ā was pervaded by Sufi ethos.  
As Carl Ernst, one of the leading Islamic scholars has observed, for pre-modern Muslims, “the 
multifarious activities that we subsume under the terms Sufism and Islam were not spheres of 
existence separate or separable from religious life in general.”22 Moreover, as the distinguished 
Islamic thinker and social critic Parvez Manzoor has noted, “The modern definition of religion as 
‘the exclusive zone’ of human reality for the experience of the “holy” bears the distinctive insignia 
of the secular man and applies only to his world. The intellectual cosmos and life-world of the pre-
modern man of faith is a unity: it knows of no religious and non-religious dominions.”23 Indeed, 
                                                 
22 Carl W. Ernst, The Shambala Guide to Sufism (Boston: Shambala Publications, 1997), xv. For a similar 
situation in Egypt at least until the end of the 19th century, see Malika Zeghal, “Recentering Religious Knowledge and 
Discourse: The Case of al-Azhar in the Twentieth-Century Egypt,” in Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of 
Modern Muslim Education, eds. Robert W. Hefner and Muḥammad Qasim Zaman(Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2007), 115. “A radical breakaway from Sufi traditions by modernists and neo-fundamentalists starts in India in 
the second half of the nineteenth-century. Before this time Sufism was an integral part of Indian Islam, even if it was 
criticized for abuses and excesses.” Marc Gabrieau, “Criticizing the Sufis: The Debate in Early-Nineteenth-Century  
India,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, eds. Frederick De Jong & 
Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999). 452. 
23 S. Parvez Manzoor, “Desacralising Secularism,” in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, eds.   John 
Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000), 84.  This was reflected in the pre-colonial India, a 
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Marshall Hodgson, the eminent scholar of Islamic history, observed, that in the pre-modern 
Muslim societies across the world, “Sufism...became the framework within which all popular 
Muslim piety flowed together; its saints … became the guarantors of the gentle and co-operative 
sides of social life. Guilds commonly came to have Sufi affiliations. Men’s clubs claimed the 
patronage of Sufi saints.”24 In fact, Hodgson credited Sufism for the widespread sustained 
observance of the Sharī‘ā.25 For Nasr, traditional Islam is this example of the historically lived 
Islam with its mutually sustaining inner and outer traditions which immensely influential figures 
like al-Ghazzālī (d.1111), Ibn ‘Arabī (1165-1240) and their followers made possible.26  
  
With regards to the natural world, the traditional ambience refers to that view of nature which, 
in the absence of modern scientific worldview, was informed by Islamic teachings including that of 
Sufism such that, as signs of God, the world of nature had a meaning beyond its material aspect 
and human interactions with it necessarily had a spiritual significance.27 Hence, commenting on 
classical Islamic texts, Attilio Petruccioli, the distinguished scholar of Islamic architecture, asserts, 
“In reality, the religious Islamic literature favours the protection of nature either as an expression of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
situation that colonial administrators tried to change. See Muḥammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary 
Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 63. 
24 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. 2 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 125. Ira Lapidus dates the prevalence of Sufism from the 13th 
century onward.  See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies, 12th edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 254. 
25 See Marshall Hodgson’s comments on  p.137 n96.  
26 For an earlier discussion of Nasr’s vision of traditional Islam, see pp. 47-48. For discussions on al-Ghazzālī 
and Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysical rationale for the Sharī‘ā, see Chapter 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
27 See Chapter 3.5. Speaking of traditional Muslims, Fazlun Khalid has observed that for them “Islamic 
environmentalism expressed itself in personal behaviour (mu’amalat: acting in public interest) It was an integral part of 
life, an expression of the existence in submission to the will of the Creator in harmony with the cosmic pattern, 
unfettered by the trappings of career and consumerism.” Fazlun Khalid., “Applying Islamic Environmental Ethics,”  in 
Environmentalism in the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 101; For 
past examples of explicit environmental behaviour influenced by Islam, see for instance, Ali Ahmed, “Nigeria,” in 
Environmentalism in the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005),76-77.   
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the Divine or in support of human behaviour.”28 According to Nasr, the view of nature as signs of 
God was to change with the advent of modern science in the Islamic world: “It is scientism which 
has destroyed to a large extent the spiritual reality that man always saw around him and has 
removed from nature what one might call the aspect of “enchantment” to which the Qur’ān refers 
so often, destroying the basic Islamic idea of the phenomena of nature as being signs of Allah, the 
āyāt which Allah manifests in His creation.”29 With that in mind, we will see how scientific 
progressivism which is dependent upon scientism came to be adopted not only by the modernists, 
but also by the fundamentalists, and disrupted the traditional ambience in the following ways: 
 
1) By letting modern science construct Muslims’ view of the natural world. 
2) By discrediting and marginalizing Sufism. 
 
As we noted in Chapter 3, Islamic ethics and Sufi teachings about nature are all based on the 
very nature of its reality as a sign of God. While metaphysics elucidates this reality, Sufism helps 
us realize it at the level of the heart as well as popularize this view. That being so, we wish to 
highlight how scientific progressivism is now intellectually at the root of the difficulty in resorting 
either to Sufism or to Islamic ethics for the protection of the natural world. 
 
4.2 The Advent of Scientific Progressivism 
                                                 
28 Attilio Petruccioli, “Nature in Islamic Urbanism: The Garden in Practice and in Metaphor,” in Islam and Ecology: A 
Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2003), 501. 
29 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1994), 
187-88. We have defined ‘scientism’ as the view that modern science and scientific rationality constituted if not the 
only, at least the most reliable means to true knowledge. See Chapter 1.5. 
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The ideology of scientific progressivism has had a different genesis in the Muslim world than it 
did in the West.  It was partly imposed by the West and partly self-generated by Muslims in order 
to resist Western domination.  It spread in the Muslim world in two ways: 
 
1) By imposition of Western institutions and administrative patterns. 
2) By Islamic reformists’ interpretations of Islam as a religion that is inherently pro-modern 
science. 
 
4.2.1 Imposition of Western Institutions and Administrative Patterns 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the ideology of scientific progressivism considers the 
rationalization of thoughts and activities as part of the scientific means of human progress.30 In 
fact, we can detect three fundamental tendencies in British activities in colonial India, for instance, 
that reflect scientific progressivism: 1) Making a distinction between secular and spiritual spheres 
of life;31 2) Utilitarian thinking that preferred the secular over the religious;32 3) Rationalization of 
the legal and administrative systems.33  These tendencies, as manifested in the various steps taken 
by colonial administrators, initiated disruption of the traditional ambience.34 Similar steps were 
repeated by Muslims themselves in Egypt and Turkey, in anticipation of European aggression, 
even before Islamic modernist intellectual movements began in the 1870s. 
 
                                                 
30 See pp. 86-89. Also, see Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide, 126. 
31 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam, 63. 
32 Ibid., 64-66.  
33 Ibid., 21-27. See Jonathan P. Berkey, “Madrasas Medieval and Modern: Politics, Education, and the 
Problem of Muslim Identity,“ in Schooling Islam:The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education, eds. Robert 
W. Hefner and Muḥammad Qasim Zaman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 51. 
34 In the 19th century, “[The] secularist perspective was forcefully promoted in the Islamic world by [thinkers] 
like James Mill, Macaulay, Muir, Hunter, Cromer, Morier, Renan, and other Westernizers connected to British and 
French colonial administrators.” See Monsoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 338. 
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The most frequent result of these efforts was the diminishing of the role of religion in 
public institutions through the establishment of secular schools, gradual exclusion of religious laws 
from public sphere, and mechanization of the work habits or workplace. In fact, for the Muslim 
world, the noted historian Francis Robinson has already demonstrated the validity of Max Weber’s 
thesis that growth of secularism in human societies keeps pace with the adoption of science and 
technology and is initiated by “structural secularization” of the type we just mentioned.35 The 
secularization process was soon to be accelerated by modernist Muslims themselves by their 
portrayal of scientific progressivism as an Islamic imperative. 
 
4.2.2 Scientific Progressivism as an Islamic Ideal 
As we have seen in Chapter 1, in the West, modern science itself was born out of a growing 
rebellion against the traditional hierarchic view of reality among the intellectual elite. Muslim 
encounter with modern science, however, did not begin in the midst of a doubt about its own 
hierarchic view of reality among either its intellectual elite or among the ordinary people.  Muslims 
encountered modern science and technology as means of power when they were conquered by the 
technologically superior Western military powers.  Muslim quest for modern science began as a 
quest for power to resist the domination by foreign powers. 
 
All Muslim leaders in 19th century were acutely aware that Muslims were far behind the 
colonial powers in the mastery of modern sciences. Most were convinced that scientific knowledge 
was essential to resist the aggression of European powers. But up until the 1860s the secular 
schools established by the British in India or by Egyptians and Turks in their countries were not 
                                                 
35 Francis Robinson, “Secularization, Weber and Islam,” in Max Weber and Islam, eds. Toby E. Huff and 
Wolfgang Schluchter (New Brunswick, USA: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 231-245. 
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very successful in attracting Muslims to the learning of modern sciences.  From the late 1860s a 
number of Muslim intellectuals from these countries began to consider redefining Islam itself as a 
more rational and worldly religion than it was conceived traditionally, so as to bring it more in line 
with the wholly rationalistic and empiricist discipline of modern science, in the hope that Muslims 
would show greater interest in achieving success in worldly endeavours with the knowledge of  the 
modern sciences and leave behind the less dynamic and more spiritually focused way of traditional 
life that the reformists deemed unfit to defend Muslims against the technologically superior 
Western powers. 
 
Given the limitation of space, we will confine our discussion to visions and activities of the 
group of Muslim reformist intellectuals associated with what is known as the Salafi movement that 
began in Egypt and who have had the greatest influence on all Islamic reform movements across 
the Muslim world ever since. We will see that, without exception, all of them showed the influence 
of the Enlightenment or the ideology of scientific progressivism in their thought. However, unlike 
many Enlightenment thinkers, the Muslim intellectuals did not reject their religion. Instead, they 
sought to reinterpret Islam to accommodate the modern scientific spirit within the faith.  
 
4.3 The Salafi Modernists 
The Salafi movement properly begins with Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905).36  It professed 
to follow the examples of the pious ancestors (salaf) and promised to purify the Islamic tradition of 
what had accrued to it in the way of interpretations over centuries and of the Sufi tradition. But the 
actual characteristics of the movement were already set in motion by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī 
                                                 
36 Yovonne Haddad, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh: Pioneers of Islamic Reform,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival ( 
London: Zed Books Ltd., 1994),  36.  
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(1838-97). Al-Afghānī of Persian origin had considerable knowledge of Islamic Peripatetic 
philosophy and was fiercely opposed to foreign domination of Muslim lands. He spoke to large 
audiences all across the Muslim world and argued for ijtihād – the rational re-examination of a 
legal precedent in light of legal principles – even by non-scholars (outside the ranks of the ‘ulamā’) 
as long as they were well grounded in the knowledge of the Qur’ān, Sunna and the early history of 
Islam.37  
 
Al-Afghānī clearly reveals his attachment to scientific progressivism in his response to the 
French thinker Ernst Renan’s assertion that Muslims did not posses the spirit of scientific inquiry: 
“I cannot keep from hoping that Muḥammadan society will succeed someday in breaking its bonds 
and marching resolutely in the path of civilization after the manner of Western society.”38 In the 
same spirit, he agreed with Francois Guizot (1787-1874), the French minister of the time, that 
human excellence is to be measured in part by the civilization he builds, as the West had done by 
removing obstruction to the scientific spirit, and asserted that true Islam possessed the spirit 
necessary for such a civilization because unlike other religions, Islam “censures belief without 
proof.”39 It appears that in teaching and discussing Islamic peripatetic philosophy he hoped to 
foster the spirit of scientific inquiry, just as this philosophy had inspired scientific activities in the 
past.40 He believed that science and Islam were not only compatible, but Islam itself had spurred 
                                                 
37 According Indira Gesink, the juristic policy took shape gradually over centuries and it wanted to restrict 
“the use of ijtihād to high-level jurists and bound lesser scholars to follow the precedents—to follow taqlīd,” in order 
to protect the rule of law from “unbridled ijtihād.” Indira Falk Gesink, “Islamic Reformation: A History of Madrasa 
Reform and Legal Change in Egypt,” in Islam and Education: Myths and Truth, eds. Wadad Kadi and Victor Billeh 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 2007), 26. 
38 Jamāl al-Dīn Al-Afghānī, quoted in Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), 87. 
39 Jamal al-Did Al-Afghānī, “Refutation of the Materialists,” in Nikkie R. Keddie,  An Islamic Response to 
Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 171-72. 
40 Nikki R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to Imperialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983),  54-
55. 
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scientific activities by Muslims in the past: “The early Muslims had no science, but thanks to the 
Islamic religion, a philosophic spirit arose among them…This was why they acquired in a short 
time all the sciences…those who forbid science and knowledge in the belief that they are 
safeguarding the Islamic religion are really the enemies of that religion.”41 But more than anything 
else, the fear of continued Western domination of Muslims would be the driving force for al-
Afghānī’s insistence on learning the modern sciences: “The Europeans have now everywhere put 
there hands on every part of the world. The English have reached Afghanistan; the French have 
seized Tunisia. In reality this usurpation, aggression, and conquest have not come from the French 
or the English. Rather it is science that everywhere manifests its greatness and power.”42 
 
For several years in the 1870s, early in his career as an intellectual and political activist, al-
Afghānī shared his views with a group of al-Azhar students in Cairo whom he also taught Islamic 
peripatetic philosophy. One of these students, Muḥammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905), came to be his 
intellectual heir and most influential disciple; first, as his spokesperson, second, in disseminating 
similar views as a rector of al-Azhar where he also reformed the traditional model of imparting 
education, and finally, as the grand mufti (chief jurisconsult) in Egypt.  Although ‘Abduh received 
a Sufi training in his youth, since his association with al-Afghānī, the ideas of scientific 
progressivism were to become most evident in his thought and actions as an activist, author and 
administrator.  
 
                                                 
41 Jamal al-Did al-Afghānī, “Lecture on Teaching and Learning,”  in Nikkie Keddie, An Islamic Response to 
Imperialism, 105. 
42 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, “An Islamic Response to Imperialism,” in Islam in Transition: Muslim 
Perspectives, 2nd edition, eds. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17.   
For similar views of  ‘Abduh, see Haddad, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh: Pioneers of Islamic Reform,” 35.  
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In one of the first of his several visits to England, ‘Abduh became personally acquainted 
with Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), the social Darwinist, and kept in touch with him ever since. He 
studied utilitarian and positivist thought and translated Spencer’s book on education.43 Spencer’s 
scientific educational model was later to have an impact on his reformist vision.44 According to 
Indira Falk Gesink, a noted historian of the 19th century Muslim reformists, during ‘Abduh’s brief 
exile in Paris in the early 1880s “he crafted a national education policy for Egypt that employed 
strikingly Spencerian motifs such as “utility” of certain subjects, “practical” education for self-
preservation…and especially the necessity of scientific expertise for national strength.”45 
 
Like al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh was convinced of the urgent need for Muslims to study the 
modern sciences to ‘catch up’ with Europe at least for the purpose military defence.46 Commenting 
on contemporary European civilization, he stated, “We see no reason for their progress to wealth 
and power except the advancement of education and the sciences among them. Our first duty, then, 
is to endeavour with all our might and main to spread these sciences in our country.”47 With that 
goal in mind, like al-Afghānī before him,48 he portrayed contemporary scientific truths to be the 
real meaning of certain Qur’ānic verses. His scientism ignored both traditional interpretations and 
the literal meanings of the verses. Thus, for instance, the invisible ‘jinns’ mentioned in the Qur’ān 
were really ‘microbes’ discovered by modern science.49 Darwinian principles also had to have their 
origin in the Qur’ān. Thus, for instance, Adam and Eve did not mean just one couple but many 
                                                 
43 Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1996), 102-3. 
44 See Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism , 91. 
45 Gesink, “Islamic Reformation,” 29. 
46 Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), 136 citing al-
Manar, xii. 408, 409. 
47 Muḥammad  ‘Abduh quoted in Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, 135. 
48 For examples al-Afghānī’s scientistic interpretations of many Qur’ānic verses, see Muḥammad al-
Makhzumi, Khatirat Jamāl al-Dīn, Beirut, 1931, pp. 161 ff. Cited in Adams, Islam and Modernism, 127. 
49 ‘Abduh, al-Manar, ix. 334, 335. Cited in Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, 138.  
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different couples which would explain the variations among different groups of humanity.50 
Likewise, the principles of ‘the struggle for existence,’ ‘survival of the fittest,’ and ‘natural 
selection’ also were very much a part of the Qur’ānic message.51 As ‘Abduh suggests, “The Qur’ān 
itself is too elevated in character to be in opposition to science,”52 as though the Qur’ān’s nobility 
was to be measured by its conformity to the conclusions of a materialistic science. 
 
In his magnum opus, The Theology of Unity, ‘Abduh tried to lay out a theoretical 
foundation for the pursuit of modern sciences in an Islamic theological and philosophical 
framework. His goal was to direct Muslim attention to strive for success in worldly ventures. His 
strategy was to appeal to the ordinary rationality,53 and not to the heart or the Intellect. He depicted 
the reality of God as totally distinct from the created realm, such that Muslims would feel free to 
pursue modern empirical sciences without being concerned with spiritual implications. Using Ibn 
Sīnā’s categorization of modes of being, he related God as the ‘Necessary Being’ who was totally 
unique from the created order which is contingent by virtue of its dependence on the Necessary 
Being.54 He adopted the Mutazilite55theological view that God’s attributes being uniquely His 
alone, cannot be grasped by human beings and should not be compared with any attributes which 
humans possessed.56 Hence, people should remain content with knowing the accidental qualities of 
things and not bother with trying to know the meaning beyond it.57  By such arguments, ‘Abduh 
                                                 
50 ‘Abduh, al-Manar, xii. 483 sqq. Cited in Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, 139.  
51 ‘Abduh, Tafsir al-Manar, ii. 483 sqq.; also in al-Manar, viii. 929-930. Cited in Adams, Islam and 
Modernism in Egypt, 142. 
52 ‘Abduh,  al-Manar, ix. 334, 335. Cited in Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, 138. 
53 Muḥammad ‘Abduh, The Theology of Unity, trans by Ishaq Musa‘ad and Kenneth Cragg (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), 103. 
54 Ibid., 41-44. 
55 See Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from its Origin to the Present, 122. 
56 ‘Abduh, Theology of Unity, 52-55. 
57 Ibid., 54. 
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hoped Muslims would view to see the world as it appears from a rationalist standpoint and strive 
for material success. 
 
‘Abduh added that the function of religion was vital only for moral guidance,58 and not for 
understanding the objective world nor for the learning of crafts.59 The means of exploring, 
understanding and benefiting from the objective world were the sciences which religion ought to 
support.60  Indeed, he reinterpreted traditional understanding of the Qur’ānic term khalifa 
(vicegerent) of God on earth, to mean someone charged with the responsibility of “building and 
constructing” a civilization, like that of the modern European one, as al-Afghānī had emphasized.61 
 
In arguing for ijtihād even by non-scholars, both al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh cited the 
Protestant Reformation as a major factor behind the apparent scientific progress resulting in 
Europe.62 Indeed, much like the Protestant Reformation’s rejection of scholasticism, ‘Abduh 
emphasized the need for ijtihād of the Qur’ānic text, without recourse to traditional 
commentaries.63 By their rejection of the interpretive tradition, they claimed to be following the 
early Muslims, the pious ancestors (salaf) who had to rely solely on the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s 
example (sunna), and hence to be known as the salafis. In truth, al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh believed 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 106. 
59 Ibid., 103. 
60 Ibid., 103. 
61 Yvonne Haddad, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh,” 38 and 46. 
62 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, “The Truth about the Neicheri Sect,” in  N.R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to 
Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (University of California Press, 
1983), 171-72. See ‘Abduh, The Theology of Unity, 127-128.  
63 ‘Abduh, Theology of Unity, 126-130. 
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that the spirit of ijtihād, in rejection of taqlīd64  (imitation of tradition) would help to create a 
scientifically curious generation necessary for progress and civilization in the modern sense. 
 
Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh addressed mostly pious Muslim societies with traditional values. 
They did not sense a crisis of values in Muslim societies but rather, a lack of desire for modern 
sciences. Naturally, emphasis on observing the Sharī‘ā was relatively absent. Instead, they were 
determined to see Muslims turn their attention to building ‘civilization’. To that end, they portrayed 
Islam as a religion that supported modern science by  first redefining Islam itself more in rational 
terms by references to Ibn Sīnā ’s philosophy, Mutazilite theology, and reinterpreting selective 
Qur’ānic verses and prophetic ḥadīths in utilitarian, Spencerian or Auguste Comtean positivist 
light.65 Both al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh argued that Islam itself, when properly understood, as they 
had defined it, would pull out Muslims from their “backwardness.” Like al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh 
insisted that it was the sciences that Europeans had learned from true Muslims of the past, and not 
Christianity, that gave the West the superior status later.66  
 
But the modernist reformists’ uncritical endorsement of modern science was in part due to a 
failure to see any fundamental distinction – which some among the ‘ulamā’ had obviously voiced – 
between traditional Islamic science and modern science. As al-Afghānī observed, “The strangest 
thing of all is that our ‘ulamā’ these days have divided science into two parts. One they call 
Muslim science, and one European science. Because of this they forbid others to teach some of the 
                                                 
64 As research over the last two decades have revealed, in pre-modern days,  taqlīd did not mean “blind 
imitation” as the reformists like Al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh defined it, but it meant the giving of due consideration to 
precedent examples. See Zaman, Ulama in Contemporary, 16-20. In fact, the traditional ‘ulamā’ had many thoughtful 
and logical arguments against ‘Abduh’s proposal for rejecting taqlīd. see Gesink, “Islamic Reformation” 31-36. 
65 “Inspired by the Enlightenment, [Abduh] viewed Egypt’s cultural predicament from a Comtean 
perspective.” Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism, 90. 
66 Haddad, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh,” 43.  Also,‘Abduh, Theology of Unity, 127-28. 
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useful sciences. They have not understood that science is that noble thing that has no connection 
with any nation, and is not distinguished by anything but itself. Rather everything that is known is 
known through science, and every nation that becomes renowned becomes renowned through 
science…”67 
4.3.1 Modernist Criticism of Sufism 
In the 19th century, criticism of Sufism only targeted certain practices such as excessive 
veneration of Sufi masters, supplication at the tombs of dead masters, loud musical performances, 
etc., but not at the level of Sufi doctrines.68 It was in line with efforts to reform populist Sufi 
practices in the 18th century all across the Muslim world by scholars who were often Sufis 
themselves.   
 
‘Abduh went further by not only disapproving of many popular Sufi practices but also by 
rejecting its many fundamental doctrines. In supporting ijtihād by ordinary Muslims, he implicitly 
disapproved of the necessity of mediation between the human individual and God, challenging both 
the authority of the ‘ulamā’, many of whom were Sufis and the fundamental Sufi emphasis on the 
need for a spiritual master. His denial of human mediation was inspired by the conviction that God 
being the “Necessary Being” was the “wholly other”69 from the “contingent” reality of the world.  
By his emphasis on God’s transcendence (tanzīh), he questioned the benefit of trying to know 
God’s reality,70 and rejected the ability of any Sufi master to perform miracles.71 Instead of relying 
                                                 
67 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, “On Teaching and Learning,” in N.R. Keddie, An Islamic Response to 
Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (University of California Press, 
1983), 107. 
68 Frederick De Jong, “Opposition to Sufism in Twentieth-Century Egypt (1900-1970): A Preliminary 
Survey,” in Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics, eds. Frederick De Jong & 
Bernd Radtke (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 310. 
69 ‘Abduh, Theology of Unity, 54-55, 65.  
70 Ibid., 54-55.  
71 Ibid., 157-158. 
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on Sufi practices beyond the observance of the Sharī‘ā or hoping for miracles from Sufi masters, 
he urged Muslims to work for material progress through learning the modern “useful” sciences 
while holding on to the moral teachings of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. In fact his proposed reforms 
were, among other things, intended to eradicate faith in Sufism:  
In studying the social illnesses in the Orient, it can be found that among the causes are the 
beliefs and opinions introduced into Islam by different groups like Sufis and others. These 
beliefs and opinions took root in the souls of Oriental people and have wrought harmful 
results. The reformation will extract these beliefs from the nation. It will replace them with 
authentic Islamic beliefs those that call for resolution, work, perseverance, and 
determination in this life.72 
   
Salafi modernist rejection of Sufism as un-Islamic, as articulated by ‘Abduh, also reflected 
the mistaken assumption of most Western orientalist scholars since the early 19th century that 
Sufism originated from non-Islamic sources.  These scholars, convinced that Islam was only a “dry 
and legalistic religion,” could not relate the “universal spirituality” of Sufism to Islam.73  Perhaps 
‘Abduh himself was influenced by orientalist scholarship on Sufism because Sufi terms, references, 
and doctrines can be easily traced to the Qur’ān, the Ḥadīth or  visions of Muslim saints of the past, 
and to the ways of many early Muslims including the companions of the Prophet.74 Followers of 
‘Abduh, motivated by the desire to present Islam as a rational religion, were quick to condemn Sufi 
practices as un-Islamic.75  
4.3.2 Modernist Salafist discourse on Modern Science and the Desacralization of Nature 
                                                 
72 Muḥammad ‘Abduh, “The True Reform and its Necessity for al-Azhar,” al-Manar, vol. 10, no.28, 
(February 1906), pp.758-65, in Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam, eds. Mansoor Moaddel and Karman 
Talattof (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 48. 
73 Carl Ernst, Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 
166.  
74 See Chapter 3.4 and 3.4.1. Also, see Joseph Lumbard, “The Decline of Knowledge and the Rise of Ideology 
in the Modern Islamic World”, in Islam, Fundamentalism and Betrayal of Tradition, ed. Joseph E.B. Lumbard 
(Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdon, 2004), 48-53.  
75 Julian Johansen, Sufism and Islamic Reform in Egypt: The Battle for Islamic Tradition ( Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996), 28-29. 
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In light of the above discussion, we can conclude with the distinguished sociologist Mansoor 
Moaddel that the reformists sought to reinterpret Islam “in light of the scientific rationality and 
modern social theory… [They] presented Islamic theology in a manner consistent with modernist 
rationalist ideas.”76 The view that emerged from the modernist reformist discourse on science and 
Islam, and continues to this day among the modernist and many fundamentalist camps may be 
summarized as follows: 
1) The domain of religion was different from the worldly domain of physical sciences; they 
could not affect each other. 
2) Islam did not neglect life of this world and so it was not against progress through scientific 
development. 
3) Scientific truths were of equal value to, and the real meanings of, many Qur’ānic verses. 
4) Islamic science was the background for modern science. 
5) Islam was a rational religion, not based on miracles, and therefore totally compatible with 
modern science. 
6) Islam emphasized on action for building a civilization and not on contemplation. 
7) Whatever beliefs and practices in the tradition, such as many aspects of Sufism, are not in 
agreement with the above, were keeping Muslims backward, and could not be part of the 
true Islam of the pious ancestors (salaf).  
 
The modernist Salafi vision of al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, by its division of life into spiritual 
realm and the worldly realm – as we saw in British attempts at reforming traditional institutions in 
India – let modern science shape Muslims’ view of the world of nature. 
  
                                                 
76Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism, 2-3. 
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As Nasr has pointed out, the reformists altered the meaning of what was considered beneficial 
knowledge in Islam to open a door for modern science; the reformists gave scientific knowledge 
equal significance to religious knowledge.77 As Muzaffar Iqbal has observed, “Almost all the 
reformists translated the Arabic word ‘ilm (knowledge) as “science” (meaning modern science).”78 
More importantly, in their whole-hearted espousing of modern science, the modernists ignored the 
question of how scientific progress can aid in fulfilling the human purpose of realizing tawhīd 
(unity of God). As regards Sufism, the Salafi modernists created a rationalist intellectual climate 
that sought to delegitimize it.   
 
In their enthusiasm for modern science, they ignored the whole inner dimension which 
emphasizes on the reality and need for knowledge by the heart. In effect, the modernist reformers 
stripped Islam of all other epistemologies save the rationalistic or the scientific one. Most 
importantly, a scientific epistemology was bound to undermine all Islamic beliefs and practices that 
would not lend themselves to empirical study. But, if beliefs about the human soul and its 
relationship with God could remain relatively unscathed, the world of nature, which was the 
subject of study for the modern sciences, could not.  Thus, a rationalistic or scientific epistemology 
could only have devastating consequences on faith in the Qur’ānic doctrine that the world of nature 
consisted of the signs of God.  
 
The modernist Muslim stance regarding Islam’s relationship to modern science continues to be 
similar to this day.79The Muslim fundamentalist position, as we will see, was formed for the most 
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part as a reaction to the secularizing consequences of the modernist stance on modern science and 
secular thought. 
 
4.4 Conservative Salafi Rejection of Secularism  
Like ‘Abduh himself, his most influential intellectual heir and younger colleague Rashīd 
Riḍā (d.1935) was a devout Muslim. Riḍā and his mentor had wanted Muslims to remain 
committed to the path of Islam while questioning taqlīd and pursuing the modern sciences.80 But 
two factors made such an outcome unlikely for many of their followers. First, not only was Egypt 
under British military and economic domination, but there was also the presence of large number 
of foreigners and their local admirers who openly preached superiority of  secular Western culture 
over Islamic culture.81Second, in this intellectual climate, the reformists’ encouragement for 
learning the modern sciences, their disdain for the traditional ‘ulamā’,82 and their advocating of 
ijtihād by non-scholars, had in fact made many Muslims more vulnerable to various modern ideas 
associated with scientific progressivism and set them on the path of greater secularization.83 As 
Joseph Lumbard has observed, the modernist reformers “tried to be modernist without being 
secularist, not realizing that the former opened the door to the latter.”84 
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Rashīd Riḍā grew disillusioned by the trends of secularization in Egyptian society led by 
former students of al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh.85  Alarmed by these trends, his views grew more 
conservative in defence of the Islamic norms that, he argued, ought to cover all aspects of life 
including politics.86 His interpretation of Qur’ān drifted from the more rationalist approach of al-
Afghānī and ‘Abduh to being literalist.87 In a break from his mentors, he came to favour literal 
truth of the Qur’ān over any scientific claims. On the other hand, his embrace of modern science 
also led to an effort, like that of al-Afghānī, to claim “scientific miracles” of the Qur’ān.88 Also, he 
and his associates shared modernist bias against Sufis. 89 A new movement of Salafi conservatism 
began to take shape around the teachings of Riḍā that was now opposed to the secularism of the 
modernist Salafis. On the question of modern science and Sufism, however, both of the groups 
were roughly on the same page.  
 
Starting with Riḍā we see a recurring pattern of revivalist responses in the Muslim world 
with calls for greater role of the Sharī‘ā in public life in reaction to growing secularization and 
associated moral decadence from the Islamic standpoint. But in each case, the revivalists though 
generally more apprehensive of modern science than the modernists, banked on establishing the 
rule of the Sharī‘ā both in the government and in public conduct as the bulwark against western 
ideological influences. The secularizing character of modern science and technology, especially of 
the world of nature, almost completely escaped their attention.  By their activists zeal to create a 
dynamic society ready to face modern Western challenges the revivalists also looked down on 
Sufism, which emphasizes contemplation and self-purification, as an inadequate remnant from the 
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past.  We will see how this pattern is reflected in the revivalist/revolutionary Salafi movements that 
followed Riḍā. 
 
4.5 Revivalist/Revolutionary Salafi movements  
Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, the first and still the 
most influential of the revivalist Salafi movements. He picked up from where the Salafi way of 
Riḍā left off with much greater organization, but unlike Riḍā,  he had a general appreciation for 
Sufis and showed more flexibility towards the Sharī‘ā interpretations.90 Like Riḍā, al-Banna was 
much troubled by the growing secularist trends and the associated moral depravities in Egyptian 
society of his time.91  According to David Commins, “an observer of Egyptian society during the 
1920s might have concluded that the tide of western secular culture would soon sweep away 
Egypt’s Muslim culture.”92 Al-Banna concluded that the magnitude of the threat to Islamic norms 
and values had to be met with “an organized movement to undo the dangerous influence of western 
culture.”93 More than Riḍā, he exhorted his audience to live a virtuous life and return to observance 
of the Sharī‘ā.94 But, in line with Salafi thought from al-Afghānī onward, Banna saw no conflict 
between Islam and modern science; in his view, science and religion occupied “different spheres of 
reality.”95 Also, despite al-Banna’s appreciation for Sufism, his emphasis on social activism over a 
contemplative life, combined with the continued deep influence of al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh and Riḍā 
among his urban followers, resulted in a general disapproval of Sufism among the Brotherhood, 
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similar to that of the modernists.96 This disapproval would worsen as the Brotherhood drifted into 
an alliance, after al-Banna’s death, with the virulently anti-Sufi Wahhabism of the Arabian 
Peninsula in their common struggle to resist Marxist and socialist ideologies from spreading in the 
Arab world.  
 
In 1941, thirteen years after the founding of Muslim Brotherhood,  Abu’l ‘Alā’ Mawdūdī 
(1903-79), a journalist with traditional upbringing in India, established the Jam‘at-i  Islami, an 
organized movement with a Salafi orientation similar to that of the Brotherhood.  However, 
Mawdūdī’s intellectual activity began a decade earlier about the same time as al-Banna’s did. Like 
other Salafis as well as followers of the leading Indian modernist reformist Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
(1817- 98), Mawdūdī rejected the interpretive traditions of the past. Like them, he would rely 
solely on the texts of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth to construct his vision of Islam, as he saw 
necessary, for the predicament of secularism and political impotence that Muslims of his time 
found themselves in.97 However, his awareness of the philosophical foundations of modern science 
was deeper than that of any of his predecessors. In the mid-1930s, he observed that “from the very 
outset Western philosophy and science both went totally against any Divine existence.”98 Unlike 
the Salafi modernists he firmly rejected the notion that either rationalism or modern science could 
be the basis of any ultimate truth that religious interpretation should try to conform to.99 Further, he 
observed that “The philosophy and science, which have nurtured the western lifestyle, have been 
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heading towards atheism, godlessness and materialism for the last five to six hundred years.”100 Yet 
he believed in the progress that science could deliver and tried to reason how the fate of 
“godlessness and materialism” would not befall Muslims if they would only remain faithful to the 
Islam of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. 
 
It appears that Mawdūdī was unclear about the difference between the science that Islam 
would support and modern science. Thus, in contradiction to his assertion that western science was 
“totally opposed to Divine existence,” he observed that religion by nature was not opposed to 
science: “In fact the study of universal laws, contemplation over its phenomena, and drawing 
results through analogy and reason is not at all against religion.”101 To explain Western rebellion 
against religion, Mawdūdī tried to place the blame squarely on “the Church’s resistance and brutal 
repression against scientific inquiry and free thinking during Renaissance.”102 But like the 
modernists, he argued that, unlike Christianity, Islam was a rational religion and is therefore not 
threatened by science.103 Muslims, after all, were once leaders in the sciences which Europeans 
took up “to achieve progress which Muslims had forsaken.”104  
 
Mawdūdī argued that the good or evil effect of modern science and technology depended 
“on the nature of a given civilization.”105 Like ‘Abduh, he argued that science and spirituality 
belonged to exclusively different domains such that experts of one domain could not have 
knowledge of the other domain.106 By the same token, while science could not disprove religious 
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truths, he recognized that it could challenge one’s faith. He could find no cure against this 
predicament except in firm faith: “The only way out of this dilemma is the belief in the Unseen. 
Once you accept a person as your prophet, fully convinced that he is an authority on the matters 
relating to God and spiritualism…then there remains no possibility of doubt and uncertainty in the 
matters beyond your observation and experience.”107 Sayyid Quṭb(d. 1966), the most revolutionary 
of all Salafi thinkers, also put emphasis on faith by way of radical rejection of all human ideologies 
and authorities. 
 
After a career as a renowned secular intellectual, Sayyid Quṭb joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood in defense of Islam against corruptions in materialist, secularist thought and lifestyle 
which he experienced in Egypt and the USA.108 Quṭb was heavily influneced by Mawdūdī ’s 
thought.  His views of modern sciences reveal many of the same assumptions and conclusions of 
Mawdūdī  and other Salafis. The modern physical sciences were born in Islamic civilization and 
were based on Islamic principles about the world of nature: “One should not be unaware of this 
fact that the empirical sciences, which in the modern age are permeating the vitals of the industrial 
civilization of Europe, were not born in Europe. Their birthplaces were the Islamic Universities of 
Cordova and other Muslim countries of the orient. The fundamental principles of these sciences 
were drawn from the teachings and instructions of Islam in which clear indications are present 
about the universe and its nature.”109 A truly Muslim society should pursue modern science and 
technology “in a big measure”.110 Like Mawdūdī , he saw the empirical sciences to concern only 
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with “worldly affairs,” a different domain from what concerns “Muslim concepts about life and the 
universe or discuss man’s responsibility and the nature of man’s relations with surrounding 
universe and his relations with the Creator of life…morals and manners…” “Hence” as Quṭb 
continues, “the Muslim need not fear that by imbibing these learnings he would be vulnerable to 
any flaw in his faith or [that] he would revert to jahiliyyah,”111 because these subjects “remain 
confined to practical experiments and results.”112 On the other hand, Muslims should stay away 
from philosophy, psychology, history and sociology, because they were products of “jahili beliefs” 
which can be traced to Europe’s illogical hatred of religion in reaction to the tyranny of the Church 
against the scholars.113 
 
Mawdūdī  was more aware of religion’s metaphysical incompatibility with modern science 
than Quṭb was. Unlike Quṭb, Mawdūdī  acknowledged that even peaceful technologies did not 
necessarily improve the human lot.114 But he accepted this condition and emphasized on faith as 
the cure. With Quṭb, criticism of modern science is relatively absent;115 his emphasis is on setting 
oneself apart from Western thought which was a product of human speculations, and on remaining 
absolutely obedient to God by following the Sharī‘ā.116 But, in line with scientific progressivism, 
Quṭb “interpreted the concept of khilāfa (vicegerency) as a mandate to exploit and develop the 
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earth on behalf of God”117 as al-Afghānī had done in the nineteenth century. And, in this regard 
their position was eerily similar to that of Francis Bacon.118 
 
4.5.1 Revivalist/Revolutionary Stance on Science and Sufism 
No matter what other areas modernists and revivalists disagreed in, both sides shared a 
disdain for tradition and endeavoured to give a new dynamic shape to Islam based solely on fresh 
interpretation of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth which they saw fit for the modern dynamic age. And 
concerning the question of modern science and technology, they were not as rationalist as the 
modernists, and rejected science if it clearly contradicted the Qur’ān.  But both the modernist and 
the revivalist camps agreed on at least three following points:  
1) The religious domain is different from the worldly domain of physical sciences, and 
therefore, they do not affect each other. 
2) Islam does not neglect the life of this world and so it is not against progress through 
scientific development. 
3) Islamic science was the background for modern science. 
With regards to Sufism, all of the modernists and most of the early fundamentalists 
determined that it was unsuitable; its unsuitability was based on Sufism’s emphasis on the 
contemplative life over activism to change outer circumstances, which the ideology of scientific 
progressivism required. ‘Abduh, al-Banna and Mawdūdī turned away from an initial inclination 
towards Sufism when they found it inadequate to face the challenges of the day for the Muslim 
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community.119 While al-Banna was critical of certain Sufi practices without opposing Sufism per 
se,120 Mawdūdī’s stance on Sufism was very similar to the modernist stance of ‘Abduh and his 
followers. For him, Sufism, though not unlawful, was a “morbid attachment” that weakened 
Muslims from the activism necessary for the modern age: 
Just as a pure and lawful thing is prohibited when it is deemed to be harmful to a patient, 
similarly the cult of taṣawwuf , though allowable, needs to be eschewed and laid aside. For 
through it the Muslims have become addicted to a kind of intoxication which has lulled 
them into sleep and sapped them of life and reality for centuries. As soon as bai’at is 
performed, the disciples start developing a servile mentality which has become intimately 
associated with the system of discipleship…Now therefore, if somebody wishes and plans 
to revive Islam, he must shun the language and the terminology of the Sufis, their mystic 
allusions and metaphoric references, their dress and etiquette, the saint-disciple institution 
and all other things associated with it. Indeed he must make the Muslim abstain from these 
abuses just as a diabetic is warned to abstain from sugar.121 
 
Quṭb did not write specifically against Sufism. But his emphasis on God’s transcendence 
over everything of this world went against the Sufi emphasis on “seeing God” everywhere. He 
believed that the function of Islam was to set human beings completely free from obedience to any 
other entity but God, making the Sufi requirement for submission to the guide implicitly 
unacceptable.122He urged for radical activism to overthrow any government not based on the 
guidance of the Qur’ān.  Contemplative life of Sufism could hardly be an ally in this struggle. 
Quṭb’s radical stance, manifested in his writings while in jail where he was much tortured from 
1954 until 1966 when he was hanged, could be explained as a perception of the need to confront, 
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more than by intellectual means, the power of repressive secular governments that had adopted 
scientifically-inspired Marxist and socialist ideologies.123  
 
Quṭb’s radical intellectual retreat to the Qur’ān from every school of human thought 
brought the Salafi revolutionary position uncannily close to the Wahhābī position that was rabidly 
anti-intellectual and anti-Sufi. But while Wahhabism was a radical reaction against the Sufi 
practices based on the belief of God’s immanence that sometimes lacked propriety, Quṭb’s position 
was a radical rejection of the growing secularism supported by the state power that was 
marginalizing religion altogether. However, for both positions, the need to obey God, the 
transcendent, was emphasized. 
 
The march of secularism was not limited to the Arab world. In fact, in the 1950s and 60s, 
secularism spreaded unabated in Turkey, Iran, South Asia, and in other Muslim nations. As in the 
past, in reaction to the growing secularist trends, an alliance of fundamentalist movements was in 
progress in defence of Islam, as they defined it. This was an alliance of the revolutionary Salafis 
with the radically anti-Sufi Wahhābīs, an alliance which would prove devastating for Sufism across 
the world. 
4.6 Transcendence of God and the Growing Affinity between Wahhābīs and Salafis 
Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1792), the founder of what became known as the Wahhābī 
movement in the mid 18th century Arabia, posited God as an absolute other from His creation.124 
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This doctrinal position from the beginning has been based on rejection of tradition by selective 
literal interpretation of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth alone. We say ‘selective,’ for the Qur’ān and the 
Ḥadīth speak not only of God’s transcendence (tanzīh) but also of His immanence (tashbīh).125  
 
Wahhāb was much less a theoretician than ‘Abduh. His doctrinal stand appears to have 
been an extreme reaction against the veneration of living saints, tombs of prophets, saints, or places 
associated with saintly men or women which had been popular in all Muslim societies for 
centuries, and which a number of Muslim scholars including Sufis were already trying to keep 
within proper limits. Initially the Wahhābī  movement gained strength not so much by the power of 
persuasion of its message but more by an alliance with a regional warlord Muḥammad b. Sa‘ud.126 
The resulting military campaign involved the destruction of all sacred sites associated with saints 
and prophets in the areas that came under Wahhābī control.  Wahhāb saw all acts of worship of 
God except those prescribed in the Hanbali Sharī‘ā, the most rigid of all schools of Sharī‘ā, as 
unbelief (kufr). A true Muslim could only do his prescribed duties; any other way of relating to the 
absolutely transcendent God amounted to associating partnership to God (shirk) and were to be 
fought and eradicated by all means. Wahhābīs were firm in their conviction that their interpretation 
of Islam was the only true Islam as practiced by the early Muslims. Consequently, Sufi orders and 
practices were devastated in Wahhābī-dominated regions.  
 
While the Salafis portrayed scientific progressivism as an Islamic imperative, the Wahhābīs 
until the 1950s showed no interest in the Western science or modern thought and had had little 
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influence outside the Arabian Peninsula. Their isolation did not last for too long due to the 
underlying affinity between them and Salafis of all stripes in their common emphasis on absolute 
transcendence of God. As we argued earlier, ‘Abduh’s belief that God is the Absolute other was 
motivated by his intent to find a way for Muslims to separate their worship of God from their 
dealings with the world of nature which was science’s preoccupation. Thus, both the modernism of 
‘Abduh and Wahhabism were based on a view of  nature where God is either absent or unknowable 
and unapproachable, which, in turn, explains their rejection of the idea emphasized in Sufism that 
God is present wherever one looks.  Wahhābī radical rejection of Sufism was already cited by 
Rashīd Riḍā to be among his main reasons for supporting the Wahhābīs.127 Riḍā’s outspoken 
support for the Wahhābīs was the first political step that would initiate an eventual close alliance 
between the two movements.  
 
Quṭb’s radical intellectual retreat to the Qur’ān and the Sharī‘ā, away from all schools of 
western thought, brought the Salafis and the Wahhābī s even closer together ideologically. In the 
meantime, secularizing trends in Egypt and other Muslim states continued relentlessly and by the 
early 1950s, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were under socialist rule. Against this political block, Salafis 
became natural allies of the fundamentalist Wahhābīs. Then, from the early 1960s, the Saudi 
monarchy, under pressure to modernize, embarked on the path of scientific progress and 
development and effectively brought the Wahhābī position another step closer to that of the Salafis. 
With their common stance against secular ideologies, the alliance between the Wahhābīs and the 
Salafis grew stronger and, supported by Saudi oil money, the radical Wahhābī rejection of Sufism 
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permeated revolutionary Salafism and other Salafi-inspired Islamic movements.128 Thus, 
Wahhabism spread on the wings of revolutionary Salafism, which in turn had come to exist as a 
reaction against the spread of secular ideologies arising ultimately from scientific progressivism. 
 
By the end of the 1960s failure of socialist governments to meet the needs of pious Arab 
masses became apparent and, especially after the total defeat of the secular Arab governments at 
the hands of Israel in 1967, Marxism and socialism came to be seen as failed ideologies. In its 
place, the more ‘Islamically-oriented’ Wahhābī or Salafi movements appeared as attractive 
alternatives. The waning influence of secular ideologies and greater acceptance of revivalist 
ideologies since the 1970s did not mean that modernists lost control in the Muslim world.  In 
today’s Muslim world at large, “Western-oriented secularists [continue to] constitute a high 
percentage of those in policy making positions.”129 Moreover, as the political scientist Beverley 
Milton-Edwards has observed, to this day “Secularism…has continued to symbolize the process of 
modernity that have defined and shaped societies and in [almost all] Muslim countries [throughout 
last century] there was a tacit assumption that modernity or modernization could only be achieved 
by jettisoning Islam.”130 However, in each of these states Islamic revivalist influence has grown 
since the late 1960s, resulting in greater acceptance of Sharī‘ā in public space, and greater 
visibility of Islamic symbols.131 On the other hand, as before, greater penetration of modern science 
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and technology, coupled with the concomitant rise of secularism, has been met with a revivalist 
response in the Arab world and elsewhere.132  
 
However, on the question of modern science and technology, modernist or secularist 
position is indistinguishable from the fundamentalist one to this day. Citing Rachid Gannoushi, the 
leading Tunisian follower of Salafi revivalists, Azam Tamimi has observed, “Like nineteenth-
century Muslim modernists, many contemporary Islamic thinkers insist that the scientific and 
technological underpinnings of modern Western civilization are reducible to categories of 
knowledge and practice that Muslims can learn and benefit from without having to give up their 
cultural identity.”133 More recently, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a widely popular intellectual of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, has asserted, “We want scientific thinking and scientific spirit to guide our 
life in every way.”134  
 
Not surprisingly, the growing role of the Salafi revivalist message has not meant revival of 
the traditional Islamic view of the world of nature.  Those who have questioned the secularizing 
effect of modern science and technology by citing examples of the way revivalists have made 
effective use of the available technology since the 1980s to spread their message, have not 
considered that the very nature of modern science and technology, as we will see in chapters 6 and 
7, cannot but have a secularizing effect on the human view of nature.135In light of this, the success 
                                                 
132 See M.H. Hafez, “Explaining the Origins of Islamic Resurgence: Islamic Revivalism in Egypt and 
Indonesia,” The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies; Fall 1997, pp. 295-324; Knysh, “Contextualizing 
the Salafi-Sufi Conflict,” 517-518. 
133 Azzam Tamimi, “The Origins of Arab Secularism,” in Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, eds.  John 
Esposito and Azzam Tamimi(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000), 26. 
134 Yusuf al-Qaradawi quoted in Ehsan Masood, “An Islamist Revolution,” 24. 
135 For the doubts raised, see Robinson, “Secularization, Weber and Islam,” 241; Lluis Oviedo, “Whom to 
blame for the Charge of Secularization,” Zygon, vol. 40, no.2 (June 2005).  
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of revivalists in the observance of the Sharī‘ā in the human domain must be attributed to the 
passion of the revivalists against secularism in spite of modern science and technology.  
 
4.7 Chapter Summary 
In retrospect, we can observe that since the death of ‘Abduh, his modernist Salafism, with a 
scientific progressivist agenda marked by opposition to Sufism, opened the gates for secularization 
across the Arab world. This led to greater adoption of secular western thought and lifestyle, and in 
time, resulted in the adoption of ideologies associated with radical scientific progressivism such as 
Marxism and socialism in Muslim world. In response, in each phase of greater secularization, there 
has been a parallel rise of Islamic revivalism which became increasingly radicalized.136  The 
revivalist response begins with the rise of Rashīd Riḍā’s conservative Salafism that soon gives way 
to the revolutionary Salafism of  al-Banna’s Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Mawdūdī ’s 
Jam‘at-i Islami in India.  These came in response to the secularist trends which these two leaders 
felt had needed an organized and disciplined response in their respective countries.  
 
The strategy of the revivalists involved criticizing western ideologies and lifestyles on the 
one hand, and insisting on the observance of the Sharī‘ā on the basis of the argument that Islam 
was superior to all ideologies in its capacity for establishing a just, moral and scientifically 
progressive society, on the other. Most importantly, the scientific progressivism, which was 
initially inherited from the West through reformists like al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, would not be 
given up but was rather promoted as an Islamic ideal. The scientific progressivist agenda, however, 
has been accommodated by rejecting God’s immanence in the world, in deviation from traditional 
                                                 
136 Mansoor Moaddel speaks of Egypt, Syria, Algeria and Iran to illustrate this phenomenon. See Moaddel, Islamic 
Modernism, Nationalism and Fundamentalism , 337.  
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doctrine of God’s simultaneous transcendence and immanence, which the Sufi tradition best 
preserves.  Naturally, all forms of Salafism strive to marginalize Sufism and relegate the task of 
shaping Muslims’ view of the natural world to modern science. The alliance with Wahhabism only 
made Salafi rejectionist stance against Sufism much stronger. Whatever revival of Islam the 
fundamentalists have been able bring to the Muslim world, owing to their relatively uncritical 
embrace of modern science and technology, the Muslim view of the natural world continues to be 
shaped not by Islam, but by modern science which ignores the sanctity of the created order. 
 
In order for care and appreciation for nature to become part and parcel of contemporary 
Muslim piety, it is imperative that we  revive the dimensions of  the Islamic tradition that speak of 
God’s simultaneous transcendence and immanence, namely Sufism and the associated metaphysics 
we discussed in chapters 2 and 3. At the same time, as we discussed in Chapter 3, Sufism would 
also help revive the deepest rationale for the observance of Islamic ethics including the Sharī‘ā 
regarding the non-human world that Nasr and other Islamic environmentalists insist on.  However, 
as we have seen, such a transformation of attitude towards nature in contemporary Muslim world 
would require, as Nasr holds, a thorough critique—from an Islamic intellectual perspective—of the 
assumptions held by both the modernists and fundamentalists regarding traditional Islamic sciences 
and the very nature of modern science and technology.137  And it is to this critique which we turn to 
next.  
                                                 















































THE PERENNIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE TRADITIONAL ISLAMIC SCIENCES 
If modern science and with it a civilization which gave and still gives itself absolute right of domination over 
the earth and even the heavens did not come into being in the Islamic world, it was not because of the lack of 
mathematical or astronomical knowledge. Rather, it was because the Islamic perspective excluded the 
possibility of the deification of the earthly man or the total secularization of nature. 1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
 
Nasr’s discussion of the traditional sciences seeks to dispel the notion that the history of 
science is just about “the progressive accumulation of techniques and the refinement of quantitative 
methods in the study of nature”2 by highlighting the radical difference in philosophical foundations 
of Islamic science from that of modern science. By the same token, he implicitly refutes the 
unqualified assertions by modernist and fundamentalist Muslims that Islamic science laid the 
groundwork for modern science. 
 
In this chapter, our purpose is not to recount the considerable Muslim contributions in the 
sciences which, seen from the perspective of their modern counterparts, are valued only for their 
quantitative aspects. Our goal here is to highlight the foundational role of the Islamic perennial 
principles in those sciences. To achieve this objective, we will rely heavily on Nasr’s An 
Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines
3 and Science and Civilization in Islam because the 
presentations of Islamic cosmological doctrines as well as the qualitative aspects of Islamic 
traditional sciences in these books remain to this day the most extensive and well-documented. In 
addition, we will use the works of the few other scholars such as Osman Bakar, William Chittick, 
                                                 
1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 
136.    
2 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 2nd edition (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts 
Society, 2003), 21 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines: Conceptions of Nature and 




Syed Nomanul Haq and Muzaffar Iqbal who have written, though not nearly as extensively, on the 
qualitative aspects of Islamic traditional sciences. 
 
Most importantly, our goal is to underline the principle of tawḥīd as the central and overarching 
perspective and objective of the traditional Islamic sciences.  Also, we will briefly discuss how, 
according to Nasr, both the classification of the sciences in the Islamic intellectual tradition and the 
multidisciplinary expertise of Muslim scientists reflect the significance of the perennial principles 
in the traditional Islamic way of pursuing knowledge. We will fulfil our objective through brief 
presentations of the role of the perennial principles – the most important being tawhid – in the 
following areas: 
1) Traditional Islamic sciences 
2) Classification of sciences in Islam 
3) Multi-disciplinary expertise of Muslim scientists 
5.1 Traditional Islamic Sciences 
The most influential metaphysical vision of the cosmos in the Islamic tradition is that of Ibn 
‘Arabī.4 It was being articulated around the same time as the fading away of the most intensive 
period of scientific activity which had been taking place in the Islamic world had began. Nasr 
points out that the principles of tawḥīd, the hierarchy of reality, and the purposefulness of the 
universe, were already central to Islamic Peripatetic natural philosophy and the traditional sciences 
closely associated with it, though not as they are elaborated in Ibn ‘Arabī’s metaphysics discussed 
in chapter 2: “It is meaningful to speak of traditional science as a knowledge which, while not pure 
metaphysics, is traditional, that is, related to metaphysical principles...”5 
                                                 
4 See pp. 62-64 and Chapter 2.2. 




As we will see, the principle of tawḥīd in the traditional sciences is generally conveyed in 
the sense of unity of the origin as God or the Supreme Intelligence which is then reflected also in 
the vision of the unicity, that is, the interrelated wholeness of the cosmos, and not as waḥdat al-
wujūd (Unity of Being).6 Then, the principle of the hierarchy of reality refers to the hierarchy of 
planetary spheres, angels, and the Intellect (‘aql), and not as levels of divine presence and Self-
disclosures of God.7 The meaning or purpose of any entity lay in its function in the cosmic unicity, 
and not in its being a Self-disclosure of God. Nevertheless, the principles of traditional Islamic 
sciences can be seen as imperfect reflections of the Islamic metaphysical principles of unity of 
reality, hierarchy of reality, and purposefulness. 
 
In modern times, many scholars argue that Greek sources constitute the cosmological 
foundation of Islamic sciences. However, as will see, the points of concurrence between these 
cosmologies and the principles of Islam are conspicuously left out of discussion. Seeking to fill this 
vacuum, Nasr contends that “Islamic science is not Islamic simply because it was cultivated by 
Muslims but because it is related to the principles of Islam.”8 
 
Muzaffar Iqbal, one of the leading scholars of the history of Islamic science today, has 
provided a sound rebuttal of the Hungarian orientalist Ignaz Goldziher’s (1850-1921) hypothesis in 
a 1916 essay9 that the Islamic sciences ought to be considered as “foreign sciences” that were 
rejected by the normative Islam of the medieval times. Iqbal contends that Goldziher’s hypothesis, 
                                                 
6 Chapter 2.2.1b. 
7 Chapter 2.2.1a. 
8 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, xv.  
9 See Ignaz Goldziher, “The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the Ancient Sciences,” in Studies in Islam, 
trans. and ed. M. L. Swartz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981). 
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which has been immensely influential in shaping scholarly opinion ever since its publication, was 
misleading for mainly two reasons: 1) a mistranslations of the term ‘ilm (knowledge) as “foreign 
sciences” in a prophetic ḥadīth which urges people to avoid useless ‘ilm and the unsubstantiated 
claim of frequent use of the ḥadīth by Muslim scholars to dissuade the public from pursuing those 
sciences;10 2) Whereas Greco-Alexandrian sciences were naturalized by the Islamic civilization, 
which was trying to live by its principles through an “organic process that examined and re-
examined [any non-Islamic] material from various angles,”11 the slow pace of such a naturalization 
process, Iqbal argues, was misinterpreted by Goldziher as a sign of Islamic opposition to these 
sciences. 
 
Among contemporary scholars of Islam a notable critic of the whole notion of Islamic 
science is Dimitri Gutas.12 His main argument is that “there is no such thing as a monolithic, 
essential “Islam” which can be seen as the historical agent” for the development of Islamic 
science.13 This is a misleading assertion because Islam is founded on a particular revelation, the 
teachings of a particular prophet and above all on certain ahistorical principles such as the unity of 
God, hierarchy of reality and beginning and the end of the world in God. Differences in 
interpretation of the Qur’ān and the sayings of the Prophet Muḥammad did not include denying the 
Qur’ān as God’s revelation or the Prophet as God’s Messenger. Moreover, the differences among 
Muslims did not include denial of the aforementioned ahistorical metaphysical principles which, as 
we will see, the various Islamic sciences were mindful of. We may say that Gutas has a positivist 
outlook that ignores traditional metaphysical principles and their relevance altogether.  However, 
                                                 
10 Muzaffar Iqbal, Islam and Science (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 76-81. 
11 Ibid., 82. 
12 See Dimitri Gutas, “Islam and Science: A False Statement of the Problem,” Islam & Science, Vol 1 
(December 2003) No. 2, pp. 215-220.  
13 Ibid., 216. 
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the foundational role of metaphysical principles in the traditional sciences, as illustrated in this 
chapter, should suffice to put the arguments of the likes of Gutas to rest.14  
 
The Qur’ān declares that every nation on earth had been sent Messengers with the message 
of tawḥīd by the one and the same God.15 So long as visions from a non-Muslim civilization were 
rooted in a unitary vision of reality they were seen to convey some essential truth and could be 
integrated with some modifications within the Islamic worldview.16 Hinting at the quest for 
knowledge relevant to Islamic principles as the motivating factor for Muslim interest in non-
Islamic sciences, Nasr argues that “The Muslims had no military, economic or political compulsion 
to study Aristotle or Indian medicine. They already possessed perhaps the most powerful empire on 
earth. Nor could turning to these sciences have been merely utilitarian.”17 Rather, Islam’s 
“confidence that it was expressing the Truth at the heart of revelations, permitted Islam to absorb 
ideas from many sources…This was especially true in regard to the sciences of nature, because 
most of the ancient cosmological sciences had sought to express the unity of nature.”18 Evidently, 
for Nasr, even when Muslims borrowed symbols and concepts from the cosmological systems of 
the Greeks or the Persians, the synthesis they produced was essentially Islamic. The Islamic 
intellectual tradition did integrate much from the teachings of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, 
Hippocrates and Galen, but Nasr argues that this was mainly because of the fundamental resonance 
of the Islamic worldview with theirs. To be sure, Nasr points out, Islam rejected “other schools of 
                                                 
14 See Muzaffar Iqbal’s rebuttal of Dimitri Gutas in Muzaffar Iqbal, “Islam and Science: Responding to a 
False Approach,” Islam and Science, Vol. 1 (December 2003) No. 2: 221-237. 
15 Qur’ān 10:47; 4:164; 21:25; 14:4; 16:36. 
16 According to Abu al-Faraj al-Nadim (d. 987), Caliph al-Mamun (r. 813- 33) had a dream of Aristotle in 
which the Greek sage instructed him to “be sure to follow tawḥīd” following which al-Mamun sent experienced 
members of the House of Wisdom to the king of Byzantium  to select which books to translate. See George Saliba, 
Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance (Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2007), 
48.  
17 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 130. 
18 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 30. 
183 
 
Greek thought, such as [those of] the Epicurean or the Sophists,”19 whose worldview clashed in 
foundational ways with that of Islam. 
 
With Nasr’s arguments in mind, we will briefly discuss five of the most well known Islamic 
traditional sciences. We will begin with a discussion of traditional Islamic cosmology which Nasr 
has called, “the mother or matrix of all sciences.”20 This is because traditional cosmology – as 
opposed to modern scientific cosmology which is solely concerned with the material dimension of 
the cosmos21 – defines one’s outlook about all levels of reality in the cosmos which Islamic 
sciences concern themselves with.22  
 
The other four traditional sciences we will discuss will be mathematics, astronomy, 
alchemy, and medicine. Our main objective is not to prove how specific conclusions in these 
traditional sciences were based on Islamic doctrines. Rather we will analyze how the traditional 
sciences shared the three perennial principles of Islam for reality as such – unity of reality, 
hierarchy of reality, and ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the cosmos – closely.  
 
5.1.1 Islamic Cosmology 
For most people in the pre-modern world, the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth alone provided a 
sufficient basis to form a general Islamic cosmology or worldview in mind. Moreover, a number of 
scholarly and popular cosmologies were developed which were solely based on the Qur’ān and the 
                                                 
19 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 159. “The Greek texts that were translated into Arabic simply 
enforced some pre-selected directions.” Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 125. 
20 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 99. 
21 See, for instance, Steven Weinberg, Cosmology (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), v-
vi. 
22 For a general discussion of traditional cosmology and worldview, and their significance in Nasr’s approach, 
see Introduction 0.9.2. 
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Ḥadīth. As Nasr observes, “The Qur’ān speaks of the seven earths and seven heavens, of the 
Divine Pedestal (kursī) and the Throne (‘arsh), of the cosmic mountain Qāf, and the cosmic tree, 
all of which became important elements of Islamic cosmology.”23 The Throne verse (2:255) and 
the Light verse (24:35) were especially subject to cosmological interpretation.24 
 
However, since the 8th century, Muslims had been in contact with Greco-Alexandrian 
science and cosmology. The already existing resonance between these cosmologies and the 
perennial principles of Islam led Muslims to modify them in ways that gave them a specifically 
Islamic character.  The most notable attempts were made first, by Abū Yūsuf al-Kindī (801-73), 
followed by his eminent successors Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (890-950) and Abū ‘Alī al-Hussain Ibn 
Sīnā (980-1037). To the degree Muslims modified the Greco-Alexandrian cosmologies, Muslims 
sought to modify the Greco-Alexandrian sciences as well, and in effect, produced what we know as 
Islamic sciences. Thus, Islamic cosmologies associated with traditional Islamic sciences in the 
middle ages had more in common with the Greco-Alexandrian cosmologies than with cosmologies 
based on the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth. The cosmology conceived by Ibn Sīnā was the culmination of the 
attempt by Islamic Peripatetic philosophers to develop a cosmology in harmony with Islamic 
perennial principles. Its tremendous influence in Islamic thought and traditional sciences cannot be 
overemphasized, and thus a brief look at its metaphysical assumptions is important. 
 
5.1.1a  Ibn Sīnā’s Cosmology 
                                                 
23 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 95. 
24 One of the most influential cosmological schemes has been Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī’s abstraction of an 
Islamic cosmology based on the Light verse in his Mishkāt al-anwār (The Niche of Lights). Nasr points out that al-
Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Mulla Sadra also provided commentaries on the Light verse. For Ibn Sīnā’s cosmological 
interpretation of the same verse, see Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 96. Also, see some verses related to the 




Ibn Sīnā makes a philosophical distinction between God as Necessary Being (wājib al- 
wujūd)25 and all that is not God as contingent beings (mumkin al-wujūd), a distinction that 
conforms closely with the general Islamic principle that all things are utterly dependent on God 
who alone is independent.  Following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā defines the ‘sub-lunar’ region as the 
world of corruption and what is above it as the heaven of perfection. In his cosmological vision, 
there is a hierarchy of Intelligences or Intellects—also identified as Archangels—by which God 
creates the rest of the universe. As the Necessary Being contemplates Itself, the First Intellect, also 
identified as the Supreme Archangel through which God created everything, is created. 26  Each 
Intellect emanates from the one above it, from the First Intellect above the First Heaven down to 
the Tenth Intellect or the Active Intellect. This ‘Active Intellect’ is seen as the Archangel Gabriel 
who had conveyed the Qur’ān to the Prophet Muhammad and is at the ninth heavenly sphere 
corresponding to the Moon.  The Fourth Intellect and Third Heaven onward each descending 
sphere corresponds also to one of the seven planets known at the time, namely Saturn, Jupiter, 
Mars, Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. The Tenth Intellect is the Active Intellect which 
contains the intelligible realities or ‘forms’ of all entities in the sub-lunar region of imperfect 
world.27  In addition, the generations from each of the Intellects results from love (‘ishq).28 In turn, 
as Nasr points out, this cosmological vision is marked by an intense love for the Necessary Being 
                                                 
25 Necessary Being is that which must exist because if it did not there would be a logical 
contradiction. 
26 On the hierarchical order of generation of the Intellects from the Necessary Being, see Seyyed Hossein 
Nasr, “Cosmology,” in  Different Aspects of Islamic Culture  (Part I), ed. A.Y. al-Hassan (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 
2001), 367-371;  Peter Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1992) 38-39. 
27 Here ‘form’ refers to the Aristotelian essence of any entity which when combined with ‘matter,’—a pure 
potentiality—brings about the corporeal existence of that entity. 
28 Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 39. 
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inherent in all the bodies of the universe such that “love is the moving force of the universe” which 
gradually actualizes the potential of each.29   
 
5.1.1b  Generation of the Four Fundamental Qualities and the Unicity of the Cosmos  
In Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology, by Divine Command the heavenly Intellects created the four 
fundamental qualities of heat, cold, dryness, and humidity. 30 From these fundamental qualities four 
fundamental elements of earth, fire, air and water were created which in turn, became bodies 
receptive of mineral souls, plant souls, animal souls or human souls with rational power, according 
to the degree of perfection in the mixing of the four elements.31 Thus, Ibn Sīnā’s cosmogenesis 
provides a vision whereby God is at the origin of all levels of creation. As such, for Ibn Sīnā the 
earthly domain “mirrors heavenly perfection” and is therefore full of meaning and purpose.32 Also, 
the levels of creation are interrelated in that they are all constituted from the same four elements 
essentially originating in God. This vision of unicity is the theoretical basis of various traditional 
sciences, especially, Islamic medicine and alchemy.  
 
According to Peter Heath, a distinguished scholar of Ibn Sīnā, “Avicenna’s cosmology rests 
upon several fundamental assumptions. The philosopher postulates that the cosmos is a unified 
whole…that is arranged in a highly orderly and seamless system (a hierarchic multiplicity) that is 
real, true, and eternal.”33 Heath emphasizes its Neoplatonic and Aristotelian character.34 Certainly, 
                                                 
29 Nasr, “Cosmology,” 370.  
30 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 206 
31 Ibid., 206-207. 
32 Attilio Petruccioli, “Nature in Islamic Urbanism: The Garden in Practice and in Metaphor,” in Islam and 
Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard C. Foltz, Frederick M. Denny, and Azizan Baharuddin (Cambridge, MA:  
Harvard University Press, 2003), 500. 
33 Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 39. 
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the idea of the Intellect emerging from God resembles the Neoplatonic vision of the Intellect 
emanating from the First Cause,35 and of the universe emerging from that Intellect.  Likewise, 
several other fundamental elements of Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology are Aristotelian-based.36  Certainly, 
this cosmological vision says nothing about the creation story found both in the Genesis and the 
Qur’ān.  
 
On the other hand, there is the well-known prophetic ḥadīth, “The first thing God created 
was the Intellect,” and God is described in the Qur’ān as the All-Encompassing(al-Muḥīt), the All-
Knowing (al-‘Ālīm), the One (al-Aḥad) and the Real (al-Ḥaqq) who is “The First and the Last.”37 
In addition, the Qur’ān speaks of seven heavens placed in a hierarchic order, of angels carrying out 
God’s command, and of the mutual love between God and His creation.38 While Ibn Sīnā’s 
cosmology has many a similarity with that of Aristotle, his idea of the Necessary Being is bound to 
the created order by mutual love and thus, radically differs from Aristotle’s vision of God.39  And 
while Ibn Sīnā and the Neoplatonists both share the concept of emanation, for Ibn Sīnā, the 
emanation does not happen unless God wills it.40 Thus, in light of the above discussion, we can 
conclude that Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology is a rational attempt to conceptualize all domains of existence 
                                                                                                                                                                 
34 For Heath, the foundation of Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology was “the tradition of philosophical discourse inherited 
from the late Hellenistic synthesis of late Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism, as worked out in Alexandria into Muslim 
culture.”  See Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 156. 
35 For a discussion of Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus’s vision of the relationship between  the Intellect and the One 
or the First Cause, see Georgios Lekkas, “Plotinus: Towards an Ontology of Likeness (On the One and the Nous),” 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 13(1): 53-68. 
36 “Ibn Sīnā envisioned the cosmos in an Aristotelian manner, used his terminology (form, matter, accidents), 
and defined change as the passage from potency to act.” Muzaffar Iqbal, Science and Islam (Westport, CT and London: 
Greenwood Press, 2007), 87. 
37 Qur’ān 4:126, 2:224, 22:6, 57:3. 
38 Qur’ān 2:29, 16:50, 5:59. 
39 As the distinguished historian Edward Grant has observed, in the purely Aristotelian cosmology, “God has 
no knowledge of our world’s existence, but is wholly absorbed in thinking about himself.” Edward Grant, Science and 
Religion: 400 BC – AD 1550 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 43. 
40 “And this thing [what emanates from the principle] is that which is willed...he is the willer of his essence.” 
Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, 366 line 12 quoted in Rahim Acar, “Avicenna’s position concerning the Basis of the 
Divine Creative Action,” The Muslim World, Vol. 94, January 2004, p. 68. 
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as being in harmony with fundamental Islamic metaphysical doctrines of reality as such: the unity 
of reality, the hierarchy of reality, and the ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the 
cosmos.  
5.1.1c  Cosmology as a Road-Map for Spiritual Orientation and Journey 
Nasr suggests that cosmology is like a road-map for spiritual progress, something which is 
clearly affirmed by Ibn Sīnā in his two successive visionary recitals, Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān (‘Living son 
of the Awake’) and Risālat al-ṭair (‘Recital of the Bird’) where Ibn Sīnā portrays the hierarchy of 
reality in the cosmos specifically as many steps in a seeker’s journey to God.41  Indeed, for Henry 
Corbin, the foremost commentator on Ibn Sīnā’s visionary recitals in the West, the recitals were 
expressions of the philosopher’s direct experience of his own inner world that he had not been 
consciously aware of beforehand, and that his philosophical system was only an outer reflection of 
that inner world.42  
 
In Ḥayy Ibn Yaqzān, the journey begins only after the orientation provided by the Active 
Intellect43 in the form of Archangel Gabriel is able to sufficiently transform the seeker’s 
consciousness to enable him to see the whole cosmos qualitatively, with the seven celestial spheres 
as hierarchically placed stations of knowledge and realizations, on the way to the presence of God 
beyond the ninth heaven of fixed Zodiac stars.44 Along the way, the seeker internalizes the wisdom 
                                                 
41 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 263-274. An analogy can be drawn to the traditional 
accounts of the Night Journey of the Prophet Muhammad through different heavenly planes where he meets the 
previous prophets, before he reaches the Divine Presence. 
42 Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books 
Inc., 1960), 8. 
43 In Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology, the Active Intellect—personified by the Archangel Gabriel—is the Intellect at the 
lowest level of the celestial realm. It serves as the source of all the intelligible essences of entities on the earthly plane 
and as the means to higher realms of knowledge for the human being.  
44 Ibn Sīnā, “Recital of Hayy ibn Yaqzan,” in Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, trans. 
Willard R. Trask (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960),143-145. 
189 
 
that each sphere offers.45  Inwardly and on the earthly plane, this would also involve traversing the 
material, mineral, plant, animal kingdoms46 and finally overcoming reliance on the senses and 
indulgence into lower passions inherent the human state, before the seeker can reach the angelic 
realms.47 The orientation provides the seeker with a transformed consciousness, just like the bird in 
Risālat al-ṭair which can fly into the heavenly realms above. The celestial journey through the nine 
spheres is now symbolized by a terrestrial journey through the natural world with nine hierarchic 
mountain tops, symbolizing the stations of knowledge and realizations on the path God.48 The 
inward journey is also a journey of the human intellect in its phases of actualization of its potential 
as we see in Ibn Sīnā’s interpretation of the Light verse of the Qur’ān.49 
 
Nasr argues that the symbolic nature of the visible cosmos does not alter by greater 
knowledge of the physical domain because the relation between the symbol and the symbolized is 
between their qualitative essences and not between their material conditions.50 For instance, as 
Nasr states, in the Qur’ān the Prophet Abraham is mentioned to have wondered if the stars, moon 
or the sun,51 and not some earthly entity, could be his Lord only because the “celestial, no matter 
                                                 
45 Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 33; Peter Heath does not see the recitals as Ibn Sīnā’s own 
spiritual experience but as allegories representing a spiritual journey through the philosopher’s rationally-structured 
cosmology. See Heath, Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna, 48.  
46 Ibn Sīnā, “Recital of Hayy ibn Yaqzan,” 145.  For Ibn Sīnā the human soul subsumes qualities of  the 
mineral, plant and animal souls.  
47 Ibid., 146-149. Ibn Sīnā elucidates the inner path with a description of nine steps in his Remarks and 
Admonitions that appears to correspond with the journey through nine celestial spheres. See Ibn Sīnā, Remarks and 
Admonitions, Part Four, trans. Shams Inati in Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism: Remarks and Admonitions: Part Four (London: 
Kegan Paul International, 1996), 86-88. 
48 Ibn Sīnā, “Translation of the Recital of the Bird,” in Henry Corbin, Avicenna and the Visionary Recital, 
trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1960), 189-191. 
49 Ibn Sīnā, The Book of Directives and Remarks, translated and quoted in Nasr, Science and Civilization in 
Islam, 96. 
50 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Traditional Cosmology and Modern Science: Interview with Seyyed Hossein Nasr,” 
in Parabola, Vol. 8.4, 109-110. “The angels have diverse levels in their luminosity. Hence, in their similitude with the 
visible world, it is appropriate for their world to be the sun, the moon, and the stars.” Al-Ghazzali, The Niche of Lights, 
27. 
51 Qur’ān 6:76-79. 
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how much we reduce it to intergalactic gas and so forth, is a symbol of the spiritual world.”52 
Furthermore, according to the metaphysics of the relationship between different planes of reality, 
greater knowledge of the material and quantitative type does not alter the reality of the higher 
planes.53  
 
5.1.2 Other Traditional Sciences 
The four other traditional Islamic sciences, namely mathematics, astronomy, alchemy, and 
medicine also have much in common with the sciences developed in the Greco-Alexandrian 
tradition. But as with the cosmological scheme we discussed above, they were sufficiently 
Islamized to embody a fundamentally Islamic worldview.   
5.1.2a  Mathematics 
The qualitative or symbolic understanding of numbers in Islam can be traced to the Qur’ān 
and the Ḥadīth.54 The symbolism of numbers began to manifest in the sciences starting with the 
science of the alphabet associated with Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq (d.765), the influential Sufi master.55 While 
                                                 
52 Nasr, “Traditional Cosmology and Modern Science, 110-111. Likewise, Nasr affirms that the masculine and 
feminine qualities of every dimension of the cosmos, visible and invisible, are also symbolized by the two visible 
bodies, the sun and the moon. Lest we take the symbolism lightly, Nasr asks, “Do you ever wonder why we don’t have 
three of these bodies, and how different human existence would have been if we did?” Ibid., 111. 
53 See Chapter 2.2.2. As Titus Burckhardt—one of the foremost traditionalist thinkers of the twentieth 
century—observed, “The medieval man, who saw the heavens as concentric spheres extending from the earth (viewed 
as the centre) to the limitless sphere of the Divine Spirit, were no doubt mistaken regarding the true disposition and 
proportions of the sensible universe. On the other hand, they were fully conscious of the fact—infinitely more 
important—that this corporeal world is not the whole of reality, and that it is as if surrounded and pervaded by a 
reality, both greater and more subtle, that in its turn is contained in the Spirit...” Titus Burckhardt, “Traditional 
Cosmology and Modern Science,” in Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional Science and Sacred Art, trans. and 
ed. William Stoddart (Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia, 1987), 31. 
 
54 Annemarie Schimmel, Deciphering the Signs of God: A Phenomenological Approach to Islam (Albany, 
NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 76-83. Also see the Qur’ān 74:30; 12:4; 13:3; 89; 3; 90; 8; 7:54; 
69:17; 17:44; 15:87. 
55 Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq assigned a mystical symbolic numerical value to each of the Arabic alphabet to derive from 
them meanings of words, names and verses. See John Eberley, Al-Kimia: The mystical Islamic Essence of the Sacred 
Art of Alchemy (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, 2004), 13; According to the traditional science of the alphabet (ilm al-
huruf), the letters of the Arabic alphabet represent universal archetypes because the Qur’ān is like a mirror of the 
cosmos, reflecting the signs (āyāt) of God. The letters provide the keys to the Qur’ān and to the cosmos. See pp. 106-7. 
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the quantitative aspects of numbers are necessary for the quantitative analysis of multiplicity, the 
symbolism is necessary to relate qualitative aspects. As Nasr has observed, “Unity…can only be 
symbolized.”56  
 
Nasr draws attention to the symbolic view of numbers manifested most extensively in the 
natural philosophy of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā (Brotherhood of Purity), a group of Muslim mystics in the 
tenth century who were inspired by the Pythagorean symbolism of numbers. For the Ikhwān, 
numbers provided the key to understanding the unitarian perspective of tawḥīd in the seeming 
multiplicity of entities in the cosmos. In their view, the number ‘1’ is symbolic of the Creator. 
Since all other numbers can be seen as so many additions of ‘1’, for the Ikhwān, they are seen as 
symbols of various entities in the natural world manifested by God, the One (al-Aḥad).57  Thus, the 
Ikhwān envisioned a cosmos defined by the symbolism of numbers and their interrelationships. In 
addition to the fundamental agreements with the principles of unity, hierarchy, and meaningfulness 
or purposefulness, the Ikhwān’s view of the cosmos also adhered to other characteristics of the 
Islamic worldview.58  
 
The symbolic dimension of numbers has survived through Islamic geometric art59 both in 
plastic forms and through great architectural wonders like Alhambra and the Taj Mahal.60  It is not 
                                                 
56 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 25.   
57 See Ikhwān al-Ṣafā quoted in Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 155. 
58 The Ikhwān rejects Aristotelian view of the eternity of the cosmos. The Intellect itself does its creative work 
“with the permission of Allah.”  The Ikhwān uses the Qur’ānic symbols of kursi (pedestal) and ‘arsh (throne) to equate 
the heaven of the fixed stars and the 9th heaven of their cosmology. The Zodiac is located in the outermost sphere of the 
heaven or Muhit which Muslims added to the Ptolemaic cosmology. The angels that fill the Islamic universe move the 
planets and make the heavens beautiful.  Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 77, 76, 81.  
59 Nasr, Islamic Art and Spirituality, 7-8.  For extensive discussion on the symbolic meaning of Islamic 
geometric art, see Keith Critchlow, Islamic Patterns: an Analytical and Cosmological Approach (Rochester, VT: Inner 
Traditions International, 1999); Keith Critchlow, Order in Space (New York: Thames and Hudson Inc., 1969). 
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likely that the Muslim mathematicians who made immense contribution to the field of mathematics 
in the middle ages remained impervious to the symbolic aspect of numbers. Nasr cites the 
celebrated Sufi poet and mathematician ‘Umar Khayyām (1048-1131) and his works on geometry 
and algebra. Khayyām preserves “the relation between the unknowns, numbers and geometrical 
forms, thereby maintaining the link between mathematics and the metaphysical significance 
inherent in Euclidean geometry.”61 Similarly, Osman Bakar cites the evident restraints in Khayyām 
and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s (1201-74) efforts in proving Euclid’s fifth postulate, in spite of their 
immense skill and power of imagination, so as not to violate the boundary of the Euclidean 
universe which had a symbolic metaphysical value.62   
5.1.2b  Astronomy 
Muslim astronomers were thinking within the framework of the Peripatetic cosmology we 
discussed above. For the medieval Muslim astronomers, the planets and the stars belonged to the 
realm of the heavens, incorruptible and closest to the pure essence of God. So the study of the 
positions, sizes, and motions of the planets and stars was a study of the heavens, and therefore, 
considered a most noble preoccupation.63 They did not study the heavenly bodies as inanimate 
masses in space, as in modern astronomy, but as entities in heaven possessing intelligences.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
60 For a discussion on symbolism of numbers and their geometric representations in Islamic architecture, as 
well as cosmological symbolism in the mosques, see Nasr, Islamic Art and Spirituality, 40-41; Nader Ardalan and 
Laleh Bakhtiar, The Sense of Unity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973); The abstract nature of 
mathematics, as the distinguished scholar of Islamic philosophy Oliver Leaman observes, “provided [Muslims] a 
fitting texture of symbols for the universe—symbols that were keys to open the cosmic text.” Oliver Leaman, “In 
search of Tradition: Islamic Art and Science in the thought of Seyyed Hossein Nasr,” in Beacon of Knowledge: Essays 
in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. Mohammad H. Faghfoory (Louisville, Kentucky: Fons Vitae, 2003), 306. 
61 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 160 
62 Osman Bakar, “‘Umar Khayyām’s Criticism of Euclid’s Theory of Parallels,” in The History and 
Philosophy of Islamic Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), 160-172. 
63 “As regards that [subject] which excels over others because of the nobility of its subject matter, it is like 
astronomy (‘ilm al-nujum).” Al-Fārābī quoted in Osman Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam: A Study in 
Islamic Philosophies of Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1998), 46;   Likewise, the famous astronomer 
Mu’ayyad al-Dīn ‘Urdī (d.1266) states, “It’s subject matter is the most amazing of God’s achievements, the most 




The view that Islamic astronomy was shaped by the Islamic world view is rejected 
completely by George Saliba, the leading historian of Islamic astronomy today. 64  However, as 
Saliba himself admits, his rejection is shaped partly by an understanding of Islamic scientific 
history that favours “modern development.”65  Moreover, he makes certain observations which, in 
our view, betray his conclusion. 
 
Ptolemy in his Almagest sought to provide an account of the planetary motions as observed 
from the earth that would also conform to the Aristotelian cosmology. Saliba recounts faithfully 
how Muslim astronomers from the ninth century onward found Ptolemy’s mathematical models 
inadequate and introduced a series of increasingly sophisticated mathematical models of their own 
to better account for the observed patterns of planetary movements. These contributions resulted in 
the works of ‘Ala al-Dīn Ibn al-Shāṭir (d.1375)—a time keeper of the daily prayers at the 
Ummayad mosque in Damascus—whose lunar model was critical for Copernicus’s formulation of 
the heliocentric model of the universe two centuries later.66 However, to explain the failure of 
Muslim astronomers to discover the heliocentric model, Saliba observes that “The Islamic 
civilization did not seem to have produced a rigorous astronomical criticism of the type that would 
have questioned the natural philosophical foundations of the Greek astronomy themselves.”67  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Maker, and the immensity of His power.” Quoted in Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European 
Renaissance, 278 n 3. 
64 Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, viii-ix.  
65 Ibid., ix. 
66 Ibid., 164. 
67 Ibid., 129. (accent is ours) 
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In other words, in spite of their brilliance, Muslim astronomers were unhappy with 
Ptolemy’s mathematical models, but content with Aristotle’s cosmology which they knew in its 
Islamicized version of Farabi or Ibn Sīnā.68 They disagreed with Ptolemy’s models for predicting 
planetary movements but not with the value and meaning contained in the Islamic versions of the 
geocentric Greco-Alexandrian cosmologies. Besides, the popular and the strictly Qur’ān and 
Ḥadīth based cosmologies were not only geocentric, but also full of angels as Ibn Sīnā’s 
cosmology was.69 In fact, Ibn al-Shāṭir (d.1375) himself was a firm believer in the geocentric 
model of the universe.70 For Nasr, as in the example where Khayyām remained within the bounds 
of the traditional worldview,71  the Muslim ‘failure’ to ‘discover’ the heliocentric model of the 
universe was a result of the deep-seated vision of the hierarchy of knowledge and existence which 
Islamic civilization sought to maintain in order to facilitate spiritual growth.72 Likewise, Philip 
Sherrard, the renowned Orthodox theologian, offered a very similar explanation for the slow pace 
of scientific progress in the Europe of the Middle Ages. 73 Indeed, Neil Postman (d. 2003), one of 
the leading critics of modern technology, observed that in the pre-modern society “Theology, not 
                                                 
68 Islamic philosophers and astronomers were well aware of each others thoughts and arguments. See Saliba, 
Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 95-96. 
69 Nasr, “Cosmology,” 397- 400. Saliba reports that the greatest of Muslim astronomers were also outstanding 
religious scholars, leaders, and even mystics. However, he attributes their pious pronouncements about exploring  the 
signs of God in the celestial world as  self-protection against the sentiments of a religious society rather than being 
founded on convictions about the nature of reality based on the Qur’ānic revelation or on Islamic cosmologies. 
However, Saliba does not explain why it would not have been enough for these astronomers to end with a few pious 
pronouncements rather than go on to be religious luminaries of their times. See Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making 
of the European Renaissance, 171-191. 
70 Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, 164. 
71 See section 5.1.2a 
72 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 174. Here, it is significant to note that, at least since al-Birūni’s 
time, Muslims have been aware of the possibility of the heliocentric universe. However, they found it unnecessary to 
reject the geocentric model. See Nasr, Introduction to the Cosmological Doctrines, 135; Saliba, Islamic Science and 
the Making of the European Renaissance, 120.  
73 Sherrard, Rape of Man and Nature, 65. 
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technology, provided people with authorization for what to think...making it almost impossible for 
techniques to subordinate people to its own needs.”74 
5.1.2c Alchemy 
In Nasr’s view, although modern science tends to consider alchemy as the precursor to 
modern chemistry, it is only the purely physical aspect of alchemy, and not its underlying goal of 
spiritual transformation, which can be linked to the subject of modern chemistry today.75  
According to Nasr, while alchemy as a systemized discipline began in Alexandria, its view of the 
unicity and sanctity of the cosmos,76 and the identification of Hermes as the Prophet Idris,77 all 
contributed to its integration in the Islamic inner tradition earlier than many other sciences.78   
 
In Alexandrian alchemy, metals were regarded as coagulation of the four fundamental 
elements, namely, fire, air, water, and earth, proportionate to the influences of the seven planets. 
Indeed, astrological symbols for planets were also used to represent seven metals used in antiquity: 
lead for Saturn tin for Jupiter, iron for Mars, gold for Sun, copper for Venus, quicksilver for 
Mercury, and silver for Moon. Aristotelian hylomorphism79 was already part and parcel of 
alchemy. Thus, alchemy was a way of relating to the world of nature in terms of its essential 
elements and as a reflection of the heavens. Alchemy within the Islamic world reached its peak in 
                                                 
74 Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 26. 
75 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study (World of Islam Festival Publishing Company, 
1976), 200. For a contemporary example of scholars who deny any authentic spiritual dimension of alchemy, see Bruce 
T. Moran, Distilling Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific Revolution (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2005). On the other hand, according to Alisha Rankin, an historian of early modern science, “The 
emphasis on empiricism and experiment in the study of alchemy had become ingrained by the late seventeenth century 
[Europe]...In this manner [modern] chemistry slowly found itself an existence of its own, detached from its historical 
origins as a subset of alchemy.” Alisha Rankin, review of Distilling Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the 
Scientific Revolution, by Bruce T. Moran, Early Science and Medicine 13 (2008), p.395. 
76 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 194. 
77 Nasr draws attention to the fact that many Muslim philosophers and scientists identified Hermes—credited 
for founding alchemy—with the Prophet Idris mentioned in the Qur’ān. Nasr, Islamic Life and Thought, 105-6. 
78 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 197, 201-204. 
79 See Chapter 1.3.1. 
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the hands of Jābir ibn Hayyan (d.800), who was a student of  Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq, who had introduced a 
symbolic science of numbers to the Arabic alphabet.80 
 
Jābir introduced the vision of the four universal qualities as the origin of four fundamental 
elements and challenged the prevalent convention of having four degrees for each universal 
quality. He wanted to make the qualitative measurements more exact and sought to harmonize 
them with the science of the Arabic alphabet. In Jābir’s alchemy each of the 4 universal natures or 
qualities81 has 4 degrees with 7 subdivisions such that for each quality there are 28 parts.82 Thus, 
each of the 28 letters of the Arabic alphabet represents a particular qualitative measure of one of 
the 4 fundamental qualities: dryness, moistness, heat and cold. The proportion of different qualities 
in a particular metal was determined by numerical values corresponding to first 4 letters of the 
name of the metal in Arabic according to the science of the alphabet.83 In effect, according to the 
leading scholar of Jābir, Syed Nomanul Haq, “[Jābir] simply rejects empiricism in favour of [a] 
philosophical system of eternal truths which alone, he believes, could serve as the theoretical 
foundation of scientific knowledge.” 84  
The association of letters to numerical values in Jābir’s alchemy was determined by the 
Pythagorean harmonic ratio 1:3:5:8 for music, which Jābir argued would apply to language as well. 
This, Jābir suggests, is because language is not accidental but based on “the natural intention of the 
                                                 
80On Jābir’s status as Ja‘far al-Ṣādiq’s student, see Syed Nomanul Haq, Introduction to Names, Natures and 
Things: The Alchemist  and his Kitāb al-Aḥjār (Book of Stones), trans. Syed Nomanul Haq (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1994), 14-20. 
81 Haq, Names, Natures and Things, 59. 
82 E.J. Holmyard, Alchemy (New York: Dover Publications, 1990), 77. 
83 Ibid.; Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 261-64. 
 Just as the bodies were constituted from the four fundamental natures, Jābir saw letters of the alphabet as the 
foundation of language and corresponding to the four universal natures. Haq, Names, Natures and Things, 89-90. 
84 Haq, Names, Natures and Things, 66. 
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soul”85 and because “language and music were governed by the same principles.”86 Thus, we can 
conclude that alchemy was profoundly affected by a vision of the unicity of nature in terms of the 
four fundamental qualities, numbers, and the letters of the Arabic alphabet.  
 
Having determined the qualitative proportions for each metal it was then possible to apply 
the methods of alchemy in order to transmute metals.  At the outer level, alchemy involved stages 
of dissolution of the base metal followed by coagulation and finally crystallization into its 
transmuted form. At the inner level, alchemical process symbolized the way of purification and 
transmutation of the soul. Moreover, according to Nasr, it is only after the transformation of the 
soul that the alchemist can experience “the power of the Spirit” flow through him, allowing him to 
perform a metal transmutation.87 As the German alchemist Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535) said in 
paraphrasing Jābir, “No one can excel in the alchemical art without knowing the principles in 
himself.”88 In fact, many Sufis like Jābir have long been associated with alchemy, which acts as a 
spiritual aid on the path of their own spiritual transformation.89  
5.1.2d  Islamic medicine 
                                                 
85 Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān quoted in Haq, Names, Natures and Things, 89. 
86 Ibid., 84-85. 
87 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 194. It appears that the alchemists sought to protect alchemy 
from misuse from the spiritually immature and revealed there methods only to those who would not misuse it. Jābir 
deliberately attempted to keep his alchemical studies secret: “As always, we deliberately abrogate in one book what we 
say in another. The purpose is to baffle and lead into error everyone except those whom God loves and provides for!” 
Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān, Kitāb al-Aḥjār (Book of Stones), 166.  
88 Cornelius Agrippa quoted in Julius Evola, The Hermetic Tradition: Symbols and Teachings of the Royal Art 
(Rochester: Inner Traditions, 1995), 25. Indeed,  Jābir’s work on Islamic alchemy and the translations of his works into 
Latin in twelfth and the thirteenth centuries had a tremendous impact on European intellectual elite. According to the 
eminent historian of alchemy E.J. Holmyard, Jābir’s theory that all metals were, formed out of the union of sulfur and 
mercury, two active and passive natures was generally accepted until the end of the seventeenth century. See 
Holmyard, Alchemy, 75. 
89 On Sufi involvement in alchemy, see Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 199-204; See Eberley, Al-
Kimia; Given Sufism is a living reality, some alchemists are still likely to be found today. Both Nasr and Holmyard 
have encountered practicing alchemists in Iran and Pakistan. See Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 205-206 
and Holmyard, Alchemy, 104.  
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Traditional Islamic medicine was practiced in a world dominated by faith and piety. Nasr 
emphasizes that prayer, fasting, and the teachings of the Qur’ān have always been at the heart of 
Islamic medicine. Islamic medicine upholds the conviction that God alone is as-Shafi, the Healer.90  
Nasr also explains that the regular ritual cleaning and dietary restrictions required by the Sharī‘ā 
are integral to Islamic medicine.91 In addition, Islamic medicine speaks of the Prophetic Medicine, 
a recount of the Prophet Muhammad’s health habits, which includes and dietary or herbal 
recommendations for maintenance of health, and cures of certain illnesses. All of this suggests 
recognition of a higher reality beyond that of reason and the material domain. However, in 
discussing the metaphysical background of Islamic medicine, Nasr refers to the systematized 
medical tradition associated with Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology. Moreover, the contemporary practitioner 
of Islamic medicine Muhammad Salim Khan’s exposition of Islamic medicine as it has been 
practiced for long suggests that the theories which Muslims had adopted from the Greeks have 
been fully integrated within Islam’s worldview and effectively, Greek elements are no more 
obvious.92  
 
The theory behind Islamic medicine is contained in Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology concerning the 
sub-lunar world of generation and corruption. By the Divine Command four fundamental natures – 
heat, cold, dry and humid – are created wherefrom four fundamental elements – earth, water, air 
and fire – are generated.  These four elements combine in certain proportions to produce four basic 
humours in the human body: black bile, phlegm, yellow bile, and blood.93 The humours in turn are 
                                                 
90 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 172; Qur’ān 3:49; 26:146.  The Prophet was heard praying for a 
sick person, “You [oh Allah] are the Healer. None brings about healing but You." see The Translation of the Meanings 
of Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol. 7, Book 71. Number. 638,  trans. Muhammad M Khan (Riyadh: Dar-us-Salaam Publications, 
1997). 
91 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 166. 
92 See Muhammad Salim Khan, Islamic Medicine (London: Routledge, 2008). 
93 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 205, 253-254. 
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the main constituents of “simple” members of the body such as flesh, bones, and nerves, and 
“compound” members such as the hands and the feet. The diagnosis of an illness is thus based on 
the condition and the harmony among the four humours. The cure lies in using various means for 
the body and the soul to restore the condition and the harmony among the humours. 94 
 
Since the world of generation and corruption, ultimately gained its existence from God, the 
Necessary Being, and since the bodies on earth were composed in various proportions from the 
same four elements of earth, water, air and fire derived from the four universal qualities, there is a 
vision a unicity in the manifested order. Islamic physicians see this vision as a reflection of the 
doctrine of tawḥīd. As Khan explains, tawḥīd is “a primordial concept of oneness and unity of all 
creation…upon which Islamic sciences in general, and medicine in particular, rests.”95  
 
Yet, in their recent book Medieval Islamic Medicine, Peter Pormann and Emille Savage-
Smith,96 conclude that the underlying principles of Islamic medicine were “secular.”97 At the same 
time, they acknowledge that Islamic physicians generally “wed philosophy with medicine” 98 and 
                                                 
94 Osman Bakar, “An Introduction to the Philosophy of Islamic Medicine,” in History and Philosophy of 
Islamic Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), 116-123.  
95 Khan, Islamic Medicine , 25. 
96 Peter Pormann and Emille Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007). 
97 Porman and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, 181. In fact, the labelling of  
the medicinal theories of Hippocrates and Galen as “secular” to suggest  that the result was only of 
human effort must be reconsidered in light of (1) the way it was perceived by themselves and (2) 
The intellectual elites of their times: “Some say (craft of medicine) to mankind through inspiration. The representatives 
of this theory follow the opinions of Galen, Hippocrates, all the Theorists, and the Greek Poets.” Ibn Abi Usaybiah 
account of the history of medicine based on Galen’s Commentary on the Book of the Oaths by Hippocrates quoted in 
Franz Rosenthal, Science and Medicine in Islam: A concise Collection of Essays (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., 1998), 56.  This point of view was shared by major Muslim thinkers. See Abu Hatim Razi, “Science of 
Prophecy,” in An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia: From Ancient Times to Umar Khayyam, Vol. II, eds. Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr and Mehdi Amin Razavi (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2005), 142-143. 
98 Porman and Savage-Smith, Medieval Islamic Medicine, 41-71 and 71. 
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that Ibn Sīnā produced a “much modified and elaborated”99 medical system from what was 
inherited from the Greeks and set the tone of Islamic medicine henceforth.  Further, as Nasr holds, 
in choosing a medical theory embedded in the cosmology, Islamic medicine “sought the principles 
of medicine in the sciences dealing with the Principle and its manifestations.”100 In Ibn Sīnā’s 
words, 
One must presuppose a knowledge of the accepted principles of the respective sciences of origins, in 
order to know whether they are worthy of credence or not; and one makes inferences from the other 
sciences which are logically antecedent to these. In this manner one passes up step by step until one 
reaches the very beginnings of all knowledge—namely pure philosophy; to wit, metaphysics.101  
 
In light of our discussion of Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology, if he did not specifically use the term 
tawḥīd to portray his unitary vision of the cosmos, that is not a proof that he didn’t consider the 
principle of tawḥīd in portraying that vision of the cosmos.  Since the affinity between Ibn Sīnā’s 
cosmology and the doctrine of tawḥīd has hardly been noticed by contemporary scholars, it is 
crucial that we consider William Chittick’s argument that while most of the philosophers were 
“well versed in the transmitted religious learning, and some even wrote Qur’ān commentaries and 
juridical works…They wanted to develop their own intellectual vision by working out the 
implications of tawḥīd in theory and in practice.”102  
 
              In summary, Islamic cosmology and the traditional sciences are highly inter-related. Also, 
certain elements recur in both in addition to the common basis of the unity of origin and unicity of 
                                                 
99 Ibid., 70 
100 Nasr, Islamic Science: An Illustrated Study, 159.  
101 See Ibn Sīnā, A Treatise on the Canon of Medicine, Incorporating a Translation of the First Book, 
translated and commented on by O.C. Gruner (London: Luzac & Co., 1930), 31-32 quoted in Nasr, Introduction to the 
Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 252.  
102 William C. Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul: The Pertinence of Islamic Cosmology in 
the Modern World (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publication, 2007), 114.  
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the cosmos. For instance, the theory of the four fundamental qualities and elements behind the 
creation of the cosmos found in the alchemy of Jābir Ibn Hayyan is carried forward in the 
cosmology of Ibn Sīnā as well as in the science of medicine.  The symbolic conception of numbers 
in Jābir’s alchemy is seen again in the cosmology of the Ikhwān and in Islamic geometric art. 
Whether in terms of the four universal qualities or in terms of the symbolic meaning of numbers, in 
traditional Islamic sciences, “the particular knowledge is always related to the whole and the 
harmony of the parts vis-à-vis the whole is always preserved.”103 As such, “The aim of all the 
Islamic sciences…is to show the interrelatedness of all that exists, so that, in contemplating the 
unity of the cosmos, man may be led to the unity of the Divine Principle, of which the unity of 
Nature is the image.”104 As Osman Bakar asserts, “In the traditional view, the question of 
methodology is conceptually inseparable from the ultimate purpose of human cognition, which has 
to do with the question of the spiritual destiny of man.”105   
 
While the observational aspects of the Islamic traditional sciences enabled the emergence of 
modern sciences, they set the precedent for a scientific tradition that upheld the sense of the sacred 
by affirming that the origin of the cosmos lay in the transcendent realm, in the Necessary Being, 
and acknowledged Its effect on the entire cosmos through a hierarchic structure of reality and 
authority. Thus, in addition to providing for some material need, they were helpful to the human 
being for meeting his spiritual needs as well.106 As such, traditional sciences were not “purely 
utilitarian in the modern sense.”107  
                                                 
103 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 81. 
104 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 22. 
105 Osman Bakar, “The Question of Methodology in Islamic Science,” in History and Philosophy of Islamic 
Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), 17. 
106 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 138. 




Nasr dismisses suggestions that he idealizes traditional sciences.108 Rather, he believes he draws 
attention to what were the prevailing models of investigation into nature and their philosophical 
effects on human consciousness in the traditional world: “There is always at the core of the 
sciences in traditional civilizations an orientation towards the sacred, but there are also here and 
there purely human speculations or observations of a scientific order in the contemporary 
sense...”109  
 
5.2 Classification of Sciences 
Having recognized the unity and the hierarchy of reality, Muslim thinkers and scientists 
went on to classify the study of different domains of knowledge according to their position in the 
hierarchic scale as they envisioned it. The main purpose for the classification was to help prioritize 
the pursuit of knowledge in a manner that is both systematic and holistic. As such, in pursuing any 
branch of knowledge, the classification provided the seeker a sense of the relation between 
different domains of knowledge and their limits, as well as, the vision of unity of reality 
(tawḥīd).110 Nasr has illustrated the relationship between the doctrine of tawḥīd and the 
classifications as follows: “Starting from …[the] intuition of the unity of various disciplines, the 
sciences have come to be regarded a so many branches of a single tree, which grows and sends 
forth leaves and fruit in conformity with the nature of the tree itself.”111 Further, Muzaffar Iqbal has 
argued that even though the study of the natural sciences did not have the same spiritual value as 
the study of the Qur’ān or metaphysics, they were seen as branches of knowledge of the ‘tree’ that 
                                                 
108 See Leif Stenberg, The Islamization of Science: Four Muslim Positions Developing an Islamic Modernity, 
Lund Studies in History of Religions, Vol. 6 (New York: Coronet Books, 1996), 103. 
109 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 96. 
110 Osman Baker, Classification of  Knowledge in Islam (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Text Society, 1998), 124. 
111 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 59. 
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grew from the foundation of tawḥīd.112 As Chittick maintains, “If the philosophers analyzed the 
souls of plants, animals, humans, and even angels, and if they described all possibilities of human 
becoming in ethical terms, their purpose was to integrate everything into the grand, hierarchical 
vision of tawḥīd.” 113 
 
A brief look at the classifications of sciences by two very influential Muslim philosopher-
scientists, namely Abu Nasr al-Fārābī (870 – 950) who marks the early stages of development of 
Islamic science and philosophy and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (1236 – 1311) who appears towards the 
end of the most intense period Islamic scientific activity in the pre-modern age can illustrate the 
general outlook. Their classifications of the sciences reveal both a continuation of the adherence to 
core objectives, as well as, the effects of greater mystical orientation in Islamic philosophy in the 
intervening centuries. 
 
Most importantly, the classifications by both al-Fārābī and al-Shīrāzī were based on 
ontological hierarchy of the subject domains from the terrestrial to the Divine, such that 
mathematics occupies an intermediate level in the hierarchy between natural sciences below and 
metaphysics above.114 The unity of reality is implicit in the very acknowledgement of relations 
between diverse sciences. In fact, in every traditional Islamic philosopher-scientist’s classification 
there is a hierarchy of order which reflects Ibn Sīnā’s conclusion, discussed above, that the 
knowledge of metaphysics ought to be the ultimate foundation of every branch of science. 
 
                                                 
112 Iqbal, Islam and Science, 72. Further, this very basis of all branches of knowledge in tawḥīd, made it 
unnecessary for thinkers and scientists to actively try to show the relation between the natural sciences and Islam. 
113  Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul, 124. 
114 Bakar, Classification of  Knowledge in Islam, 95-103, 252-53 and further clarified in Ibid., 266. 
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5.3 Example of the Traditional Scientists 
The role and vision of tawḥīd is made apparent by the focus of traditional scientists on 
multiple disciplines.115  Nasr argues that since Muslim scientists, philosophers and mystics 
operated essentially within the same worldview of tawḥīd, the hierarchy of reality, and ultimate 
purposefulness of the cosmos, they considered the various sciences to constitute different fields on 
the central quest to realize tawḥīd.116This consideration, according to Nasr, led most influential 
philosophers, Sufis, or religious scholars, to pursue one or more branches of science.117 
 
For example, before engaging in philosophy, math, and music, Al-Fārābī had been an 
Islamic judge (qādī).118 He also lived as a Sufi and wrote treatises on astrology, alchemy and dream 
interpretation.119  In another example, Ibn Sīnā, was not only a master of Peripatetic philosophy, he 
was also the most influential person of medicine in Islamic history. Even though he is mostly 
known as a Peripatetic philosopher, his oriental philosophy exemplified by his later writings has a 
decisively mystical bent that calls for a way beyond mere rational inquiry into truth. Quṭb al-Dīn 
Shīrāzī (1236 – 1311) was an ardent Sufi since his childhood, and studied Ibn Sīnā, Shihāb al-Dīn 
Suhrawardī (d.1191) and Ibn ‘Arabī extensively.120 In addition, he was not only one of the greatest 
astronomers the Islamic world has ever produced,121 he retained a lifelong passion for the science 
of medicine and wrote a famous commentary on Ibn Sīnā’s Canon of Medicine.122 Moreover, it is 
                                                 
115 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 41. 
116 Ibid. 
117 This also explains why, as Saliba has observed that most of the great astronomers were also illustrious men 
of religion or even Sufis. See n67. 
118 Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam, 13, 21-26. 
119 Ibid., 20, 26, 30. 
120 Ibid., 229-236. 
121 Saliba, Islamic Sciences and the Making of the European Sciences, 158-161. 
122 Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in Islam, 235. 
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believed that Suhrawardī’s Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq (Theosophy of the Orient of Light) on which he wrote 
a popular commentary, influenced his work on optics, a neglected science which he had revived.123  
 
Abū Raihān al-Birūni (973-1051) the great mathematician, astronomer, astrologist, and 
historian, was a devout Muslim.  Though not inclined to Sufism, his approach to nature was similar 
to what we now we associate only with Sufis. For instance, he viewed the sensible cosmos as 
means of knowledge about God: “Sight”, he contends, “connects what we see to the signs of 
Divine Wisdom in creatures and demonstrates the being of the Creator from his creation.”124 
Moreover, al-Birūni states that the two sense organs that are involved the most in conveying sense 
data are the eyes and ears which are connected to the heart. 125  As such, he suggests that the senses 
alone are not sufficient to perceive the signs of God but require also the perception by the heart.  
 
As Nasr explicates how al-Birūni’s deep faith in Islam affected his conclusions about the 
physical universe.126 It is also clear that he used strict logic and observations to refute commonly-
held ideas, some of which were conclusions arrived at by Aristotle.127 Nasr concludes that in al-
Biruni’s view, the role of reason “lay in leading naturally to the Transcendent Cause of all things. 
We see again and again in his study of mathematics, geography, or astronomy how the most 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 239. 
124Al-Birūni,  Kitāb al-Jamāhir, p.5 quoted in Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines,150. 
125 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 150. On Sufi view of the role of the heart, see 
Chapter 3.4. 
126 We will cite just two of  the many examples Nasr provides:  
1) Al-Birūni sharply rejected the views of the Greeks where they contradicted the Qur’ānic doctrines. He suggested, 
“that which is limitless cannot be bound by anything,” thereby rejecting the Aristotelian view that the cosmos and time 
could be eternal with God.  Al-Birūni quoted in A.Z. Validi Togan, Biruni’s Picture of the World (Calcutta, 1937-38), 
pp. 53-54 quoted in Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 117. 
2) Biruni  quotes the Qur’ān to argue that time will cease to be only when the universe also collapses: “Both [cessation 
of time and of the universe] do not happen together except at the time of the total collapse of the universe as the 
Almighty has said: ‘Then when the sight shall be dazzled and the moon shall be eclipsed and the Sun and the Moon 
shall be in conjunction.’” Al-Birūni, Kitāb al-Jamāhir …, “Chapter on Pearls…,” trans. F. Krenkow, Islamic Culture 
15:421 (1941) quoted in Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 120. 
127 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 125-126, 168-170.  
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technical mathematical discussion or rational discourse leads naturally to the affirmation of some 
attribute of the Creator.”128  
 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, it can be conclusively demonstrated that that the pursuit of science in the 
traditional Islamic world, as Nasr contends, were essentially carried out within a worldview 
defined by the principles of the unicity of the cosmos, of a hierarchy of reality, and of 
purposefulness of the cosmos, very closely related to the metaphysical principles of Islam. 
 
As the destructive effects of modern science on the natural environment are beginning to 
seriously be felt, traditional Islamic science, according to Nasr, serves as an inspiration for a grand 
new Islamic science he envisions within the framework of a natural philosophy akin to the 
metaphysics of nature discussed in Chapter 2. As such, Nasr envisions an Islamic science much 
more in harmony with the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth than even the traditional sciences based on 
natural philosophies of Islamic Peripatetic philosophers were.129 As we will see in the next two 
chapters, the need to base a new science on pure metaphysics that can relate the nature of reality in 
all domains of existence is necessitated by the problem that scientism poses by relying on modern 
science for objective knowledge of the universe. 
 
                                                 
128Ibid., 115. 
129 See Chapter 8.    
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Chapter 6 
NASR’S CRITIQUE OF MODERN SCIENCE AND SCIENTISM  
Say: Behold all that is in the heavens and the earth. 
But neither Signs nor Warners profit those who do not believe. 
                Qur’ān 10:101   
 
The first step in the Islamic world must be to criticize th[e] stifling scientistic view of reality and to 
demonstrate why it is opposed to the authentic Islamic and more generally religious point of view as such.1 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
 
While Chapter 5 demonstrates that the principles of unicity and hierarchy of reality were 
integral to the traditional sciences, in this chapter we present Nasr’s critique of modern science and 
scientism by highlighting the consequences of the complete absence of any role for those principles 
in modern science. In particular, we discuss how for Nasr, the absence of those foundational 
principles from modern science is the cause of its various limitations and how ignoring those 
limitations by a Muslim, in turn, gradually shapes a worldview for him that is characterized by the 
lack of the same principles. How a Muslim with such a worldview is most likely to pursue a 
materialistic lifestyle and thus contribute to the exploitation of nature is the final point of our 
discussion. 
 
In effect, to ignore the limitations of modern science is to ignore the message of the Qur’ān. 
Commenting on the verse quoted above the renowned Sufi Ibn ‘Atā’illāh al-Iskandarī (d. 1309) 
said in his Book of Wisdom,  
 It is permitted for you to contemplate created beings – ‘Behold what is in the heavens’ – 
the door of inspiration will then open for you. It did not say simply ‘Behold the Earth’ so 
that you not be guided unto mere physical bodies, for the physical forms are like shells over 
                                                 
1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, the Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” in Islam and 
Ecology: A Bestowed Trust, eds. Richard Foltz, Frederick Danny and Azizan Baharuddin (Harvard University Press, 
2003), 100. 
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pearls of the archetypes. Whoever stops at the shell is veiled from the beauty of the 
innermost pearls. 2 
 
In other words, according to al-Iskandarī, the material world must be studied in light of the 
immutable principles or the ultimate realities of the “heavens,” as the traditional sciences had tried 
to do, though imperfectly, in the pre-modern days.  However, in ignoring the realities of the 
heavens, we not only reduce signs of God in the non-human world to their “physical bodies,” but 
also, we ignore the higher nature of the human being himself as God’s vicegerent or ‘image’.  
 
Hence, we find al-Ghazzālī reminding us that the primary conditions for  understanding the 
signs of God were to accept the higher realities of both the objective pole of nature and the 
subjective pole of the human self: 1) with regards to the objective pole, “there is a parallel between 
the visible world and the world of dominion;”3 2) with regards to subjective pole, there are “layers 
of the spirits of the human clay; and the levels of their lights…” 4  Nasr relates this in 
contemporary language in stressing the need to recognize the Intellect or the ‘eye of the heart’ of 
the human subject as well as the non-physical higher realities of the objective world that only the 
pure heart can perceive.5  
 
The traditional insights such as those of al-Iskandarī and al-Ghazzālī are evident, directly or 
indirectly, in Nasr’s critique of modern science in a number ways. First, this is evident in the way 
                                                 
2  Shaykh Ibn ‘Atā’illāh al-Iskandarī, The Book of Wisdom, quoted in Fatima al-Yashrutiyya, “Selections from 
the Works of Fatima al-Yashrutiyya,” in Two who Attained, trans. Leslie Cadavid (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 
2005),178-79.  
3 Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, The Niche of Lights, trans.  David Buchman (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young 
University, 1998), 25. By the “world of dominion” al-Ghazzālī refers to the spiritual plane of reality in the hierarchic 
structure of reality in the Islamic view of the cosmos. 
4 Ibid., 25. 
5 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 2nd edition (Chicago: ABC International, 2001), 
13-14 and 10.  Nasr uses the same criteria in his diagnosis of the problems of the post-medieval West. See p.72. 
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Nasr’s philosophy of science differs from those of the positivists and of their contemporary 
opponents.  Second, in what Nasr holds to be the limitations of modern science. Third, most 
importantly, by what Nasr suggests are the spiritual consequences of scientism for Muslims, 
especially in the way it can incline their thoughts and actions away from tawḥīd and its 
implications, and by the same token, lead them to have a destructive attitude towards nature.  
Hence, in discussing them we will discuss Nasr’s critique of modern science. 
 
6.1 Nasr and the Philosophy of Science 
Nasr is not a religious scholar who judges modern science and its history as an outsider.  He 
was a brilliant student of physics, mathematics and geology at M.I.T and later of the History of 
Science at the Harvard University. Beginning with his doctoral thesis completed in 1958 which 
was titled Conceptions of Nature in Islamic Thought6  (later published as the book An Introduction 
to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines
7), Nasr pointed out the possibility of natural sciences, 
exemplified by medieval Muslim scientists’ way of studying nature, grounded in metaphysics and 
ontology. He pointed out how such natural sciences could be one of the means for knowing God 
also.8 In this manner, in an age when the philosophy of science was dominated first by logical 
positivism9 followed by the naturalism10 of John Dewey (1859-1952), W.V.O. Quine (1908-2000) 
                                                 
6 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. 
(Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2001), 29. 
7 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1964). 
8 The great Muslim scientists and scholars “consider the study of Nature not as an end in itself but as means to 
an end, as a scientia which leads to sapientia...the reason why they consider the pursuit of sciences to be legitimate is 
that the purpose of human life is to gain knowledge of the Creator Whose wisdom is reflected in His creation in such a 
way that the study of this reflected wisdom leads to the knowledge of the Creator Himself.” Nasr, Introduction to 
Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 277. 
9 Logical positivism fundamentally believes, like empiricists, that only that which can be experienced by the 
senses are true.  Accordingly, logical positivists “dismissed a lot of traditional philosophy as meaningless.” Peter 
Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago, 2003), 237. 
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and their followers,11 Nasr proceeded to demonstrate that the fundamental premises of the natural 
sciences were dependent on the prevalent worldview of the people who develop them and could 
not be properly appreciated by those who have a radically different worldview, as illustrated by the 
lack of proper appreciation of Islamic sciences by modern scientists and philosophers of the time.12 
This line of thought regarding the relevance of worldviews in the pursuit of science, was soon to 
become widely known through the writings of another philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn (1922-
96) in his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, first published in 1962.13 
 
Later, in his Rockefellar lectures at the University of Chicago in 1966, Nasr faulted the 
secularization of nature by the modern scientific worldview for the environmental crisis, and again 
in his Science and Civilization in Islam,14 parts of which he completed even before he finished his 
PhD thesis,15 Nasr continued to stress how a people’s prevalent worldview shape the sciences they 
produce. While Nasr and Kuhn share similar views on the question of the relevance of worldviews 
in the scientific enterprise, unlike Nasr, Kuhn does not believe either in the possibility of an 
objective truth, scientific or not, nor in the existence of any transcendent reality.16 For Kuhn and 
his followers like Paul Feyerabend, a worldview or paradigm, as the Kuhnians refer to it, is 
                                                                                                                                                                 
10 “Naturalism rejects the claim that philosophy provides a priori foundations for science, and instead attempts 
to solve philosophical problems by exploiting theories in natural science.” Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A 
Contemporary Introduction, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2005), 81.198. 
              11 Ibid., 150-51. 
12 Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, xix. 
13 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edition (Chicago and London:  The University 
of Chicago Press, 1996). 
14 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 2nd edition (Cambridge, UK: The Islamic Texts 
Society, 2007) 
15 Nasr, “An Intellectual Autobiography,” 30. 
16 Throughout his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn concerns himself with paradigm shifts in the 
physical sense only. There is never any suggestion that there could be a higher reality beyond the measurable one. On 
the contrary, he questions even the quest for a preset “goal” of knowledge and gives Darwin’s example of rejecting 
teleological explanations as a model to follow to overcome “vexing problems.” See Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 170-71.  Peter Godfrey-Smith, a philosopher of science, agrees with this assessment when he asserts that 
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determined by history and culture, not by immutable ahistorical principles. For them, knowledge is 
dependent on a given paradigm or worldview and hence we cannot speak of the truth of a 
knowledge without speaking of the associated paradigm. Further, for them, any two paradigms are 
incommensurable in the sense that a theory in any paradigm cannot be fully understood from the 
perspective of another, confounding the empiricist assertion that a new paradigm only results from 
progress in science’s quest for truth.17 In this manner, Kuhnians argue that modern science is no 
more objective than any other branch of human enterprise.  
 
While the positivists and empiricists – who make up the vast majority of the scientists and 
the philosophers of science –deny that the observing human self has any role in the determination 
of the objective scientific knowledge, the Kuhnian relativists in opposition attribute all knowledge 
to the perceiving self conditioned by history and culture. Moreover, in so doing, as Ibrahim Kalin 
has observed, the relativists deny any objective reality to the world of nature.18 On the other hand, 
in denying any transcendent reality, both the Kuhnians and their empiricist or positivist opposition, 
deny the reality of the Intellect,19 and by the same token, reduce the essence of the individual self 
to its ordinary reason and senses.  
 
For Nasr, the difference between the paradigms of traditional science and modern science is 
wholly related to the active role of the Intellect and the revelation in the former and their absence in 
the later. For this reason, according to Nasr, Islamic traditional sciences founded on principles akin 
                                                                                                                                                                 
for Kuhn, scientific procedures were superior to non-scientific ones – those that involve intuition or intellection such 
those pertaining to traditional sciences –  in human quest for knowledge. See Godfrey-Smith, Theory and Reality, 96.  
17 For Feyerabend, the doctrine of incommensurablity also applies to any two theories within the same 
paradigm. See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 4th edition (London: Verso, 2010), 211-213. 
18 Ibrahim Kalin, “Three Views of Science in the Islamic World,” in God, Life and the Cosmos: Christian and 
Islamic Perspectives, eds. Ted Peters, Muzaffar Iqbal and Syed Nomanul Haq (Aldershot,UK: Ashgate, 2002), 58-59. 
19 See Introduction 0.9.1. 
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to the perennial principles,20 cannot be appreciated by the modern scientific paradigm which denies 
any transcendent reality, and by the same token, the existence of the Intellect beyond ordinary 
reason.  However, the reverse is not true because the Intellect functioning in the traditional 
paradigm does not deny the reality of ordinary reason and the knowledge accessible to it at the 
material plane as valid for that plane. Hence, we can say that from the perspective of the traditional 
paradigm, the doctrine of incommensurability between it and modern science does not exist. 
Traditional paradigm knows to confine modern scientific views to where they belong, that is, at the 
level of the material plane. 
 
For Nasr, contrary to the perspectives of empiricists and Kuhnians of every stripe, there are 
immutable ahistorical principles of truth contained in the metaphysics of every religious tradition 
which can serve as the criteria by which we can measure the objectivity of our knowledge in any 
branch of human enterprise irrespective of cultural norms and historical events. Thus, Nasr’s 
position stands in stark contrast to the positivist or even the Kuhnian relativist positions which are 
all committed to the empiricist and rationalist approach to knowledge of modern science.21 
 
6.2 Limitations of Modern Science 
The various limitations of modern science that Nasr speaks of are all interrelated.  That is 
because, for Nasr, all of these limitations stem from modern science’s ignoring, in al-Iskandarī’s 
language, the “pearls of archetypes,”  that is, the ultimate reality of the idea of  ‘forms’22 conveying 
meanings, to settle instead for their corresponding “shells” or “physical” realities. These limitations 
                                                 
20 See p. 180. 
21 “The [modern Western] philosophy of science…having surrendered itself to the fruits of the experimental 
and analytical methods…cannot itself be an independent judge of modern science.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and 
Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (Chicago: ABC International Group, 1997), 115. 
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could as well be attributed to the lack, in modern science, of any role for the heart or the Intellect 
that al-Ghazzālī held was necessary for the true understanding of the signs of God. Accordingly, 
for Nasr, the limitations that are reflected in modern science may be broadly categorized as 
follows: 
 
6.2.1 ‘Matter’ is the fundamental basis for all phenomena 
In modern science there is an unstated assumption that matter is the basis of all that exists 
in nature.  It is assumed that if there are ‘forces’ in nature  they are necessarily material-based. As 
Nasr puts it, “[Scientific] reductionism has become part and parcel of the modern and even post-
modern mindset. People believe that it is possible to understand a thing only through analysis and 
the breaking up of that thing to its “fundamental” parts, which are material.”23 
 
Yet, findings of Quantum physics suggest the possibility of an empirically imperceptible 
origin for the universe.  “Today’s postmodern science,” as Huston Smith observes,” speaks 
increasingly of the unseen, and does so respectfully.”24 Nasr is cognizant of such post-classical 
developments of modern physics which do not necessarily see ‘matter’ in the Newtonian sense to 
be the fundamental basis for the visible cosmos but he warns of the general mindset: “despite the 
total rejection of the classical view of matter in modern quantum mechanics, there still lingers in 
the public arena reliance upon a materialistic perspective which ultimately reduces all things to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
22 See our brief discussion of the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism. p. 76. 
23 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,” in The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. 
William C. Chittick (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2007), 225. 
24 Huston Smith, “The Ambiguity of Matter,” Sophia, Vol. 3 No. 2 Winter, 1997, p. 20. 
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‘matter’.”25 Moreover, modern science remains, by the logic of its need for demonstration, in 
search of phenomena perceptible by ordinary rationality and senses.26  
 
The focus on material factors is a consequence of rationalism which rejected the doctrine of 
hylomorphism: the doctrine which states that any corporeal entity is the combination of its ‘form’– 
the aggregate of the qualities of an entity – and ‘matter’, a pure potentiality. As Mullā Sadrā 
(d.1640) observed, “the dog is a dog because of its animal form, not because of its particular 
matter; and the pig, too, is a pig because of its form, not its matter.”27 
 
6.2.2 The whole is just the sum of its parts 
Nasr maintains that, those who have been affected by the scientific worldview are generally 
“led to believe that the whole is nothing more than some of its parts, and physicists continue to 
search for the ultimate particles or building blocks of the universe, which the less sophisticated 
public envisages as minute billiard balls which are then accumulated together to create all the 
beings of the universe.”28 
 
In mathematics the number ‘1’ can be represented as the sum of its fractions. However, the 
reality of an entity is not the sum of the realities of its fractions.  As Nasr observes, “qualities do 
                                                 
25 Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,” 224.  
26 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 152.    
27 Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī, The Wisdom of the Throne: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mullā Sadrā, trans. 
James Morris (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 146.  Here, for Sadrā, “material forms are nothing but 
icons and moulds of [the archetypes].” Mullā Sadrā, Afsar, I, 3, p.304, quoted in Ibrahim Kalin, Knowledge in Later 
Islamic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104.  Emphasizing the importance of the meaning of an 
entity over its quantitative description Nasr argues that “to know the archetype – the essence – of an animal is a higher 
form of knowing than to know its weight, anatomy and mating habits.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Traditonal Man, 
Modern man, and the Environmental Crisis”, Sophia, vol 12, No. 2, Fall/Winter 2006, p. 32. 
28 Ibid., 225. Also, see Wolfgang Smith, “The Plague of Scientistic Belief,” in Science and the Myth of 
Progress (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 223. 
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not add up as do quantities.”29  For instance, even for something as simple as a brick, two halves of 
a brick together don’t mean the same thing qualitatively as the whole brick before the split.  
Neither does one third of a flower equal third of the whole flower qualitatively. Yet, the 
mechanistic model of classical physics – followed by the majority in the scientific community and 
even the more gullible public – functions as though the whole is just the sum of its parts.  Modern 
science thrives in the task of analyzing quantitative parts of the whole; seeing the whole or making 
any qualitative sense of the whole is beyond the scope of modern science.30 As observed in the case 
of modern science’s exclusive focus on ‘matter’, this problem also can be traced to rationalism, 
which ignores the ‘form’ of any entity. 
 
6.2.3 Quantification of Observations 
In Nasr’s words,“By taking away from corporeal existence all its qualitative aspects and 
reducing it to pure quantity, [modern science] created a worldview in which there was such a thing 
as pure inert matter divorced totally from life and consciousness…”31  
 
Modern science can only know of the physical reality or material factors. Hence, its observations 
consist only of what is quantifiable.  As Huston Smith notes, “quality itself is unmeasurable.  
Either it is perceived for what it is or it is not, and nothing can convey its nature to anyone who 
cannot perceive it directly.”32 As such, modern science can be used only as the means to measure a 
physical manifestation that has been predetermined by us as an indicator of a particular value, 
                                                 
29 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 236. 
30 “What we do not do is passively contemplate the whole. We do not reverence creation, we break it open 
like a child to see how it works. And we cannot put it back together again. Classical physics has not merely misled us 
in our laboratories and observatories, it has made us wrong in our world.” Bryan Appleyard, Understanding the 
Present: An Alternative History of Science (London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004), 191. 
31 Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,” 224. 
32 Smith, Forgotten Truth, 16. 
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quality, or meaning.  To cite an example, it cannot distinguish between life and death, but it can 
provide physical signs of life or death as predetermined by us.  In other words, modern science can 
only provide knowledge of the purely physical reality in terms of numbers without the qualitative 
aspect of corporeal existence. In fact, as Wolfgang Smith suggests, since there is no corporeal 
entity that does not possess value, quality, or meaning, the physical entity that modern science 
knows should not even be perceptible.33  
 
6.2.4 Exclusion of the Self  
“Modern science”, Nasr suggests, “depicts a universe in which man as spirit, mind and even 
psyche has no place and the Universe thus appears as ‘inhuman’ and not related to the human 
state.”34 Indeed, in all the investigations made by modern science the role of the perceiving human 
self or soul is always absent, as though our perception of the universe is wholly independent of 
what we believe or know.   
 
Modern science’s exclusion of the self happens in two ways.  First of all, modern science is 
not, for the most part, based on immediate experience of the world.35  Neither the workings of 
electricity nor the chemical reactions or the law of gravitation are strictly observable facts; they are 
based on data measured under special conditions and by special instruments.  Second, modern 
science excludes from consideration of the values and meanings we humans either believe in or 
                                                 
33 Wolfgang Smith, “Sophia Perennis and Modern Science,” in The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXVII, eds. Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier, Lucian W. Stone, Jr. 
(Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 2001), 473. 
34 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1994), 99.  
35 Smith, Forgotten Truth, 98. While religion also claims that things are more than they appear to be, it 
promises knowledge by the ‘eye of the heart’ within us. See Chapter 3.4-3.4.1. Modern science, on the other hand, 
resorts to modern technologies outside of us to prove its claims. 
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perceive of the cosmos.  For instance, modern science would use the same approach to determine 
the reality of the ka‘ba in Mecca as it does for any other corporeal object.  
 
Using various instruments modern science can indeed measure the height of a mountain, the 
heat generated by a fire, or the depth of a lake. But it can say nothing qualitative about them 
because the qualities, like beauty or meaning, cannot be quantified. That is the task of the human 
Intellect or heart which sees beyond the physical reality into the meaning of entities.36  
 
6.2.5 Modern Science is only Partially Objective 
  According to Nasr, “The success of applied science…is no reason for accepting the 
infallibility of the scientific theories involved.”37In this respect, his position hints of the doctrine of 
‘underdetermination’, which stipulates that a set of data can be explained by a number of different 
theories, as discussed in the modern philosophy of science since early in the 20th century.38 
Objectivity in modern science, thus, is limited within the framework of a particular set of 
conditions and assumptions such that a particular observation can be ascribed to a specific cause. 
 
The doctrine of underdetermination becomes all the more evident when we consider 
theories that are based partly on intuitive knowledge. For instance, a particular patient may be 
cured from a certain sickness based on a diagnosis and treatment by traditional Islamic medicinal 
theories, as well as, by those based on empirically-based theories of modern medicine.  
                                                 
36 See Chapter 3.4. 
37 Nasr, Man and Nature, 115.  
38 See Richard Dewitt, Worldviews: An Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell, 2004), 48-49; In fact, René Guénon observed as early as in 1927 that “Modern experimentalism also 
involves the curious illusion that a theory can be proven by facts, whereas in reality the same facts can always be 
equally well explained by several different theories.” René Guénon, The Crisis of the Modern World, trans. Marco 
Pallis, Arthur Osborne and Richard C. Nicholson (Hillsdale, NY: Sophia Perennis, 2001), 47.  
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For Nasr, scientism amounts to blindness to the aforementioned limitations of modern 
science.  In order to see how scientism affects Islamic values, in the next few pages we will 
discuss, in light of the Islamic metaphysics discussed in Chapter 2, how scientism denies the 
perennial principles of Islam and induces the mind and the soul to turn away from the vision of 
unity which reflects tawḥīd.   
 
6.3 Scientism denies tawḥīd and the hierarchy of reality 
In the Peripatetic cosmology of Ibn Sīnā the hierarchy of Intellects or Archangels, each 
presiding over a heavenly sphere below it indicates a hierarchical structure of knowledge and 
awareness.  This vision is explored at a deeper level in Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmological vision where 
hierarchy is determined by the intensity of disclosure of divine qualities in entities.39  The higher a 
level of reality is, the more infused it is with Absolute Being or Awareness.   As Nasr observes, 
“Islamic philosophers consider being to be inseparable from knowledge and therefore awareness, 
and consider cosmic level of existence also to be levels of knowledge and awareness.”40 Thus, 
Islamic cosmological schemes depict the relation between God and His infinite creation, or 
between the One (al-Ahad) and the many, in terms of a hierarchy of existence and awareness of the 
qualities of God.  We may conclude that in Islamic philosophy and metaphysics, the unity of reality 
is the precondition for any relationship between realities at different levels. In other words, in 
Islam, tawḥīd is the basis of all metaphysics.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
39 See  pp. 113-14. 
40 Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,” 223.   
 219
Hence, so far as “matter” in the classical Newtonian sense is assumed to be the basis of all 
phenomena, modern science denies Islamic vision of God as Being and Awareness pervading all 
levels of reality, and by the same token, denies the unity and the hierarchy of reality.  At the same 
time, modern science’s preoccupation with the purely physical reality makes the “the existence of 
God redundant” to the scientific enterprise. 41   
 
Thus, from Nasr’s metaphysical perspective, when modernist and fundamentalist Muslims 
champion modern science they let modern science define the cosmos as a material reality alone.  In 
effect, for the believer, the corporeal world becomes “an independent reality which can be studied 
and known in an ultimate sense without any reference to a higher reality.”42 Thus, while the 
modernists and the fundamentalists hold onto their faith in God, their scientism obscures their 
vision of God as the all pervasive one reality,43 because to “To understand God as [the all 
pervasive] Reality, it is necessary to understand that there are levels of reality” within the single 
indivisible reality of God.44 In this way, as scientism denies the hierarchy of reality, God becomes 
an absolute ‘other’ to the natural world, even for the believer. 
 
In summary, by relying on matter or material forces as the basis of all phenomena, 
scientism in effect denies tawḥīd in the sense of the one all-pervasive reality or awareness.  This 
leads to denying the hierarchy of reality, and by the same token, also leads one to believe in God 
only as a transcendent reality, if belief in God is entertained at all. As a result, for one persuaded by 
                                                 
41 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic Worldview and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity, 
Vol. 7 (1), 1996, pp.11-12. 
42 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World, 2nd edition (Chicago: Kazi 
Publications, 1994), 182. 
43 See pp. 160, 169 and 172. 
44 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 
11. 
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scientism, the human being and cosmos are viewed neither in the microcosmic-macrocosmic 
relationship nor as reflections of God’s qualities.45 Instead of offering a vision of unity that can aid 
in the contemplation of tawḥīd, the cosmos presents itself  as a multiplicity of entities with no 
ontological bond among themselves or between them and God. For a believer, the meaning of the 
natural order as so many “Signs of God” pointing to higher realities is reduced to being signs of 
God’s kindness and generosity in terms of their utilitarian value for human beings, and not as 
means to higher knowledge of God and of oneself.  
 
6.4 Scientism denies any ultimate meaning or purpose 
In light of the hierarchic structure of reality where all levels of reality are mere reflections 
of the immutable archetypes in God’s knowledge,46 the ultimate meaning of any entity lies in God 
alone. Hence, Nasr concludes, “There can in fact be no ultimate meaning without the acceptance of 
the ultimate in the metaphysical sense.”47  
 
By the same token, since the ultimate realities of entities cannot belong to more than one 
plane of reality, the acceptance of tawḥīd is essential if we are to see the ultimate meaning of the 
natural world. However, since modern science can provide only knowledge of the physical reality, 
obviously, modern science cannot help in the realization of the ultimate meaning of the natural 
world, and by the same token, cannot help in the realization of tawḥīd. On the contrary, by ignoring 
the hierarchy of reality, modern science draws our attention to the multiplicity of existents in the 
material plane and away from a sense of unity.  
                                                 
45 Chapter 2.2.1 
46 See Chapter 2.2.2 
47 Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,”227. “Values and meaning cannot be volatile, they must 
endure. If nothing in science endures, it can offer no meaning.” Appleyard, Understanding the Present, 195.  
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6.4.1 Verification (taḥqīq) in Traditional Science and Modern Science 
Theoretically, if ultimate realities of natural entities are the immutable archetypes in God, how 
would one know them?  As we saw in Chapter 5, the traditional sciences, for the most part, were 
limited to providing the image of unicity in the cosmos, an icon of the interrelatedness of 
everything in the cosmos that emerges from the one God.  The vision of unicity could be seen as an 
aid in a Muslim’s contemplation of tawḥīd or the unity of reality. However, Nasr’s discussions of 
the traditional Islamic sciences suggest that apart from this outer dimension of traditional Islamic 
science there was a complementary inner approach to the knowledge of the objective world by 
means of the purification of the self or the heart.48 Indeed, as a Sufi, al-Ghazzālī observed that 
when the heart is made pure through the Sufi way the knowledge of the true or higher nature of a 
thing comes to the heart without any outer effort.49  
 
Accordingly, traditional scientists aspired to know things “as they really are” with purified hearts, 
an objective that for Nasr, has its precedence in a prayer of the Prophet Muḥammad.50  The aim is 
nothing short of a desire to know the reality of each thing in God.51 Nasr points out that no less a 
figure than ‘Umar Khayyām (1048-1131), the great mathematician and Sufi poet, confirmed the 
existence of this inner approach to knowledge among scientists, many of whom were also Sufis,52 
and argued for its superiority over mere rational approach: 
                                                 
48 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Reflections on Methodology in the Islamic Sciences,” Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. III 
No.3, (1980), 3-13.  
49 See Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, “The Elaboration of the Marvels of the Heart (Kitāb Sharḥ ‘ajā’ib al-qalb),” 
in Knowledge of God in Classical Sufism, trans. John Renard (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 301. 
50 Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 352-353. Nasr observes that the famous prayer by the Prophet 
Muḥammad, “ O Lord show us things as they really are,” set the course for Islamic quest for knowledge at the deepest 
level for all entities in the cosmos. 
51 See pp. 103 and 132-36. 
52 See Chapter 5.3. 
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The Sufis…do not seek knowledge by meditation or discursive thinking, but by purgation 
of their inner being and purifying of their dispositions. They cleanse the rational soul of the 
impurities of nature and bodily form, until it becomes pure substance. It then comes face to 
face with the spiritual world, so that the forms of that world become truly reflected in it, 
without doubt or ambiguity.  This is the best of all ways, because none of the perfections of 
God are kept away from it, and there are no obstacles or veils put before it. Therefore, 
whatever (ignorance) comes to man is due to the impurity of his nature; if the veil be lifted 
and the screen and obstacle removed, the truth of things as they are will become manifest. 
And the Master [the Prophet Muḥammad] –upon whom be peace –indicated this when he 
said: “Truly, during the days of your existence, inspirations come from God. Do you not 
want to follow them?”  Tell unto the reasoners that, for the lovers of God [Gnostics], 
intuition is guide, not discursive thought.53  
 
The Sufi way of knowledge of the reality (ḥaqq) that Khayyām describes above is known as 
taḥqīq
54
 which amounts to the knowing of the reality of things by the heart which leaves no “doubt 
or ambiguity.”  He speaks of the need to “cleanse the rational soul” which amounts to gaining the 
‘eye of the heart’ or freeing the Intellect from obstructions such that it can that receive “forms” of 
the “spiritual world.”55Khayyām assures that this way of knowledge was the best of all 
methodologies for knowing things in their essential realities or “as they are.” Moreover, he does 
not distinguish between the knowledge of “perfections of God” and “the truth of things as they 
are,” thus highlighting the essential unity of reality (tawḥīd).  
 
                                                 
53 ‘Umar Khayyām quoted in Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam, 34. 
54 In the Islamic intellectual tradition, the term taḥqīq means to realize the reality (ḥaqq) of something in one’s 
heart. See William C. Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, Science of the Soul: The Pertinence of Islamic Cosmology in the 
Modern World (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publication, 2007), 23-24. According to Chittick, “The goal of taḥqīq is to see 
the face of God wherever you turn, in every creature and in oneself, and then to act according to ḥaqq of God’s face. If 
we understand anything in the universe without taking the Divine face into account, then we have lost the thing’s ḥaqq. 
By losing sight of the thing’s ḥaqq, we have lost sight of God, we have lost sight of tawḥīd.”  William Chittick, “Time, 
Space and Objectivity of Ethical Norms: The Teachings of of Ibn al-‘Arabi,” Islamic Studies 39, no.4 (2000), p. 585.  
Likewise, James Morris describes traditional understanding of taḥqīq as “the inseparably moral, spiritual and 
intellectual tasks of both discovering and investigating – and actually realizing or “making real” – everything that is 
demanded of us by the ḥaqq which we are striving to know.” James Morris, “Communications and Spiritual Pedagogy: 
Exploring the Methods of Investigation in Classical Islamic Thought,” unpublished manuscript of a lecture, p. 2; 
available from http://www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlespdf/sp_communication.pdf Internet; accessed 10 September 
2010. 
55 See Introduction 0.9.1 and Chapter 3.4-3.4.1. 
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However, adoption of this inner approach to knowledge did not mean that Jābir Ibn Hayyān 
(d.800), ‘Umar Khayyām (1048-1131), Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī(1201-74), Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (1236-
1311),  Bahā’ al-Dīn ‘Āmilī (1546-1621) and other great scientists who were all Sufis and believed 
in a hierarchy of reality for all entities, abandoned their rational and empirical methods of 
investigation.56 Instead, believing in a hierarchy of reality, traditional Islamic science used multiple 
methodologies – rational, empirical, illumination through self-purification and revelation57 – in its 
investigations into the nature of things. In contrast, by limiting itself to only the rational and 
empirical methodologies, modern science deprives us of deeper realities of entities in nature. 
 
  Commenting on the contrast between taḥqīq and modern science’s verification by empirical 
methods, Chittick explains that, for the most part, the scientific community builds on knowledge by 
“hearsay.”58  Not every scientist has the necessary expertise and equipments to verify the numerous 
theories that he takes for granted. His certainty is built on consensus reached by previous other 
scientists based on yet those of others. Even those scientists who have verified the claims in their 
laboratories, do not know with certitude at the level of their hearts: 
 It can be argued that a modern scientist who makes a new discovery has “verified” and 
“realized” it for himself. The Muslim intellectual tradition would not have called this 
taḥqīq, however, because it does not extend deeply enough into the depths of the soul and 
spirit to recognize the real nature of things.59  
 
  For instance, there have been at least a few religious luminaries such as the Prophets and 
certain saints who claimed to have realized in their hearts the truth of the unity of reality (tawḥīd). 
                                                 
56 For a brief discussion of how the Sufi scientists employed diverse methodologies, see Nasr, “Reflections on 
Methodology in the Islamic Sciences,”7-10.  
57 Ibid., 8. Also, see Osman Bakar, “Reformulating A Comprehensive Relationship Between Religion and 
Science: An Islamic Perspective,” Islam and Science, Vol. 1 (June 2003) No. 1, pp. 35-36. 
58 Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, 24. 
59 Ibid. 
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But even scientists cannot claim to have realized Newton’s theory of gravitation in their hearts, 
that is, at the centre of their beings. The scientific proof is always external.   
 
In contrast to modern sciences, the traditional sciences and the Sufi way together provide 
the means for a unified vision of reality; while the framework of traditional science at least 
recognized higher realities of corporeal entities, the Sufi way sought to know their realities at the 
deepest level in God. In any case, both the traditional sciences and the Sufi way were means of 
retreat from the consciousness of multiplicity towards the reality of unicity or unity.  
 
6.5 Scientism in Action 
We have discussed how scientism denies the principles of unity of reality, hierarchy of 
reality, and of the ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the cosmos in metaphysical terms. 
To shed more light on the nature of this predicament we will now discuss the consequences that 
scientism could have on the human mind with examples.  Scientific knowledge reflects all the 
limitations of modern science. To the extent that we let scientific knowledge shape our view of the 
nature of reality we fall into the trap of scientism. It is this situation in the contemporary world 
which Nasr refers to when he states that “Young Muslim students in traditional madrassahs did not 
cease to perform their prayers upon reading the algebra of Khayyām or the alchemical treatises of 
Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān as so many present-day students lose their religious moorings upon studying 
modern mathematics and chemistry.”60 
 
                                                 
60 Seyyed Hossein Nasr,“Islam and Modern Science,” in Islam and Contemporary Society, ed. Salem Azzam 
(London: Longman Group, 1982), 179. 
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As we discussed in Chapter 3, if we are to fulfill our purpose as human beings, that is, to act 
as God’s vicegerent on earth, we ought to know the essential realities of all things so that we may 
treat them with right awareness. Since human beings can respond to any entity only according to 
their knowledge of it, when that knowledge comes directly from God, the giver of reality (ḥaqq), 
they ought to be the most efficacious gateways for knowing the entity in its essential reality.  So if 
the Qur’ān or the gnostics, who have knowledge of higher realities, tell us that the earth is ‘a 
resting place’ (40:64), that the sky is a ‘well-guarded canopy’ (21:32) and that water is a blessing 
from heaven (2:22), those would be a most efficacious way for us to relate to them irrespective of 
the scientific descriptions of them. Besides, these descriptions of earth, sky and water, not only 
have meanings that we can relate to, but also they convey God’s love and care for us. This way of 
understanding the cosmos has been the traditional way. It gives meaning and purpose to all things 
in the cosmos, and most of all to our human lives. 
 
In contrast, in the modern world dominated by the scientific worldview the sky is no more 
than gaseous particles reflecting the color blue; stars are no more than distant gaseous substances 
giving light produced by nuclear fusions of unimaginable magnitude; and water is no more than 
two atoms of hydrogen combined with one of oxygen, that is, H2O.  The scientific knowledge 
overtly challenges the religious vision of reality. At the same time, the scientific knowledge of 
these entities say nothing about the stars, sky and the water that our souls can relate to.  Such 
knowledge neither conveys God’s nearness nor tells us how to connect with Him. Water as simply 
H2O does not convey anything about the existence of any qualitative relationship of water with the 
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human being, God or with other entities in the universe.61 Thus, by replacing traditional knowledge 
with scientific knowledge, the human being is deprived of a means to relate to God. In addition, 
scientific knowledge encourages the view that the natural world is nothing more than a mere 
multiplicity of phenomena with no essential bond with the human being or with God. 
 
For Nasr, among various scientific theories those that challenge the grand narratives of 
religions about the origin and the end of life and the universe are among the most consequential. 
Based on certain observations of the physical universe, scientists develop theories on how the 
cosmos began, how long ago it began, and how it may come to end.  First of all, the very existence 
of several theories to explain the origin and the end of the cosmos, such as the Multiple-universes 
theory, Big Bang theory, and String theory, indicates, as Nasr has observed, the “conjectural” 
nature of modern science.62 Second, the scientific theories categorically deny the religious or 
metaphysical vision of the origin and the end of the cosmos. Third, as Nasr has observed, even if a 
conjecture tries to restore God by granting Him the originating role, it reduces the relation between 
God and the world “to a purely material one.”63 Moreover, by ignoring the hierarchy of realities 
between God and the material plane, the scientific theories of cosmogenesis, even when God is 
assumed to be the initiator in each case, cut “the ‘Hands’ of God from His creation.”64   
 
Likewise, when it comes to the end of the cosmos, scientific theories, unlike the religious or 
metaphysical visions, do not bring the end of things back to their origin in God at a higher plane of 
                                                 
61 Chittick cites the example of how traditional qualitative meanings of the four fundamental elements of 
nature, namely earth, water, air and fire, have been shed with the advent of modern science. Chittick, Science of the 
Cosmos, 100.   
62 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Question of Cosmogenesis – The Cosmos as a Subject of Scientific Study,” 
Islam and Science, Vol. 4(Summer 2006) No.1, p. 53 
63 Ibid., 54. 
64 Ibid. 
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being.65  Instead, scientific theories “speculate” that the end of entities will take place as a “final 
death.”66Thus, the cosmos has no ultimate purpose.  In summary, by denying the three perennial 
principles of Islam, the modern scientific theories concerning the origin and end of the cosmos 
deny the very foundation of Islamic faith. 
 
It is important to note, however, that Nasr does not advocate for the outright rejection of the 
observations of modern science. It is scientism, which ignores the limitations of scientific 
knowledge, which he stands against.  He argues that the symbolic view of nature offered by 
religion and traditional sciences cannot be negated by the scientific knowledge: “It is not true to 
say that the sun is only incandescent gas, although this is an aspect of its reality. It is also as true to 
say that the sun is the symbol of the intelligible principle in the Universe and this element is as 
much an aspect of its ontological reality as the physical features discovered by modern 
astronomy.”67  
 
While modern scientific knowledge and theories about nature of reality deny tawḥīd, 
hierarchy of reality, and ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the cosmos, they have a 
relatively sound basis –though not totally free of conjectures– at the material level.  However, with 
regards to the theory of evolution, for Nasr, most fantastic conjectures, rather than necessary 
observations at the material plane, seem to constitute its foundation.  More importantly, according 
to Nasr, due to the “pervasive nature [of evolutionism] in the modern world,”68 and because of its 
denial of faith in the spiritual origin and purpose of life, it is necessary for Muslims to refute this 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Nasr, Man and Nature, 120. 
68 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 105. 
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theory “from the scientific as well as the metaphysical, philosophical, logical and religious points 
of view.”69 We will summarize his arguments against the theory of evolution from these different 
perspectives. 
 
6.6 Nasr’s Arguments against the Theory of Evolution 
From a strictly Qur’ānic view, as Nasr outlines, God is not only Al-Aḥad (The One), but 
also, Al-Hayy (The Living), Al-Muhyī (The Giver of Life), and Al-Khāliq (The Creator).  From an 
Islamic point of view the idea of the origin of life being an ‘accident’ must be rejected by Muslims 
because “no other power in the universe can bestow existence except the Source of existence.”70 
Nasr points out that for those who believe in a theistic evolution, arguing that God created and then 
allowed for the natural transformation of species, deny God’s role as Al-Muhyī and Al-Khāliq.71 
Moreover, modern science can neither prove that God did not create a particular entity, nor can any 
laboratory make that entity non-existent.72  By the same token, Nasr suggests that the theory of 
evolution denies consciousness at the origin of corporeal reality; life and consciousness in living 
entities are presumed as “epiphenomena of material factors,” and as such, the theory stands in 
complete opposition to the Islamic faith.73  
 
In supporting the immutability of a species, Nasr argues that if indeed all beings are in the 
process of evolution from one species to another, say, an ‘ant’, then what we call an ‘ant’ is only “a 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 106. 
70 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On Biological Origins,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, Science, Muslims, 
and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam Publishing, 
2007), 153.  Nasr has criticized the theory of evolution in most of his works. However, since it is in this interview that 
Nasr has explained his point of view most extensively, we have chosen to focus on this source. 
71 Ibid., 152. 
72Ibid., 152. Nasr implies that laboratories can transform an entity (i.e. reduce it to dust or vapour) but cannot 
make it non-existent. Ibid. 
73 Nasr, “In the Beginning was Consciousness,” 225. 
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certain part of temporal sequence.”74 If the ‘ant’ is evolving and if reality implies something 
permanent, as it must, there is no reality of the ‘ant’ as a species to be known by God as the Qur’ān 
asserts He does.75   
 
As regards the scientific ‘evidence’ for evolution, Nasr  points to the conclusions of a 
number of biologists that based on paleontological records, species suddenly appear on the scene, 
rejecting the idea of gradual evolution from what was there before.76 In fact, Darwin’s 19th century 
thesis was not accepted for any rigorous scientific evidence provided for it, but rather, for its 
affinity with the “philosophical idea of progress”77 on the material domain and “to satisfy the 
materialists’ need for causality”78 in the absence of God.  Indeed, as the geologist and philosopher 
of science Stephen Meyer has observed, from the time the theory of evolution was introduced, 
“Unobservable transitional forms of life were postulated to explain observable biological evidence 
– as Darwin himself explained.”79 But such transitional forms, however, were never found.80 In 
fact, Darwin’s assumption about the foundational single cell as an utterly simple entity – an 
assumption that encouraged the speculation that complex beings evolved from a simple cell in time 
–has turned out to be totally erroneous.81  
                                                 
74 Ibid., 164 
75 Ibid., 164-165. Qur’ān 3:29; 20:98. 
76 Ibid., 155.  
77 Osman Bakar, “The Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory,” in Science and the Myth of 
Progress (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2003), 174.  
78 Frithjof Schuon, Form and Substance in the Religions (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2002), 65, quoted 
in Bakar, “The Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory,” 169. 
79 Stephen Meyer, Signature in the Cell: DNA and the evidence for Intelligent Design (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2009), 424;   Nasr, Knowledge and the Scared, 237,239.    
80 David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 
2008), 188-193. Titus Burckhardt has argued that if the transitional forms cannot be found, it contradicts “with the 
principle of selection that is supposed to be operative factor in the evolution of species: the trial forms should be 
incomparably more numerous than the ancestors having already acquired a definitive form.” See Burckhardt, Mirror of 
the Intellect, 35.  
81 Meyer has observed that for the scientists of the time of Darwin, single cells were seen as “amorphous sacs 
of chemical jelly, not intricate structures manifesting the appearance of design.” Meyer, Signature in the Cell, 44; 
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Whatever the scientists for and against the theory of evolution may conclude in the long 
run,82 the theory only concerns with the material aspect of any living entity. But Nasr argues that in 
Islam a living entity is always more than its physical aspect.83 The fact that an animal’s DNA may 
closely resemble the human DNA, does not necessarily prove that the former evolved into the later 
species.84 Even when we notice certain characteristics of one species repeating in another more 
complex species, this does not prove that biological ‘evolution’ must have taken place. This 
phenomenon was observed in the traditional Muslim world by great scientists like Ibn Sīnā, who 
interpreted it to mean that complex life forms “contain within themselves” the aptitudes of the less 
complex animals and more. 85 
 
Nasr argues that if logical concepts remain unchanged over the course of time, during that 
period, any species ‘A’ cannot evolve into another species ‘B’.  As Nasr argues, “In logic no A can 
become B unless B is already in some way contained in A, and surely B can never come out of A if 
it possesses something more or is greater than A.”86 There is thus no way of glossing over this 
logical lacuna without denying the existence of the “greater.”  This argument is also the essence of 
the metaphysical argument: The “higher” cannot evolve from the “lower” unless, as in the case of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Microbiologist Michael Behe, in arguing for an Intelligent Designer behind what he sees as the evidence of irreducible 
complexity of even single cells, has argued that given numerous features of a single cell appear to work in harmony for 
every function, “Even if someone could envision some long, convoluted gradual route to such complexity, it is not 
biologically reasonable to suppose random mutation traversed it.” Michael J. Behe, The Edge of Evolution: The Search 
for the Limits of Darwinism (New York: Free Press, 2007), 119. 
82 Bakar has provided an excellent summary of the growing dissention among biologists against the theory of 
evolution.  Bakar, “The Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory,” 174-179 
83 Nasr, “On Biological Origins,” 162-63. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Nasr, “On Biological Origins,” 163. In Ibn Sīnā’s cosmology for instance, the rational soul of the human 
being subsumes the animal soul and the vegetable soul. See Nasr, Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, 
249-252.  Generally, the vision of the human being as a microcosm of the macrocosm expresses the view that realities 
of all beings in the cosmos are contained in the human microcosm. See Chapter 2.2.1c.   
86 Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 237. 
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the human mind, the potential of the higher reality is already contained in the “lower.” From the 
perspective of the metaphysics of the hierarchy of reality, the corporeal forms are only lesser 
reflections of their immutable and greater realities in the higher planes of reality.87 Existence 
‘descends’, as it were, from the immutable and greater reality ‘above’, not the contrary. By the 
same token, a corporeal entity on the earthly plane cannot change beyond the scope of its 
immutable archetype,88 and thus, while micro-evolution is possible, transformation from one 
species to another, that is, macro-evolution, is impossible:  
 
There is the possibility of micro-evolution, but not macro-evolution. Now micro-evolution 
is still possible within the possibilities of the archetype…Each species has a width, a range, 
a reality greater than a particular individual in that species. So other individuals can appear 
in that species with other characteristics and even change according to environmental 
conditions, without one species becoming another.89 
 
In summary, Nasr suggests that the theory of evolution is wrong on a religious basis, has no 
scientific evidence, and is logically and metaphysically impossible as well. The scientific theory of 
evolution abandons the metaphysical vision that all things originate from immutable archetypes in 
the knowledge of God and are unto Him returning, or the ‘ordinary’ religious vision of all things 
being created by God and returning to Him. Instead, the theory of evolution offers a vision of an 
inexplicable beginning of life from matter and of evolving and multiplying over time in 
unpredictable ways with no ultimate purpose or meaning. Thus, while the religious or metaphysical 
                                                 
87 See Chapter 2.2.2. In this connection, as Osman Bakar has observed, “no amount of facts accumulated by 
biology can in any way affect the truth of this metaphysical criticism.”  Bakar, “The Nature and Extent of Criticism of 
Evolutionary Theory,” 169. 
88 See Chapter 2.2.1a. 
89 Nasr, “On Biological Origins,” 154.  Bakar has pointed out that in the positivist intellectual climate of the 
second half of the 19th century metaphysical ‘ideas’ such as divine archetypes, design in nature, etc., were understood 
at their theological level and rejected for  being scientifically meaningless. Bakar suggests that Traditionalists, 
including Nasr, has presented these ideas in a more rigorous intellectual fashion that deserves attention. Bakar, “The 
Nature and Extent of Criticism of Evolutionary Theory,” 166-167. 
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vision offers a vision of tawḥīd, the theory of evolution, as one of the central pillars of the modern 
scientific worldview, offers a vision of multiplicity with no ultimate purpose or meaning.  
For Nasr, denying living things their sacred origin and ultimate purpose is bound to have 
destructive consequences.90  Indeed, the eminent philosopher George Grant holds, like Nasr, that 
“the era in which Darwin’s explanations have had such power in the life sciences has also been the 
era in which human beings have been responsible for the destruction of more species than at any 
other period...At a deeper level it may be said that the same technological destiny brought forth 
Darwin’s science and the human conquest of the environment.” 91  
 
However, it is important to note that there are environmentalists who do not criticize modern 
science, and directly or indirectly find inspiration in the theory of evolution which Nasr rejects. Not 
surprisingly, they question Nasr’s premise that religious worldviews, or the lack of them, can have 
a decisive impact on human behaviour towards the environment. These environmentalists come in 
two main categories: the evolutionists who openly base their views on Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, and the pragmatists who support the theory indirectly. Hence, it is important to 
understand their perspectives and imagine how Nasr would respond to them. 
 
6.6.1 Evolutionist and Pragmatist criticisms of Nasr’s Approach 
Bron Taylor has summarized and voiced the criticisms of the evolutionists against the 
religious worldview approach in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature compiled and edited by 
him to present the views of this group.92 In fact, Taylor seems to be supportive of the premise about 
                                                 
90 Nasr, Religion and the Order of Nature, 216. 
91 George Grant, Technology and Justice (Concord, Ontario: Anansi Press, 1986), 65. 
92 The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron Taylor (New York: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005). See 
Taylor “Religious Studies and Environmental Concern” in The Encylopedia of Religion and Nature, 1375. 
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worldviews when it comes to “nature-oriented spirituality”93 or “dark green religion”94 by which he 
seems to imply religions based on direct human experience of nature.  Accordingly, he has no 
qualms about endorsing new religions based at least in part on Darwinian “evolutionary 
worldview.”95 Otherwise, for him, the premise that religious worldviews have a decisively positive 
effect on human behaviour towards the environment is an “undemonstrated idealism,”96 
particularly for monotheistic religions such as Christianity and Islam. However, during the last two 
decades the successes of Islamic environmental activism in the Muslim world97 and much more 
widespread environmental activism from within avowedly Christian communities98 leave no doubt 
about the truth of the premise that religious worldviews make a difference.  
 
Taylor ignores the effect of “religious attitudes” of mainstream religions on the 
environment and focuses on the “new ethical forms that began to flower in the wake of Darwinian 
thought. These values quite easily deduced from an evolutionary worldview…promotes a sense of 
kinship grounded in an understanding that all life shares a common ancestor and came into 
existence through the same survival struggle. These values displace human beings from an isolated 
place, alone at the centre of moral concern.”99  
 
                                                 
93 Bron Taylor, “Religious Studies and Environmental Concern,” 1375-76. 
94 See Bron Taylor, Dark Green Religion: Nature, Spirituality and the Planetary Future (`Berkley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2010), Chapter 2. 
95 Bron Taylor, Introduction to The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron Taylor (New York: 
Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), xx. 
96 Taylor, “Religious Studies and Environmental Concern,” 1376. 
97 See p.53 n214 -215; p.55-56 n218-221. Also, for contemporary examples of Islam inspired environmental 
activism around the world, see the magazine Eco-Islam at http://ifees.org.uk/ 
98 For numerous examples of Christian environmental activism, see Willis Jenkins, “After Lynn White: 
Religious Ethics and Environmental Problems” Journal of Religious Ethics, 37.2, 2009, p.296.  For examples from 
environmental initiatives taken by diverse religions, see Gary Gardener, Inspiring Progress: Religious Contributions to 
Sustainable Development (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). 
99 Taylor, “Introduction,” xx. 
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The feeling of oneness with nature that Taylor often identifies as a hallmark of his ‘dark 
green religion’100 is not knowledge or evidence of the theory of evolution, as he suggests.101 The 
saintly individuals who represent the mainstream religious traditions have confirmed, repeatedly 
and over centuries, the essential unity of reality by inner experiential evidence, and have supported 
the outer ethical teachings of religions based on metaphysical knowledge acquired by such inner 
experiences.102 In the essential reality of these traditions, which Nasr’s traditional religious vision 
articulates in contemporary language, the bond between the human being and nature is traced to 
their common origin in God and thus goes deeper than Taylor's attempt to find it in a “common 
ancestor.” With God seen as the origin as well as the ontological connection for nature and the 
human being in the present, the mainstream religions, especially their inner dimensions, are 
theocentric and urge  for the observance of God’s will.  As such, the human is not at “the centre of 
moral concern,” as Taylor would have it.   
 
Ben Minteer and James Collins, two of the leading philosophers of environmental 
pragmatism, acknowledge that “ontology and metaphysics” constitute the “foundational work on 
environmental value theory,”103 and thus help us to know of the intrinsic value of nature. However, 
their support of metaphysics is based on shaky grounds, as evidenced in their inability to respond 
to colleagues who question the usefulness of metaphysics. 104  
 
                                                 
100 Taylor, Dark Green Religion, Chapter 2: 13-41.  
101 Ibid., 23. 
102 See Introduction 0.9, Chapter 1.1, and Chapter 3.2-3.5. Also, see Seeing God Everywhere: Essays on 
Nature and the Sacred, ed. Barry McDonald (Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2003). 
103 Ben A. Minteer and James P. Collins “From Environmental to Ecological Ethics: Toward a Practical Ethics 
for Ecologists and Conservationists” Sci Eng Ethics(2008) 14:483-501 and 489. 
104 Ben A. Minteer “The Future of Environmental Philosophy” Ethics & The Environment, 12(2) 2007), 132. 
Also, see Bryan Norton “The Past and Future of Environmental Ethics/Philosophy” Ethics & Environment, 12(2) 2007, 
135. 
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Furthermore, if we look more closely at the thought of pragmatist philosophers we find that 
for them, nature’s intrinsic value has empirical naturalistic foundations, and not in a higher 
metaphysical reality as understood in any traditional metaphysics. For instance, Minteer considers 
the natural piety of John Dewey (1859-1952), an ardent believer of Darwin’s theory of 
evolution,105 to be the ideal attitude for environmental pragmatism.106 In the same vein, Bryan 
Norton, another leading pragmatist, appreciates the approach of the pioneering secular 
environmentalist Aldo Leopold (1887-1948) who took the theory of evolution for granted,107 and 
like Leopold, “supports a naturalistic epistemology of environmental values”108  
 
In effect, from Nasr’s perspective, both the pragmatists and the evolutionists reject the 
predetermined spiritual quality of nature. While their environmentalism, owing to their interest in 
the physical reality of nature, can have a positive impact in the short term, they offer no vision of 
ultimate meaning and purpose for the natural world. On the contrary, by their focus on the material 
domain alone and obvious support for the theory of evolution, the pragmatists and evolutionists 
deny the unity and hierarchy of reality,109 which can only contribute to a fragmented materialistic 
vision of reality which, as we will see soon, may indeed bode ill for the survival of the natural 
world. As Shaya Isenberg and Gene Thursby have noted, “Some environmentalists criticize 
mystical approaches to the environmental crisis as other-worldly and useless, but they have yet to 
respond to the claim of the perennial philosophers that every form of activism is based on 
                                                 
105 John Dewey, “The Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy,” in The Essential Dewey: Pragmatism, 
Education, Democracy Vol. 1(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 39-45. 
106 Ben A. Minteer, “Pragmatism, Piety, and Environmental Ethics” Worldviews 1  2(2008) 179-196.  
107 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Ballantine Books, 1970), 116-117. 
108Norton, “The Past and Future of Environmental Ethics/Philosophy,” 136; Also, see Bryan Norton, “Beyond 
Positivist Ecology: Toward and Integrated Ecological Ethics,” Sci Eng Ethics (2008) 14:581-592, 582. 
109 See section 6.3 
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metaphysical assumptions and that if the assumptions are inadequate, then the activism will be 
inadequate.”110  
 
6.7 Modern Science as a Way of Takthīr 
Nasr has characterized the shift from traditional perspective to one of modern science as a 
“plunge in sheer multiplicity” away from the “knowledge of the whole of Reality” or “the Truth in 
its universal aspect” which relates to tawḥīd and its implications.111 In Islamic metaphysical 
language this amounts to the movement of consciousness away from tawḥīd and to takthīr (“to 
make things many” 112), that is, from ‘seeing’ unity to seeing multiplicity, division or unrelatedness 
in our understanding of the world around us. Whereas tawḥīd serves as the central perspective as 
well as the central objective in the traditional approaches to knowledge of the natural world,113 
knowledge provided by modern science is not guided by any comparable unitary vision and is 
limited to the physical dimension.  As such, modern scientific knowledge denies the perennial 
principles and offers takthīr, or a vision of multiplicity instead of unity, in every situation.114  As 
we saw, modern science, by its very nature, calls for a quantitative study of the world; it cannot 
engage one in seeking the qualitative meaning of any entity as a whole. Hence, continued 
investigation by modern science can only result in further division and specialization of any entity 
it investigates. In a word, takthīr is what modern science can offer. 
 
                                                 
110 Shaya Isenberg and Gene Thursby, “Perennial Philosophy,” in The Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, ed. Bron 
Taylor (New York: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005),1272. 
111 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Scence, 80-81. 
112 Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, 12. 
113 The unicity, that is, the interrelatedness of everything in the cosmos is evident in Islamic cosmology, and 
by the same token, in Islamic mathematics, astronomy, medicine and alchemy. See Chapter 5. 
114 See Chapter 6.3- 6.6.  
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As previously discussed, higher realities of entities, or by the same token, metaphysical  
doctrines of unity cannot be known by ordinary reason but by reason’s higher reality in the human 
being, namely by the Intellect or the heart.115 Already in the 17th century,  Mullā Sadrā (d.1640) 
warned of takthīr if we shun the use of the Intellect, when he said, “it is in the nature of the 
intellect to make many one (tawḥīd al-kathīr) and of the senses [to make ] one many(takthīr al-
wahīd).”116 Today, the prevalence of empiricism, the rationalism confined to the world of the 
senses and the defining methodology of modern science, has proved Sadrā right. 
 
By ignoring the limitation of modern science, scientism keeps us away from the 
contemplation of tawḥīd and consequently deprives us of any sense of the ultimate meaning and 
purpose in what we pursue through modern science.   The situation can be reversed not by further 
investigation with modern science as it is, but by beginning the scientific quest with the perspective 
of unity. “Fragmented knowledge” as Nasr put it, “ can be related to the whole only when there is 
already an intellectual vision of the whole.”117 That new beginning would require faith in the 
message of unity of reality, which is found in the revelation or in the Intellection of the sages.118  
 
6.8 Takthīr, the Environmental Crisis, and the Predicament for Muslims 
To the degree that scientism seems persuasive, one is guided in life by the vision of takthīr. 
In contrast to the traditional world where modern science did not exist, for one persuaded by 
                                                 
115  See Introduction 0.9.1 and pp. 132-34. 
116 Mullā Sadrā, I, 3,380 quoted in Ibrahim Kalin, “Mullā Sadrā’s Realist Ontology of the Intelligibles and 
Theory of Knowledge,” The Mulim World, Vol. 91, January 2004, 99. 
117 Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 7. 
118 As Lings observed, only the Divine message “can counter balance the out-pouring urge to which all 
creation is subject; and with this urge unchecked, just as the radii of a circle move further and further apart from each 
other...so the different psychic elements become more and more loosely knit and the soul becomes less and less of a 
unity...” Martin Lings, Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions, 2nd edition (London and Boston: Unwin Paperbacks, 
1980),36-37. 
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scientism, one sees his own faculty of perception limited to his ordinary reason. Scientism also 
encourages the notion that the cosmos has no living connection with God, even if God exists, and 
no relevance to one except as the source of one’s material wants and needs. As the vision of unity 
by virtue of an ontological interconnectedness among everything in the universe crumbles under 
the gaze of modern science, scientism can only encourage self-interested and materialistic thoughts 
and activities.119  As such, the rationalistic Promethean human120 with a scientistic mind becomes 
oblivious of the religious or metaphysical principles concerning the natural world  and  
consequently feels free to transform his natural surroundings as his own reason and self-interest see 
fit.121 Thus, for Nasr, the shift in the relationship between the human being and nature from the 
traditional one in which everything in nature had a sacred significance for him, to the one 
constructed by scientism in which nature is merely the source of his material needs and wants, has 
been the primary cause for human being’s destructive  attitude  towards nature.122 
 
Even when a Muslim influenced by scientism still retains his faith in a transcendent God 
and the Sharī‘ā, his mind cannot be completely impervious to scientific views for long. For 
instance, he cannot remain completely unaffected by the way modern science theorizes, in the 
fashion of the theories of cosmogenesis or the theory of evolution. Nasr warns that even if someone 
is pious, “the effect of a secularized science so blatantly opposed to the Qur’ānic vision of the 
                                                 
119 It should come as no surprise that it was Adam Smith – a man so utterly convinced of the Newtonian 
mechanical worldview that he wrote several treatises in support of it– who famously theorized that acting only in self-
interest was a good thing for what has come to be known as the capitalist economy which is sustained by technological 
innovations. See Eric Schliesser, “Wonder in the Face of Scientific Revolutions: Adam Smith on Newton’s ‘Proof’ of 
Copernicanism,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 13(4) 2005, pp. 697-732. 
120 For Nasr’s understanding of the Promethean image of the human being, see pp. 74-75. 
121 See Chapter 1.5 and 1.6. “Having lost the sense of the sacred, [the Promethean human] is drowned in 
transience and impermanence and becomes a slave of his own lower nature, surrender to which he considers to be 
freedom.” Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred, 161.   
122 This point of view is now shared by many other scholars. See p.91 . 
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created order must be felt. One cannot forget such basic problems which at first might appear to be 
more theoretical and less immediate on the pretext that society has immediate needs.”123 
 
If a Muslim rejects certain theories simply on account of his faith, he remains vulnerable to 
the scientific worldview just by virtue of living in the modern world. He is still affected by modern 
science’s inherent nature of causing takthīr in every domain it is applied on.  Far from being an aid 
to the realization of tawḥīd, the scientific method of investigation leads to ever increasing goals to 
pursue, all of which remain confined to the material or psychological plane that require no more 
than ordinary reason and senses to perceive.124  Here, we are referring to not just the ever 
increasing opportunities for scientific explorations in the physical sciences, which always remain 
outwardly focused and bound to the material dimension, but also to the “social sciences and human 
sciences each trying to emulate the methods of physical sciences by becoming as quantitative and 
“exact” as possible.”125 In addition, a great deal of literature today also shares the secularized 
worldview of the natural sciences and is not in the least concerned with the unity of reality.126 
Modern science and scientism have effectively created an intellectual climate where the worldview 
of takthīr prevails. In such a climate, a Muslim’s consciousness cannot remain impervious to the 
effect of the scientific worldview simply by rejecting certain scientific claims because whichever 
                                                 
123 Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,”136. “There is always a connection between the way we 
dream and the way we are. We are fooling ourselves if we think that the state of science today is none of our 
concern…We are all connected by the problem of what we mean.” Appleyard, Understanding the Present, 199. 
124 Grant, Technology and Justice, 35-37. 
125 Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide, 187. 
126 On several occasions Nasr has given outlines of the ways scientistic secular philosophies, literature, 
psychologies, etc., have been affecting Muslim societies. Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 201-222.  In the 
same vein, Heba Ezzat discusses the effect of secular thought on Muslim social structure. See Heba Raouf Ezzat, 
“Secularism, the State and the Social Bond: The Withering Away of the Family,” in Islam and Secularism, eds. John 
Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000), 124-137. 
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modern profession he chooses he cannot escape “picking up the mental habits” of that profession 
already affected by scientism.127 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, the vision of tawḥīd is at the foundation of  meaning and 
ethics in Islam.  Accordingly, Nasr relates the prevalence of the vision of takthīr and the 
consequent sense of a loss of direction and purpose to the loss of “the principial knowledge.”128 
Since tawḥīd is the foundational principle of Islam, prevalence of takthīr  not only has outer 
environmental consequences, but also poses the greatest danger to Islamic values and ethics: 
“However dangerous the separative tendencies of modern sciences may be for the West,” Nasr 
claims, “it is doubly fatal for Islam, whose sole raison d’être is to assert the doctrine of unity (al-
tawḥīd) and to apply it to every aspect of life.”129 If a Muslim wishes to retain authentic Islamic 
values and care for nature accordingly, he cannot do so without being constantly aware of the 
limitations of modern science. 
 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
A vision of takthir is facilitated by modern science due to its various limitations rooted in 
the exclusion of the principles of the unity of reality, hierarchy of reality, and the ultimate 
meaningfulness of the cosmos from its worldview.  Various scientific theories, some of which are 
very conjectural, promote a view of the world consisting of multiplicity of distinct entities whose 
essential realities are material in origin.  Thus, scientism, the attitude that ignores the limitations of 
modern science, undermines fundamental values of Islam which are founded on the doctrines of 
                                                 
127 Chittick, Science of the Cosmos, 11. 
128 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 81. 
129 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Pertinence of Studying Islamic Philosophy Today,” in Islamic Life and Thought 
(Chicago: ABC International Group, 2001), 150. 
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unity and hierarchy of reality.  As such, unless the problems with scientism are widely recognized, 
as scientism gradually undermines their faith as well as secularize their view of nature, Muslims at 
large are most likely to follow an increasingly more materialistic lifestyle and further worsen the 
environmental crisis.  What’s more, as we will see next, a re-evaluation of modern science and 
scientism should include a re-evaluation of modern technology, the most concrete applications of 




TECHNOLOGY IS NOT VALUE-NEUTRAL 
In this chapter we will explore Nasr’s contention that applications of modern science, that 
is, modern technology, are not value-neutral.1 Rather, in keeping with the outlook of modern 
science, modern technology affects our sense of meaning and purpose in the cosmos in a 
profoundly negative manner.2 In particular, we will explore how the very nature of modern 
technology can in time bring about a shift in consciousness from a sense of relative unity to that of 
greater multiplicity about the world around us. In other words, we will see how, like modern 
science, modern technology, by its very nature, ultimately inclines our consciousness from tawḥīd 
towards takthīr,3 and by the same token, inclines us to be less caring towards the natural world.  
We will end the chapter with a brief discussion of the traditional solutions that Nasr recommends in 
the face of the challenges posed by modern technology. 
 
The destructive impact of modern industries on the natural environment will not be 
discussed as it was covered in the Introduction.4 Rather, the focus will be on the spiritual damage 
resulting from what Nasr calls “peaceful”5 technologies. This will highlight his argument that the 
very nature of modern technology exacts a spiritual price from those who become dependent on 
them.6 As Nasr contends, “Whatever form of modern technology is adopted, even if positive on a 
                                                 
1  Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal,  Islam & 
Science, Vol. 3 (Winter 2005) No.2, pp. 113, 123.  
2 As Nasr explains, any technology is “derived from a particular view of man’s relation with the forces of 
nature and the environment, as well as the understanding of man himself.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic Worldview 
and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity, Vol. 7 (1), 1996, p. 9. According to the modern 
scientific worldview, nature is ontologically unrelated to the human being; it is the domain he should control and 
exploit for his benefit. Modern technology is an expression of that attitude. 
3 See Chapter 6.7. 
4 See Introduction 0.1. 
5 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of New York, 1993), 83. 
6 Ibid., 86. 
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certain level, will bring with itself its negative effects.”7 In effect, our discussion will implicitly 
bring about his rebuttal of modernist or fundamentalist Muslims’ claim that modern technology is 
value-neutral and can do no harm to Islamic values unless Muslims make wrong use of them.8 
 
We will accomplish our objective in three phases. First, from section 7.1 to 7.1.2, we will 
discuss Nasr’s view of the ideal relationship between work and spirituality in Islam, followed by a 
brief discussion of his insights into the nature of the traditional technology, which we may refer to 
as the tool. The tool, as we will see, enables a mode of work and lifestyle that has a unifying effect 
on the soul and its relationship with the world. Next, from section 7.2 to 7.2.3, we will discuss the 
nature of modern technology, which we may refer to as the machine. For its part, the machine 
imposes a mode of work and lifestyle that has the opposite effect on the soul and its relationship 
with the world. Finally, in section 7.3, we will summarize Nasr’s recommendations regarding the 
traditional tools and modes of work as counterbalances to the dispersive effects of modern 
technology on the human soul and the consequent effects on the natural environment. 
 
Compared to his extensive critique of modern science, Nasr’s discussion of the nature and 
function of the tool and of the machine are brief but pithy.  On the other hand, there have been a 
handful of Western thinkers who have written much more extensively on the nature of the machine 
and its effect on modern society.  Jacques Ellul (1912-94) and Ivan Illich (1926-2002) from the 
1960s and 1970s, Bryan Appleyard (b. 1951) and Neil Postman (1931-2003) from the 1980s, and 
Ellul’s student, Willem Vanderburg, since the 1990s, are worthy of mention as they have been at 
                                                 
7 Seyyed Hossein Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal,  in Islam, Science, 
Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam 
Publishing, 2007), 57. 
8 See Chapter 4.3.2 and 4.5.1. 
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the forefront of the scholarly critique of the role of machines in modern society. 9 Nasr’s own 
understanding of the nature and function of technology was in part shaped by the works of Ellul 
and Illich.10 Indeed, Nasr concurs with these critics on the point that machines have come to 
dominate the modern human being. However, Nasr and these Western thinkers disagree on what 
they emphasize as the ultimate loss for humans who endure the domination of the machine.  
 
Ellul was a pious Protestant and Illich was a devout Catholic. Both were concerned with the 
dominating character of machines and their snuffing out of the God-given freedom that is 
fundamental to the very meaning of being human.11 Appleyard and Postman stress the need to 
preserve human freedom for the sake of culture.12 Even though less religiously motivated than his 
mentor Ellul, the main goal for Vanderburg is to preserve human freedom from the constraints of 
machines.13 Nasr also criticizes the machines’ robbing of human freedom but his ultimate concern 
is the way machines create a fragmented view of reality and how they alienate the human self from 
its surroundings. However, there is much in the varied criticisms of these Western critics of the 
                                                 
9 See Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Random House, 1964); Ivan Illich, Tools for 
Conviviality (New York, London: Harper & Row, 1973); Neil Postman, Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to 
Technology (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); Neil Postman, Building a Bridge to the 18th Century: How the Past 
Can Improve Our Future (New York: Vintage Books, 1999); Willem H. Vanderburg, The Labyrinth of Technology: A 
Preventive Technology and Economic Strategy as a Way Out (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); 
Vanderburg, Living in The Labyrinth of Technology (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 2005). 
10 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 112. 
11  Following the neo-orthodox theologian Karl Barth, “Ellul was preoccupied with freedom because he saw 
Christianity’s message [in our age] as essentially one of liberation [more than redemption].” See Clifford G. Christians, 
“Jacques Ellul’s Conversions and Protestant Theology,” Journal of Media and Religion, 5(3), p.152.  For Ellul, 
freedom can be preserved against the constraining forces of technology only through faith in the totally other 
transcendent reality of God who determines everything. Jacques Ellul, To Will and To Do, trans. C.E. Hopkin 
(Philadelphia: Pilgrim, 1969), 146.  Ivan Illich was a Catholic priest who believed that setting limits to technological 
development is one of the essential ways of preserving human freedom and practicing renunciation in the modern 
world. See Lee Hoinacki, “The Trajectory of Ivan Illich,” Technology & Society, Vol. 23, No.5, October 2003, p. 386. 
12 See Postman, Technopoly, 182-183. He values religion as one of the most effective means for overcoming 
the ‘thought-world’ of modern societies devoted to technology. However, religion for him is not a message from the 
transcendent realm. Rather it is “as an expression of humanity’s creativeness, as a total, integrated response to 
fundamental questions about the meaning of life.” Ibid., 198.  For Appleyard’s objective of defending of culture over 
all else, see Appleyard, Understanding the Present, 250. 
13 Vanderburg, Living in The Labyrinth, 484-85. 
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machine to help elucidate Nasr’s perspective. Thus, using Nasr’s metaphysical outlook on the 
nature and function of the tool and of the machine as a base, we point to the arguments of the 
above mentioned Western critics of the machine, to illustrate Nasr’s pithy discussion criticizing the 
machine. 
7.1 Work and Spirituality in Islam 
In order to see how in Nasr’s view the machine impoverishes human beings spiritually, we 
must begin with the Islamic understanding of the relationship between work and spirituality before 
analyzing the ways in which technology affects this relationship. According to Nasr, given the 
“unitary perspective of Islam, which refuses to distinguish between …religious acts and secular 
ones, or between prayer and work,” work and other activities, excluding those which are 
religiously forbidden, must never be devoid of a way of relating to the sacred.14  Accordingly, 
traditional sciences, as we saw in Chapter 5, were mindful of the unitary nature of reality and of the 
relation of everything in the material dimension to higher realities.  
 
Furthermore, Nasr draws attention to the verse “O you who have attained to faith! Be 
faithful to your covenants (‘uqud)”15 to make the argument that every work or action in the Islamic 
way involves doing one’s duties not only to God, but also to oneself and to others.16 Thus, 
obligation to God is linked with the obligation to oneself and others. When working for the benefit 
                                                 
14 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan Paul 
International, 1994), 37. As the Qur’ān states that God created human beings only to worship Him (51:56) indicating 
the potential of all human activities to be acts of worship. Likewise William Chittick and Sachiko Murata assert that 
for Muslims worship of God involves not only “the Five Pillars” of Islam but “everything they do.” Chittick and 
Murata, The Vision of Islam (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House), 276.  
15 Qur’ān 5:1 
16 According to Raghib, a traditional exegete, this verse refers to covenants of  ‘of three kinds: the covenants 
between God and man [i.e., man's obligations towards God], between man and his own soul, and between the individual and 
his fellow-men’ – thus embracing the entire area of man's moral and social responsibilities.” Muhammad  Asad, The Message 




of others, or if creating something to be sold or given to others, a true Muslim, by virtue of his 
faith, would be obligated to himself to use his skills and intelligence in the best possible manner in 
order to fulfil his obligation to God and others.  This obligation to oneself to fulfil an obligation to 
God relates to Nasr’s argument that acknowledging tawḥīd means not only to affirm the oneness of 
God outwardly, but also to integrate “the individual soul into its Centre,” that is, to make the 
individual soul conform to the will of God who resides in his heart.17  In other words,   to 
acknowledge the unity and the ultimate authority of God is to bring one’s will and action in 
accordance with His, that is, “to be one” in one’s faith, word and action.18  Thus, we may conclude 
that for Nasr, in Islamic terms, the self cannot be separated from work in order for this work to be 
spiritually meaningful. 
 
As for the most praiseworthy mode for the believer to work in, a number of prophetic 
ḥadīths glorify direct physical engagement.  Nasr draws attention to the relevant ḥadīth “Strange 
are the ways of the believer, for there is good in every affair of his hand” in order to highlight the 
special benefit in working with the hands by one whose heart is turned towards God. 19 Thus, from 
a traditional Islamic point of view, the most spiritually beneficial manner of work is to work with 
faith and love for God in fulfilling one’s covenants (‘uqud) and  with direct physical involvement.  
 
                                                 
17 Nasr, The Heart Islam, 197; and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of Islam, 2nd edition (Chicago: 
Kazi Publications, 2000), 16. 
18 Similarly, for al-Ghazzali the proper course for human development—to make progress towards the 
realization of tawḥīd—was to make one’s actions conform to the knowledge of the truth. See Laleh Bakhtiar, 
Introduction to  Al-Ghazzali on Trust and the Unity of God, trans. Muhammad Nur Abdus Salam (Chicago: Great 
Books of the Islamic World, 2002), 5-6. 
19 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 45. On Another occasion the Prophet said, "Nobody has ever 
eaten a better meal than that which one has earned by working with one's own hands. The Prophet of Allah, David used 
to eat from the earnings of his manual labour."   The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih al-Bukhari, Vol 3, Book 34, 
Number 286,  trans. Muhammad M Khan (Riyadh: Dar-us-Salaam Publications, 1997).  
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Nasr sees two broad categories of work that human beings engage in, one, “moulding and 
remoulding materials and objects drawn from that world,” and two, all other works.20  Technology 
affects how we perform the first category of work and then how we use the products of that work 
in all of our other actions.  In order to see how in working with technologies, the tool has a 
unifying effect on the soul whereas the machine has a ‘dispersing’ effect on the same, it is 
important to define the tool and the machine and distinguish between them.  
7.1.1 The Tool and the Human Being as the Vicegerent of God 
Traditional technologies were generally tools or simple technologies operated by hands or 
feet, or in rare cases powered by the wind, water or animals, such as the windmills, the 
waterwheels, and horse carriages.  Often, the very simplicity of the tools made them “suitable for 
widely varying craftworks.”21  Not only were people well-aware of what tools could accomplish 
but they also knew how they worked, even in the relatively complex case of traditional technology 
such as windmills. Working with tools engaged one’s body, mind and soul—one’s whole being. 
The quality of the work depended almost entirely on the skill and dedication of the human worker.  
 
Nasr explains the Islamic religious significance of the relationship between humans and any 
tool that relates to the way qualities of God that are inherent in the human being can be reflected in 
the work itself.  He begins by stating that in the way people have had total control over traditional 
tools, they were like “an extension of our hands, senses, and other parts of our body and which, like 
the body, were subservient to the soul.”22 There is a sense of unity between the tool and the user of 
the tool.  As with the limbs of our body, we can connect, understand, control and express creativity 
inherent in our souls with ease, as we mould and remould “materials and objects drawn from the 
                                                 
20 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 35-36. 
21 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 23-24. 
22  Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 112.  
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world” with these traditional tools. Thus, in working with a tool the user possesses most of the 
know-how. 
 
As God’s vicegerents, human beings share all the qualities of God including His creativity23 
and manifests God’s qualities to the extent he surrenders or lives according to God’s will.24 Since 
everyone leaves the mark of his qualities on what he makes, according to Nasr, one’s work reflects 
God’s qualities to the extent one lives according to God’s will.25 Since the human being can be 
fully engaged and best  expresses his qualities through his work only when he works with tools, 
“there is something directly human and at the same time directly spiritual in the production of 
handiworks.”26 In other words, along with the ease with which a human being can use a tool “as an 
extension” of our limbs, it allows for the transfer of his qualities, which are nothing but traces of 
the qualities of God cultivated by him, on to the objects he makes or interacts with.  Henceforth, 
we will refer to this intuition of Nasr that the human being leaves a trace of God’s qualities on what 
he makes or interacts with, as the vicegerency effect.  The vicegerency effect or the lack thereof 
plays the central role in Nasr’s approval of the tool and in his criticism of the machine. 
 
Another important aspect of working with the tool, according to Nasr, is that it allows the 
human being close contact with the material he works on. Since working with the tool allows the 
freedom for close observations as well as direct bodily contact with the material, this mode of work 
is a means for intimate knowledge of the material essential for working with it most creatively.27 
 
                                                 
23 See Chapter 2.2.1c. 
24 See Chapter 3.2 and 3.4. 
25 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 113-114.  
26 Ibid., 119. 
27 Based on a conversation with Nasr at the George Washington University (USA) on  13 August 2009. 
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7.1.2 The Tool and the Vision of Unity 
Recalling the famous ḥadīth “God is beautiful and loves beauty,” Nasr observes that, being 
made in the image of God, the human being has an inherent love for beauty.28 Likewise, he shares 
God’s qualities of freedom and creativity and has an inherent need to express himself freely and 
creatively. Further, his love for beauty drives him to want to make things beautiful. Since the tool 
allows him to express himself most creatively, it is only with the tool as such that the human being 
can make things most beautifully. As Nasr has observed, the act of making was always seen as a 
form of art in pre-industrial days, since all things were made with tools till then. 29 As Titus 
Burckhardt, the leading scholar on Islamic traditional art in the twentieth century, notes, in Islam 
“art can never be separated from craft.”30 
 
Several scholars have noted that people derive great satisfaction from the freedom and 
creativity allowed in working with traditional tools. 31  Nasr adds an Islamic explanation to that 
phenomenon. Recalling that “in Arabic the word husn means ‘beauty’ and ‘goodness’,” he believes 
that the love for beauty also brings into play the virtue of goodness which benefits the producer 
spiritually.32   When one has love for something he wants to make, “it brings into play the virtue of 
goodness. Such a work ennobles the soul of the person who creates it and fulfils deep religious and 
                                                 
28 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity (New York: HarperCollins, 
2002), 222.  
29 Nasr “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 111. Nasr underlines that this understanding of  making 
by  using tools as an art is reflected in the Arabic word sinaa‘ah or the corresponding Persian word sana‘at which 
mean both “technology” and “art”, even though in the modern times the significance of this association of  art with 
technology has been forgotten except  for a relatively few things still made with tools. 
30 Titus Burckhardt, “Perennial Values in Islamic Art,” in Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional 
Science and Sacred Art, trans. and ed. William Stoddart (Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia), 227.  
31 See Illich, Tools for Conviviality, 11, 20; also see E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if 
People Mattered (New York: HarperPerennial, 1989), 158. 
32 Nasr, Heart of Islam, 223. 
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spiritual needs.”33 Nasr notes that love of beauty also “brings about collectedness and helps the 
scattered elements of the soul gather together in a state of calm.” As an attribute of God, Nasr 
explains, beauty also shares God’s characteristics of mercy and compassion which have a unifying 
and harmonizing quality within the soul, as Ibn ‘Arabī has argued.34 
 
The “collectedness” or the unification of “scattered elements of the soul” found in the 
traditional mode of working with tools was made possible by several factors: 1) by the sense of 
intimacy with the tool one worked with, 2) the sense of intimacy with the material one worked on, 
and 3) the freedom and creativity this mode of work allowed.  When we consider that in pre-
industrial society a deep faith in God—who loves beauty and demands the fulfilment of all 
covenants (‘uqud)—was prevalent, we can assume greater efforts on the part of people in making 
things with beauty.35  For instance, in the traditional guilds, which were generally associated with 
Sufi orders,36 “love of beauty” was seen an essential aspect of the work ethics to ensure the high 
quality of the work.37 
 
                                                 
33 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 43. As Burckhardt reported, “In a Fez of not long ago, we 
knew...men who saw in the most modest aspects of their profession a means of spiritual perfection (ihsan).” Titus 
Burckhardt, “Traditional Sciences in Fez,” in Mirror of the Intellect: Essays on Traditional Science and Sacred Art, 
trans. and ed. William Stoddart (Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia), 181. 
34 Nasr, Heart of Islam, 222.  For Ibn ‘Arabī, God’s mercy contained in the recommended acts of  the Sharī‘ā 
has the unifying and harmonizing  effect in the way diverse divine qualities are manifested in the human being.  See 
pp. 128-29. 
35 For Burckhardt, Islamic teachings themselves played a significant role for the impulse to make things 
beautiful. To this end, he frequently cites the famous hadīth “God prescribes ihsan in all things,” where the term ihsan 
refers to perfection, virtue or beauty. “The Role of Fine Arts in Moslem Education,” in Mirror of the Intellect: Essays 
on Traditional Science and Sacred Art, trans. and ed.  William Stoddart (Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia, 1987), 
214.  
36 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. 2 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), 221. 
37 See Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 43, 128-129. 
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As such, in traditional Islamic society every man-made object had a spiritual quality by 
virtue of the vicegerency effect.38Indeed, in Burckhardt’s words, “Before the world of Islam was 
invaded by the products of modern industry, no object left the hands of a Moslem craftsman 
without being endowed with some beauty.”39 Furthermore, traditionally-made objects as such, 
when shared, carried with them certain spiritual grace to others and thus became the principle 
means of social bonding. “The fabric of all traditional societies” as Nasr puts it, “is based on the 
spiritual relationship between the human being and the objects he or she creates.”40  
 
It could be said that just as the traditional mode of working with the tool can bring a sense 
of “collectedness” in the soul, the beauty of the products themselves—brought about by the 
vicegerency effect—induces a sense of unity in two ways: 1) It serves as a reminder of God who is 
Beautiful, 2) It creates a bond of faith and beauty among the people in society. For Burckhardt, the 
impulse for beauty in Islamic craftsmanship was rooted in Islam’s “innermost reality, which is 
Unity (al-tawḥīd) manifesting itself as justice (‘adl) and generosity (karam).”41 Burckhardt might 
as well have said that the “innermost reality” of Islam was the faith in God—the One and the 
Beautiful—which manifested a vision of unity, beauty, and thus generosity, in the craftsmanship. 
  
In summary, by enabling the cultivation of spiritual qualities and in creating a spiritual 
ambience with the products, work with traditional tools can provide a greater sense of unity for the 
human being both within himself and with his surroundings. This cannot but aid in the realization 
                                                 
38 In the pre-modern Islamic world “from the making of a simple comb to the composition of Sufi poetry and 
everything in between… was related to God and reflected His quality as the Supreme Artisan on the human plane.” 
Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 114.  
39  Burckhardt,“The Role of Fine Arts in Moslem Education,” 213. 
40 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 113. 
41 Burckhardt, “The Role of Fine Arts in Moslem Education,” 213. 
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of the unity of God (tawḥīd) whose signs are in the horizons and within the human being.42 We 
must keep in mind what has been said above of the conditions and benefits of working with 
traditional tools to appreciate what Nasr contends are at stake when working with modern 
technologies or the machines. 
7.2 The Machine and its Relationship with the Human Being  
According to Nasr, the most important difference between traditional tools and modern 
technologies or machines, is, that the machine, contrary to the tool, “dominates over the human 
being.”43 This domination begins by marginalizing the input of the human being in what he does 
with machines.  
 
In contrast to tools, machines are complex and not powered by human beings. Their inner 
workings, for the most part, remain unclear, if not incomprehensible, to almost all users. The more 
complicated a machine, the less transparent are its inner workings.44 With a machine we only know 
what specific tasks we can accomplish with it when we press a button or turn a wheel. The quality 
of the performance requires minimal input from the user.  Machines for moulding, drilling, cutting, 
chiselling, mixing or house and office appliances such as radios, televisions, cameras, refrigerators, 
micro-ovens, telephones, and modern vehicles of transportation, all attest to this fact.  The 
incomprehensibility and the lack of control over machines, contrary to the experience of working 
with the traditional tools, rob the sense of intimacy not only with the machines, but also with the 
materials one applies the machines on.  
 
                                                 
42 See Quran 41:53. 
43 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 112. 
44 For more on this, see Bryan Appleyard, Understanding the Present: An Alternative History of Science 
(London: Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 2004), 173. 
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The machine can outperform the human being only in mechanical tasks. However, it does 
not possess a soul. Hence, the machine can perform only specific mechanical tasks as it is designed 
or programmed for; it does not have feelings, intuitions, or metaphysical beliefs which are all, as 
Appleyard has noted, “non-computable”45 capacities of the human soul.  As human beings, we 
have the freedom and ability to change our course of action from moment to moment according to 
our judgments of what is required based on worldly estimations, intuitions, feelings and our 
understanding of the nature of reality. On the contrary, as Ellul noted in his celebrated treatise, The 
Technological Society, technology is artificial in that it “subordinates the natural world...Just as the 
hydroelectric installations take waterfalls and [disregarding their natural courses] lead them into 
conduits.”46 The operations of the machine never take into account the changing context in the real 
world.47 In machine operations, the role of the human is minimal, and effectively takes away the 
opportunity for the human being to express himself. The vicegerency effect is thus marginalized. 
Most importantly, compared to the relationship between the human being and the tool, there is 
relatively little sense of unity between the human being and the machines he uses.  Unlike the tool, 
the machine is neither like “the extension of our hands and senses,” nor, by the same token, is it 
“subservient to the soul.” 
 
Two broad types of machines can be outlined: machines for making things and machines    
for doing all other things. We will briefly examine how each type disrupts our sense of relative 
unity and harmony with our surroundings. 
 
7.2.1 Disconnection and Spiritual Loss from Machines for Making Things  
                                                 
45 Appleyard, Understanding the Present, 217-221. 
46 Ellul, The Technological Society, 79.   
47 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 85. 
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The minimal human involvement in the making of things is most evident in the plants and 
factories where the human involvement is limited to a few specialized repetitive tasks that cannot 
be easily copied by machines. Really creative work is conducted only by a handful of people who 
design the products being manufactured. In the performance of a given task, unlike the traditional 
tool, it is the machine which possesses the know-how. In Nasr’s words, 
Traditionally, the know-how and the art resided within the being of the craftsman and the 
tool was very simple. But if you go to a Detroit factory where they are producing cars, the 
worker there has very little know-how – he just presses a few buttons. All of the know-how 
is in the machine…48 
 
In contrast to the situation with traditional tools, the disconnect between the machine and 
the human being prevents him from availing the spiritual opportunity to engage his self fully and 
derive satisfaction from his work. The machine leaves no room for the vicegerency effect to take 
hold. As Nasr states, “a mechanical and impersonal manner of making things destroys a basic 
dimension of the ethical value of work”49 in the sense that it deprives the human being of the 
“creativity and spiritual content of work.”50According to Nasr, in time this denial of an opportunity 
for spiritual cultivation has grave consequences: “Technology itself imposes upon man a type of 
worldview. It changes man to a machine in many ways,”51 The machine mechanizes our “manner 
of being” and our “way of acting.”52 Once we see how the dependence on machines makes 
people’s behaviour more mechanical, it is easy to see how machines transform their worldview as 
well. 
 
                                                 
48 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 112. 
49 Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 43. 
50Nasr  “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,”113. 
51 Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,”59. 
52 Ibid., 56. 
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The effects of machines on human beings are not hard to visualize if we look back on how 
modern science creates a God-less materialistic worldview.  Just as modern science makes the 
reality of God irrelevant by leaving Him out from its discourse on the cosmos, modern machines 
bring about a mechanical way of thinking and acting simply by substituting for traditional tools. 
We do not switch to working with machines in order to destroy our qualitative relationship with 
our surroundings, it happens quietly without our consent. We can better understand Nasr’s point of 
view by analyzing how the type of machines that make things result in a mechanization of 
everything else.   
 
First, to the extent that the making of things requires the human being to follow the 
machines, he works according to the mechanical logic of the machine. In performing a task, this 
implies limiting the human being’s involvement according to the mechanical need of the machine. 
His contribution can be as little as pushing a button or turning a wheel or placing the raw material 
in a certain location for the machine to operate on. The division of labour that the machine creates 
in this manner largely excludes the human heart and intelligence, that is, his self, from participation 
in the making of things. As a result, the opportunity for spiritual benefit through the work is 
severely limited. The worker being used only for a particular physical movement is reduced to a 
mechanical entity. The more complex the machine he uses, the more the role of the self of the 
worker is diminished. 
 
The mechanization of the human producer through the division of labour is even more 
evident and consequential in factories where several individuals may be operating a machine in the 
making or moulding of a product. As each individual participates in performing a peripheral aspect 
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of the production process, his involvement in the whole project becomes even more superficial 
than if he alone were involved in the making. He may even be unaware of what his contribution 
eventually produces. The division of labour in modern factories enabled mass production which 
eliminated the economic viability of working with tools and simple technologies.53 At the same 
time, the division of labour eliminated the opportunity for the engagement of one’s skill, heart and 
intelligence.54 By the same token, machines for producing things eliminated a social network of 
individuals formed through the exchange of their tool-made objects which, by virtue of the 
vicegerency effect, carried a spiritual grace and thereby had an unifying effect on the community.55  
 
The second way of mechanization also originates in the impersonal mechanical way of 
making things. It relates to the consumers of things produced in the mechanical manner. Almost 
every object in our homes and offices are produced or shaped by machines we cannot even operate. 
Neither do we see these machines or their operators, for we simply buy their products from stores. 
In this manner, in surrounding ourselves with machine-made objects, indeed we live in a less 
intimate space compared to households in the traditional ambiance.56   
 
7.2.2 Disconnection and Spiritual Loss from Machines for Doing Things  
                                                 
53 For an insightful discussion on the mechanizing consequences of technical division of labour, see 
Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 23-26.. 
54 As Torben Nielsen notes, “[Adam] Smith saw the impairment of the greater part of the population’s 
intellectual, social and moral virtues as the price to be paid for the division of labour.” Torben Nielsen, “The State, the 
Market and the Individual” in Acta Sociologica 1986(29), 290. 
55 Vanderburg has referred to this kind of bond in society as culture-based connectedness which was enabled 
by traditional technology. See Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 27. 
56 If modern human beings are not consciously aware of any sense of alienation and fragmentation in  
surrounding themselves with machine-made objects, this could be attributed to getting used to a given situation in the 
absence of any alternative experience.  The situation may be described as being “in a tunnel so long [that] one has 
forgotten that sun and stars and rain exist.”  Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), viii.  
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Mechanization of our lives also happens through machines with which we do things other 
than making of objects. For instance, activities such as travel, computation and communication are 
now facilitated by modern machines such as cars, trains, planes, telephones, computers, email and 
internet. In addition to the sense of disconnection with the machines themselves, in at least two 
more ways all machines for doing things can mechanize our lives. Firstly, by doing with machines 
what we could do on our own or with tools. Secondly, by doing with the machines what are not 
humanly possible with or without the tools.  
 
In the first case, we deprive ourselves, as in the case making things with machines, from 
our full participation and use of our sense of creativity. For example, the more we use a car to go 
where we could easily walk to, the more we deprive ourselves of the spiritual benefits inherent in 
the ordinary human function of walking and interacting with the elements around us which induces 
a sense of unity with our surroundings. The more we rely on telephones and emails to 
communicate, the more we deprive ourselves from the spiritual benefit of personal encounters with 
others or the personal touch of a hand written letter. The more we allow computers or calculators to 
compute for us, the weaker our natural ability to compute or to visualize numbers becomes. As 
such, every time we use a machine to do what we could do normally in its absence we deprive 
ourselves of an opportunity to live as self-reliant human beings creatively exercising our unique 
qualities and interacting with our surroundings.57 In effect, we deprive ourselves spiritually when 
                                                 
57 Here, one may object, as Appleyard does, that unlike other technologies which are specifically task-
oriented, computers are fundamentally different for they depend wholly on the programming skill of the user and 
therefore offer opportunity for much creativity. See Appleyard, Understanding the Present, 175.  But we believe that 
this opportunity for creativity is fundamentally different from that offered in working with tools.  In the case of the 
computer, the programmer simply plays with the logic of an artificial language with virtually no knowledge of the 
immensely intricate circuitry of the hardware that makes the outcome possible. The creativity of the programmer 
remains confined mostly to the mental plane as he plays with the abstract commands of the programming language.  
Also, one can speak of no sense of intimacy with the computer itself whose inner workings remain largely obscure 
even to the programmer. 
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we resort to machines for tasks that do not necessarily require them. In all, as Nasr would have it, 
in choosing to interpose a machine between us and our tasks, we minimize the vicegerency effect 
of our actions as much as we forego the opportunities to foster a greater sense of unity with people 
and nature.  
 
In the second case, when we use machines simply because they can vastly outperform us, a 
lifestyle is created that struggles to keep up with the demands generated by the efficiency and pace 
of that mechanical performance. Indeed, without things like cars, trains, planes, and ships, the 
modern world and its lifestyle would collapse. But, it must not be forgotten that modern means of 
transportation were instrumental in creating such a lifestyle. Likewise, while emails allow us to 
send messages instantly, they necessitate a much faster response to every inquiry. And while cell 
phones have made it possible to communicate with anyone in any place, they gradually limit the 
amount of time we spend in solitude to reflect or contemplate in peace. Indeed, as Nasr has 
observed, every technology that promised to save time, in reality has robbed our time even more in 
other ways.58  In the same vein, as Ivan Illich suggests, every form of modern technology and the 
numerous industries that the modern lifestyle is dependent upon impose a ‘problematic’ pattern of 
life.59 By having to keep up with the speed and efficiency of these machines, our lives are 
gradually shaped in the “image” of machines.  In this manner, contrary to the image of traditional 
tools being like “extension of our hands,” Nasr suggests that due to our dependence on machines 
we ourselves become “the extensions of the machine.”60 Similarly, Illich suggests that although the 
                                                 
58 Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 56-57.  “Time becomes scarce, partly because it takes time to 
consume [the ever increasing number of time saving] goods...”  Illich, Tools for Conviviality, 79. 
59 See Illich’s discussion of ‘radical monopoly’ in Tools for Conviviality, 51-54; Nasr, Need For a Sacred 
Science, 77. 
60 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, A Young Muslim’s Guide to the Modern World, 2nd edition (Chicago: Kazi 
Publications,  1994), 191. 
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industrial age began with the hope that machines would work for people, “evidence shows that, 
used for this purpose, machines enslave men.”61 
 
Since machines are neither products of nature nor can they ever be like “extensions of our 
hands” or be “subservient to our souls,” they create a distance between us and the world whenever 
we rely on them. In adjusting to the logic and performance of the machines, our natural relationship 
with the world becomes transformed into the machines’ relationship with the world. In walking, 
running, and moving by traditional carts or even horse-drawn carriages a relative unity between us 
and the space surrounding us is maintained. As Vanderburg suggests, this relative unity and 
harmony is disrupted when we are transported by high-speed machines like cars, trains and planes; 
in such activities space is objectified, it becomes the other that we seek to conquer.62 
 
Again, as Nasr has observed, through technology, ‘time’ has been objectified and quantified 
in modern times.63 From a traditional conception of time in cycles defined by days, weeks, months, 
years, and the religious rites, which returned regularly over ages with corresponding planetary 
cycles, the Western human had to shift to the view of time as an objective linear reality when 
mechanical clocks were introduced in Europe. The effect of the clocks was apparent especially 
from the beginning of the industrial era. According to Vanderburg, the clocks, as it were, 
synchronized “the lives of factory workers with the rhythms of machines and factories.”64 In the 
traditional Islamic world, all daily activities were scheduled around the times of the adhān (call to 
prayer) five times a day. But, the times for adhāns are not standardized as is the case with clocks. 
                                                 
61 Illich, Tools for Conviviality, 10. 
62 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 199. 
63 Based on class notes from the graduate level course titled Man and Nature  taught  by S.H. Nasr at the 
George Washington University (USA), 9 March  2004. 
64 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 198. 
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They are based on certain positions of the sun in the sky, suggesting a relation between the cosmic 
cycle and the human life and religion. For a long time, it was difficult for Europeans to adjust to 
the standardized objective clock time which was unrelated to the rhythm of life of the pre-modern 
human being.  In the Muslim world as well, modern clocks have objectified time itself for those 
who have resorted to these machines to meet the demands of modern life. The mechanical and now 
digital clocks have played a role in distracting modern Muslims’ from a sense of a harmonious 
relationship with the cosmos around them.    
 
All kinds of machines also have a mechanizing effect on our consciousness simply by their 
ubiquitous presence in our ordinary life.  Along with machines like cars, trains, planes, computers, 
telephones, televisions, refrigerators, toasters and blenders, there exists an extensive and ever-
expanding system of infrastructure needed to maintain the functionality of these machines. 
Infrastructure systems like modern roads, highways, train lines and electric grids have produced a 
mechanized sense of physical space itself. As Nasr has pointed out, our sense of space changes in 
accordance with what we find in it.65 The sense of space in a craftsman’s workshop or on a brick 
laid road is qualitatively more in harmony with our selves than the space inside a modern factory or 
on a modern highway.  Insofar as we are affected by the qualities of what surrounds us, machines 
and the infrastructure built for their efficient functioning have a disruptive effect on our souls’ 
relationship with what surrounds us. Vanderburg reflects this phenomenon in his description of the 
process of cultural transformation that societies undergo as a result of more advanced technology: 
“The more people changed technology, the more they changed their social and physical 
surroundings, and the more they changed the kinds of experiences from which they grew their 
                                                 
65 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Knowledge and the Sacred (Albany: State University of New York, 1989), 202-203. 
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brain-minds and cultures.” 66 In the same vein, Nasr notes that modern technology “allows us to 
build an artificial ambience in which it is easy to forget God,” and thus, modern cities contribute to 
a materialistic and, by the same token, a fragmented vision of reality.67 
 
In summary, for the purposes of both making and doing things, machines interpose 
themselves between humans and the natural world. In so doing, the machine prevents humans from 
leaving a vicegerency effect on our works and actions. The machine also prevents humans from 
knowing the world more intimately and has a disruptive effect on the sense of relative unity 
between us and the natural environment. Furthermore, machines mechanize our lives by forcing us 
to keep up with its mechanical efficiency and pace which further distances us from the world of 
nature. In all, machines ultimately cause disharmony and disunity between the human being and his 
natural surroundings.  
7.2.3 Mechanization Leads Us away from tawḥīd and towards takthīr 
In light of the preceding discussions, it is easy to see why Nasr sees the machine as a source 
of “disintegrating impulse,”68 or as an agent of takthīr, that is, the means for creating a view of 
world consisting of ontologically unrelated multiplicity of entities. In Chapter 6 we saw how 
modern science passively ignores the human self by disregarding our immediate experiences of 
qualities of an entity and by dismissing our faculties of perception beyond ordinary reason.  
Machines do the same by interposing themselves between the self and the world actively 
irrespective of how we perceive scientific knowledge. To further elucidate how the machine leads 
                                                 
66 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 28-29. 
67 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam and the Environment,” Lecture delivered at Georgetown University School of 
Foreign Service, Qatar, 26 January 2009.  
68 Nasr quoted by Keith Critchlow, “Keyonte Speech” for The Beacon of Knowledge: Essays in Honor of 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. Mohammad H. Faghfoory (Louisville, Kentucky: Fons Vitae, 2003), l. 
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us away from tawḥīd it is important to comprehend that machines can only perform quantifiable 
tasks.  
 
The whole concern of technology is about doing or making things and not about answering 
why a particular task should be done. Hence, if a mechanical or quantitative problem can be 
defined, scientists or engineers can design a technology to solve that problem, if not immediately, 
then in time.  But since machines can be designed for only specified quantifiable tasks, machines 
can only have quantifiable goals. In other words, the purpose of technology cannot be qualitative 
except in quantifiable terms. Machines portray life as though it were a sum of quantifiable tasks. 
As machines penetrate deeper and deeper into our lives, quantitative means and goals, and not 
cultivation of virtues or contemplation and reliance on God, appear to be the normal course of 
action in every situation. Every technological innovation carries the message that the means to an 
objective can be quantitative even if it lacks the personal touch. However, quantitative 
considerations, since they concern only the material dimension, can only lead to the vision takthīr. 
 
Another way to see how machines lead to a worldview of  takthīr is to realize that each 
piece of  technology is not only a technical information in itself, but also a means to much new 
technical information which, like scientific knowledge in general, indicate no ultimate meaning or 
purpose for themselves.69 For instance, a microscope is itself a kind of technical information. Also, 
the microscope is a means to much quantitative data that say nothing whatsoever about their 
relation to higher realities. In a modern society, this situation has grave consequences on the vision 
of unity. To see this, first, we must understand, as Ellul demonstrated in the 1970s, so long as 
                                                 
69 See Chapter 6.5. 
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scientific progressivism70 prevails in a society, once we choose the path of the machine to perform 
any particular task, society effectively chooses the path of irreversible and unstoppable 
advancement in the efficiency, capacity and variety of technologies. 71 
 
Second, as we saw in Chapter 6, scientism undermines religious narratives about the 
meaning and purpose of the universe.72 In such circumstances, proliferation of technology becomes 
an agent of takthīr because the increasing number of ultimately purposeless information generated 
by the new machines has a dispersing effect on the mind.73 As Martin Lings notes, the state of a 
human soul in the midst of this information oversupply is “like a multitude of hands pulling at it 
from all directions as much as to say ‘Give me just a small piece of your attention,’ and these 
‘hands’ are ever on the increase, and ever more trivial in their demands.”74 We might say that the 
vision of takthīr is exacerbated by what Neil Postman describes as modern human’s addiction to 
scientific information.75  
                                                 
70 See p.89. 
71 The two most important dynamics which Ellul thinks are responsible for the unstoppable progress of 
technologies are what he calls ‘technical automatism’ and ‘self-augmentation.’ As long as scientific progressivism 
prevails in a society, ‘technical automatism’ refers to the phenomenon that any technology ‘X1’ which outperforms 
technology ‘X’ will replace ‘X’ in the future.  ‘Self-augmentation’ refers to the phenomenon that as long as scientific 
progressivism prevails, when a technology ‘X’ is invented, it enables the invention of a host of other technologies in 
diverse fields such that technological innovations grow exponentially.  Ellul, The Technological Society, 80-91. 
72 Chapter 6.3-6.5; Postman, Technopoly, 79. 
73 Postman has argued that with the loss of a coherent religious worldview, human beings have become quite 
susceptible to any scientific claims: “There is almost no fact, whether actual or imagined, that will surprise us for long, 
since we have no comprehensive and consistent picture of the world that would make the fact appear as an 
unacceptable contradiction.”  Postman, Technopoly, 58. In the same vein, Vanderburg has referred to the exponential 
growth of information with the diffusion of machines through society as an “explosion of ignorance.” Vanderburg, The 
Labyrinth of Technology, 80. 
74 Martin Lings, Ancient Beliefs and Modern Superstitions, 2nd edition (London and Boston: Unwin 
Paperbacks, 1980), 38-39.  
75 Postman observed that since the Scientific Revolution, modern civilization has been accustomed to desiring 
more and more scientific information about nature in order to solve resource scarcity problems. This approach to 
knowledge eventually swept aside the coherent religious worldview which prevailed until the Scientific Revolution.  
But without that worldview to make sense of  what we know, the continued quest for scientific information gradually 
created an oversupply of information which provides no moral guidance. This situation, Postman suggests, has brought 
about a range of problems. However, unfortunately, in societies dominated by scientific progressivism, the answer to 




In light of the above discussions, Nasr is justified in warning Muslim nations that they 
cannot catch up with the West technologically without sacrificing Islamic values which are 
ultimately based on the vision of tawḥīd. In the same vein, Nasr maintains that technology cannot 
be isolated from the culture it is born in.76 Technologies are ultimately products of what we think 
are possible and how a culture intends to move forward. Commenting on motivations for  inventing 
certain kind of technologies over others, distinguished philosopher Jacob Needlemen has observed 
that  “When an idea or theory “works” it always does so relative to what we are asking of 
reality...our discoveries – no matter how ingenious – never [can] be bigger than our basic 
intentions.”77 If modern technologies have a tawḥīd-denying effect, it is not accidental that they 
have been produced mostly by cultures where a secular scientific worldview prevails. Thus, in 
describing the process of transformations of traditional cultures through penetration of modern 
technologies, “the diffusion of a particular constellation of technologies” Vandenburgh argues, 
“depended on the diffusion of the culture…in which it was embedded.”78 
 
In summary, in disrupting our relative harmony with our surroundings, in forcing us to see 
life’s goals and means in quantitative terms, and in generating evermore technical knowledge, 
modern technologies or machines are means to an ever more exacerbating vision of takthīr. As 
with scientism, the result is a lack of appreciation for the natural world as so many signs of God 
held in the ‘embrace’ of God’s Unity.79 And as discussed earlier, distracted from spiritual vision, 
                                                 
76 Seyyed Hossein Nasr,“Islamic worldview and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity, 
Vol. 7 (1), 1996, p. 9.   
77 Jacob Needleman, A Sense of the Cosmos: Scientific Knowledge and Spiritual Truth (New York: Monkfish 
Book, 2003), 15. 
78 Vanderburg, Living in the Labyrinth, 163. Also, see Ibid., 144.   
79 See Chapter 6.5. 
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human beings are most likely to focus their energies in worldly pursuits with the desire for even 
more technology to secure those pursuits.80 The consequence among other things is further 
exploitation of natural resources.  If Muslims wish to catch up with the West technologically, 
whether by buying them or by producing them, they cannot do so without undermining the 
conviction in the fundamental Islamic principles, the values they support, and consequently 
engaging in further exploitation of nature.   
7.3 Preservation and Revival of Traditional Modes of Production  
Nasr is aware that neither Muslim masses nor their governments are willing to give up 
modern technology for a variety of compelling reasons.81 Under the circumstances, Nasr’s stance 
regarding available technology is quite practical. There are three aspects to his stance. First of all, 
he insists that Muslims ought to be more aware of the negative consequences of modern 
technologies such that they can choose to use only “technologies which have less negative impact 
on the environment.” 82 Second, Nasr approves of technological measures being considered by 
many Western nations to reduce pollution of the land, water and air, so long as they are seen only 
as means to gain more time to prepare for profound spiritual responses.83 
 
  Third, Nasr adds that to truly solve the environmental crisis Muslim nations must make 
every effort to preserve or revive the use of traditional tools and the ways of doing and making 
things with them in whichever sector of life still possible.84 With regards to making and doing 
things in the traditional way, Nasr believes that much can still be preserved or revived in the 
Muslim world in the sectors of agriculture, medicine, architecture, textiles, as well as carpet and 
                                                 
80 See Chapter 6.8 and Chapter 1.5-1.5.1. 
81 See Chapter 4.1. 
82 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 116. (accent ours) 
83 See p. 33. 
84 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 117-119; Nasr, “Islam , Science, and Muslims,”79. 
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utensil production. But instead of producing certain traditional tools and crafts as souvenirs for 
tourists as it is commonplace today, Nasr recommends extensive production by traditional methods 
such that these products and modes of production can be brought back to use in the daily life of the 
masses. 
 
He reminds us that some of the traditional ways of production such as the art of weaving 
“did not decay until very recently.”85 The same is true of agriculture86 and architecture, until early 
in the twentieth century.87 In the case of agriculture, Nasr suggests “…keeping small farms, rather 
than changing the whole method by adopting large agro-businesses, using genetically engineered 
seed, taking over the traditional farms.”88 With regards to architecture, Nasr reiterates the advice of 
the great Egyptian architect Hasan Fathy, who called for the use of material available naturally to 
create “architecture which is also environmentally very friendly.”89 In the same vein, Nasr suggests 
minimizing the input of metals which are not really natural but are extracted from compounds 
found in the earth, as is the situation with most chemicals that pollute the environment.90  
 
Closely linked with traditional architecture is traditional Islamic urban planning which “[is] 
all based on certain metaphysical principles related to the nature of reality, cosmology, and the 
                                                 
85 Nasr, “Islam , Science, and Muslims,” 68. 
86 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On the Environmental Crisis,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, Science, 
Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam 
Publishing, 2007), 136. 
87 Nasr, “Islam , Science, and Muslims,” 68. 
88 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 117. 
89 Nasr, “On the Environmental Crisis,”140. For more on Hasan Fathy’s work with natural local materials, see 
his book Architecture for the Poor (University of Chicago Press, 2000). Also see Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 89. 
90 Ibid., 140-141. “One of the main victims of the blind import of Western technology and uncritical imitation 
of  Western strategies of development has been Islamic architecture.  Islamic architecture was once the best in the 
world. It was beautiful.  It turned the glare of the desert sun, into pleasing patterns of light by the use of lattices. Made 
of earth and tiles, it was cool in the summer and warm in the winter. It trapped breezes and led them gently throughout 
the structure, cooling the occupants. It resisted the climate for hundreds of years.” Lloyd Timberlake, “The Emergence 




relationship between the human being and God from an Islamic point of view.”91 Nasr states that 
efforts must be made to protect traditional urban designs wherever they still survive.92  In cases 
where traditional ways may not be easily revived, he recommends that Muslims at least become 
aware of the negative consequences of modern means of production while searching for more 
traditional ways.93 
 
Proliferation of modern technology works ceaselessly to marginalize the function of all 
traditional ways of making and doing things. For instance, if machine-made house wares, garments 
or shoes are cheaper and more durable, economic considerations would force most people to 
choose the machine products over traditionally made ones. In this regard, Nasr disagrees with the 
assumption that given the dramatic increase in population during twentieth century, we have no 
recourse but to produce in large scale using large industrial production facilities. He argues that 
with the increase in population, there is also an increase in availability of workers who could be 
employed to make things in a traditional way by using traditional tools or simple technologies, that 
is, by the traditional production process.94 Nasr maintains that “men and women ... can continue to 
make many things without their being automatically replaced by the machine. And this can be of 
benefit not only from a spiritual, social and ecological point of view but also in the long run even 
economically.”95 
                                                 
91 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,” 125. For a discussion of the vision of unity in Islamic 
urban design, see Nader Ardalan and Laleh Bakhtiar, The Sense of Unity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1973). 
92 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims, and Modern Technology,”  124. 
93 Nasr, “Islam , Science, and Muslims,” 59-60. 
94 Nasr, “Islam, Muslims and Modern Technology,” 119-20.  
95 Nasr, Need for a Sacred Science, 90. Waleed El-Ansary has demonstrated that neither industrial capitalism 
which focuses on increasing profit, nor socialism which uses secular ethics and social engineering to bring about 
cooperation among workers, can enable men and women to perfect their talents, or succeed in building an 




Nasr’s preference for traditional tools and traditional modes of production over machines 
and industrial modes of production reminds one of the famous British economist E.F. 
Schumacher’s (1911-77) arguments for human-scale technology and what he called Buddhist 
economics.96In this regard, we believe Schumacher was one of Nasr’s inspirations.97 In this 
connection, it is important to note that Schumacher’s worldview was quite identical to the 
Traditionalist worldview of Nasr. 98 Indeed, Frithjof Schuon was one of the three most important 
20th century thinkers Schumacher read often99 and he frequently made references to other 
prominent Traditionalists.100 Like Nasr, he also rejected the theory of evolution on logical and 
scientific grounds, famously labelling the theory “science fiction” rather than science.101 
 
In our view, Schumacher and Nasr differ only by the aspect of modern life each has 
targeted for radical transformation. Schumacher, the economist, recognized the problem with 
                                                                                                                                                                 
See Walid El-Ansary, “The Traditionalist Critique of Industrial Capitalism,” Sophia Vol 12, no. 1 (Spring/Summer, 
2006), 55-65. 
96 See E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (New York: HarperPerennial, 
1989) 155-69 and 56-66.  
97 Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful has been for years in the short list of recommended readings for a graduate 
level course titled Man and Nature which Nasr teaches at the George Washington University (USA). 
98 This similarity in views is most clearly reflected in E. F. Schumacher,  A Guide for the Perplexed (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2004). 
99 Schumacher’s daughter Barbara Wood mentions Frithjof Schuon as one of the three most important 
contemporary thinkers for Schumacher; the other two being the Catholic theologian Joseph Pieper (1904-97) and the 
Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain (1882-1973), both prominent scholars of St.Thomas Aquinas.  Barbara Wood, 
E.F. Schumacher: his life and thought (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1984), 336.   
100 See the footnotes in Guide for the Perplexed for references to René Guénon, Ananda Coomaraswamy, 
Lord Northbourne, Whitehall Perry and Martin Lings – all prominent Traditionalist thinkers.  It is highly likely that 
Schumacher also read Nasr’s Man and Nature and other works published in the 1960s.  Moreover, the fact that 
Schuon, Guénon, Lings, and several other Traditionalists had lived in and written about Islam,  may have influenced 
Schumacher’s unfulfilled intention “to begin a study of Islam to examine the implications of an Islam economics.” 
Wood, Schumacher: his life and thought, 370.  
101 Schumacher, Guide for the Perplexed, 111-116. 
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modern science102 but stressed the need for a new philosophy for economics, one that would 
replace what he called the “religion of economics", which values profit over virtues or 
environment.103 Nasr criticizes modern economics for being opposed to virtues of simplicity and 
contentment, and consequently sees it as the outward cause of consumerism and the environmental 
crisis. 104However, he always underlines that the fundamental inward cause of the environmental 
crisis is the scientific worldview.  As a scholar of the history and philosophy of science Nasr’s 
criticism of modern science and technology has been coupled with a vision to establish, as we will 
see, a new sacred science based on the metaphysical principles which are at the root of each 
religious tradition.  
7.4 Chapter Summary 
In summary, apart from the obvious physical onslaught of modern technology on the 
natural environment,105 there are serious spiritual consequences to working with machines which in 
turn is likely to drive a materialistic lifestyle and further pursuit of technologies. Hence a thorough 
critique of modern technology along with a re-appreciation and revival of traditional tools and 
modes of production would take us a long way in countering the effects of modern technology in 
Muslim societies. However, to ultimately overcome the tawḥīd-denying effects of modern science 
and technology, we must be able to envision an alternative science that would not have the 
dispersive effects of modern science and technology on our souls and consequently on our vision 
of reality. We will now turn to Nasr’s vision of this alternative science. 
                                                 
102 “In the excitement over the unfolding of his scientific and technical powers, modern man has built a system 
of production that ravishes nature and a type of society that mutilates nature.” E.F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful, 
313. 
103 Ibid., 47. 
104 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Religion and the Environmental Crisis,” in The Essential Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. 
William C. Chittick ( Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2007), 31-32. 
105 Introduction 0.1. 
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Chapter 8 
TOWARDS AN ISLAMIC SCIENCE 
The student should be taught about the various schools of the Islamic ‘philosophy of nature’, 
which …have views concerning time, space, matter, change, cause and effect and many other 
subjects which form the basis of natural sciences…1  
       Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
 
In the last two chapters we saw how modern science ignores Islamic metaphysical 
principles and how modern technology forces humans to ignore them by limiting our 
vision to the quantifiable physical realm. However, if we can imagine a science bound by 
the same metaphysical principles that are at the core of Islam, science would not be an 
agent of distraction from the spiritual. This realization is the basis of Nasr’s vision of an 
Islamic science: “The ideal situation would be to have an authentic metaphysical 
knowledge, embracing knowledge of the Divine Principle and all Its levels of 
manifestations, as the framework for both science and religion, understood in the 
ordinary sense of the term, so that the two would share common principles.”2 For Nasr, 
only a science that is capable of interpreting all natural phenomena through the 
metaphysical perspective as such without denying the “factual discoveries of modern 
science,”3 would really be an Islamic science. 
 
In this chapter, we will provide an outline of the “authentic metaphysical 
knowledge” and the educational reforms that Nasr believes are necessary to establish an 
Islamic science founded on that metaphysical knowledge.  Nasr believes that the most 
                                                 
1 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, (London and New York: Kegan 
Paul International, 1994), 216. 
2 Seyyed Hussein Nasr interviewed by Mehdi Golshani in Can Science dispense with Religion? ed.  
Mehdi Golshani (Tehran, Iran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, 1998), 208. 
3 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,” in An Early Crescent: The 
Future Knowledge and Environment in Islam, ed. Ziauddin Sardar (London: Mansell, 1998), 133. 
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fitting metaphysical knowledge to serve as the framework of an Islamic science today 
would be the one found in the natural philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā. As to how Ṣadrā’s 
natural philosophy could be the foundation of a science today that would affirm the 
ontological bond between  human beings and the natural world, and by the same token, 
ultimately aid human beings in their realization of tawḥīd,  “in themselves and  in the 
horizons”4 will be the subject of our discussion.5 This will follow an overview of the 
reforms of the educational institutions in the Muslim world that Nasr argues would be 
necessary to bring about the establishment of the new Islamic science. 
 
8.1 Why Metaphysics? Why the Metaphysics of Mullā Ṣadrā? 
In Chapter 2, we discussed the role of metaphysics in making sense of the 
immanent aspect of God without violating His transcendence.6  In so doing, we saw that 
metaphysics describes all levels of reality and their interrelations.7 Based on that 
discussion, in Chapter 3, we saw how metaphysics forms the foundation of ethics by way 
of elucidating the nature of reality of the natural world.  Since modern science, in its 
assessment of nature, limits it to the material dimension as a reality independent of any 
higher realm, it is only by metaphysical knowledge and its certitude found through 
Sufism that it can be effectively argued that the material reality is not an independent 
dimension. Nasr gives his rationale for preferring metaphysics to provide the intellectual 
framework for Islamic science by way of explaining that other aspects of Islamic 
                                                 
4 Qur’ān 41:53. 
5  Nasr expresses his vision of an authentic Islamic science in this manner. Nasr, “Islam and the 
Problem of Modern Science,” 133 and 137. 
6 Chapter 2.2.1. 
7 Chapter 2.2.2.   
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intellectual tradition cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the different 
levels of reality: 
 
 Islamic worldview… as far as the cosmos and the whole question of various 
scientific epistemologies are concerned, cannot be simply extracted from the 
Sacred Law or al-Sharī‘ā, which embodies God’s Will for our actions in this 
world, nor even from Kalam whose role has always been to protect the citadel of 
faith from rationalistic attacks, nor still from jurisprudence (al-fiqh)…Rather it 
must be drawn from the haqiqah, which lies at the heart of the Noble Qur’ān and 
ḥadīth as expounded and formulated by the traditional commentators, as well as 
Islamic metaphysics, cosmology, the doctrinal and intellectual aspects of Sufism, 
and the Islamic sciences, themselves. Only in this intellectual tradition…can one 
rediscover the authentic Islamic worldview as far as it pertains to the knowledge 
of nature, and in fact, the whole question of the levels of knowledge.8  
 
Islam cannot retreat from the study of nature, for, “In numerous verses of the 
Qur’ān”, as Nasr asserts, “man is directed to the phenomena of nature and asked and even 
ordered to study them.”9 However, unlike modern science, in Islam, nature or the visible 
cosmos consists of the “signs of God” pointing to meanings and realities beyond the 
physical reality. Hence, only an intellectual perspective, such as that of Islamic 
metaphysics or cosmology which does not exclude any dimension of reality physical or 
otherwise, can provide an alternative paradigm to that of modern science for the 
comprehension of the cosmos in the Islamic sense. 
 
Traditional Islamic sciences, as noted in Chapter 5, share with Islam the vision of 
unity – based on the unity of the origin and reflected in the unicity of the cosmos – as 
                                                 
8 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic worldview and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific 
Creativity, Vol. 7 (1), 1996, pp. 13-14. 
9 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Question of Cosmogenesis – The Cosmos as a Subject of Scientific 
Study,” Islam and Science, Vol. 4(Summer 2006) No.1, pp.56-57. See Qur’ān 3:190; 57:17; 88:17-21; 
3:191. 
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well as, the principles of the hierarchic structure of reality and the purposefulness of the 
cosmos, though they do not conform to Islamic metaphysics in its full scope as 
expounded by Ibn ‘Arabī.10 Hence, instead of the cosmological visions of Jābir Ibn 
Ḥayyān (d. 800), Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (870-950) or of Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), he 
recommends the natural philosophy of Mullā Ṣadrā, which conforms to Ibn ‘Arabī’s 
metaphysical intuitions, to serve as the basis of the new Islamic science. As we will see, 
Nasr’s preference for Mullā Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy has other reasons as well. 
 
The Sufi and theologian, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī (d.1111) argued that Peripatetic 
philosophy failed to comply with Islamic faith in several ways.11  In contrast to al-
Ghazzālī, Mullā Ṣadrā demonstrated how rational philosophy could play an important 
role when integrated within the metaphysical teachings of the Qur’ān, Ḥadīth, and the 
visions of gnostics. As such, according to Nasr, Ṣadrā’s philosophy “accords with the 
inner meaning of the revealed Text.”12 Concurring with Ibn ‘Arabī, Ṣadrā demonstrated 
philosophically that it takes both reason and intellection to know the truth of things as 
they are.13  
 
On the one hand, Ṣadrā showed that rational philosophy could be refuted on 
purely rational grounds, and on the other, when combined with gnostic intuitions, rational 
arguments could support the truth-claims of the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth. In this 
                                                 
10 See Chapter 2.2. 
11 For instance, al-Ghazzālī asserts that the Peripatetic philosophers deny God’s knowledge of 
particulars. See Abū Hāmid al-Ghazzālī, Al-Ghazali’s Path to Sufism: his Deliverance from Error, trans. 
R.J. Mccarthy, S.J. (Luiseville,KY: Fons Vitae, 2000), 36.  
12 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from the Origin to the Present, 226. 
13 William Chittick, The Sufi path of knowledge: Ibn al-Arabi’s metaphysics of imagination,  (New 
York:  State University of New York Press, 1989), 122, 368. 
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connection, Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy is relevant to the enterprise of science because it 
can provide an understanding of the parameters of natural sciences, namely space, time, 
matter, cause, effect, growth and change in a way that achieves three objectives: 1) It 
addresses previously unanswered questions in Greek and Islamic Peripatetic natural 
philosophy and thus closes an important gap in traditional natural philosophy, 2) It 
provides profound alternative visions of the parameters of science, illustrating the central 
role of God in everything associated with entities without rejecting rational arguments, 3) 
It responds to what Nasr believes are limitations of modern science. In the next few 
pages, we will provide an outline of these achievements, and underline the significance of 
Sadrian natural philosophy and the possibility of Nasr’s vision of an Islamic science. 
 
8.2 Ṣadrā’s Contribution to Greco-Islamic Natural Philosophy 
The primary challenge in Islamic natural philosophy has been to explain the 
workings of the multiplicity of the phenomenal world in a way that portrays the world as 
a domain wholly dependent on God who is at once One and transcendent to the created 
order. The answers to this challenge, as it applies to the world of nature, are found in the 
Islamic philosophy of nature.   
 
Muslim theologians, on the one hand, generally emphasized the transcendent 
aspect of God and His distinction from the created order.  Since God is the All-Knowing 
(al-‘Ālīm ) and the Most Exalted in Power and Might (Al-‘Azīz), theologians saw God’s 
will as the sole direct cause for all natural phenomena. They maintain that any 
consideration of secondary causes is an affront to God’s absolute power and authority 
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over the entire created order.  In other words, God’s will is cause enough and no further 
explanation is necessary.  
 
On the other hand, Muslim Peripatetic philosophers argued that God is not 
whimsical for that would make “justice and accountability” on earth meaningless; the 
cosmos had to be intelligible; otherwise there would be “metaphysical chaos where 
nobody can know anything for sure.”14  Believing that the cosmos had to be intelligible, 
they accepted secondary causes subordinated to God. Thus in the cosmologies of  al-
Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, even though God is the transcendent ultimate cause, there is a 
hierarchy of  intellects governing all affairs of the world and a view that motion and time 
are agents of change . However, while the Peripatetic philosophers believed the existence 
of the material world derived from the heavenly intellects and ultimately from God 
through emanations, they held the Divine to be essentially transcendent to the multiplicity 
of the phenomena. 
 
Following Aristotle, Muslim Peripatetic philosophers concluded that motion in 
cosmos was the agent of all change. For instance, if an object was moved from heat to 
cold, or from one set of circumstances to another, the entity goes through changes.  The 
Peripatetics saw this change only as change in the accidents of an entity, namely in place 
(‘ayn), position (wad'), quantity (kam) and quality (kayf) of an entity. They did not accept 
                                                 
14 Ibrahim Kalin, “Will, Necessity, and Creation as Monistic Theophany in the Islamic 
Philosophical Tradition,” in Creation and the God of Abraham, eds. David Burrell, William Stoegger and 
Carlo Cogliati (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 116.  
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change in the very substance, namely the principle of an entity that “subsists by itself”15 
and provides the identity of the entity, under any circumstances. They argued that any 
change in substance means a change in the very identity of the entity and negates the 
possibility of motion for that entity.   
 
First, Peripatetic natural philosophy could not explain how God was directly 
involved in the changes associated with any entity except through secondary causes. 
Second, Peripatetic natural philosophy could only provide an explanation for drastic 
changes, such as changes in accidents due to external motion. Importantly, it could not 
account for the gradual and continuous change in nature. For instance, it could not 
explain how a seed grows into a tree, or how a fruit or a living entity matures.16 In a 
world of fixed substances, gradual and continuous change eluded explanation.  It was left 
for Ṣadrā to explain how God was directly involved in every act and in every change, 
drastic, or gradual and continuous.  
 
Modern science avoids addressing the failure of the Peripatetic philosophers to 
provide a rational explanation for God’s direct role in nature by simply ignoring the role 
of God as a possible cause in any act or change in nature.  Thus, we will see how Ṣadrā’s 
natural philosophy fills a vacuum in traditional natural philosophy and, at the same time, 
offers an intellectual challenge to modern science’s vision of nature. 
 
                                                 
15 Zailan Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason in the Philosphy of Mullā Ṣadrā: An 
Analysis of  al-Hikmah al-‘Arshiyyah (Richmond: Curzon, 2003), 95. 
16 See Ibrahim Kalin, “Between Physics and Metaphysics: Mulla Sadra on Nature and Motion,” 
Islam & Science, Vol. 1 (2003) No.1, pp. 83-89.  
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In order to see how Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy is relevant to questions that 
concern modern science, we will begin with a brief summary of the foundational 
principles of Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy and his doctrine of the ‘substantial motion’ (al-
ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah).17 Subsequently, we will explore how they provide a view of 
reality that agrees with the “realities of prophecy” and challenges the fundamental 
assumptions of modern science. 
 
8.3 An Outline of Ṣadrā’s Natural Philosophy 
According to Ṣadrā, our ordinary experience of the world leads us to think that 
quiddities (māhiyya)18 are the fundamental realities to which being (wujūd) is added.19  
This had been the conclusion of Aristotle, and was accepted by most Muslim 
philosophers prior to Ṣadrā. Ṣadrā himself believed this conclusion, until he was inwardly 
revealed the truth of the Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd),20 and that the quiddity in 
itself was no more than mental abstractions (it’ibari) of a particular “limitation or 
modality of Being.”21 Hence, Ṣadrā concluded that the being of an entity was the 
principial aspect of an entity (asālah al-wujūd). By the same token, he concluded that the 
hierarchy of reality in the cosmos was determined by the gradation of the intensity of the 
Being (tashkīk al-wujūd) for all entities.22  The lesser the delimitation, the greater the 
attributes of Pure Being were expressed by an entity.  In other words, the beings in 
various entities we experience in the world are merely delimitations of the Being of God 
                                                 
17 Nasr prefers to use the term ‘trans-substantial motion’ instead of ‘substantial motion.’ 
18 The ‘quiddity’ of an entity is the response to the question “What is it?” which is the translation 
of the original Arabic term mahiyya. Thus, the quiddity of a horse is its ‘horseness’. 
19 Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason, 91. 
20 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His teachings,” in History of Islamic Philosophy, Part I, 
eds. S. H. Nasr and Oliver Leaman (London: Routledge, 1996), 646. 
21 Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason, 91. Ṣadrā, The Wisdom of the Throne, 119. 
22 Ibid., 93. 
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which determine the quiddities (māhiyya) of the entities.23 Thus, the foundational 
principles of Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy are the Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd), the 
principiality of being (asālah al-wujūd) and gradation of being (tashkīk al-wujūd).] 
 
8.3.1 Substantial Motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah) 
Mullā Ṣadrā argues that since accidents could not occur without the presence of 
substance, the change in accidents must be caused by a corresponding change in the 
substance itself.24 The change itself is caused by constant “effusion (fayd) of Being”25 in 
the substance of entities, and hence ceaseless in both the material and imaginal planes of 
reality.26 Continuous change or motion in accidents reflects continuous change in 
substance, that is, substantial motion (al-ḥarakat al-jawhariyyah) in entities. Ṣadrā claims 
that he gained certainty of substantial motion by “heart knowledge” and not by discursive 
proof.27 Also, he cites Qur’ānic verses which, according to him, point to the doctrine of 
substantial motion.28 However, he analyzes, logically and rigorously, the alternative 
visions of motion and change in the thought of both the Greek and the Muslim 
philosophers, and rejects or accepts their arguments accordingly.29   
 
Ṣadrā suggests that the Peripatetics were mistaken in thinking that motion was the 
principle of change. Instead, he argued, motion was the process of change and not the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 92-93. 
24 Ibid., 96. 
25 Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His Teachings,” 649. 
26  The highest or the purely spiritual plane remains immutable. See Chapter 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. 
27See Mullā Ṣadrā, al-hikmat al-muta‘aliyah fi’l-asfar al-‘aqliyyah al-arba‘ah, (hereafter cited as 
Asfar), III, 1, p.65. quoted in Kalin, “Between Physics and Metaphysics,”  p. 75.  
28 Ṣadrā cites the Qur’ānic verses 27:88; 50:15; 25:59; 32:4 in his Risalah fi’l huduth, (hereafter 
cited as Huduth) pp. 59-60 quoted by Kalin, “Will, Necessity, and Creation as Monistic Theophany,” 124. 
29 Kalin, “Between Physics and Metaphysics,” 67-77.  
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principle of change.30  For Ṣadrā, if an object moved from A to B, the movement 
described the effect of change, “the fact of changing from potentiality to actuality” 31 of 
that particular entity, not the principle of change itself. In light of the doctrines of  the 
unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd) and principiality of being (asãlat al-wujūd), Ṣadrā 
holds that since the being (wujūd) of an entity is particularized as such by the Being of 
God, ultimately, it is the Being of God which is the principle of all change.32 However, 
the Being of God acts through its agent, the power inherent in the being of any entity33 - 
like the “spirit of a person,”34 – that seeks change or perfection. 
 
The being of an entity is a reflection of its archetypal possibility, or a particular 
gradation of the Being of God within the range of its potential determined by the 
immutable archetype of the entity.  In Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy, the being of an entity 
refers to its “substance.”  But no entity begins its lifespan with its archetypal potential 
fully realized.35  For example, a tree begins as a seed which is not pure potentiality; the 
seed’s very existence is the proof that the tree’s archetypal potential has been actualized 
to a certain degree.  
 
The potential of an entity actualizes by the continuous effusion of Being in the 
entity, through the inherent power in the substance of the entity, resulting in substantial 
                                                 
30Kalin, “Will, Necessity, and Creation as Monistic Theophany,”123. 
31 Ibid., 127. 
32 Ibid., 127-128. 
33 Kalin, “Between Physics and Metaphysics,” 70-71. 
34 Kalin, “Will, Necessity and Creation in Monistic Theophany,” 128. 
35 As Kalin explains, no existent entity is either pure potentiality or pure actuality. The prime 
matter as pure potentiality has no existence and only God can be said to be pure actuality. “Between 
Physics and Metaphysics,” 62. 
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change or  substantial motion, up to the limit allowed by its immutable archetype,36 such 
that “it is not necessary for the particular thing to leave its quiddity and become 
something else."37 As such, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, the doctrine of substantial motion 
explains continuous growth and change in natural entities and has a teleological 
purpose.38  
 
Nasr contends that the doctrine of substantial motion enables us to envision many 
scientific theories and the parameters of modern science in a new light:   
 
In divorcing the traditional cosmology from its reliance upon Ptolemaic 
astronomy, in integrating the dimensions of time and space, in providing a means 
to understand natural transformations without falling into the error of evolutionary 
reductionism, and in many other ways, Mullā Ṣadrā created on the basis of the 
doctrine of trans-substantial motion a natural philosophy that can function and be 
viable even in a contemporary setting with all the challenges of modern science 
and yet still remain faithful to the realities of prophecy.39  
 
To begin with, he proposes the doctrine of substantial motion as a viable 
alternative to Darwin’s theory of evolution, which portrays the world of nature as no 
more than products of material forces with no role for God, and no ultimate meaning or 
purpose.40 Nasr points out that substantial motion can explain growth and change in 
nature without denying either the direct role of God or the immutability of any species 
while affirming God’s unity and transcendence.41  
 
                                                 
36 Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His Teachings,” 649; Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason, 
97. 
37 Moris, Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 96; Asfar, I, 3, 61; Kalin, “Will, Necessity, and Creation as Monistic Theophany,” 131. 
 
39 Nasr, Islamic Philosophy from the Origin to the Present, 231-232. (accent ours) 
40 Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His Teachings,” 650. 
41Ibid., 649-650. Also see Chapter 6.6. 
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8.3.2 Substantial Motion, Time and Space  
Like Greek thinkers, Muslim Peripatetic philosophers also viewed time as the 
measurement of circular motions of the heavenly bodies—the sun and the planets—
around the earth as observed by human beings from the earth as their point of reference.  
Time in this view had a cyclical quality. Seasons, days and tides came and passed away 
in cycles. The heavenly bodies, in this traditional worldview, were viewed as perfect and 
beyond the world of corruption and change.  By the same token, time, a measure of the 
motion of the heavenly bodies, was eternal. 
 
However, Sufis had already considered time to be illusory; only the present 
moment had a reality.  From the present moment as the point of reference, neither the 
past nor the future had any reality. The Qur’ānic statement  “Every day He is at 
something” (Qur’ān 55:29) was taken by the great Sufis  to mean that creation was 
renewed at each moment and the real Sufis came to be seen as the ‘child of the moment’ 
(ibn al-waqt) because they strove to be fully present to the Divine reality available for 
experience at any given moment.42 Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā formulated these mystic 
intuitions of the Sufis in the language of metaphysics and philosophy. Time, for Ibn 
‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā, is a relation between events in terms of “before” and “after” 
constructed in the mind of an observer. As Ibn ‘Arabī states, “time is a relation (nisbah) 
                                                 
42 “The differences of opinion between the people of realities is also a mercy from God because 
each one of them speaks from where he is at the moment...” Abū Nasr as-Sarrāj quoted in Kristin Zahra 
Sands, Sufi Commentaries on the Qur’ān in Classical Islam (London: Routledge, 2006), 43. “I am a child 
of the present.” Rūmī quoted in William Chittick: The Sufi Path of Love: The Spiritual Teachings of  Rūmī 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 275. “What are past and future and present to the man 
of No-place, within whom is God’s Light?” Rūmī quoted Ibid., 277. 
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that is non-existent in its essence.”43  Mullā Ṣadrā, for his part, concurs that time has a 
kind of existence whose parts can only be described in the mind by relational terms such 
as “Before-ness (al- sabaq), beginning, attached-ness (al-luhuq) and end (intiha’),” but 
unlike an existent entity, it has no essence.44 
 
As for ‘time’ being a measure of the spatial motion of the planets, Mullā Ṣadrā 
points instead to the cause of all changes in the cosmos, including that of spatial motion, 
in the beings of entities themselves, which for him, as we discussed earlier, rests in the 
substantial motion in entities.45 Thus, for Mullā Ṣadrā, time is not a measure of external 
spatial motion but a ‘measure’ of substantial motion in the contingent, moving entities.46  
At the same time, since continuous substantial motion is a feature of all contingent 
entities, Mullā Ṣadrā concludes that time is simply a modality of contingent existence.47 
By the same token, we cannot imagine existent entities without the spatial dimension. 
Hence, if things exist “before” and “after,” space is also a modality of contingent 
existence.    
 
In light of the above discussion, the celestial spheres and the heavenly bodies in 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s cosmology are neither perfect nor eternal. Their movements result from 
substantial motion in their being actualizing their potential, and do not determine the 
movements of bodies situated at a lower level: “…the substance of a sphere (falak) is not 
                                                 
43 Ibn ‘Arabī (Futuhat, III, Ch. 390, 529) quoted in Ibrahim Kalin “From the Temporal Time to the 
Eternal Now,” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society, Vol. 41, 2007, p.45. Also, see William C. 
Chittick, Ibn ‘Arabī: Heir to the Prophets (Oxford: Oneworld, 2005), 91. 
44 Mullā Ṣadrā, Asfar, I, 2, p.14. quoted in Kalin “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 
51.  
45 Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 52-53. 
46 Ibid., 52. 
47 Ibid., 53. 
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permanent with its natural and positional (wad’iyyah) form. The same applies to all 
heavenly bodies. The cause of motion and its subject is a particular corporeal being and 
such a being cannot be eternal.”48 
 
Thus, by means of the doctrine of substantial motion, Mullā Ṣadrā’s cosmology 
succeeded, according to Nasr, in divorcing the “hierarchic Islamic cosmos with its 
angelic, imaginal and physical realms from the Ptolemaic system”49in a number of ways. 
First, in rejecting the notion that the visible cosmos beyond the moon was unchanging 
and perfect; second, in rejecting the notion that higher spheres and their corresponding 
planets determine the movements of lower bodies; third, in rejecting the notion that time 
was ultimately caused by the movements of the heavenly bodies.50 And finally, as in Ibn 
Sīnā’s cosmology in his visionary recitals, 51 Ṣadrā’s metaphysics interiorized the cosmos 
by its emphasis on the being – the agent of all change and growth – because the being of 
any entity was ontologically related to the being of the human who could potentially 
realize the Unity of Being (waḥdat al-wujūd) within his own self.  
 
Nasr considers the reformulation of Islamic cosmology in the hands of Mullā 
Ṣadrā “as one of the reasons” for the relative lack of shock in the Islamic world, when 
compared to the reaction of the medieval Christian world, from the discoveries of 
Copernicus and Galileo.52 Ṣadrā’s view of time and space as modalities of existence, as a 
                                                 
48 Mullā Ṣadrā (Asfar, I, 3, p.131) quoted in Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 
55. 
49 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Cosmology,” in  Different Aspects of Islamic Culture  (part 1), ed. A.Y. 
al-Hassan (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2001), 402. 
50 Nasr, “Cosmology,” 402; Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 55. 
51 See Chapter 5.1.1c. 
52 See Nasr, “The Question of Cosmogenesis,” 52-53. 
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‘measure’ of substantial motion, is relevant and timely. If time is a measure of substantial 
motion, time is determined by the intensity of the Being of God in the perceiving entity 
and not by the fixed structure of an external reality. Ṣadrā speaks of three hierarchic 
categories of time, from the eternal ‘timeless’ level in the Divine order, to the temporal 
time determined by the relation between the “changing” entities to the “unchanging” 
God, and finally to that determined  by the relation between “changing” entities.53  
 
For Islamic scientists, Ṣadrā’s vision of time would undercut the Newtonian 
classical vision of time that dominates modern consciousness today.  Time, as defined by 
Newton, is “absolute, true and mathematical,” and flows from its own nature equably 
“without relation to anything external.”54 In this sense, time has an objective reality and a 
homogenous quality extended indefinitely in the past and in the future. In this view, 
things happen “in” time as though time were something prior to events. 55 Likewise, 
Islamic scientists may reconsider the concept of “space” as it has been defined in the 
Newtonian science as something prior to things which happen “in” it.  Ṣadrā’s vision of 
time and space as realities that are not objective or absolute, but means of description of 
relation among events in accordance to their state of being, brings the focus back to the 
being of entities and of the perceiving self.  
 
8.3.3 Substantial Motion and Creation ex-nihilo or “from nothing” 
                                                 
53 See Ṣadrā, Asfar, I, 3, p. 144 quoted in Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 
62.  For a comparable view of time based on Ibn ‘Arabī’s vision of time, see Caner Dagli, “The Time of 
Science and the Sufi Science of Time,” Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabī Society, vol. 41, 2007, pp. 86-
92. 
54 Isaac Newton quoted in Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 37. 
55 As discussed in Chapter 7, the modern mechanized clock helped to quantify the objectified view 
of time. The ubiquitous presence of clocks and watches, and the mechanized fragmented lifestyle of today, 
has made the quantifiable sense of time the standard. See pp. 259-60. 
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Nasr suggests that the doctrine of substantial motion explains the doctrine of 
creation ex nihilo found in the Abrahamic religious traditions.56 Ṣadrā’s doctrine of 
substantial motion and his vision of time as a mode of contingent existence or as a 
‘measure’ of substantial motion, sheds light on the doctrine of  creation of the world ex-
nihilo and in temporal time, the doctrine which had hitherto eluded philosophers and 
theologians. If all contingent beings are continuously renewed through substantial 
motion, then creation or manifestation is a stage in this continuous transformation.57 
Furthermore, if time exists only as a mode of existence of an entity, we cannot speak of 
creation “in” time or of a time “before” creation. In the divine order, there is no time. 
Before creation only God is. With the effusion of Being on the archetypes in the 
knowledge of God, things gain contingent existence and time and space can be spoken of 
to describe the relation between entities. Thus, Ṣadrā offers a philosophical explanation 
not only for the temporal origin of the world, but also for that of creation ex-nihilo, that 
is, out of pure awareness of God, and not out of matter. 
    
8.3.4 Substantial Motion and the Unity of knowledge and Being  
Ṣadrā claims that the human soul not being corporeal58 cannot know a corporeal 
entity directly. Offering strictly rational arguments, he asserts that the perceiver and the 
perceived must be of “one mode of being.”59  For the soul to know something, as the 
Ṣadrā scholar Zailan Moris explains, the object of knowledge must be of the nature of 
                                                 
56 Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His Teachings,” 650.  Also, see Christian Jambert, The Act of Being, 192. 
57 Kalin, “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now,” 59. 
58 According to Islamic philosopher Maria Dakake, “Mullā Ṣadrā conceives of the soul as a 
simple, holy and indivisible substance (jawhar) that has its origin in the immutable, immaterial, and purely 
intellectual or angelic realm of the malakut, but which nonetheless also exists in and journeys through the 
world of temporality and change.” See Maria Massi Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh: Substantial Motion and 
Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory of Human Becoming,” The Muslim World, Vol. 94, January 2004, p. 109. 
59  Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 134 and 136. 
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existence, because “the nature of the soul is existence.”60 In Ṣadrā’s words, “In reality, all 
that man conceives or perceives…are not things separate from his essence and different 
from his individual being and substance.”61  The soul is the “substance,”62 and thus, 
acquiring knowledge means a corresponding effusion of Being and the substantial motion 
in the knowing soul. The soul becomes what it knows; its knowledge constitutes its 
being. It is to this process of self-transformation which Nasr alludes to when he states 
that, “Through trans-substantial motion the act of knowing elevates the very existence of 
the knower.”63 
 
Central to the doctrine of the unity of knowledge and being is the principle that 
the ‘form’ of an entity is knowable and represents the reality of the entity.  According to 
Ṣadrā, the form of any entity “is the concrete ground of its quiddity, the completion of its 
reality, and the source of its ultimate differentia.”64 Nasr echoes this view when he states 
that the form of an entity has a finality about it that also contains its meaning just as 
geometric forms like triangles and circles have finalities and meanings associated with 
them. 65In short, the ‘form’ of an entity is its meaning or reality and is not transient. The 
corporeal ‘form’ is nothing but the reflection of the imaginal form. The imaginal form in 
                                                 
60 Moris, Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason,  101. Also, see William Chittick, “On the 
Teleology of Perception,” in Perception According to Mullā Ṣadrā, ed. Seyed G. Safavi (London: Salman-
Azadeh Publication, 2002), 234.  
61 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 159. 
62 Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh,” 107. 
63 Nasr, “Mullā Ṣadrā: His Teachings,” 651;  Also, see Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,” 
235. 
64 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 154. 
65 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On the Question of Biological Origins,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in 
Islam, Science, Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal 
(Alberta, Canada: Al-Qalam Publishing, 2007), 151. 
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turn is nothing but the reflection of the intelligible form in the spiritual or archetypal 
plane, and hence immutable.66  
 
For Ṣadrā, the soul begins its journey as pure potentiality without the knowledge 
of the forms.67 It starts out with three key faculties, the sensus communis (al-hiss), the 
imaginal faculty, and the intellective faculty through which the soul can be gradually 
actualized to finally become like the Active Intellect or the Spirit which possesses the 
realities of all entities.68 The sensus communis gathers the sense data from the outer 
senses to create “whole images or whole impressions.”69 Then by the power of God, 
‘forms’ corresponding to the “whole images” created by sensus communis are created in 
the imaginal and intelligible planes within the soul.70 Once the ‘forms’ are created at the 
same plane of reality as the soul, the soul knows, that is, it is united with these ‘forms’ 
through its imaginal and intellective faculties. 71 Thus, the soul becomes actualized or 
intensified in its being by what it learns through substantial motion.  
 
8.3.4a ‘Matter’ is Unknowable 
                                                 
66 See Chapter 2.2.2. 
67 In summarizing Ṣadrā’s view of the human soul, Chittick states that “The goal of human 
existence is to bring the soul’s potentiality into actuality. At the beginning of its creation, the human self is 
empty of the knowledge of things. In contrast, the other things are created with actualized knowledge of 
things, and this fixes them in their specific identities.” Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,” 232. 
68 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 132; Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,”224. 
69 Caner Dagli, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Epistemology and the Philosophy of Physics,” in Perception According 
to Mullā Ṣadrā, ed. Seyed G. Safavi (London: Salman-Azadeh Publication, 2002), 247. (accent ours) 
70 Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,”234. 
71  Commenting on Ṣadrā’s theory of perception, Chittick notes that “The thing that is perceived is an 
‘intelligible,’ that is, an object known to intelligence. The intelligible is called the ‘form’ (sura) of the 
thing, in the Aristotelian sense of the word form.  Hence it is contrasted with the thing’s ‘matter’ (madda), 
which is unintelligible in itself. The only things we can truly perceive and know are forms, not matter.” 
“On the Teleology of Perception,”222.  
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While forms reflect the meaning and reality of an entity, for Ṣadrā, the ‘matter’ of 
the entity remains unknowable.72 Concurring with the arguments in the mathematician 
and philosopher Wolfgang Smith’s book The Quantum Enigma,73 Caner Dagli, a scholar 
of Ṣadrā, makes a distinction between the corporeal reality and the physical reality of a 
corporeal object. Dagli and Smith agree that corporeal reality comprises of the qualities 
we perceive of an object – colour, shape, beauty, etc. – and the physical reality are made 
up of precise measures of quantitative aspects of the object.74 The purely physical object 
is no more than a construct of numbers signifying height, weight, density, etc., measured 
by physical instruments. Since there does not exist any corporeal object without the 
perceptible qualities, the purely physical object corresponding to the corporeal object 
cannot be perceived and does not really exist.  
 
Concerning the knowledge of ‘matter,’ of a corporeal object, Dagli writes that in 
Ṣadrā’s theory of perception, the sensus communis can only access the corporeal reality, 
not the physical reality.75 Through the sensus communis we perceive the “whole” form 
comprised of the perceptible qualities of a corporeal object, but not either ‘matter’ or the 
corresponding physical object of modern science.  Dagli observes that modern science 
works only with mathematical structures based on quantitative measurements of 
corporeal objects. But when modern science studies non-perceptible objects or objects 
that cannot be humanly perceived  in whole,  it relies on mathematical structures based on 
                                                 
72 Dagli, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Epistemology,” 254-55. Also, see p. 214. 
73 Wolfgang Smith, The Quantum Enigma (Peru, Illinois: Sherwood Sugden and Company, 1995). 
74 Dagli, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Epistemology,” 246. 
75 Ibid., 248. 
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the whole ‘forms’ of  perceptible corporeal objects.76 In other words, in modern science 
‘matter’ is never known or measured. Thus, actual practices in modern science only 
appear to confirm, as Aristotle and traditional Islamic philosophers including Ṣadrā 
maintain, that ‘matter’ is unknowable.77 
 
Ṣadrā’s view of matter’s “unknowability” can help revive the traditional attention 
given to forms which emphasizes the qualitative aspect of things and help resist the 
temptation, encouraged by modern science, to find the meaning of things in their 
quantitative measures or their material constituents. 
 
8.3.5 Substantial Motion and the Imaginal World
78
 
The doctrine of substantial motion plays an essential role in Mullā Ṣadrā’s 
description of the workings of the imaginal world which, according to Nasr, “found its 
most systematic elaboration in Mullā Ṣadrā.”79 By the doctrine of the principiality of 
being, the soul is the principle and substance of the human body.80 The soul is 
transformed by substantial motion caused by what it believes, learns and manifests 
accordingly in character traits.81 That transformation eventually frees the soul from 
                                                 
76 Whole images of electrons, protons, planets, etc. are not perceptible; their behaviour is 
conceptualized in modern science in terms of objects like a sand particle or a ball whose whole images are 
perceptible. See Dagli, “Mullā Ṣadrā’s Epistemology,” 251-53. 
77  For views of al-Fārābī and Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, see Osman Bakar, Classification of Knowledge in 
Islam: A Study in Islamic Philosophies of Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1998), 50-53 
and 251-52. 
78 The imaginal world is the intermediate plane of reality between the corporeal plane and the spiritual 
plane. See Chapter 2.2.2. 
79 Nasr, “Cosmology,” 402. 
80 See section 8.3; Dakake, “Soul as Barzakh,” 107. Ṣadrā points out that the state of the soul is known 
to affect even the physical body.  Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 160. 
81 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 146. 
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materiality, causing the death of the physical body.82  At the moment of this death, the 
accumulated transformation of the soul gives rise, for itself, a sensible imaginal form – 
which could take the form of a non-human being – according to the nature of the soul at 
the point of death.83  
 
After death, the imaginal faculty survives84and allows the soul in its new imaginal 
form to experience the imaginal world – in which hells and heavens manifest – intensely 
because that world is no longer veiled by the material body.85 Most importantly, in 
contrast to the scientistic community’s charges of irrationality and naivety with regards to 
belief in eschatological events, Ṣadrā succeeds in providing a rigorous intellectual 
explanation for the plausibility of heavens, hells, bodily resurrection – in the subtle form 
of an imaginal body – and other eschatological events as described in the Qur’ān and the 
ḥadīth. Ṣadrā demonstrates that scriptural descriptions of reality are not allegorical as 
rationalism would have them reduced to, but as Henry Corbin remarked, they have a 
“literal spiritual truth.”86 
 
8.4 Implications of Mullā Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy 
In summary, Mullā Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy provides profound expositions for 
cause, effect, motion , space, time, form, matter, growth and change – the very 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 139. However, this transformation does not automatically imply that “All human beings... [are] 
moving toward a felicitous end, or toward a subtle form that is analogous to the physical human form they 
enjoy in this life, but [it does mean that] they are all moving toward increasing immateriality and 
independence of the physical body.” Dakake, “Soul as Barzakh,” 125. 
83 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 146-47.   
84 Ibid., 137. 
85 Dakake, “Soul as Barzakh,” 124-125. 
86 Henry Corbin, Alone with the Alone: Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn ‘Arabī, trans. Ralph 
Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 214. Dakake, “The Soul as Barzakh,” 126. 
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parameters of reality that define the scope of the field of modern science – with rational 
arguments for their plausibility. In contrast to modern science, Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy 
affirms the religious vision of the nature of reality. Most importantly, Ṣadrā cogently 
argues that these parameters are determined by the intensity of being present in the 
entities. Thus, in Ṣadrā’s vision of the nature of reality, the focus is always on the being 
of entities, and with regards to human beings, on the perceiving self, which, modern 
science, owing to its Cartesian bias,87 leaves out completely, and which, modern 
technology seriously curtails the participation of.88 
 
Modern science’s objectivity is limited to mathematical speculations or 
representations of physical dimensions measured by instruments where the whole is the 
sum of its parts and the qualitative meanings perceived by the self are meaningless.  By 
the same token, modern science ignores the self by disregarding the perceptions of the 
soul’s imaginal and intellective faculties.  
 
One of the main characteristics of perception through empiricism or scientific 
rationality alone is the view that the world is a conglomeration of distinct entities defined 
by their distinct accidents. In contrast, in Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy, the unitary vision of 
the cosmos becomes clearer as the faculties of the soul that transcend the senses and 
ordinary rational faculty are recognized and allowed to play the defining role.  
 
                                                 
87 Chapter 1.4 and Chapter 6.2.4. 
88 Chapter 7. 
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For Ṣadrā, a thorough understanding of his worldview “requires a pure 
disposition”89 (although this is rarely discussed in Ṣadrā’s writings). To be able to attain 
that disposition, he clearly indicates the necessity to follow the path of self-purification 
like that of Sufism,90 which would include the observance of the Sharī‘ā.91 Indeed, as we 
consider how the Intellect perceives the intelligible forms and transforms our beings, it 
should be recalled that in Sufism the Intellect is associated with the pure heart.92 From the 
Sufi perspective, in addition to the observance of the Sharī‘ā, the heart must be polished 
with the remembrance of God in order for the ‘eye of the heart’, that is, the Intellect, to 
function unobstructed. As such, Ṣadrā brings together the practices of the inner and outer 
dimensions of Islam in the study of nature, and provides a vision of a traditional Islamic 
path that can fulfil personal religious goals on the one hand, and reveal the Truth in 
nature, on the other.  
 
Ṣadrā’s rationale for self-purification as a means for greater knowledge may be 
summarized as follows. Ordinarily, the imaginal and intellective forms produced in the 
soul are only faint reflections of their reality in the outer world.93 But the more one 
engages in seeking the Truth, the more the soul “returns to its essence and [the] less it is 
                                                 
89 Ṣadrā, Huduth, 71 quoted in Kalin, “Will, Necessity, and Creation as Monistic Theophany,” 102. 
90  Ṣadrā clearly indicates the need to follow the guidance of a Sufi master: “...the true verification and 
realization of this goal [of knowing thing as they are] must be sought from those to whom these things have 
been directly unveiled, through extensive consultation and continued personal association with them.” 
Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 190. 
91 Ṣadrā outlines two ways for realizing the truth: 1) The “Path in this world” which requires the need 
to observe the religious Law and following a spiritual guide, 2) “Path of the other world” which relies on 
“contemplative power and its practical intellect.” Ibid., 194-195. Nasr explains that for Ṣadrā “the 
perfection of the practical faculty ...resides in following faithfully the Islamic Divine Law.”  Nasr, 
Traditional Islam in the modern world, 159. 
92 Chapter 3.4. 
93 Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,” 230-31. 
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preoccupied with distractions of this body,”94and “the more manifestly will these 
[imaginal and intellective] forms appear in the soul and the stronger will be their 
being.”95 In short, as one advances on the path for Truth, the intelligible forms 
corresponding to the entities in the cosmos of one’s perception crystallize in the soul and 
constitute one’s being.96  
 
It is important to recall that all entities are Self-disclosures of God in terms of His 
qualities.97 At each higher plane the qualities are more intensely manifested.  In effect, as 
one progresses along the spiritual path one becomes more aware of the spiritual 
dimension of nature, and by the same token, one becomes more aware of one’s own being 
as a focal point for the manifestation of God’s qualities and thus as a sign of His unity. A 
revival of the awareness of the higher dimensions of both the human being and the 
cosmos is, in Nasr’s view, the key to bringing about a harmonious relationship between 
humans and the natural world.   
 
Indeed, seeing the natural environment through the lens of Ṣadrā’s doctrines can 
bring  about a whole new way of understanding the world of nature and its meaning. For 
instance, in the study of natural entities we may focus on the meanings of their ‘forms’ 
rather than on their material composition; the study of the growth and change in nature 
can be understood through substantial motion rather than through the theory of evolution. 
                                                 
94 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 138. Ṣadrā is evidently referring to soul’s turning towards God and 
earnestly following His path; Ṣadrā,  Wisdom of the Throne, 146, 149, 194-97. 
95 Ṣadrā, Wisdom of the Throne, 138. Chittick, “The Teleology of Perception,” 8. 
96 Chittick, “On the Teleology of Perception,” 235; “...the soul is spiritual matter with the capacity of 
receiving and being united with the intellective form, thereby emerging from potency into actuality – or a 
delusive Satanic form, or that of a brutish or a predatory animal.” Ṣadrā, The Wisdom of the Throne, 145.  
97 Chapter 2.2.1a. 
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Time and space may be seen as modalities of our existence rather than independent, 
objective linear realities. The natural sciences developed by Muslims with this worldview 
would be drastically different, and in harmony with the Islamic religion. Nasr hopes that 
Muslims will adopt Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy as the framework for scientific 
investigations of the natural world, and thereby establish new Islamic sciences. He leaves 
the task of establishing these Islamic sciences to the Muslim scientists, philosophers and 
mystics who must take up the necessary studies and the spiritual discipline to bring it 
about. 
 
8.5 Technology based on the new Islamic Science 
Nasr believes that once Muslims have an Islamic science that shares the same 
foundational principles as that of an Islamic natural philosophy, they can develop 
technology that would not have the negative consequences of modern technology.98 
However, in light of Nasr’s elaboration of  the merits of  the traditional tool99 and his 
criticisms of  the machine,100 we can conclude that the technology based on Islamic 
science would have to meet the following basic conditions, a) It must be relatively simple 
such that it does not curtail the participation of the self,  and most of the know-how for a 
given task to be performed with it must reside within the human self; b) It must allow the 
human being close access to the material being worked upon with it; c) It should be 
operated by human hands and feet;  d) If it cannot be directly powered by humans, it must 
be powered by the wind, water and/or sun, in ways that do not harm the natural 
                                                 
98 Seyyed Hossein Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, 
Science, Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, 
Canada: Al-Qalam Publishing, 2007), 58.   
99 See Chapter 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 
100 See Chapter 7.2.1 and 7.2.2. 
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environment.101 These four conditions are meant to bring about a sense of oneness for the 
human being with the technology used, with the material worked on, and with the 
surrounding natural environment. 
 
Since the basic characteristics of the technology of Islamic science would be 
similar to that of traditional technology, Muslims would do well to revive the use of the 
traditional tools wherever possible.  In addition, until the envisioned new ‘Islamic 
technology’ comes about, Nasr recommends that Muslims remain circumspect about 
adopting new technology. In Nasr’s words, “rather than jumping headlong into emulating 
Western science and technology, we must do it where it is absolutely essential, where 
there is no other choice – meanwhile buying for ourselves time to create our own science 
and, insha’Allah, one day our own technology.”102 
 
8.6 The Debate over Islamic Science 
The vast majority of contemporary Muslims, including almost all Muslim 
governments, owing in large measure to the teachings of Muslim modernists and most 
‘fundamentalists,’  believe in the 19th century vision of science as a value-neutral human 
enterprise that is independent of history and culture, and essential for human progress.103 
For them, there can be no such thing as an Islamic science distinct from modern science. 
Much of Nasr’s efforts against the environmental crisis in the Muslim world is geared 
                                                 
101 Nasr emphasizes on remaining within the bounds of Islamic legal principles. Nasr, “Islam, the 
Contemporary Islamic World, and the Environmental Crisis,” 102. One of principles that apply in our case 
is the maxim, “harm may not be negated by inflicting further harm,” that is, one element or species may not 
be harmed in the act of restoring another. See Mawil Izzi Dien, The Environmental Dimension of Islam 
(Cambridge, UK : The Lutterworth Press, 200), 115. 
102 Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 60. 
103 See Chapter 4.  
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towards convincing this group of Muslims that science is not value-neutral, and that blind 
pursuit of  modern science and its applications is bound to cost Muslims not only a 
healthy environment, but Islamic values themselves. Today among the most vocal 
proponents of the view that science is always value-neutral is Pervez Hoodbhoy. 
Interestingly, he does not disagree with Nasr’s arguments but finds him impractical for 
the contemporary world where material power holds sway.104  
 
The next most popular view on science in the Muslim world also owes its 
beginning in the Muslim world to the Salafi reformists in the 19th century. According to 
this view, modern science can prove the veracity of the Qur’ān.105 Nasr is vehemently 
opposed this trend.106 Regrettably, this approach is often championed by the 
‘fundamentalists’ trying to justify the Qur’ān’s validity by contemporary science’s 
conclusions while being unconcerned about the transient and completely secular nature of 
modern science’s worldview. Also, as Kalin has observed, that the doctrine of 
‘underdetermination’ or the fact that a number of different theories can justify the same 
set of experimental data does not strike as a problem for the proponents of this 
approach.107 
 
Some scholars like Leif Stenberg have seen much in common between Nasr’s 
position on Islamic science and that of a group of Muslim scholars collectively known as 
                                                 
104 See Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality 
(London: Zed Books Ltd., 1991), 74-75. 
105 See pp. 154-55. 
106 Nasr, “Islamic worldview and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity, Vol. 7 
(1), 1996, p.11. 
107 Ibrahim Kalin, “Three Views of Science in the Islamic World,” in God, Life and the Cosmos: 
Christian and Islamic Perspectives, eds. Ted Peters, Muzaffar Iqbal and Syed Nomanul Haq 
(Aldershot,UK: Ashgate, 2002),  56. Also, see Chapter 6.2.5. 
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the ‘Ijmalis’ who emphaisze, like the Kuhnians,108 that science is a historical and cultural 
construct.109  However, in our view Ijmalis share little with Nasr. Led by Ziauddin 
Sardar, the Ijmalis has been active since the 1980s in promoting an understanding of 
Islamic science that is difficult to characterize because of many significant internal 
inconsistencies in Sardar’s attempt to define it.   
 
In his most extensive effort at a definition yet, Sardar seeks to define Islamic 
science as a “subjectively objective enterprise: objective solutions to normative goals and 
problems are sought within an area mapped out by eternal values and concepts of 
Islam.”110 The “objective solutions” are pursued by multiple methods “each as rigorous as 
the other”111 and “complementary”112 which includes not only empirical observation but 
also Sufism.113 Thus, Islamic science employs methods that can obtain “every form of 
knowledge from pure observation to highest metaphysics”114 which for Sardar are of 
“equal status.”115  The subjective aspect of this enterprise involves in Muslims pursuing 
their goals “subservient”116 to “values and concepts” of Islam.117  
 
While, according to Sardar’s own definition, the way of Sufism is as objective as 
the empirical method of science, he seems quite out of step with the traditional Islamic 
                                                 
108 See Chapter 6.1. 
109 Leif Stenberg, “The Islamization of Science or the Marginalization of Islam: The Positions of 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Ziauddin Sardar,” Social Epistemology, x, ¾, 1996, 273-87. 
110 See Ziauddin Sardar, Explorations in Islamic Science (London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1989), 
108. 
111 Ibid., 86 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., 82. 
115 Ibid., 83. (accent ours) 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 108. 
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understanding of the hierarchy of reality and knowledge which is central to Sufism as 
well as in Islamic philosophy and theology. Apparently, Sardar confuses  the validity of 
different methodologies practiced in Islamic traditional sciences with giving equal status 
to the knowledge obtained by them.  For instance, salvation in Islam is not conditional 
upon the knowledge of physical properties of the world, as much as upon the knowledge 
of God’s will and wisdom or upon the very “values and concepts of Islam” that Sardar 
believes all other concerns should be subservient to. This lack of appreciation of the 
hierarchy of knowledge and reality makes him equate the knowledge obtained by 
empirical methods with that obtained in the Sufi way of purification of the heart.  
  
Contrary to Nasr, Sardar speaks of reviving the “holistic” nature of Islam without 
grounding it, in Islam’s doctrine of wholeness or tawḥīd and without upholding the Sufi 
method of its realization as proposed by Sardar’s model Muslim intellectual Abū Ḥāmid 
al-Ghazzālī.118 He acknowledges no shift in worldview that distinguishes modern science 
from the Islamic sciences of the middle ages. Instead, he believes that his “subjectively 
objective” Islamic science can materialize only when more of modern science will help to 
bring about the wholeness of Islam through greater ijtihād.119 In the end, the Ijmali 
position on Islamic science is not Islamic in itself. For them, science is Islamic so far as it 
is used by Muslim individuals to secure Islamic goals within the context of a culture. In 
the final analysis, their view of science hardly differs from that represented by Pervez 
Hoodbhoy.  Ijmalis, as represented by Sardar, seem unconcerned, like those represented 
                                                 
118 Sardar, Ziauddin. “Beyond the troubled relationship,” Nature, Vol 448, 12 July 2007, 131-32. On 
Sardar’s taking Al-Ghazzālī  as an inspiration, see Stenberg, “The Islamization of Science or the 
Marginalization of  Islam,” 85. 
119 Sardar, Ziauddin. “How to take Islam back to reason,” Newstatesman, 5 April 2004, 29-30.  
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by Hoodbhoy, with the anti-religious philosophical foundations of modern science itself 
which is of fundamental concern to Nasr, not only for the sake of the environment, but 
also for the preservation of Islamic values in Muslim societies.  
 
8.7 Reform of Educational Institutions 
Nasr is not opposed to the study of modern science but he is critical of the fact 
that authentic metaphysical principles which could mark science’s limits and guide its 
course of development, are not recognized by it.120  He freely admits that modern science 
has learned much about the material realm that can be of value.121  But in order for 
Muslims to determine the future course of modern science in an Islamic way, Nasr 
believes that the following conditions need to be fulfilled: 
 
a) Muslims must be thoroughly versed in the Islamic intellectual tradition, 
particularly on a traditional natural philosophy, and preferably that of 
Ṣadrā.122 
b) Muslims must master the modern sciences both in the theoretical and applied 
level.123 
c) Muslims must be able to provide a systematic critique of modern scientific 
worldview from the perspective of the Islamic natural philosophy. 
                                                 
120 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Man and Nature: The Spiritual Crisis in Modern Man (ABC International 
Group, Inc., 1997), 114-129. 
121 Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,” 133. 
122 Nasr,“Islamic Worldview and Modern Science,” 15. 
123 Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,” 131. 
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d) Finally, Muslims must integrate the observational aspects of modern science 
by reinterpreting the observations in light of the doctrines of Islamic natural 
philosophy.124 Only then can an Islamic science emerge.  
    
The Islamic intellectual critique of the modern scientific worldview is essential 
for the success of other proposed measures. The critique would clear the intellectual 
climate which would subsequently enable the public and the governments to be more 
judiciously circumspect of modern science and its machines, not only for their obvious 
destructive effects on the natural world, but also for their effects of dispersing the soul 
and desacralising the natural world. 
 
The current situation of educational institutions in the Muslim world makes 
Nasr’s vision seem quite improbable.125 However, Nasr is still hopeful that Muslim 
intellectuals will see where the current trend is leading the society and will make a 
concerted effort to amend the situation. How then should the Muslim world proceed? For 
Nasr, curriculums must be reformed both in the madrasahs and in other educational 
institutions in the Muslim world such that modern sciences are studied there within the 
framework of Islamic intellectual tradition.126 He is confident that once Muslims become 
more knowledgeable of the Islamic intellectual perspectives, they would be more 
                                                 
124 For instance, he suggests that Muslim scientists reinterpret quantum mechanics not on the basis of 
Cartesian bifurcation, as it has been done, but rather “in a metaphysical way.” Nasr, “Islam, Science, and 
Muslims,” 58 and 79. 
125 “The mindset of graduates of institutions of natural/physical and social sciences in the Muslim 
World does not differ significantly from that of graduates of institutions in the West. Muslim politicians, 
lawyers, economists, scientists, health care professionals, etc., deal with all problems – even those peculiar 
to the Muslim World – through approaches and methods developed in Europe or the United States.” 
Suleman Dangor, “Islamization of Disciplines,”520. 
126 Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 9-11. 
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resistant to scientism. This method of using Islamic metaphysical criteria rooted in the 
Qur’ān as a basis of criticizing the sciences is in harmony with the traditional Islamic 
method of acquiring knowledge.127   
 
The reforms of these educational institutions would result in a gradual elimination of 
the dual systems of secular and religious education which have existed in the Islamic 
world since the colonial era.128 Numerous prominent Islamic scholars and educationists 
such as Syed M.N. al-Attas(1931-2010) and Syed Ali Ashraf(1931-98) severely criticized 
this dual system, which, in Nasr’s words, “creates a society divided against itself.”129 
Moreover, Nasr argues that just as traditional madrasahs of the past which produced 
“philosophers and scientists as well as jurists, the men of letters and the experts in other 
fields of knowledge,”130 only institutions which can impart knowledge of the Islamic 
intellectual perspectives can again serve as the basis for addressing the modern 
                                                 
127 Summarizing traditional Islamic epistemology, moral educationist J. Mark Halstead highlights that 
in it “All knowledge ... should ultimately serve to make people aware of God and of their relationship with 
God. Revealed knowledge provides an essential foundation for all other knowledge and people are free to 
pursue any branch of knowledge only insofar as they remain loyal to the divine injunctions contained in the 
Qur’ān and the Sharī‘ā.” J. Mark Halstead, “An Islamic concept of education,” Comparative Education, 
Vol. 40, No. 4, November 2004, pp. 524-525.  
128 The European colonial administrators imbued by the Enlightenment doctrines believed in separation 
of strictly religious subjects from that of natural sciences. Accordingly, in colonial India, British 
administrators established secular schools which aimed at excluding teaching anything founded on a 
religious worldview.  In tandem, available government jobs favoured those educated at such secular 
schools. In response  madrasahs themselves reformed in ways  that appear to have been a factor in 
abandoning education in Islamic philosophy with its inherent traditional cosmology, and traditional 
medicine and astronomy closely associated with that cosmology. Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in 
Contemporary Islam (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Chapter 3. 
129Nasr,  A Young Muslim’s Guide, 129. According to Nasr, modern Western philosophical ideas 
generally have no connection with the ethos of Islamic cultures themselves, but are more associated with 
relativism and humanism rooted in rationalism and scientism. In effect, they contribute to a rupture 
between western educated classes and the society at large. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Pertinence of Studying 
Islamic Philosophy Today,” in  Islamic Life and Thought, no editor ( ABC International Group, Inc., 2001), 
147. For a good discussion of this dual system of education and its consequences on the Muslim world, see 
Suleman Dangor, “Islamization of Disciplines: Towards an indigenous educational system,” Educational 
Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 37, No.4, 2005, pp. 519-525.  
130 Nasr,Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 139. 
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challenges from the Islamic perspective.131 Nasr’s proposal for reform of existing 
educational institutions can be summarized as follows: 
1) Revival of the madrasah curriculum along traditional lines which would include 
teaching of logic, mathematics, Islamic philosophy and metaphysics, along with 
teaching the Qur’ān, ḥadīth, and the Sharī‘ā.132 
2) Inclusion of the modern sciences in madrasah education along with an Islamic 
critique of the modern sciences.133 
3) Integrating traditional madrasah education within modern universities in the 
Muslim world which, up until now, have largely followed the Western curriculum 
and pedagogy.134 
 
                                                 
131 In this connection, we should note that David Orr, a distinguished scholar of environmentalism, 
suggests that it is the graduates of modern education who are largely responsible for the perpetuation of an 
industrial culture which is causing the degradations of the environment: “It is worth noting that this 
[environmental degradation] is not the work of ignorant people. It is rather, largely the result of work by 
people with BA, BSs, LLBs, MBA, and PhDs.” David Orr, “What is Education For?” in Annals of Earth, 
Vol. 8, No. 2 (1990) quoted in Fazlun Khalid, “Applying Islamic Environmental Ethics,” in 
Environmentalism in the Muslim World, ed. Richard C. Foltz (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2005), 
100. 
132 Nasr “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 61.  Nasr points out that unlike in other parts of the Muslim 
world, in the Persian world madrasahs never completely abandoned teaching Islamic philosophy. Based on 
an authoritative article by Muḥammad Tāhir Tabarsī, one of the leading Islamic philosophers in the 
twentieth century, Nasr provides a list of texts used in Persian madrasahs prior to 1938 including those on 
philosophy, logic, Sufism, medicine and mathematics. See Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 
Chapter 10.   Further east, from early in the eighteenth century the Dars-e-Nizami curriculum which 
includes Islamic philosophy has been the basis of madrasah education throughout the South Asia even 
though over the last 200 years most of the madrasahs dropped Islamic philosophy from their curriculum.. 
See Douglas Johnston, Azhar Hussain and Rebecca Catildi, Madrasa Enhancement and Global Security 
(International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, 2008). Also, see p.301 n128. 
133 Nasr criticizes the modernized Muslims who simply complain that the ulama do not understand the 
modern world, because as he points out, the modernized classes have already been convinced of the 
superiority of the modern West, and therefore, have not helped the ulama to learn about the modern world 
in a way that would not undermine the objectives of the traditional education system. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 2nd edition (ABC International, 2001), 203. What the modernized 
classes have failed to do, for lack of their own knowledge of the riches of Islamic intellectual heritage, is to 
extend the madrasah programme “to embrace courses which would acquaint the students with the modern 
world” while appraising it thoroughly and critically from Islamic intellectual perspectives. Ibid. 
134 Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 61-62. 
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Nasr contends that the so-called Islamic universities founded in Muslim countries 
since the late seventies, which seek to Islamize what Muslims learn135 have not succeeded 
in providing a true Islamic response to modern thought because these universities have 
excluded Islamic philosophy, metaphysics and other related intellectual disciplines like 
cosmology from their curriculums.136 In any proposed curriculum in Islamic institutions, 
Nasr insists that Islamic philosophy and metaphysics, which form the heart of traditional 
philosophy,137 must be included.138  
 
For those who question the relevance of Islamic philosophy today, Nasr makes many 
cogent arguments.  He argues that Islamic philosophy provides profound answers to the 
perennial questions of human life – such as questions regarding human origin, nature, 
                                                 
135 For a summary of the Islamization of the knowledge initiative by contemporary Islamic scholars, 
see Dangor, “Islamization of Disciplines,” 525-527.  
136 Nasr,“Islam, Science and Muslims,”62. In describing the curriculums at Islamic universities, Nasr 
says, “You may teach Sharī‘ā on side, and modern science, modern sociology and modern economics on 
the other side. And then this is called an Islamic university, but this is not an Islamic university. An Islamic 
university is a university where all subjects are viewed in the perspective of Islam.” Ibid., 62. 
Islamic universities established since the late 1970s with the purpose of Islamizing knowledge generally do 
not offer courses in Islamic philosophy or Sufism. Notable exceptions are a handful of Islamic universities 
and colleges in Malaysia and Indonesia. Among these, the most successful has been the International 
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) at the International Islamic University of  Malaysia 
(IIUM). Commenting on efforts at providing an Islamic education at Egyptian institutions, Bradley Cook 
notes, “the current fragmentation and superficial mixture of secularized and religious courses in Egypt’s 
public education system is completely alien to the fundamental principle of tawhid.”  Bradley Cook, 
“Islamic versus Western conceptions of education: Reflections on Egypt,” in International Review of 
Education, 45(3/4), 1999, p. 344. To the best of our knowledge, this assessment applies to most modern 
institutions in the Muslim world even when they are known as Islamic institutions. 
137 Nasr explains the centrality of metaphysics in Islamic philosophy by the fact that “nearly every 
treatise on traditional philosophy deals with transcendent origin and end of things.” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 
“Islamic Philosophy – Reorientation or Re-understanding,” in  Islamic Life and Thought, no editor ( ABC 
International Group, Inc., 2001), 154. 
138 Nasr,“Islam, Science and Muslims,”62. Nasr explains that importance of Islamic philosophy is 
precisely because of its association with metaphysics which is essential to understand and respond to the 
many intellectual challenges, one of which concerns the relation between science and religion, faced by 
Muslims in the modern world. See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Theoretical Gnosis and Doctrinal Sufism and 
their Significance Today,” in Transcendent Philosophy, Vol. 6, Dec 2005, pp. 25-26. Among the foremost 
proponents of Islamization of knowledge, Syed M.N. Al-Attas also emphasizes the need to include 
elements of Sufism and Islamic philosophy in any Islamic educational curriculum. See Syed Muhammad 
Naquib al-Attas,  Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and 
Civilization, 1993), 157.  
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purpose, his relation to the universe, and those that concern the nature of reality and 
therefore science – which are at once in harmony with the teachings of the Qur’ān and 
Ḥadīth.139In particular, Nasr suggests that the modern ideas of “evolutionism, 
rationalism, existentialism, agnosticism, and the like”140 are philosophical challenges 
because they are influenced directly or indirectly by the modern scientific worldview and 
because they also answer the essential perennial questions in their own way. These 
modern ideologies thus require philosophical counter-arguments. They cannot be 
addressed by “juridical” dictates, as “fundamentalists” try to do.141  
 
By nature, humans are never without interest for answers to the perennial questions.  
This fundamental interest is always fulfilled by one or other sources. For example, while 
Islamic philosophy is largely ignored in modern universities in the Islamic world, modern 
Western philosophy is studied avidly.142 But Nasr contends that without the knowledge of 
Islamic intellectual perspectives, Muslim students “are like tabula rasa waiting to receive 
some kind of impression from the West,”143 unable to critically appraise what they 
receive. In other words, without a philosophical understanding of Islamic principles, 
Muslims cannot know with confidence what to accept or reject of ideas originating from 
non-Islamic sources. 
 
                                                 
139 Nasr, “Islamic Philosophy – Reorientation or Re-understanding,”, 155; Nasr, Traditional Islam 
in the Modern World, 160. 
140 Ibid., 109. 
141 Ibid. 
142  Nasr, “Pertinence of Studying Islamic Philosophy Today,” 145-46. 
143 Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 208. 
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Nasr argues that the lack of interest in Islamic philosophy is also due to the 
misconception –among many Western orientalist scholars and their Muslim students – 
that Islamic philosophical activities ceased with Ibn Rushd, the last of the major Islamic 
peripatetic philosophers. 144 Nasr himself has played a major role in drawing attention to 
the fact that new philosophical schools impregnated with Islamic metaphysical intuitions 
flourished in the Eastern lands of Islam which eventually produced figures like Mullā 
Ṣadrā (d.1640) whose school of philosophy survives to this day especially in Iran.145 In 
this connection, Nasr believes that one of the many positive effects of studying Ṣadrā’s 
natural philosophy is that Muslims would recognize that Islamic intellectual activity did 
not end seven hundred years ago. To the contrary, students of Ṣadrā would know that an 
immensely rich current of Islamic philosophy still survives and has the potential to 
effectively respond to many contemporary intellectual challenges.146  
 
Finally, in Nasr’s view, Islamic philosophy is relevant for those whose faith has been 
weakened by modern education and who are more open to philosophical arguments than 
to the assertions of scriptures: “Religious arguments can be presented only to those who 
already possess faith. Of what use is it to cite a particular chapter from the Qur’ān to 
                                                 
144 Nasr, “Pertinence of Studying Islamic Philosophy Today,” 147-48. 
145 For instance 'Allāmah Sayyid Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī (1892-1981) was a major representative 
of  this school of Islamic philosophy. In this regard, Nasr’s efforts began with his Three Muslim Sages and 
later Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and his Transcendent Theosophy: Background, Life and Works introducing, from 
a traditional Islamic perspective, the English-speaking world to Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, Ibn Arabi and Mullā 
Ṣadrā from the traditional Islamic perspective. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages (New York: 
Caravan Books, 1964); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Sad al-Din Shirazi and his Transcendent Theosophy: 
Background, Life and Works (Tehran, Iran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1978); For Nasr’s 
seminal contribution on the Qur’ān’s central place in Ṣadrā’s philosophy, see Mohammed Rustom, 
“Approaching Mullā Ṣadrā as Scriptural Exegate: A Survey of Scholarship on His Qur’ānic Works,” 
Comparative Islamic Studies 4.1-2 (2008), pp. 78-79; Also, see Steven Blackburn, review of Islamic 
Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy by S.H. Nasr, State 
University of New York Press, 2006,  Religion and Theology, 14:3 (2007), p.438.  
146 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “The Life, Doctrines and Significance of Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (Mullā 
Ṣadrā),” in  Islamic Life and Thought, no editor ( ABC International Group, Inc., 2001), 165. 
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refute an idea held by someone who does not accept the authority of the Qur’ān to start 
with.”147 
 
With regards to pedagogy, Nasr strongly recommends transferring the madrasah’s 
emphasis on cultivating spiritual virtues to the modern educational institutions.148 An 
important part of this emphasis on virtue is to ensure that the teachers chosen can serve as 
exemplary role models in character.149 Nasr’s insistence on including philosophy in the 
madrasah and in modern institutions is also relevant in this regard because Islamic 
philosophers at large considered the perfection of the soul to be the ultimate purpose of 
philosophy.150  
 
Efforts to include Islamic metaphysics, cosmology, and ethics in the study of the 
sciences and their applications are already underway by Islamic scholars who have been 
inspired by Nasr’s vision, most notably by Osman Bakar. Bakar designed a course 
syllabus with that purpose151 which has been implemented at the International Islamic 
University of Malaysia (IIUM) since 1992 and has been partially adopted by the 
                                                 
147 Nasr, Islam and the Plight of Modern Man, 211. 
148  Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, 123; Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 61. 
Nasr insists that the spiritual dimension of madrasah education, though weakened, is still very much alive. 
According to Nasr, in recent decades some new madrasahs in Iran have been established which teach “the 
intellectual and spiritual aspects of Islam, and not only the legal training.” Ibid., 61. The continuation of 
intellectual vitality elsewhere has also been brought to light in the last few years by a description of life at 
the Nadwat al-Ulama madrasah in India at the end of the twentieth century. See Mohammed Akram an-
Nadwi, Madrasah Life (London: Turath Publishing, 2007). 
149 For more on the ideal role of the teacher in the Islamic education system as a paragon of virtue, 
see A.H. Tamuri, “Islamic Education teachers’ perceptions of the teaching of akhlaq in Malaysian 
secondary schools,” Journal of Moral Education, Vol. 36, No.3, September 2007, p. 376. 
150 Nasr draws attention to this aspect in the philosophy of Ikhwan al-Safa, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi 
and Mullā Ṣadrā. See Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World, Chapter 9: 147-63. 
151  Osman Bakar, “Designing a Sound Syllabus for Courses on Philosophy of Applied and/or 
Engineering Sciences in the 21st Century Islamic University,” in The History and Philosophy of Islamic 
Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts Society, 1999), Chapter 11: 243-52. 
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University of Technology of Malaysia (UTM).152 Bakar has also designed a similar post-
graduate programme with focus on the environment for the Department of Science and 
Technology Studies at the University of Malaya.  
 
Outside Malaysia, Bakar’s syllabus has been recommended by the Ministry of 
Education of Iran since the 1990s. Also, according to Nasr, recently at the Sharif 
University, Iran’s most prestigious school of science and technology, a new PhD 
programme for Islamic Philosophy of Science has been opened partly due to his own 
initiatives when he served as its vice-chancellor in the 1970s.153 Nasr holds that such 
attempts to integrate modern science within Islamic worldview would be helped also by a 
revival of intellectual debates between scholars, mystics and scientists in order to create 
what Osman Bakar has called a “knowledge culture”, similar to that of the epoch when 
the Islamic world was the leader in philosophy and science.154 
 
In the spirit of his Traditionalist perspective, Nasr believes that each religious 
tradition should seek to restore its religious worldview through recourse to sapiential 
commentaries of its sacred texts.155 In this regard, in the non-Islamic world, he believes 
that his thought most closely correlates with that of the Eastern Orthodox theologian 
                                                 
152 Information on the implementations of Bakar’s syllabus is based on conversations with Prof. 
Osman Bakar by telephone. 22 November 2010. 
153 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islam and the Environment,” Lecture delivered at the Georgetown 
University School of Foreign Service, Qatar, 26 January, 2009.  
154 Nasr, “Islam and the Problem of Modern Science,”134; Nasr,Traditional Islam in the Modern 
World, 206-207; Osman Bakar, “Islam, Science and Technology: Past Glory, Present Preicaments and The 
Shaping of the Future,” in The History and Philosophy of Islamic Science (Cambridge, UK: Islamic Texts 
Society, 1999), 241-42. 
155 See Chapter 1.7.  Nasr clearly relies on the views of such traditional authorities as al- Ghazzālī, 
Ibn ‘Arabī and Mullā Ṣadrā who in turn base their doctrines on the Qur’ān and Hadīth. 
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Philip Sherrard (1922-95).156  Though Nasr may not have been his inspiration, Sherrard 
referred to Nasr’s Encounter of Man and Nature in his much later work The Rape of Man 
and Nature approvingly,157and he has been closely associated with Traditionalist 
thinkers.158 Most importantly, just as Nasr recommends Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy for an 
Islamic science, Sherrard calls for the creation of a unified science within the conceptual 
framework of Christian metaphysics of nature as articulated by the renowned Catholic 
philosopher and mystic Oscar Milosz (1877-1939).  Milosz rejected modern scientific 
notions of space as absolute and of time extending into infinity.159 He sought to redefine 
space, matter and time as identical in the sense of being transmutation of archetypes in 
the incorporeal light of God who alone is absolute and infinite.160 As with Ṣadrā, there is 
a recognition in Milosz’s vision of the origin of everything in the archetypes in God, and 
of time and space as illusions by themselves. However, we think Milosz’s natural 
philosophy is not nearly as rationally argued or explicable as Ṣadrā’s is, and other 
Christian mystics and thinkers must show us more clearly how a Christian sacred science 
may materialize out of Milosz’s essential vision. Nevertheless, Sherrard’s efforts are a 
                                                 
156 Based on a conversation with Nasr at the George Washington University, USA. 13 August, 
2009. 
157 Philip Sherrard, The Rape of Man and Nature (Ipswich, UK: Golgonooza Press, 1987), 122 
n51.  For Nasr’s views on Sherrard, see Nasr,  Religion and the Order of Nature, 201-205. 
158  Two recent edited volumes consisting mostly of essays by well-known Traditionalist thinkers  
include essays by Sherrard. See Philip Sherrard, “Modern Science and the Dehumanization of Man,” in The 
Underlying Religion: An Introduction to the Perennial Philosophy, eds. Martin Lings and Clinton Minnaar 
(Bloomington, Indiana: World Wisdom, 2007), 70-91 and Sherrad, “Epilogue,” in The Betrayal of 
Tradition, ed. Harry Oldmeadow (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2005), 359-64.  Indeed, Sherrard’s 
critique of modern science is as scathing as Nasr’s, and like him, he sees no possibility of harmony between 
the modern scientific and religious views of nature. He calls for the revival of a sacred view of nature based 
on Christian scriptures and their sapiental commentaries, especially those of St. Maximus the Confessor 
(580-662). See Sherrard, Rape of man and Nature, 68-71. On Sherrard’s rejection of the theory of 
evolution, see Philip Sherrard, Human Image: World Image (Golgonooza Press, 1992), Chapter 3: 56-76. 
159 Sherrard, Human Image: World Image, 134-35. 
160 Ibid., 142-43. 
 309
necessary first step that may help others to find a way forward in the Christian world with 
the vision of a Christian science for nature.  
 
  With regards to contemporary Muslim governments, Nasr asserts that they do not 
understand the importance of reviving the Islamic intellectual tradition.  But if an effort is 
successful in the sense that it begins to draw attention at home and abroad, the 
governments may be convinced of its relevance. In describing his own efforts to revive 
the Islamic intellectual tradition by establishing the Iranian Academy of Philosophy in the 
1970s, Nasr recalls that when the academy began to show “remarkable 
accomplishments…Many people in Iran, even the government, who were sceptical about 
it, were very surprised, and soon very supportive.”161 Indeed, Nasr’s interest in 
educational reforms is more than theoretical. As the distinguished Islamic scholar Jane 
Smith notes, in many of his contributions on Islamic education “he demonstrates his 
immediate concern for working at the grassroots level on issues of educational planning 
and developing teacher training curricula.”162 
 
As for Muslims in the West, Nasr advocates first the formation of small institutes that 
can be easily managed, and later, the establishments of larger institutes of learning that 
can have more outreach and influence.163  Nasr believes that small institutes run by 
competent Islamic intellectuals with the traditional perspective can educate bright new 
                                                 
161 Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 63-64. 
162 Jane I. Smith, “Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Defender of the Sacred and Islamic Traditionalism,” in 
The Muslims of America, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 90.  
163 Nasr, “Islam, Science, and Muslims,” 64-65. 
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students each year and thus produce, over time, a cadre of teachers that can later impart 
their knowledge of Islamic intellectual perspectives to larger institutes of learning.164 
 
Nasr argues that just as the secularization from the Renaissance onward began with a 
handful of figures, and just as the secularization of the Muslim world began with just a 
few Western influenced Muslim thinkers, a small number of Muslim thinkers today can 
bring about a new paradigm over time.165 This paradigm-shifting small group of 
Muslims, however, must not only have deep knowledge of Islam’s inner dimension 
including the metaphysics of nature, but must also understand the modern world.166  
 
8.8 Chapter Summary 
Nasr envisions the establishment of a new Islamic science that is based on Mullā 
Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy. Being, or the self, which is of Divine origin, is at the core of 
this philosophy. At the same time, the envisioned Islamic science would address critical 
philosophical questions on the parameters of modern science, namely cause, effect, 
matter, form, space, time and change, rationally, without ignoring or contradicting 
fundamental principles of religion. For Nasr, this new Islamic science would be the 
ultimate answer to the problem of the desacralisation of nature by modern science.  
 
                                                 
164 Ibid. 
165 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “On the Environmental Crisis,” interview by Muzaffar Iqbal, in Islam, 
Science, Muslims, and Technology: Seyyed Hossein Nasr in Conversation with Muzaffar Iqbal (Alberta, 




Nasr is confident that with the educational reforms, an intellectual climate for the 
re-evaluation of modern science would be created, and it would thus become possible to 
establish the new Islamic science in time. The reform would involve the integration of 
modern scientific studies with Islamic metaphysics and philosophy, thereby enabling 
Muslims to critically analyse the foundation and objectives of modern science. 
Ultimately, these reforms would allow the Islamic world to realize the destructive 
consequences of modern science on nature and the soul, and establish a comprehensive 
science rooted in Islamic natural philosophy.  
 
To be sure, establishing the Islamic science is not the main objective in Nasr’s 
strategy against the environmental crisis; it is only the ultimate means of countering the 
“corroding effect” of modern science on Islamic worldview. The proposed educational 
reforms with emphasis on traditional metaphysics and philosophy is intended to  also help 
Muslims have a renewed grasp that spiritual perfection, and not material accumulation, 
ought to be the purpose of their life again as it was in the pre-modern days.167 That 
reorientation of the Muslims’ purpose and their rediscovery of Sufism as the way to 
fulfilling that purpose is Nasr’s main objective in the face of the environmental crisis. 
Without that reorientation of the purpose of life, the current focus on economic growth 
and the consequent exploitation of nature is likely to continue, and the proposed Islamic 
science can only remain as a dream. 
                                                 
167 For our discussion of the prevalence of Sufism in Islamic world before the advent of scientific 
progressivism, see Chapter 4.1.1. Similarly, in the pre-modern Europe, nature was seen as a sign of God, 
and moral or spiritual perfection, rather than “progress through material accumulation,” was seen as the 
















































As discussed in Chapter 1, Nasr considers the modern scientific worldview, rooted in 
rationalism and empiricism, to be the fundamental cause of the scientism and scientific 
progressivism which has resulted in the environmental crisis.   
 
In epistemological terms, Nasr points to the denial of revelation as a source of objective 
knowledge of nature and the denial of the existence of the Intellect as a faculty of perception higher 
than that of ordinary reason – the denials which characterise rationalism and scientific rationality – 
as the roots of scientific progressivism.  This epistemic reorientation from the pre-modern age 
ignores three perennial metaphysical principles inherent in world religions: the unity of reality, the 
hierarchy of reality, and the meaningfulness or purposefulness of nature in the ultimate sense. Nasr 
speaks of the spiritual impoverishment of human consciousness resulting from this shift in 
worldview and its catastrophic consequences on nature.   
 
According to Nasr, the solution to this crisis is the revival of a worldview that upholds the 
perennial principles. Hence, this solution does not consist of a cost-benefit analysis of different 
external measures to reduce environmental degradation. Rather, it hopes to persuade people to 
transform their vision of nature from being a source of mere biological sustenance or emotional 
pleasure to one of sacred presence that is ontologically related to us. For Nasr, the kind of vision of 
nature we hold is crucial because one’s thoughts and actions are inevitably shaped by one’s view of 




In what follows, we will highlight the main features of Nasr’s whole approach to the 
environmental crisis for the Islamic world. This will follow a brief discussion of how we have 
fulfilled our thesis objectives and our final reflections on Nasr’s approach.   
 
9.1 Summary of Nasr’s Approach for the Islamic World 
Nasr's response to the environmental crisis focuses on the way modern science ignores the 
essential principles of Islam for reality as such, namely the reality and unity of God, hierarchy of 
reality, and the purposefulness of nature in the ultimate sense. He suggests ways to restore those 
principles in the consciousness of Muslims in their interactions with nature, noting that the full 
import of these principles can be found only in metaphysics, as discussed in Chapter 2.  Without 
the certitude of metaphysical principles, Nasr maintains in Chapter 3, an Islamic ethics of nature 
would lack solid foundations. Moreover, without such certitude Islamic ethics would remain 
vulnerable to scientism, which renders nature meaningless beyond its physical reality. But what 
approach to knowledge can confirm the reality of the metaphysical principles? As discussed in 
chapter 3, Nasr suggests Sufism, as a way of purifying the heart and enabling the direct perception 
of higher realities beyond the corporeal world.  In Nasr's view, traditional metaphysics, in the 
deepest sense, is knowledge that can be perceived not by ordinary or scientific rationality, but by 
the Intellect or the ‘eye of the heart’ that, in Islam, can be unveiled through the Sufi way. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, Nasr’s criticisms of modern science and his arguments for the 
relevance of metaphysics and Sufism in any comprehensive approach to protect the environment 
are a response to Muslim modernist and ‘fundamentalist’ espousal of scientific progressivism. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Nasr’s strategy involves highlighting the integral role of the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See p.45. 
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aforementioned metaphysical principles in the traditional Islamic sciences so as to refute modernist 
and fundamentalist conviction that modern sciences are simply advanced versions of traditional 
sciences. More importantly, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7, he demonstrates that contrary to the 
modernist and fundamentalist claims, neither modern science nor technology are value-neutral.  
Rather, they are agents of takthīr – the means for a fragmented vision of reality – which hinder the 
realization of tawḥīd, the principles of a hierarchy of reality, and the meaning or purpose of the 
cosmos in the ultimate sense.  Nasr’s immediate recommendations, discussed in Chapter 7, consist 
of three essential measures: (a) choosing the least destructive from among the available modern 
technologies, (b) pursuing technological fixes as in the West,2 and most importantly, (c) resorting 
to traditional tools or simple technologies and traditional modes of production wherever possible. 
 
For a permanent solution to the problems created by modern science, Nasr proposes an 
Islamic science to substitute for it. The proposed Islamic science would reverse the takthīr 
engendering effect of modern science by its focus on the being of all things, including the 
perceiving self, without forgetting ‘the transcendent unity of Being’ (waḥdat al-wujūd). Nasr hopes 
that the metaphysical framework of Ṣadrā, whose brief outline is presented in Chapter 8, would be 
used by Muslims well-trained in modern science as the lens through which to reinterpret all the 
findings of that science, thereby bringing about a truly Islamic science. 
 
Nasr recognizes that for Muslims at large, to appreciate the criticisms of modern science 
and technology, and to turn away from them, the aforementioned criticisms as well as the 
significance of the religious worldview must be persuasive.  Additionally, the proposed Islamic 
science could only develop within a religious worldview which in turn this science would come to 
                                                 
2 See Introduction 0.8. 
315 
 
uphold. For Nasr, achieving those objectives on the part of the masses would require reforms in 
educational institutions, as discussed in Chapter 8.  The proposed reforms call for instructions in 
Islamic philosophy and metaphysics, and with insights acquired from there, a thorough critique of 
the modern scientific worldview and the concomitant scientific progressivism which prevails 
today. In Nasr's view, such a critique would be the first step in clearing the way for a revival of a 
religious worldview that upholds the metaphysical principles of Islam in Muslims’ view of nature. 
The overall goal of Nasr’s strategy is to confront the environmental crisis by rendering 
contemporary Muslims free from scientism, and in making them more mindful of their religious 
purpose and of the spiritual significance of nature in fulfilling that purpose.  
 
9.2 Thesis Objectives and Results 
 As stated in the Introduction, our objective has been to provide a systematic and comprehensive 
presentation of Nasr’s traditional Islamic response to the environmental crisis for the Muslim 
world. We set out to accomplish this with two guiding questions:  1) what do we need to know to 
best appreciate Nasr’s approach to the environmental crisis? 2) How does Nasr’s vision reflect his 
adherence to traditional Islamic thought?  
 
Accordingly, we have brought together Nasr’s views on the environmental crisis from 
diverse sources and put them into context with relevant discussions of the perennial philosophy, 
Western intellectual history, the Islamic intellectual tradition, the history of the Muslim reformist 





In the Introduction and in Chapter 2, we demonstrated that his adherence to the perennial 
philosophy does not conflict with his adherence to traditional Islamic worldview because three 
fundamental Islamic metaphysical principles for reality as such – unity of reality, hierarchy of 
reality, and ultimate meaningfulness or purposefulness of the universe – are identical to those of 
the perennial philosophy. Rather, the perennial philosophy allows his approach to be relevant 
across non-Islamic religions as well. 
 
In order to demonstrate the traditional Islamic character of Nasr’s approach, we have 
shown how his arguments conform to the views of the grand authorities of traditional Islamic 
theology, metaphysics, science and philosophy, namely al-Ghazzālī, Ibn ‘Arabī, Ibn Sīnā and 
Mullā Ṣadrā. We have done this with relevant discussions on the following topics: a) In Chapters 2 
and 3, Islamic metaphysics and Sufism and their relevance to Islamic ethics, especially as argued 
by al-Ghazzālī and Ibn ‘Arabī, b) In Chapter 5, traditional cosmology of Ibn Sīnā and other 
sciences closely related to it and finally, c) In Chapter 8, Mullā Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy. In 
Chapters 4, 6 and 7, we have drawn on insights and conclusions of the aforementioned discussions 
in other chapters. 
 
We have shown that the common thread that runs through every aspect of Nasr’s vision and 
the thought of aforementioned grand authorities is their adherence to the metaphysical principles of 
Islam with special focus on the three perennial principles for reality as such. In addition, Nasr’s 
conformity to the views of the grand authorities is reflected in several other ways: a) In his strong 
support for the observance of the existing Islamic ethics including the Sharī‘ā with regards to the 
natural world and for extending the scope of the existing Sharī‘ā, according to Islamic legal 
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principles, to circumstances created by modern industrial culture;3 b) In his insisting on a role for 
Islamic metaphysics and Sufism in justifying the outer ethical norms and in realizing the nature of 
reality in the deepest sense; c) In his upholding the example of the traditional Islamic sciences as 
reminders of the way metaphysical principles were, and again can be, integral to the science of 
nature; and d) In his recommending of Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy as the basis of a new Islamic 
science for the future such that science would uphold, rather than deny or ignore, the fundamental 
Islamic metaphysical principles. 
 
In our comparisons of Nasr’s approach with those of others, we have seen that his vision 
resonates fundamentally with those of most Islamic environmentalists and in the West with the 
likes of Phillip Sherrard and E.F. Schumacher who have been influenced by Traditionalist thought. 
However, we have seen in Chapter 6 that the criticisms against Nasr’s kind of approach to the 
environmental crisis originate in the West and, not surprisingly, have their roots in secular thought 
inspired by scientism and the theory of evolution.  
 
In presenting Nasr’s approach to the environmental crisis comprehensively and 
systematically for the first time, we hope to facilitate developments on several fronts: 1) Greater 
appreciation of Nasr’s environmentalism, the first articulation of Islamic environmentalism for the 
contemporary world; 2) A re-examination of the nature of modern science and technology in terms 
of its effect on the valuation of Islamic principles and ethics; 3)  A re-evaluation of Islamic 
intellectual tradition as a project to establish a unified science of knowledge about God, nature and 
our souls, and finally, 4) A greater appreciation of the perennial philosophy as a philosophical 
                                                 
3 See Chapter 3.1. 
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perspective that accepts each religious tradition in its totality,4 especially at a time when all 
religious communities need to cooperate in confronting a crisis that threatens all. 5   
 
9.3 Final Reflections  
On the surface Nasr’s proposed solutions may seem most idealistic. However, his solutions 
do not overlook the conventional measures being taken or being considered by mainstream 
environmentalists.6  Nasr's solutions set forth what must be understood and done beyond those 
conventional measures. In light of Nasr’s support for technological fixes and other “secular” 
solutions–as long as they are seen as means for gaining time in preparation for a profound spiritual 
response–it would be unfair to characterize his approach to the environmental crisis as impractical. 
In his criticisms of modern science and technology, his encouragement for resorting to traditional 
tools and modes of production, and finally, with his vision of an Islamic science to substitute for 
modern science, Nasr is mindful of their long-term effects on nature and on Islamic values. Thus, 
far from being unrealistic, he is realistic in the deepest sense of keeping the Real (al-Ḥaqq) in view 
in all human thoughts and deeds:  “Islamically speaking, it is always the truth (al-Ḥaqīqah) that 
must prevail and we must always think as Muslims in terms of the truth, rather than expediency 
whether it be political or otherwise, never forgetting the Qur’ānic verse: And say the truth has come 
and falsehood has vanished away; verily falsehood is bound to perish. (17:81)”7  
 
                                                 
4 See Introduction 0.9. 
5 For more on this issue, see Osman Bakar, “Civilizational Dialogue on Enviornmental Philosophy: Nasr’s 
‘Man and Nature’ Revisited” in The Beacon of Knowledge: Essays in Honor of Seyyed Hossein Nasr, ed. Mohammad 
H. Faghfoory (Louisville, Kentucky: Fons Vitae, 2003), 294-296. 
6 See Introduction 0.8. 
7 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Islamic Worldview and Modern Science,” Islamic Thought and Scientific Creativity, 
Vol. 7 (1), 1996, p. 8. 
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Nasr’s emphasis on the importance of Sufism, metaphysics and philosophy as a means to 
safeguard oneself from scientism may seem 'far-fetched'. However, he expects only a few Muslims 
to actually excel in these pursuits.8 For the majority, a basic understanding and appreciation would 
suffice, such that there is a renewed grasp that the purpose of a Muslim’s life and work ought to be 
spiritual. As it was in pre-modern times, it would be enough to have a few men or women to excel 
in spiritual pursuits to serve as leaders and as verifiers of the profound religious or metaphysical 
principles for the community as a whole.9 What is important is to comprehend the critical 
significance of these dimensions of Islamic tradition, especially in modern times, and to make 
space for their pursuit in societies. Educational reforms, including the teaching of Islamic 
philosophy and metaphysics, would serve that purpose. 
 
The proposed Islamic science may take a long time to manifest, and given the spiritual 
training necessary to fully realize Ṣadrā’s natural philosophy,10 it is likely to be as much about the 
purification of the perceiving self of the scientist as about the study of the natural world. Moreover, 
given the need to keep technologies at the human scale,11 the new Islamic technology is not likely 
to vary much from what we think of as traditional tools. As such, the proposed Islamic science will 
perhaps lack the outward dynamism that characterizes modern science. 
 
But in replacing modern science with a science that draws attention to higher realities of 
nature, Nasr's envisioned Islamic science is bound to generate greater dynamism in the Muslim 
                                                 
8 Based on a conversation with Nasr at the George Washington University (USA) on 13 August 2009. 
9 “The sheer presence in human society of those who have attained the Ultimate Self has an invisible effect 
upon all of society far beyond what an external study of their relation with the social order would reveal. Such men and 
women are not only a channel of grace for the whole society but the living embodiment of the truth that self-awareness 
can lead to the Ultimate Self....” Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, (New York: State University of 
New York, 1993), 20. 
10 Chapter 8.4. 
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soul towards attaining its ultimate purpose, the realization of tawḥīd. By the same token, it will also 
inspire Muslims to abandon the goal of progress through material accumulation. In addition, the 
proposed Islamic science would provide a spiritual orientation which when combined with full 
awareness of the negative consequences of the modern technology as well as the benefits of 
traditional tools, is likely to inspire even greater appreciation of traditional tools than in pre-
modern times.   
  
However, Nasr’s Traditionalist position, with its emphasis on preserving the integrity of 
each religious tradition, insists that each tradition should develop its own science based on a natural 
philosophy within that tradition.12 In theory, the differences among the sciences from different 
religious traditions may seem like impediments to scientific cooperation between different 
religious communities. But if Nasr’s approach in Islam is taken as a model, the sciences of non-
Islamic religious traditions are likely to uphold the perennial metaphysical principles as well as 
focus on spiritual advancement of their scientists as would be the case for the Islamic science. With 
this assumption, we can anticipate at least three levels of cooperation among the scientists from 
different religious traditions: 1) At the level of spiritual perception, 2) At the level of ideas, and 3) 
At the level of technology. 
 
At the level of spiritual perception, the scientists may share their insights on the true nature 
of various natural entities. At the level of ideas, based on insights into the true nature of entities and 
based on the material factors already known from methods of modern science, they can share their 
views on how humans might live in harmony with those entities. At the level of technology, since 
                                                                                                                                                                 
11 Chapter 7.3. 
12 Based on a conversation with Nasr at the George Washington University (USA) on 13 August, 2009. 
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the technologies are expected to be of human scale and simple, sharing their secrets is not likely to 
be challenging. Should that level of awareness and cooperation ever become a reality, human 
beings will have saved their souls as well as the natural environment.  
    
Nasr is not very optimistic that either Muslims or humanity at large will follow his 
recommendations in good time.13 Given the current widespread apathy towards the environmental 
crisis, he predicts that unfortunately it may take major environmental catastrophes that specifically 
touch hundreds of thousands of modernised people to prompt humankind to contemplate a change 
in our way of thinking and living.14  However, it was only four hundred years ago when Francis 
Bacon (1561-1626) held out little hope that people would take up in earnest his experimental 
method of investigations into nature.15  Likewise, what seems far-fetched in Nasr’s approach now 
may one day become commonplace. Being a believer in God by whom all things are possible, Nasr 
is not without hope.16 
 
  
                                                 
13 Based on class notes from the graduate level course titled Man and Nature taught by Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
at the George Washington University (USA), 22 April 2004. 
14 Ibid. 
15 “Even to deliver and explain what I bring forward is no easy matter, for things in themselves new will yet 
be apprehended with reference to what is old.” Francis Bacon, The New Organon, Aphorisms Book One, no. XXXIV 
in The New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1960), 46. Also, see 
Chapter 1.3.1. 
16 Nasr, “Islamic Worldview and Modern Science,” 22. Also, see Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Traditonal Man, 
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